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ARTICLE

The Elements of Culture of Peace in some Multiethnic Communities in Croatia

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Abstract

Peace is mainly a micro-social phenomenon. The concept of a culture of peace, as well as the concept of liberal peace, is designed for studying peace on nation-state level and internationally. In the first part of this paper micro-social foundations of peace are discussed, primarily to explain why the rising participation of women in parliaments is correlated with a decrease in collective violence in societies. In the second part of the paper, De Rivera's analytical concept of the culture of peace is adapted for the sake of studying peace at a local level, i.e. Croat-Serb 'peace enclaves' in the 1990s, and comparing them with Croat-Serb conflict areas. The empirical findings confirm the relevance of the concept of culture of peace. The most important link between micro-peace and macro-peace is recognised in trends towards gender equality and non-dominance over weak, respectively, which are stronger in the peace than the conflict areas. Such results fit a pluralist approach to culture, which maintains that some non- or pre-liberal communities may also preserve peace as their prominent value.

Keywords

peace, war, gender equality, culture of peace, Croatia

INTRODUCTION

"Periods of happiness are empty pages in history, for they are the periods of harmony, times when the antithesis is missing."
Hegel, 1837/1988, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, p. 29

Different positions in the ongoing debate on the evolutionary anthropology and archaeology on the origins of war (cf. Markus, 2008; Gregor, 1996; Sapolsky, 2006; Gat, 2006) are not entirely polarised. For example, some Darwinists along with humanists argue that war and peace are by no means 'natural conditions' of society and that they should accordingly be taken as results of human choice (cf. Gat, 2006, Ch. 1). Basically, peace predominates in the Palaeolithic, i.e. small-scale societies. This evolutionary format seems to predetermine the extent of peace in civilisations. A stable peace perpetuates in a micro-social sphere as a way of life of countless, although not all, individuals, families, neighbourhoods and local communities in the world. In this sphere, physical violence is rarely or never used as a means for resolving disputes. War, on the other hand, is armed conflict between larger groups or whole societies and is the major mechanism of expansion of civilizations.[1]

1 "The most elaborate forms of cultures and the most complex patterns of structure are product of an intense, unremitting, and all too often violent competition for power between rival armies, classes and creeds" (Runciman, 1989, p. 449).

Histories of states and international relations are thus permeated with massive violence.[2]

Hegel's dictum, cited above, according to which chapters of happiness in history are 'empty', alludes to the discrepancy between the two worlds, i.e. communal/'female' and societal 'male' which is also synonymous with world history. Consequently, the 'Founding Wars'[3] feature the development of civilisations, whereas peace denotes the power of deterrence between antagonized macro-units. Thus, war is only temporarily off the centre-stage (cf. Cooper, 1996).

Less dramatic and basically detached from the historical narrative, the analytical concept of culture of peace, which will be discussed in the next section, is much more difficult to reintegrate into macro-history. The concept is originally intended for studying nation-states as prospective units of peace. At this level, peace is seen as a propensity of states with relatively small military budgets, inclined to provide more for education and social welfare. The question is, however, whether or how such countries can provide a template for peace for countries less endowed with peace culture elements. Also, contemporary liberal democracies described as 'relatively peaceful nations'[4] in terms of measured elements of peace culture are not taken as 'champions' of the expansion of peace culture. Likewise, peace culture is not used, or not yet, as an explanatory concept as regards global conditions of peace. On the other hand, one of the most important elements of the concept, which explains the decline of violence in the respective countries, concerns the increasing participation of women in national parliaments, as well as a trend toward gender equality in general (Melander, 2005). However, it is questionable whether this emergence may be attributed to national history as such. Women's participation in parliaments is, indeed, a historical novelty. Yet, women did not live without any active experience with secular peace in pre-national and pre-liberal communities. Many women in traditional communities favoured peace, although they exerted their influence mostly indirectly and informally.[5]

THE CONCEPT OF A CULTURE OF PEACE

Initially designed both as a normative and holistic concept, the culture of peace aims to bridge the gap between the micro- and macro-level of peace. It includes personal virtues such as respect for life and promotion of non-violence in everyday life as much as national values such as principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states (cf. Blagescu, 2004; Adams and True, 1997; Adams, 2002; Mitrović, Miltojević and Stevanović, 2006). However, it is questionable whether or how the contrast between peace consolidated in numerous communities and the fragile peace on the macro-level, e.g. in a nation-state consisting of democratic parliament and military headquarters placed next to each other, can be surmounted.

As Boulding put it, "we can point to a few small societies that live in isolated circumstances, indigenous people who have beautiful, peaceful ways. We can say that is a peace culture. But mostly in our very complex society, we identify pieces of peace culture, elements and sectors." (Boulding, 1999, p.1). The 'very complex society' consequently complicates the comprehension of the dynamism of the culture of peace. For instance, how can 'pieces' of peace culture be eventually merged and outgrow a broader or even global peace culture (cf. Presler, Scholz, 2000)? In this regard, it would also be necessary to explain how particular societies or nation-states may interact and interfere, respectively, in the peace process. For example, it is difficult to imagine that wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s could have ever been brought to an end without intervention of the international community. On the other hand, in those wars some multiethnic communities, Croats and Serbs, and Serbs and Albanians, respectively, have preserved peace and tolerance. Practically, they did this without external, i.e. national or international, assistance, amid expanding ethnic violence in their surroundings (cf. Katunarić and Banovac, 2004; Banovac, 2009; Katunarić, 2010). Obviously, macro-social units, whether nation-states or interstate alliances of democratic countries, such as NATO, as carriers of peace culture represent a major conundrum in the articulation of the concept.

2 Democratic polis in ancient Greece and democratically constituted cantons in Switzerland (the 'forest cantons') represent exemptions to the rule. Actually, they never waged wars against each other, but they fought against non-democratic states. In a similar vein, oligarchic republics in ancient Greece and Switzerland, as Hanseatic, Dutch and Baltic cities, were not at war with each other, but they often fought against the democratic republic and cities (Weart 1994, pp. 302-303). On the other hand, the most developed modern democracies are involved in wars in the periphery (Ravlo, Gleditsch and Dorussen, 2003).

3 The core of the (Indo-European) myths of the 'Founding Wars' (Dumezil, 1968) extends to the era of nationalism: the wars accompanied the foundations of virtually all nation-states (Wehler, 2001).

4 In De Rivera's study, the following countries are listed as 'relatively peaceful nations': Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland (De Rivera, 2004, p. 547).

5 "In many societies women have a traditional peacemaking role, for instance intervening between warring sides as the Naga Mothers'Association in India has done, or, as in Somalia, using their relationships by marriage to bring different clans together." (Francis, 2010, p. 3). For the theoretical background of the feminist anthropological assumption that peace represents a triumph of the specific form of women's power, based on maternity and accompanying endeavors affirming life, see: Kurtz and Turpin, 1999, p. 19).

Among several empirical studies based on the concept of a culture of peace, the study of De Rivera, who defined culture of peace by the means of eight groups of indicators at a national level, comparing 74 nations, is the most elaborate analytical version of the concept of peace culture so far (De Rivera, 2004). In this case-study some of the indicators are taken and modified to adapt them to the local level. In doing so, one must also bear in mind De Rivera's remark that the culture of peace is not an empirically coherent concept. He shows, for example, that although liberalism and economic development are closely linked, they are not sufficient to ensure equality and peace. For instance, the important principle of a culture of peace is that "the strong should not dominate the weak" (De Rivera, 2004, p. 546). Since such a condition, which includes elimination of major inequalities between (developed and underdeveloped) countries cannot be provided without establishing a global culture of peace, the author rightly contends that such an expectation as well as the concept of the global culture of peace by itself is unrealistic (De Rivera, 2004, pp. 545-546).

As a realistic concept, therefore, the culture of peace thus exists only within (some) mature democracies (see footnote 3). Such an understanding infuses the concept of 'democratic' or 'liberal peace' into 'culture of peace'. However, these concepts are not always complementary. The former, for example, stirs up controversies primarily because of its confinement within developed nations (cf. Barkawi and Laffey, 1999; Richmond and Franks, 2007; Richmond, 2004; Richmond, 2009; Sörensen, 2009). On this track, "social development and modernization facilitate a culture of peace and human security, based on individualistic, egalitarian and postmodern values" (Basabe and Valencia, 2007, p. 417). In a similar vein, the increasing presence of women in parliaments is seen as an integral part of liberalism, i.e. freedom of press, respect for human rights, of literacy, life expectancy and gross domestic product combined (cf. De Rivera and Páez, 2007, p. 246). Such an interpretation of the evolution of peace is one-sided inasmuch as the Western attitude towards the rest of the world is motivated by trade rather than strengthening democracy (cf. Galtung, 2002; Silverson and Ward, 2002; McDonald, 2004; Bearce and Omori, 2005; Katunarić, 2007a). This is particularly the case in peripheral countries where majorities reject shock-therapy policies of privatization (cf. Klein, 2007). This is not to say, though, that liberalism thwarts peace endeavours in the periphery, for freedom is indispensable for peace. However, freedom alone is not sufficient for establishing a culture of peace as a profound value for individuals and societies.

The culture of peace concept has at least two characteristics that differentiate it from liberal peace. One is non-usage of arms in major crises. Liberal states often use arms, under whatever pretext. The other characteristic of the peace culture concept is women's influence and the principle of non-dominance, including sensitivity for the weak. On the other hand, many liberal societies favour competition over consensus or solidarity as a necessary condition for societal development. Both characteristics, thus, are more micro- than macro-social tendencies. Besides, presumably a great number of women in pre-modern, small scale societies were, and they still are, truly interested in peace. Such peace can be understood as a result of the usage of soft power, i.e. persuasion and empathy (cf. the case of reconciliation efforts in Cyprus in: Hadjipavlou, 2007). Eventually, the rising participation of women in democratic parliaments, as well as other public institutions, can be understood as a channel through which the basic propensities for peace in a number of local communities proliferate into the macro-spheres (for Chilean transition to democracy see: Noonan, 1995; cf. Black, 1997).

In this study, conditions for maintaining peace are found akin to some elements of culture of peace. For example, in communities where peace and tolerance between Croats and Serbs were preserved, amid violence in most of the other Croat-Serb communities in Croatia in the early 1990s, a trend toward gender equality prevails, as will be shown later. The tendency for consensus rather than for conflict that eventually leads to dissolution of a community or society, is usually associated with values of cultural 'femininity', including the principle of non-dominance and sensitivity for the weak (cf. Hofstede, 2001).

In the next section, some broader meanings of women's participation in politics will be discussed. Subsequently, attitudes to gender equality and some other elements of culture of peace will be analyzed in selected peace and conflict areas in Croatia.

WAR AND PEACE AS A GENDER ISSUE

> "Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size. Without that power probably the earth would still be swamp and jungle. The glories of all our wars would be unknown."
>
> Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own*, Ch. 2

In discussions on the effects of participation of women in politics of peace, it is often stressed that merely (rising) numbers of participating women is not sufficient to create peace, unless political style on the whole is changed (Chenoy and Vanaik, 2001; Moylan, 2003). This remark is adequate only in part, as the entry of women into traditionally male activities is not a mechanical shift. Also,

both democratic and non-democratic politics should not be regarded in terms of essentialism, i.e. irrespective of particular decisions by political actors or how the decisions are carried out. In particular, with women who, directly or indirectly, influence communal decisions in favour of peace in the context of pre-democratic politics or with women who participate in democratic parliaments, in both cases the decision-making produces new results. At the same time, other rules of the game must not be altered, such as the growing corporate power in mature liberal democracies or the exclusive power of local leaders in pre-democratic communities, for example in places which preserved peace in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

Most likely, some forms of women's advocacy for peace as well as their active influence have existed for longer in a number of multiethnic areas (cf. Hunt, 2004; Cheng, 2006; Nwoye, 2008). However, this assumption could only be tested indirectly in this particular study, through examining attitudes toward gender (in)equality among members of the present-day communities, as will be shown in the next section.

In the main, wars are results of the escalation of conflict between organized groups of men (cf. Beaver et al., 2010), who are usually supported by most women within conflicting communities (cf. Moser, 2007). Such collective actions are symbolically fostered by a whole set of binary symbols, from a sharp gender dichotomy (Iveković, 1993) to the black-and-white portrayal of the 'arch' friends and foes (cf. Reich, 1976). In turn, binarism is most effectively corroborated by war. Peace, on the other hand, disrupts binarism, most effectively due to the increasing influence of women in the collective decision-making, whether in traditional communities or in contemporary democracies (cf. Harling, 2004; Jayal, 2006). Higher proportions of women in parliament, for instance, reduce the risk of violence in the concerned countries (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005; De Rivera, 2004). This fact can be explained, at least in a part, as a consequence of the dissolution of binarism into multiple choices, which entails rational decision-making varying with different issues rather than pre-emptive beliefs.

Democratic deliberation with participation of women may have had its precursors in local communities traditionally capable of solving conflicts in non-violent ways. Countless women were/are basically interested in peace, especially because peace enhances the outlook for survival of their children, husbands and other relatives. In this way, unlike women supporting war,[6] women supporting peace transcend binarism and cut across hardened lines of impenetrable divisions, including ethnic ones.

Hence the core hypothesis of the next empirical analysis: the trend towards gender equality is more strongly manifested in multiethnic areas which preserved peace and tolerance than in multiethnic areas overwhelmed by the violence in Croatia in the 1990s.

IDENTIFYING PEACE AREAS IN CROATIA IN THE 1990S

In the first phase of research on which this study is based, two main types of peace in multiethnic areas were identified: the 'peace enclaves' persisting during the war, which are a focus of this study as well, and peace established (in most cases) in the post-conflict processes (Katunarić, 2007b). A series of interviews with experts at the national level were then conducted, mainly to identify places with Croat and Serb residents where peace was preserved (e.g. Moravice, Drežnica, Vrbovsko, Plevlja, Gomirje, Pula, and parts of the Slavonia region, e.g. Moslavina) amid violence and war activities in their vicinity and the rest of the territory of Croatia. After that, local leaders were interviewed in Plaški and in Vrbovsko (see Map 1), the first a conflict area and the second a peace area (Katunarić, 2010). Interviews provided the basis for an oral history of the early 1990s in these areas. From these accounts, the occurrence of peace areas was explained in terms of path dependence. The path dependence approach maintains that collective choices in the past determine subsequent collective actions (cf. Mahoney, 2000). For example, in World War II, after Ustasha[7] units scorched a Serbian village near Vrbovsko, neighbouring Croats provided shelter in their homes for Serb refugees. This event was implanted in the memory of generations of local Serbs, which probably had an impact on the decision of local Serbs in those places, in the beginning of the 1990s, to not join their compatriots (Serbs) who rose up against the newly elected Croatian government.

6 Why women in warring communities support violence rather than non-violence and peace may, perhaps, have something to do with binarism which presumably induces more frustration among women by preventing them activating their male qualities, i.e. the androgynous nature of every human being. As a result, latent conflict and discontent with (more brutish) men ensue more than in non-warring communities. Hence, women in the conflict areas may find it easier to 'say farewell' to their men (husbands, brothers, fathers…). Of course, this is just a speculative assumption which cannot be empirically tested here, and no such empirical study is known. Nevertheless, although speculative, the theoretical core of the assumption that women are more content with social arrangements in which they can display other, and not only maternal and auxiliary roles, and where they are less, or less directly, exposed to male domination and violence, can reasonably be maintained.

7 *Ustasha* were elite military troops of the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia (1941-1945), notorious for their atrocities, especially against Serbs, Jews and gypsies in Croatia.

Map 1. Some areas of peace and conflict between Croats and Serbs in Croatia in the 1990s



Of course, the fates of various areas in Croatia were also influenced by the fortunes of war. For example, the zones of war operations also depended on the erratic movements of the Yugoslav Army (cf. Katunarić, 2010).[8] Nevertheless, such circumstances do not reduce the relevance of path dependence or the above mentioned (evolutionary) postulate of peace and war as (social) constructions rather than natural conditions. Still, path dependence is not created only by circumstances. The favourable circumstances – both in World War II and during the recent war in Croatia – could also have been created due to the spread of positive attitudes among local people, recalling the elements of peace culture, but could not have all arisen at the same time.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PEACE AND CONFLICT AREAS

This analysis was based on a representative sample of 809 respondents, with 422 in peace areas (Vrbovsko, Rovinj and Daruvar), and 387 in conflict areas (Gospić, Plaški and Pakrac), interviewed between September and November 2008. The main hypothesis proposes that there are statistically significant differences between peace and conflict areas in the terms of culture of peace.

The conceptual framework of culture of peace is taken from the aforementioned study (De Rivera, 2004), with six of the eight groups of indicators adapted to this study. According to De Rivera, the key characteristics of countries which score high on the scale of culture of peace are the following: (1) higher level of education, especially in the peaceful resolution of conflict; (2) sustainable development (including the eradication of poverty, reduction of inequalities, and environmental sustainability); (3) high level of respect for human rights; (4) gender inequality significantly reduced; (5) democratic participation rather than passive citizenship; (6) understanding, tolerance, and solidarity predominates (among peoples, vulnerable groups, and migrants); (7) participatory communication and the free flow of information are secured; and (8) the countries cherish international peace and security, including disarmament.

8 The Yugoslav Army, the remnant of the official army of the second Yugoslavia, actively supported the insurgence of Serbs against the Croatian government.

Omitted from De Rivera's research are indicators of freedom of the press (7), as in some of the studied areas – Vrbovsko, Plaški, Saborsko and Pakrac – there are no local media, such as radio or newspapers. Vanhanen's index of democracy (Vanhanen, 2000), used in the original study, which combines percentages of voter abstinence with indicators of competitiveness of various parties in different countries (5), is not applicable either, as the war in Croatia broke out immediately after the first multiparty elections. After that, elections were not held in the occupied or conflict areas of Croatia.

1. Education

The first group of indicators in De Rivera's research concerns education, especially education for conflict resolution. In this study, no significant difference was found regarding the levels of education of respondents in the conflict and peace areas (Table 1). As education for peace, does not exist yet in Croatia, analogous data could not be provided. Also, while De Rivera used the UNDP data on homicide rates by country as an indicator of readiness for peaceful resolution of conflict, here information was sought on the officially registered homicide rate by county in 2007 and 2008 (Ministry of the Interior 2009, pp. 22-23). Data show that the number of homicides is too small for suitable comparisons. Likewise, when taking into account rates of other categories of crimes by county, there is no indication that crime rate is higher in conflict than in peace areas.

Table 1. Levels of school education in peace and conflict areas

School		Peace	Conflict
Elementary	f	55	59
	%	13.1	15.2
Vocational training school	f	23	25
	%	5.5	6.5
Middle vocational school	f	239	213
	%	56.9	55.0
High school	f	7	6
	%	1.7	1.6
Undergraduate	f	43	35
	%	10.2	9.0
Graduate	f	53	49
	%	12.6	12.7
N		422	387
Chi-square			1,427
P			< .92

2. Sustainable development

De Rivera used GDP per capita, along with life expectancy and the Gini coefficient of inequality in income as indicators of sustainable development. In the case of Croatia, there are no data on the GDP of the cities, but only counties (cf. Državni Zavod za Statistiku Republike Hrvatske, 2004),[www1] which is also inadequate. As an alternative, those interviewed were asked to estimate the local living standards, the level of infrastructure, and the level of social care for poor and unemployed (Tables 2a and 2b). T-test statistical analysis shows that the estimates of the arithmetic means of respondents in the areas of peace and the areas of conflict are significantly different in all measured variables. So, respondents in peace areas are more satisfied with a variety of socio-economic situations in their area.

Table 2a. Respondents' estimations of certain socio-economic situations

	Peace	Conflict	df	t (p)
The level of living standards of most people	2.52 (.97)	2.35 (.98)	807	2.53(<.01)
In the town where you live	3.70 (1.41)	2.93 (1.20)	805	9.34(<.00)
Social care for the poorest people in your community	2.73 (1.19)	2.28 (1,15)	805	5.45(<.00)
Social care for the unemployed	2.27 (1.16)	2.04 (1.14)	807	2.83(<.00)

Table 2b. Percentages of respondents satisfied and very satisfied (combined) with the situations in above table

	Peace	Conflict
The level of living standards of most people	13.99	9.82
In the town where you live	61.61	36.18
Social care for the poorest people in your community	29.62	14.76
Social care for the unemployed	14.93	10.8

3. Respect for human rights

In his study, De Rivera used data from the Amnesty International report on political terror in certain countries. Here, a list of 11 items (statements on the degree of

[www1] www.suvremena.hr/2945.aspx

satisfaction with various categories of human rights) was composed. The perception of the degree of satisfaction with civic rights in two areas differs significantly only in two items: the protection of private property and the right to education. There was no statistically significant difference with regard to the perception of other dimensions (right to information, privacy, freedom of expression, religion, equality in employment, court justice, health care, social security, and retirement) (Table 3). It is reasonable to suppose that differences in perceptions of protection of private property and the right to education concern the characteristics in the areas of conflict. In the first case, there are still unresolved property issues for returnees (e.g. return or restitution of houses), mostly local Serbs. They are also more likely to be dissatisfied with the sluggishness in introducing separate classes for Serb children in elementary schools.

Table 3. Respect for human rights

	Peace	Conflict	df	t (p)
The right to full and true information you are looking for	2.68 (1.17)	2.69 (1.28)	807	-.14(<.87)
Protection of private property	3.26 (1.06)	3.06 (1.22)	803	2.55(<.01)
Free public expression of opinions	3.61 (1.13)	3,50 (1.26)	805	1.25(<.21)
Equal opportunities in employment	2.26 (1.32)	2.16 (1.42)	804	1.06(<.28)
Equality before the judiciary	2.26 (1.49)	2.17 (1.57)	802	.811(<.42)
Health care	3.36 (1.03)	3.25 (1.28)	804	1.31(<.19)
Social security	2.01 (1.61)	2.20 (1.57)	801	-1.7(<.09)
The right to education	3.19 (1.21)	2.99 (1.49)	738.8	2.05(<.04)

The levels of (dis)satisfaction with human rights in both areas, which are very similar for most items, probably reflect the initial stage of liberal democracy in those areas. At this stage most people encounter similar instances of institutional inefficiency, from health care to employment opportunities. In this regard, peace areas are not necessarily the areas in which, for example, employment opportunities – whether generated by free market or by state provisions – are better than in conflict areas.

4. Gender equality

The fourth set of data deals with gender (in)equality. De Rivera's study provided data representing participation of women in national parliaments. In this case, data on the official results of local elections in 2005 for members of the Croatian national parliament were taken (National Electoral Commission 2009). Figures for elected representatives in the peace areas of Vrbovsko are 16 men and no women, and in both Rovinj and Daruvar, 15 men and 4 women. In the areas of conflict, the corresponding figures are: in Gospic 12 men and 3 women, in Plaški 4 men and no women, and 15 men and 1 woman in Pakrac. Although in the areas of peace the total of number of women (8) was double that in the areas of conflict (4), the numbers and variations are all too small (e.g. in Plaški and Vrbovsko there were no women elected in the local governments) to allow statistical comparisons.

As an alternative, respondents were asked several questions dealing with gender (in)equality, with the degree of acceptance measured as the arithmetic mean between 1 ('I do not agree') and 5 ('I absolutely agree'). Data show that there are statistically significant differences between the areas of peace and conflict. Respondents in the areas of peace are more inclined to gender equality than those in conflict areas (Table 4). For example, the degree of acceptance for the statement 'For a woman it is natural to deal with housework, and for men to work outside the home' for the areas of peace is 2.00 and for the areas of conflict 2.20. In addition, the number of those who absolutely disagreed with this statement was 41.60% in the areas of conflict, and 50.47% in the areas of peace.

These differences cannot be explained by experiences of different, i.e. conflict and peace, situations in these areas

Table 4. Acceptance of gender (in)equality

	Peace	Conflict	df	t (p)
It is natural for women to do the housework, and men to work outside the home.	2.00 (1.25)	2.21 (1.31)	807	-2.3(<.02)
Men are more predisposed to carry out public activities and women to private activities	2.16 (1,61)	2.42 (1.25)	783.2	-3.1(<.00)
Homosexuals are not better than criminals and so should be strictly penalized.	2.03 (1,20)	2.24 (1.31)	777.5	-2.3(<.02)
It is good that women and men are equal, but it is best that men have the last word.	1.83 (1.06)	2.16 (1.26)	753.7	-3.9(<.00)

in the 1990s. The images of gender roles constitute cultural values on a more permanent basis. Obviously, the tendency to gender equality being stronger in the peace areas than conflict areas is not purely coincidental. Of course, there is no empirical evidence on gender attitudes of important actors in decision-making in both areas in the 1990s. Still, the present-day attitudes of those interviewed may be taken as an indication of possibly prevalent cultural beliefs favourable to peace in the past as well.

Another fact, however, elucidates some of the hardships in the process of women's emancipation: inclination to gender equality in some areas of peace is not manifested adequately on the political scene, where participation of women in politics is not substantially greater than in areas of conflict. This indicates that there is a long way to go between a formally declared acceptance of gender equality and corresponding (democratic) practices. For example, Rovinj and Daruvar are peace areas with a higher proportion of politically active women, and are also economically more developed with more modernized urban infrastructures, than Vrbovsko, another peace area. Besides its relative underdevelopment, Vrbovsko, unlike Rovinj and Daruvar, was very near to the military borderline separating territories controlled by the Croatian government and territories controlled by the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina in the first half of the 1990s. Thus, in Vrbovsko the 'shock-waves' from the vicinity of the frontline might have produced tensions and frustrations, initial fears which yielded a siege mentality and binarism. Later on, such constraints may have hindered the process of women's emancipation, with a lack of encouragement to take part in local politics. On the other hand, their roles in politics may in principle be appreciated by most locals as something that may happen in the future, i.e. with the advent of peace in the whole country and removal of the nearby frontline, as stable peace provides better conditions for women to participate in politics. Indirect evidence for such a latent preparedness is that people in Vrbovsko are more predisposed to gender equality than people in Plaški, which was a conflict area (see Table 5), although, between 1991 and 1995, both places were equally near to the line separating the territory of Croatia from the territory of the Republika Srpska Krajina.

Table 5. Statistically significant differences in the attitudes toward sex/gender equality in Vrbovsko and Plaški with Saborsko

	Vrbovsko	Plaški with Saborsko	df	t (p)
It is natural for women to do the housework, and men to work outside the home	2.13 (1.31)	2.51 (1.36)	226	-2.1(<.03)
Homosexuals are not better than criminals and so should be strictly penalized.	2.21 (1,26)	2.38 (1.35)	224	-.93(<.37)
It is good that women and men are equal, but it is best that men have the last word.	1.91 (1.09)	2.53 (1.38)	223	-3.7(<.00)

5. Tolerance

In De Rivera's study, tolerance (with understanding of others and with solidarity) was measured indirectly by the number of refugees accepted minus the number of refugees who emigrated from each country. Here, measurement of tolerance was based on statements regarding national identity and relations with others. The results show that there is a statistically significant difference between peace and conflict areas in the degree of acceptance of a set of statements presented (Table 6). Acceptance of mixed marriages and of friendships across ethnic boundaries is higher in peace areas, while those interviewed in these areas are less inclined to accept the uniqueness of one's own nation, and a privileged position of Croats as essential in Croatia. For example, in the peace areas, 66.79% of respondents reject the idea that Croats should have a privileged position while this figure is 57.10 % for those interviewed in the conflict areas.

Another measure of tolerance is the social distance with respect to the Roma ethnic group (Table 7), where chi-square tests showed that there is a significant differ-

Table 6. National tolerance

	Peace	Conflict	df	t (p)
It is not good that members of different ethnic groups are friends.	1.50 (.76)	1.73 (.96)	733.6	-3.7(<.00)
Our nation, like others, has a uniqueness that others cannot understand.	2.55 (1,13)	2.77 (1.21)	806	-2.6(<.00)
In the state of Croatia, Croats should have advantage in all respects.	2.24 (1,27)	2.51 (1.36)	784.9	-2.9(<.00)
Intermarriages are acceptable.	4.04 (1.08)	3.50 (1.27)	758,6	-6.5(<.00)

ence in the degree of acceptance of a member of this ethnic group as a spouse in the areas of peace and conflict, with respondents in the peace areas more predisposed to marry Roma than those in the areas of conflict. Also, in the areas of peace, 70.85% of the respondents accept Roma as their neighbours, but only 51.67% of the respondents in the areas of conflict. This is interesting insofar as Roma as a group were not involved in conflicts in the 1990s. Their acceptance reflects the amounts of traditional prejudices against them and, indirectly, the level of (in)tolerance in general, rather than situational attitudes: war in this case did not essentially amplify pre-existent prejudices.

Table 7. Marriage with Roma

Would you choose a member of the Roma ethnic group as a spouse?		Peace	Conflict
Yes	f	217	144
	%	51.42	37.21
No	f	205	243
	%	48.53	62.79
N		422	387
Chi-square			16.50
P			< .00
Coefficient of contingency			.14
The estimated p			.00

6. Propensity to (non)violence

The last set of indicators in De Rivera's study is named 'international peace and security'. The topics have been changed here, as data showing military spending and extent of using the army in international crises are inappropriate. Nevertheless, the purpose remained very similar: to determine the propensity to violence in peace and conflict areas. This was measured indirectly through the degree of acceptance of authoritarianism (Table 8) where authoritarianism can be understood as preparedness to tolerate or even commit violence if it is demanded by national leaders or superiors, and through the occupation of those interviewed, in business or in the military and the police (Table 9). An attempt was also made to determine possible differences in the degree of authoritarianism in the two types of areas, based on agreement with the two statements in Table 8. There is a statistically significant difference in the response to the statement: 'A nation without a leader is like a man without a head'. In the areas of conflict, 30.74% absolutely agreed with this statement, and in the areas of peace, 23.93% of the respondents.[9]

Table 8. Degree of authoritarianism

	Peace	Conflict	df	t (p)
A nation without a leader is like a man without a head.	3.53 (1.25)	3.82 (1.12)	802.5	-3.4(<.00)
Superiors should be listened to even when they are not right.	2.09 (1.16)	2.20 (1.24)	785.9	-1.3(<.18)

Table 9. Occupational structure

Occupation		Peace	Conflict
Students (in secondary schools and universities)	f	19	14
	%	4.5	3.6
Unemployed, housewives, pensioners	f	153	160
	%	48.9	51.1
Blue-collar workers	f	65	54
	%	15.4	14.0
Administrative personnel and technicians	f	94	87
	%	22.3	22.5
Executives	f	2	6
	%	0.5	1.6
Entrepreneurs	f	22	10
	%	5.2	2.6
Military and police	f	1	11
	%	0.2	2.8
Other	f	8	6
	%	1.0	0.7
N		422	387
Chi-square			19.57*
P			< .01
Coefficient of contingency			.15
Estimated p			< .01

* For two cells (11.1%) the expected count is less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.83.

As regards occupations, the number of entrepreneurs in the areas of peace is significantly higher (22) than in the conflict areas (10), while the number of employees in the army and the police are significantly higher in the areas of conflict (11) than in the areas of peace (1). Of course, the latter may be the result of the post-war situation as well as the fact that mostly Croats have been employed in the army and the police since the end of the 1980s (cf. Katunarić, 1993). Therefore, the 'securitisation' of the areas of conflict cannot be attributed to the continuation of (traditional) militancy of Croats or Serbs. It is also true that the securitisation, (besides strategic reasons such as preventing further insurgence by

9 Of course, the lower level of authoritarianism in peace areas, measured by this statement alone, cannot substitute a set of feminine values in a culture, including non-dominance and sympathy for the weak, as measured by Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001; cf. Katunarić, 2007). The reason why such a set of variables was not included in this study is that the principle of non-dominance, although postulated as an important element of the peace culture, was not operationalised in De Rivera's study. Hence, the high association between tendencies to gender egalitarianism and feminine social values such as sensitivity for the weak, is taken for granted.

local Serbs), is accompanied with low, if any, economic opportunities in those areas. Thus, police stations and military build-ups serve as the major source of employment in those areas. At the same time, the relatively stronger tendency towards authoritarianism in the areas of conflict may indicate that the use of weapons in the case of crisis in interethnic relations may be higher than in the areas of peace.

The use of the concept of a culture of peace in the Croatian case has revealed some differences between the areas of conflict and peace. Nevertheless, these differences cannot be used to explain all causes of conflict and peace. Another causal link must be sought in path dependence. In World War II, these areas experienced different fates, but it is still possible that peace areas in World War II might have also been moulded by the elements of peace culture. However, this assumption cannot be empirically tested.

Two characteristics are prominent in this case. Firstly, war and peace are a matter of choice, although not in all stages of inter-communal conflicts, since they are path dependent. Thus, when the choice is made to go to war, it is generally difficult to change the route of subsequent events, except when, mainly broader environment or international community peace becomes more preferable, resulting in a peaceful settlement. Secondly, in peace areas in Croatia in the 1990s as well as in other peace areas in the former Yugoslavia, peace was chosen by local leaders, and supported by the majority of the concerned communities, yet in a pre-liberal political setting.

CONCLUSIONS

Discrepancies between micro-peace and macro-war can be illustrated with situations in Croatia in the first half of the 1990s, where a few communities of Croats and Serbs, preserved peace and tolerance. The occurrence of peace can be explained by combining explanations in terms of path dependency and in terms of culture of peace. Thus, traditional peace in some multiethnic areas can be understood as a result of choice by particular communities, whose ideas and practices of communal life are informed by some elements of a culture of peace, primarily tendencies to gender equality and the principle of non-dominance. These tendencies upset binarism, i.e. sharp dichotomies and social divides between different people, which are likely to legitimise violence against the others.

In this study, a modification of De Rivera's concept of culture of peace is applied at a local level, preserving two crucial meanings of the concept. The first is avoidance of using arms in conflict situations, and the second is the (proportionally higher) acceptance of gender equality, which is presumably associated with the principle of non-dominance. In both cases, the role of participating women seems to be crucial. These women – unlike women in communities where gender roles are strictly segregated and where violence is more often used to solve local disputes – are less likely to support armament and violence. Likewise, both qualities of peace culture prevail in some, but not all, pre- or non-liberal communities (as shown in this case study), and also in some, but not all, liberal societies (as shown by De Rivera's data.

Another important feature of peace areas in Croatia is that they were not constituted in terms of liberal democracy and economy on the eve of war. Actually, from 1930 to 1991 no multiparty elections were held in those areas. Likewise, the market did not, and has never constituted local economies. However, there are eight countries in De Rivera's study that feature (mature) liberal democracies in which the elements of culture of peace predominate. As such, the results of this study correspond more closely to those of Galtung (Galtung, 2002) and similar pluralist approaches to culture (cf. Cashdan, 2001; Boulding, 1999). These approaches emphasize that some non- or pre-liberal communities may also preserve peace as their prominent value. On the other hand, one must recall De Rivera's caveat that the culture of peace concept is empirically inconsistent, applicable to the global but not a generally international, context And indeed, how can contemporary international society become peaceful when its evolutionary path so far, notably its 'progress', is unthinkable without violent competition between different macro-units? (Runciman 1989).

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