



Journal of Conflictology

Volume 3, Issue 2 (2012) ■ ISSN 2013-8857
<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Table of Contents

Editorial

A Partnership for Peace. **Eduard Vinyamata**..... 3

Pioneers

Elise Boulding: New Voices in Conflict Resolution. **Tom Woodhouse and Irene M. Santiago** 4

Articles

- The Resurgence of Social Movements. **Michel Wieviorka**..... 13
- Transcending Constructed Boundaries: The Role of the State in Managing Cultural Diversity through Multiculturalism. **Hastings Aid Amurani-Phiri** 20
- Limits of 'Peace through Statebuilding' in Southern Sudan: Challenges to State Legitimacy, Governance and Economic Development during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Implementation, 2005-2011. **Aleksi Ylönen** 28
- Culture of Peace: Art and Play in the Carmen Serdán Centre for Social Integration, Zinacantepec, Mexico State, Mexico. **Lizette Rodríguez Marroquín and Martha E. Gómez Collado** 41
- Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence: *Les Événements*, a Lost Opportunity for Peace. **Miquel Calçada**..... 52



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



UOC
Universitat Oberta
de Catalunya



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Interview

Journalists in War Zones: The Question of Objectivity. An Interview with Photojournalist Laith Mushtaq.

Jack Shaka 62

Profile

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. **John W. McDonald** 66

EDITORIAL

A decorative square composed of two teal squares stacked vertically.

A Partnership for Peace

Cooperation and mutual support are the keys to success, which is why we at the UOC want to share our contributions to peace and conflict resolution studies taught at universities and research centres all over the world, and published in scientific journals.

In today's violent world, we need to cooperate and establish agreements to share information and research programmes, to form alliances between universities which have courses on conflictology. In this way we will gain academic recognition, establish practical agreements, or simply contribute to the spread of our collective activities and plan joint publications.

In the short or medium term, it is planned to publish the *Journal of Conflictology* (JoC) in Spanish and French, as well as the current English version. We also want to share with other institutions the publication of electronic books and the organisation of international conferences, such as the 5th International Congress of Conflictology and Peace which we recently organised in Barcelona.

The Internet makes it easier for us. Online courses and journals, such as the JoC, have a global reach. Personal communication is fast and efficient... and the demands for peace are pressing. Regional wars, political conflicts resulting from a lack of democracy, social conflicts as a result of crime, the economic crisis and the demands for freedom are more than sufficient justification for establishing strategic partnerships in favour of peace, social justice and a solution to problems.

Eduard Vinyamata
Director
Journal of Conflictology / School for Cooperation
CREC / Campus for Peace (UOC)

**PIONEERS**

Elise Boulding: New Voices in Conflict Resolution*

Tom Woodhouse and Irene M. Santiago

Submitted: August 2012

Accepted: September 2012

Published: November 2012

■ Abstract

This article presents a biographical account and analysis of the work and ideas of Elise Boulding as a pioneer of peace education, peace research and peace activism. In a context where many of the leading figures in the emergence and evolution of peace research and conflict analysis are seen to be men, the article emphasises the significance of women as peacemakers and peace thinkers, and the role that Elise Boulding played in this evolution of a gendered peace. Born in Norway in 1920, Elise emigrated to the USA as a child, and in her academic career took a leading role in some of the key institutions that shaped the contemporary peace research community globally. She was a creative thinker who opened spaces for the 'new voices' that appears in the title of this article, exploring the place of women, children and the family in the everyday practices of peacemaking, in pursuit of what she called a global civic culture of peace. The second part of the article takes the form of a partly auto-biographical account by Irene M. Santiago and her work in the Philippines, showing how much of what Elise Boulding argued for and represented has come to inspire contemporary peacemakers to mainstream gender analysis in the policy, theory and projects of their peace building work.

■ Keywords

Elise Boulding, peace education, gendered peace, peace activism

INTRODUCTION

When the history of peace research is surveyed, the academic literature often concentrates on the biographies of the men who pioneered this development – and the names for example of Johan Galtung, John Burton, Kenneth Boulding and Adam Curle dominate the accounts. Yet women peacemakers and peace thinkers are currently prolific in the theory and practice of peace. In this article we concentrate on Elise Boulding, one of the pioneers of peace

research, whose career as an academic and peacemaker spanned the years from the mid-20th century until her death in June 2010. The article is in two parts. Firstly, we provide an overview of the work and ideas of Elise Boulding. Secondly we show, through the contribution of a partly auto-biographical account by Irene M. Santiago, how much of what Boulding argued for and represented has come to inspire contemporary peacemakers to mainstream gender analysis in the policy, theory and projects of their peace building work. In this section, Irene Santiago demonstrates how she adapted a well known model used in conflict analysis

* This article is adapted in part from material in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, (Third edition 2011), Cambridge, Polity Press (especially chapters two and thirteen).



(Edward Azar's concept of protracted social conflict), and radically adapted it in the light of women's experiences in the conflict in Mindanao. She also shows the creative role played by women and women's organizations in peacebuilding in that conflict.

PART 1. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ELISE BOULDING TO PEACE EDUCATION AND PEACE RESEARCH

Elise Bjorn Hansen was born in Norway in 1920, and emigrated to the USA as a young child, with her parents, in 1923. She became a peace activist as a young woman and also joined the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), where she met her husband Kenneth Boulding, whom she married in 1941. Together they brought up a family of five children and forged a lifelong relationship which was pivotal in the definition and growth of what was to become a global peace research and peace education network.

Elise Boulding trained as a sociologist, receiving her Masters degree from Iowa State College and her PhD from the University of Michigan. With Kenneth and a small group of other academics, which included the mathematician-biologist Anatol Rapoport, the social psychologist Herbert Kelman and the sociologist Robert Cooley Angell, she was involved in launching the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (JCR) in 1957, and the initiation of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in 1959. She served as Secretary-General of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), from 1964, and as chair of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, of which she was subsequently international chair. She was also co-founder of the Consortium on Peace, Research and Education (COPRED) in 1970, (currently the Peace and Justice Studies Association). With the help of UNESCO, the IPRA Newsletter, started by Boulding, developed the network which facilitated the formulation of the Association, and she continued to serve as its editor for a number of years.

As a young sociologist she was concerned, as were all the pioneers of the new field of conflict research in the 1950s, to avoid the mistakes which led to World War II and which might lead to a catastrophic, nuclear, third world war. She was influenced by *The Image of the Future* (1951), a study of 1,500 years of European history by Dutch historian-sociologist Fred Polak. In the efforts to rebuild a peaceful European and global society after 1945, Polak offered the idea of 'imaging' a better future as a way of empowering people to bring it about. The idea attracted Boul-

ding, and her major contribution both to the foundation of conflict research and its gender sensitisation was to open up a discourse and practice in contemporary conflict resolution, where women and children were included as radical change agents and empowered peacemakers.

In order to encourage wider participation in peace and conflict resolution processes, she introduced this idea of 'imaging the future' as a powerful way of enabling people to break out of the defensive private shells into which they retreated, often out of fear of what was happening in the public world. She encouraged them to participate in the construction of a peaceful and tolerant global culture. The use of social imagination and the idea of imaging the future was placed within the context of what she called the '200-year present', that is, the idea that we must understand that we live in a social space which reaches into the past and into the future, "it is our space, one that we can move around directly in our own lives and indirectly by touching the lives of the young and old around us" (Boulding, 1990, p 4). She was also an early exponent of the idea of civil society, of opening up new possibilities for a global civic culture which was receptive to the voices of people who were not part of the traditional discourses of nation-state politics, and in this she anticipated many of the preoccupations of conflict resolution workers today. Women (see Boulding, 1976) and children (see Boulding, 1989) were obviously excluded groups, and these new voices were added to the idea that globalism and global civic culture needed to accommodate the many culture communities which were not heard in the existing international order (see Boulding 1988, 2000). For further details on Elise Boulding's life the reader might like to refer to the excellent biography by Morrison (2005).

For Elise Boulding, as she developed the idea in the 1980s, the next half of our '200-year present' contained within it the basis for a world civic culture and peaceful problem-solving among nations, but also for the possibility of Armageddon.

Her study of women in history, *The Underside of History* (1976), presented the case for a feminist project to abolish structural and behavioural aggression against women and to establish gender equity. However, she also insisted that 'equity feminism', while representing an important phase of feminist aspirations, was a limited mode of action. It needed to be augmented by a social and transformational feminism which focused on the broader malformations that produce violence and oppression for both sexes, while also identifying women's culture historically as a resource for development and peacebuilding.

During the 1980s, Boulding organised a series of 'Imaging a World Without Weapons' workshops, an extension of the idea of problem-solving workshops and influenced



by Polak's thinking on future imaging. Initially Western-oriented, the workshops were subsequently reformulated in an effort to incorporate perceptions and values globally. In *Cultures of Peace: the Hidden Side of History* (2000), she surveyed over fifty years of research on human culture and society, and on the activity of peace movements working within a culture of war. She argued that the resources and energies for peace cultures are deep and persistent and are nourished by collective and communal visions of how things might be. In a manner not often displayed by the value-neutral exponents of problem-solving based conflict resolution, Boulding was explicit about the norms and objectives that characterized her transformative agenda. In 2001, at the age of 81, she imagined herself looking back at the way the world had changed in the 100 year future, that is, looking back from 2101:

“By 2050 the population had, through both disaster and design, fallen below five billion: human life on earth became viable again. School-based peace education joined with health and social education, leading to mutual solving of problems in and across communities and faiths. Industrialization slowed down, older technologies and skills were revitalized, steady-state economies were achieved. Dismantling the military and its institutions began. People's organizations (NGOs) now provided vital communication networks round the world, linking the growing thousands of locally-run communities, sharing information, skills, problems, solutions.

By 2100, the biosphere was beginning to recover from the destruction of the twentieth century, though used-up resources were gone for ever. National boundaries still existed for administrative convenience, but regional intergovernmental bodies skilled in conflict management handled disputes peacefully ... Humans had learned to listen to one another and the planet. (2000, p.1)”

Many people are rightly credited with the academic and intellectual innovations which collectively contributed to the emergence of the new field of peace and conflict analysis as it began to take shape and become institutionalized in academic and policy centres from the mid-1950s. Amongst this group of pioneers, Elise Boulding provided a uniquely creative, comprehensive and imaginative concept of a project for peace research and education which has had far-reaching impact on the evolution of the field as praxis – the unity of theory and practice. She saw the field of peace and conflict studies as being relevant beyond the academy, indeed as drawing its energy and creativity across

an inclusive and cosmopolitan global community. She saw the development of indigenous and international citizens' networks, composed of the voices of women and children as well as men, as a potent way of engendering a world-wide civic peace culture. For her, peacemaking demands specific craft and skills, a peace praxis encompassing “all those activities in which conflict is dealt with in an integrative mode – as choices that lie at the heart of all human interaction” (1990, p. 140). In the inter-subjective relationships which make up social and political life, as also in the structures and institutions within which they are embedded, the success with which this is inculcated and encouraged will determine whether, in the end, we are peacemakers or warmakers. This global vision, with peace praxis as its core, is her enduring contribution. In the second part of this article, through a case study of the work of Irene M. Santiago, we demonstrate how Elise Boulding's peace praxis evolved, and also through her voice. Irene has worked globally through UN agencies to provide women with a voice in peacemaking. She has also worked at the grassroots in many communities in the Philippines to develop a peace praxis relevant for the challenges faced by Mindanao, which has suffered a generation of conflict. In the following section, this conflict is explored and analysed by Irene M. Santiago, in a way that acknowledges the influence of Boulding on her peace praxis. As will be seen, Santiago was an activist in a global citizens network that progressively embedded women's rights and a gender perspective in policies at the UN. Upon the passage, in October 2000, of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which calls for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes, Santiago became involved in the vigorous implementation of the Resolution at national and grassroots levels, where the impact of international instruments has to be felt.

PART 2. THE WORK OF WOMEN PEACEBUILDERS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE PHILIPPINES

Many women have followed and built on the pioneering work of Elise Boulding and have projected women's voices and gender-sensitive perspectives into the academic, policy and activist discourse of conflict resolution, and many are also voices from the global South (McKay et al., 2004; Ashe, 2010). In this section, Irene M. Santiago describes her work as a peace activist and peace scholar based in Mindanao. She is the founding Chair and CEO



of the Mindanao Commission on Women and Convenor of Mothers for Peace. She was a member of the peace panel of the Philippine government negotiating with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front between 2001 and 2004. She has worked with Muslim communities in Mindanao, especially women, and is a leading voice calling for the recognition and involvement of women in peace processes. Here she shows how the gender perspective called for by Elise Boulding became progressively mainstreamed in UN policy, and how academic theory on peace and conflict was enriched through her work and that of others in the Philippines through a grassroots programme that evolved to become relevant to the realities of the conflict in Mindanao, where women were to become active and creative as peacebuilders.

In her work, she came to realize that gender is usually not seen as central to the armed conflict and therefore it is not seen as central to its resolution. She looked at the work of Edward Azar, who produced a generic theory of conflict using the term protracted social conflict to label and analyse it (see Azar, 1990). Azar was born in Lebanon and went to the United States to study. He became aware that traditional analytical frameworks described only inter-state conflicts that did not have any relevance to the armed conflict in his own country or other countries such as Northern Ireland, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and so on.

The Philippines has had a long-standing conflict between the central government and the Muslims who were the majority in the island of Mindanao until successive colonization by Spain and the United States left them as the minority in what they consider to be their own land. Azar's theory of protracted social conflict resonates in this type of majority-minority conflict.

Azar's conclusion was that long-term development is essential to address the issues around protracted social conflict. However, while Azar's original theory makes no reference to gender, it becomes evident that gender in fact is central to the resolution of protracted social conflict. Men and women are involved in war differently. Although more women are now involved as combatants, war is largely male in both its leaders and participants. Because of the gender roles assigned to them by society, men and women also suffer differently in times of war. Women are usually left to care not only for their children but also for their extended family. Destruction of infrastructure and loss of property burden women who have to cook, clean, wash, look for food, and generally care for the young and elderly. On top of this environment of economic insecurity, women suffer physical insecurity as rape is used as an instrument of war. However, it has also been shown that women have economic, political and social roles that are important in post-war reconstruction and recovery. So

aside from looking at women as victims, women must also be seen as important actors in the attainment of peace and development.

Edward Azar saw civil wars (protracted social conflicts, as he termed them) as the outcome of a denial of four areas of human needs. In this section, Irene Santiago describes her work in Mindanao, building on Boulding's theory not only about the centrality of gender in the analysis of peace and conflict but most importantly about women's participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Santiago writes:

In my work with women in Mindanao, I have defined the four fundamental human needs that form the basis of Azar's analysis differently – that is through a gender lens – as follows.

Security needs:

Gender-based violence is a concern during the war and also the post peace agreement period when men, who have become used to a life of violence, return home. Having taken full responsibility for children and extended family in war time, women have become more independent. This independence may not sit well with the returning combatant who still believes that everything is what it was before the war. That is why I have recommended training in non-violence for ex combatants in post peace agreement programs. Women also view the security problem in the aftermath of war differently. The Mindanao Women's Peace Summit (called If Women Negotiated the Peace Agreement) organized by the Mindanao Commission on Women in February 2006 recommended that, instead of the traditional DDR (demobilization, disarmament, reintegration) there should be a 'de-militarized Mindanao'. The women believed that no armed groups – whether government or rebels – should be allowed to operate in the areas once wracked by violent conflict if their communities are to feel secure.

Development needs:

Because of their role as primary providers of basic family needs in times of war and in its aftermath, women give much importance to food security. Only when food is secure will they have time to attend to other things. The ability to provide basic sustenance gives women status. It is important to bear this in mind in designing reconstruction and rehabilitation programs. For example, the way houses are designed has a bearing on whether women are able



to continue to play the food provider role effectively. In Cotabato, a row of government-constructed housing for internally displaced families was built with very little space in between the houses. Such a design meant that there would be no space for a woman to plant vegetables and keep small animals. This meant she would have no contribution to the family's basic need for food. Her status in the family – as a major contributor to the family's food security – would be diminished. With a diminished status, she would have less voice in family decisions. Women's development needs and priorities being different from men's, it is important for women to be trained as program officers and community organizers. In Mindanao, a foreign-funded training program excluded women, because the local partner agency believed only men should be trained for reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. The training facilitators convinced the agency that women were needed, not only to approach other women, but also to provide a different perspective on how to assist families and communities who had suffered from war.

Fair access to decision-making:

Even when women have played significant roles in the struggles for liberation, their role is diminished in post-war decision-making as the structures of old are replicated in the reconstruction and recovery period. In the armed conflict between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which culminated in a peace agreement in 1996, the women's committee chair held an important position as a member of the Central Committee. However, most of the powerful positions in the newly created structures were given to men. She was relegated to the traditional position of social welfare secretary. Furthermore, all resources were directed to state commanders who were all men. Women had very limited access to those resources, having to negotiate with the men at every turn. In the end, the MNLF women calculated that they were able to access less than 10 per cent of the post-war resources. Learning from this lesson, the Mindanao Women's Peace Summit organized by the Mindanao Commission on Women has taken a position in the current negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that a Special Fund for Women be established in the Mindanao Trust Fund. In this manner, women will get not only immediate access to funds but also have decision-making authority over these funds (access and control). Women have expressed the desire to use the funds to develop an economic development model that will not lead to the impoverishment of others.

Acceptance of identity:

Since Moro women are readily identified because of their headscarves, they are more easily the objects of discrimination. In public transportation and in employment, they suffer in ways that Moro men do not. The demand of the Moro struggle for their right to self-determination includes the right of Moro women to be proud of and secure in their identity. This involves, also, recognition of their identity and pro-active role as peacemakers and peacebuilders. Many of the projects initiated by the Mindanao Commission on Women recognize, support and project this positive role. For example, the Mothers for Peace movement provides training for women in conflict prevention, resolution and containment. They are involved in mediating violent clan feuds or *rido*, a blood feud or a chain of killings provoked by an affront to family honour. A *rido* may erupt any time this honour or *maratabat* is besmirched. Taking the form of tribal conflict or clan warfare, the killings are often carried on for generations. Mothers for Peace members also participate in grassroots institutions that address violence against women and other issues of injustice. Being a movement among Muslim, Christian, and indigenous women, Mothers for Peace provides a venue for communal groups to learn that diversity is an asset. The Mothers for Peace credo states: "I affirm the uniqueness and goodness of every individual and group and regard diversity as a resource for enriching humanity."

MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN POLICY MAKING AND THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

The passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, on 31st October 2000, was described by Kofi Annan as "a landmark step in raising awareness of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, and of the vital role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding" (UN 2002). It was clearly historically significant in the progression of the role of women in peacebuilding, as originally envisioned in the conflict resolution field by Elise Boulding. Resolution 1325 called for fuller representation of women in peace negotiations and in the highest offices of the UN, and for the incorporation of gender perspectives in peacebuilding, peacekeeping and conflict-prevention activities.

The Philippine example shows us that women's advocacy can an international instrument such as Resolution 1325 to the local level. The Philippines is the first country in



Asia to develop a National Action Plan to implement Resolution 1325. Women's NGOs took the major initiative in developing the plan by conducting a series of consultations in different regions of the country. A presidential order was then enacted. A national steering committee composed of major executive departments, co-chaired by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and the Philippine Commission on Women, has overall responsibility for implementation of the plan. Mindanao 1325, a network of peace and women's NGOs, was formed to ensure that Mindanao NGOs had a voice in the implementation of the national plan. The major thrust of the network is the localization of Resolution 1325. Localization enables women at the grassroots to participate in advocacy for the passage of a local ordinance and in monitoring its implementation. Localization also ensures that issues addressed under the four pillars of Resolution 1325 – prevention, participation, promotion and gender mainstreaming – are relevant to the local context.

One of the major gaps addressed by Resolution 1325 is the participation of women in peace processes. Few women have ever participated in Track 1 or formal peace negotiations (Anderlini, 2007). Women are concentrated in Track 2 – among civil society organizations – and in Track 3, the grassroots. In the Philippines, Muslim, Christian and indigenous women formed the Women's Peace Table as a 'connecting, mediating, and educating' table. It connects the various tracks while also trying to influence the peace negotiations to include gender provisions. It will also mediate between parties when necessary, and educate the public, especially key sectors, not only about the roots of the conflict in Mindanao but also the options for achieving peace. Boulding's global civic culture is very much at work here, as Mindanao 1325 is linked to the national network called WeACT 1325 and the international women and peace network lobbying at the UN. Recognizing the transformative power of women's participation in imaging and making real a peaceful future as envisioned by Boulding, the Women's Peace Table is engaging various sectors to participate in designing peace-promoting institutions to be established after a peace agreement is signed. Looking back at the life of Elise Boulding, it is evident that the significance and importance of women in peacemaking has become progressively established in the policy of the global community, as the following chronology demonstrates.

ENGENDERING PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE EVOLUTION OF UN POLICY¹

1948 (Dec): Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly Resolution 217A) recognised the equal rights of men and women.

1966 (Dec): Resolution 2200A on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict recognized that women suffered as civilians in armed conflict. Member states should make all efforts to spare women from the ravages of war and ensure they are not deprived of shelter, food and medical aid (Articles 4 & 6).

1975 (June): First UN World Conference on Women, leading to the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and World Peace. Recognized the multiple roles as peacemakers played by women at the level of the family, community, and at national and international levels. Called for fuller representation of women in international fora concerned with peace and security. The declaration had the status of a recommendation, and was not binding on States.

1979 (Dec): General Assembly Resolution 34/180 on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), recognising that global peace and welfare was linked to the equal participation of women in all areas.

1985 (July): Nairobi Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. Produced the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, a collective plan of action for women and their advocates.

1989 (Nov): UN Secretary-General reported to the Commission on the Status of Women to review the implementation of the Nairobi Strategies. Concluded that women remained victims of violence disproportionately, and that they had not progressed significantly in decision-making roles since 1985.

1993 (July): The World Conference on Human Rights issued a Programme of Action to integrate women's needs into human rights activities. The Programme identified a variety of forms of discrimination against women, including rape in situations of armed conflict.

1995 (Sept): Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, held during the 50th anniversary of the formation of the UN, issued the Beijing Declaration. This identified six strategic objectives related to promoting the role of women in peacemaking, including commitments to increase wom-

¹ Source: adapted from Poehlman-Doumbouy and Hill 2001, and WILPF, and Global Network of Women Peacebuilders at <http://www.gnwp.org/>.



en's participation in decision making, to reduce military expenditures, to promote non-violent conflict resolution, and the contribution of women to fostering a culture of peace.

2000: Women in the Balkans and Rwanda claim that systematic rape is a form of genocide. Influenced by the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognised these issues for the first time as crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Rome Statute also demanded the equal participation of female judges in trials and on gender-sensitive processes in the conduct of trials.

2000 (Aug): The UN conducted a comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations under the direction of Lakdhar Brahimi. The Brahimi Report produced a wide range of recommendations for the reform of peacekeeping, which, although it did make some proposals to increase the role of women in leadership positions in peacekeeping operations, did not fully recognise the significance of gender perspectives.

2008 (June) UNSCR 1820; 2009 (September) UNSCR 1888; 2009 (October) UNSCR 1889: all three resolutions strengthened calls to take effective action against sexual violence in armed conflicts and in post-conflict situations and to support the inter-agency initiative United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict.

2010 (February): Margot Wallstrom appointed as first Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

* * * * *

It was because of disappointment with the lack of recognition of women's roles in peacekeeping and peacemaking in the Brahimi Report (2000) that women's organizations intensified their lobbying of the Security Council. Their goal was to press for a resolution that would mainstream the role of women in peace and security issues and confer the status of recognition of that role in international law. The immediate factor which influenced the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was, therefore, linked to the lobbying by the Coalition on Women and International Peace and Security. This coalition consisted of Amnesty International, the Hague Appeal for Peace, International Alert, the International Peace Research Association, the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The original project to review peacekeeping operations was declared in May 2000, in the form of the Windhoek Declaration in Namibia, a country which had itself experienced years of conflict and which had also provided a successful model for UN led post-conflict peacebuilding. The Coalition on Women and International

Peace and Security persuaded Namibia to hold an open session on women, peace and security during their month of Security Council presidency in October 2000, which ended with the passing of resolution 1325. One of the key campaigning groups in the Coalition, which secured the resolution, was the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; another was the International Peace Research Association. It is significant that Elise Boulding served as Secretary General of both of these organizations.

CONCLUSION

The barriers to women's substantive participation in conflict prevention and resolution, as in all areas of peace and development, are conceptual, technical and political. That is why theory and practice must always be linked. If the concept is that peace negotiations are only about ending war, women will rarely be at the table because war actors are usually men. On the other hand, if the concept is that peace negotiations are about building peace, women will have a greater chance at being named as participants to peace talks because they do play important peacebuilding roles in their communities. To harness women's energies to effectively address the security, development, political and identity needs of their communities, women will have to develop the required technical skills. But in the end, it is the power dynamics that will have to change, not just between the state and the people of the minority engaged in protracted social conflict, but also between men and women at all levels of the society. Women's vulnerabilities and capacities to participate in public decision-making is a critical area to be continually addressed by those who work for peace.

Boulding's idea of a global civic culture builds on women's networking – of creating even bigger circles of engagement – that makes no distinction between international, national and grassroots levels. Instead it sees the circles as one dynamic whole. In the Philippines, we initiated the formation of a Women's Peace Table, describing it as a 'connecting, mediating, and educating' table. It connects Track 1 (the peace negotiations) with Track 2 (NGOs and other civil society groups) and Track 3 (grassroots groups). The Table, through various forums and dialogues, is also building a peace constituency among key sectors (media, business, church, youth) to support the implementation of a peace agreement when it is finally signed. Using UN SCR Resolution 1325, the Table is advocating for local government legislative bodies to pass ordinances that will make 1325 relevant in the local areas. NGOs and peace groups, nationally and internationally, share experiences on how to do this, considering this is a new area of work.



Among those under-represented in peace work, Boulding said, are young people, particularly children. They are easily engaged through art and music. Currently, Youth for Peace in Mindanao is conducting Imaging the Future exercises, where children and young people, using an adaptation of Boulding's technique, imagine what a peaceful Mindanao would look like 30 years from now and the actions they would take to make that future happen. Among the Bangsamoro men and women, the Mindanao Com-

mission on Women will conduct workshops on Imaging a Bangsamoro Nation in a Philippine State.

Boulding has shown how women have sown the culture of peace throughout history, although this work has been largely invisible in history books focused on war and conquest. The challenge is to push Boulding's ideas and their practice in contemporary times into a wider arena in public discourse and consciousness. ■

■ References

- ANDERLINI, S.** (2007). *Women Building Peace: What they do, why it matters*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- ASHE, F.** (2010). *Gender, Nationalism and Conflict Transformation*. London: Routledge.
- AZAR, E.** (1990). *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- BOULDING, E.** (1976). *The Underside of History: A View of Women through Time*. New York: Halsted Press.
- BOULDING, E.** (1988). *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- BOULDING, E.** (1989). *One Small Plot of Heaven: Reflections on Family Life by a Quaker Sociologist*. Philadelphia: Pendle Hill Press.
- BOULDING, E.** (1990). *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- BOULDING, E.** (1994). *Women's Movements for Social Change: Social Feminism and Equity Feminism*. Geneva: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. <http://www.wilpfinternational.org/publications/1994eliseboulding.htm>
- BOULDING, E.** (2000). *Cultures of Peace: The Hidden Side of History*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- BRAHIMI REPORT** (2000). *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August).
- McKAY, S.; MAZURANA, D.** (2004). *Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique. Their Lives Before and After War*. Canada: International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development.
- MORRISON, M.** (2005). *Elise Boulding: A Life in the Cause of Peace*. North Carolina: McFarland and Company.
- POEHLMAN-DOUMBOUY, S.; HILL, F.** (2001). "Women and peace in the United Nations." *New Routes: A Journal of Peace Research and Action*. Vol. 6, iss. 3, pp. 28-32. Life and Peace Institute, Sweden.
- RAMSBOTHAM, O; WOODHOUSE, T.; MIAL, H.** (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Third edition.
- UNITED NATIONS** (2002). *Secretary-General's Statement to the Security Council*. New York: UN Department of Public Information.



■ Recommended citation

SANTIAGO, Irene M.; WOODHOUSE, Tom (2012). "Elise Boulding: New Voices in Conflict Resolution" [online article]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 4-12. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-santiago-woodhouse/vol3iss2-santiago-woodhouse>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1607>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.

■ About the authors

Tom Woodhouse

T.Woodhouse@bradford.ac.uk

Tom Woodhouse is the Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. The Centre has a strong research and teaching profile around conflict analysis, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and the development of conflict theory related to international conflict. He directs the Centre's E-Learning Programme and teaches on the OUC Master's in Peace and Conflict.

He is on the editorial board of *International Peacekeeping*, and of the *Journal of Conflictology*. He is also a member of the Council of the Conflict Research Society, a network of academics working on conflict and peace research at British universities.

Irene M. Santiago

irenesantiago@yahoo.com

Irene M. Santiago, founding chair and chief executive officer of the Mindanao Commission on Women, has been at the forefront of efforts to improve the status of women in the Philippines, Asia - Pacific and international levels for more than three decades.

In 2005, she was one of the 1000 women collectively nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Ms. Santiago was a member of the academic committee of the Rotary Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand where she continues to teach integration of gender in peace and conflict analysis.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



ARTICLE




The Resurgence of Social Movements

Michel Wieviorka

Submitted: December 2011

Accepted: June 2012

Published: November 2012

 **Abstract**

Starting in the early nineteen seventies, there were mainly two opposed perspectives in the sociological debate on social movements, illustrated on the one hand by Charles Tilly and on the other by Alain Touraine, which this article follows. The concept of 'social movement' has been used to analyse the working class movement, the new social movements and global movements. Is it useful to analyse the struggles that developed recently within the Muslim and/or Arab world, and the actors that have been called *indignados* in Spain and that appeared in many countries? Is there any unity in these movements?

 **Keywords**

social movements, Arab spring, social revolution, indignados

INTRODUCTION

The sociology of social movements could be helpful in analysing contemporary actors that more or less successfully try to put an end to authoritarian regimes in Arab and/or Muslim countries, and those that act to impose new forms of struggle against social injustice and in favor of democracy in several western countries – those actors that sometimes refer to the famous book by Stéphane Hessel, *Indignez-vous!*. The same sociology could also help us to test the hypothesis of unity within these various actions.

A first condition is that we can propose a precise concept of 'social movement', a rather controversial category in sociology, and that we can give a historical account of the specificity of the recent conflicts and struggles. Is it possible to consider that this could mean entering a new era, a new cycle of social movements, the fourth since the end of World War II?

In less than half a century, we have witnessed three social figures in succession, all with the potential of incarnating a social movement. In the first instance, the paradigmatic figure of the sociology of social movements, the

working class movement, at its height in the 1960s before starting on its historical decline. The end of the 1960s saw the appearance of the 'new social movements'; it was permissible to think these indicated entry into the age of post-industrial society but they lost impetus towards the end of the 1970s, even if their ideas and their protests continued to constitute powerful forces for modernization and cultural change. The sympathies and convictions of the anti-nuclear activists, ecologists and feminists in particular permeated the whole political sphere and profoundly renewed the cultural scene. Finally, from the end of the 1990s, new struggles - this time 'global' - began to take shape, the alter-globalist movement for example, indicating entry into a new historical phase much more distinctly and in a different way from the new social movements. These struggles have also lost their impetus in the wake of important developments in the present-day world. The 11 September 2001 attacks, the 'war against terrorism' in Iraq and Afghanistan, then the world economic crisis from 2008, all considerably weakened the aspects which made them social movements to the advantage in particular of political and ideological categories dominated by anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism.



During this period, sociological thinking was mainly dominated by the confrontation of two paradigms. The first, the theory of mobilization of resources defined a social movement as collective action taking the form of rational behaviour aimed at enabling the actor to enter a political system and to remain there. The name of Charles Tilly, who died recently, by far predominates in this current of thought. The second paradigm was suggested by Alain Touraine to account for the action of an actor, in a conflictive social relationship, opposed to a class adversary who dominates and rules, for the control of the major orientations of community life. This is what Touraine refers to as historicity: “The social movement is the organised collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community”.¹ This corresponds, not to the concrete reality of struggles, or to their meanings taken as a whole, but only to one meaning amongst many possible others, which is often more visible or more overwhelmingly present. Furthermore, the paradigms of Tilly and Touraine, both of which were first formulated when the working-class movement was at its height, in the 1960s, are not necessarily contradictory.

1. IS THIS CONCEPT STILL RELEVANT IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION?

a. Two distinct paradigms

Over the last fifty years, sociological theory in the field of social movements has been structured by two main paradigms. The first, the theory of resource mobilisation, considers that a social movement is a collective action defined by rational behaviours aiming to enable the collective actor to enter a political system, and stay within it. The historian Charles Tilly, who died recently, is the person best known for this family of approaches. Many other social scientists belong to this intellectual group, including Donatella Della Porta, Sidney Tarrow and Mario Diani. The second paradigm was proposed by Alain Touraine to analyse the way a dominated and directed actor participates in a socially conflictive relationship. In this the actor is up against a ruling and dominating adversary to control the main orientations of collective life, the so-called historicity: “the social movement is the collective behaviour of an actor fighting against an adversary in order to lead socially historicity within a concrete collectivity”.² In this perspective, the

social movement does not correspond to the reality of all struggles and all their meanings, but to only one among many that may or not be more visible, more influential or more significant.

The paradigms of both Tilly and Touraine were formulated in the 1960s, when the working class movement was at its summit. They do not necessarily contradict each other.

The theoretical debate between these two families of approaches has changed with time, and some significant inflexions have been made. But we can consider that this opposition is still valid, and that from a paradigmatic point of view, it structures today the debate between the main sociological researches dealing with social conflicts. The demonstration provided by Antimo Farro³ at the beginning of the 21st century is still pertinent: it is clear that two distinct visions of the social movement exist today, one mainly interested in the strategies and calculations of actors, the other dealing mainly with the meaning of their action. As will become clear, this article is closer to the second of these perspectives.

b. Towards a new conceptualisation

Adopting the approach suggested by Alain Touraine, in a recent publication I proposed listing the figures in the recent history of the social movement in function of five main criteria. These criteria are: i) the context of the action (national, international or global); ii) the nature of the domination called into question by the actor; iii) the nature of the action, either specifically social or to some extent endowed with a cultural input; iv) the relation of the social movement to the State and the political system; v) the concept of the ‘subject’ underlying the action: is the subject social, cultural or an individual?

I only return to this outline typology to insist on a decisive point: the further one goes from the golden age, symbolised by the sociology of social movements by the working-class movement at its peak – at least in democratic, industrial societies – the more difficult it seems to be to apply the initial concept as defined by Tilly or by Touraine. Thus, can the context of the action really be global or transnational, as it is to some extent for the alter-global movement? Is it not of necessity national, as the advocates of Tilly-type hypotheses suggest in relation to this same movement, since they are much more interested in comparing the forms it takes in different countries than in its global dimensions? A social movement is considered an action in which the dominated and the dominators, the leaders and the led, confront one another in a conflictive relation defined within a specific community. This was

1 Alain Touraine (1982), p. 77

2 Alain Touraine (1978), p. 103

3 Antimo L. Farro (2000)



seen in the recent past when the working-class movement was clearly opposed to the employers. But, can one still describe something as a social movement when the action seems to be predominantly conveyed by actors incapable of designating a social class adversary, or, more importantly, do not even wish to do so.

c. Three possible answers

Three main answers can be formulated here. The first is based on a historical analysis and stating that the initial concept of the social movement has ceased to be relevant. This is, quite simply, as a result of our entry into a world devoid of movements of this sort: a world in which collective action, when it does exist, can only be convulsive, characterised by violence and a desire for rupture, tending towards revolution. This world could be described perhaps by the most disenchanted. For them the triumph of democracy prophesied at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, by Francis Fukuyama, only conceals a quite different reality: the triumph of post-democracy, in the words of Colin Crouch, and therefore of the power of experts and the media over an atomised society.

This first answer cannot be really admitted, for it ignores many struggles that developed during the 80's, 90's and the start of the 21st century. It is true that these conflicts were generally less massive or spectacular than in the 1960s and 1970s. But they had their importance, for instance as far as the environment and human rights were at stake.

The second theoretical answer pleads for a re-conceptualisation, once again, of social movement. Should this concept not be re-worked in order to rediscover an idea of conflict, and more precisely of conflictive social relationship? By doing this in a way which frees us from the over-classical reference to the social movement, we will be able to examine, generally, the interplay of the social forces struggling to control and direct historicity, and to envisage how society works by itself, whatever the type of society under consideration, industrial, post-industrial or networked, etc. Then all that would remain would be to apply this updated concept to the struggles which, in our hypothesis, have elements of a social movement.

Finally, the third answer is, like the first, historical. It requires considering the long period following the decline of the working-class movement as a phase of transition, with the social struggles as forms of action which foreshadow but do not yet convey the shift to a new era, while remaining weak, disorganised and incapable of establish-

ing a high level of project over a long period of time. From this point of view, the researchers who spoke of 'new social movements' (including myself) were perhaps too hasty in seeing the advent of this new era. We were not sufficiently sensitive to the transitional nature of these forms of action, still too frequently characterised by categories, references and a vocabulary which continue to owe a lot to the working-class movement and its struggles. This third answer is therefore a plea to maintain the idea that our societies are produced through their conflicts and, more precisely, their social movements. It considers that this concept remains relevant and that it must quite simply be recognised that a long interim period began with the exit from an industrial society.

This answer is different from approaches such as Sidney Tarrow's that promote the notion of protest cycles, and consider that social movements analysed along the lines of Tilly can go through high or low stages that correspond to the political opportunities at any given moment. In fact, here the analysis of the decomposition of old meanings and the emergence of new ones is of much more interest than the analysis of variations within political offer or opportunities.

2. ENDING THE FOCUS ON THE WEST

More and more frequently, social scientists accept distancing themselves from the methodological nationalism denounced by Ulrich Beck, they think globally, and have a strong interest in transnationalism. But it is also true that, despite what they may say, social scientists have long been, and often still are, profoundly ethnocentric, convinced that their work concerns the whole world or that their theories could be applied everywhere, whereas they have only been valid for a restricted number of societies. It must also be clearly stated that the exit from the industrial age which we have just referred to does not apply to the whole of the planet but to a few western societies which are, moreover, mainly those where social sciences came into being. Here we must make two important comments.

On one hand, it must be admitted that we are emerging not only from the industrial age, but also from the long phase of transition which followed, described at the outset as post-industrial. On the other hand, it must be recognised that not only is the age of colonisation behind us, but also that which followed. This age has often been referred to as

4 Michel Wieviorka (2010)

5 cf. for example Agrikolianski, Fillieule and Mayer (2005). For a truly global perspective, not restricted to the context of the Nation-State, the reference publication is that of Geoffrey Pleyers (2010).

6 Francis Fukuyama (1989).

7 Colin Crouch (2004)



post-colonial: societies which were colonised more recently are now capable of functioning, of changing and thinking by themselves at a level of autonomy which is not fundamentally different from that of the former colonial powers.

These two observations have important implications from the point of view of the arena of contemporary social movements. In this perspective, western societies can envisage new discussions, new conflicts, over and above the social movements specific to the industrial age, and also beyond the new social movements of the 1970s. Furthermore, the societies which were colonised can now act by themselves, and not only to liberate themselves from former colonial powers or to endeavour to imitate them. After a tumultuous half century, characterised for many of these societies by the establishment of authoritarian regimes, they are becoming the stage for social movements which are in no way different from their counterparts in western societies.

The present panorama of social struggles at the level of the planet constitutes a pressing invitation to envisage, in this perspective, the third of our possible answers to the question of knowing what to do with the concept of social movements today. The need is not so much for the concept to be reconfigured as to be applied to the struggles which, today, are reshaping the image of numerous societies whether or not they are western, developed and democratic.

3. WRONG TRACKS

Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and even in the new century, it has been difficult to recognise the existence of social movements, and even more so to locate those at the centre of the production of collective life. It was as if the exit from the industrial age and the historical decline of the working-class movement had reduced social struggles to defensive, of little consequence, while the damage done by colonisation, even a long time after, had more impact than the emergence of new societies.

Then two waves of struggles, both of which were unexpected, changed the perspective. The first was constituted by movements which rocked the whole of the Arab and Muslim world with the aim of putting an end to authoritarian regimes. The Iranian Green Movement in 2008, protesting against the widespread rigging of the elections by the dictatorial power of the Ayatollahs, can be considered the start of this wave, which truly took off in December 2010 with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia. The second was the actions of the indignados – the social actors who take their name, as we have seen, from a former diplomat, over 90 years old, Stéphane Hessel, whose essay entitled ‘Time for Outrage. Indignez-vous!’ became a world best-seller in a few months.

Whether about the first or the second, a fundamental question was posed: Was there a unity of action in each of these waves, possibly in both, comparable to the popular uprisings in 1848 or the movements symbolised by the mere mention of the year 1968?

a. Revolutions?

The neo-Marxists are convinced there is. They see in the present-day uprisings, beginning with those which are traversing the Arab and Muslim world, the return of the Revolution heralding the emancipation of the people, the Réveil de l’Histoire or the Awakening of History to quote the title of a book by the French philosopher, Alain Badiou. The “end of history” prophesied by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 is effectively behind us. But the unity of action of the present-day protest movements in Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece in particular), Latin America (especially in Chile), the United States, Israel and in the Arab and Muslim world can in no way be defined by the image of a shared revolutionary wind of change.

On the whole, the actors do not aspire to revolution; they do not tend towards taking over state power. Some wanted to put an end to a dictatorship and open the path to democracy in a non-violent manner. It took the murderous obstinacy of Muammar Gaddafi for the protest in Libya to be transformed into armed action. Others demand changes which a democracy should be able to handle: measures against the damage caused by the crisis or to control the banking and financial system, re-launching of the welfare state, educational policy appropriate for low incomes, etc.

b. Middle classes?

We are so far from revolution that it is even tempting, at first sight, to disagree with Alain Badiou and take the opposite view, namely that these are movements characteristic of the middle classes struggling to promote interests which are to some extent selfish. This is quite the opposite of the working masses, the proletariat and other groups symbolic of the Revolution freeing themselves of their chains to liberate the whole of humankind. Effectively, there are those who have risen up against a dictatorship (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, etc.), against the banking and financial world (Wall Street), to recover a welfare state damaged by neo-liberal policies (Israel), against the drastic measures of budgetary rigor imposed by the IMF and the European lenders (Greece), for free and democratic education (Chile), to denounce the widespread unemployment of young people (Spain) etc. But these are not so much workers, or proletarians, but relatively educated middle class people – the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ which Marxism constantly put down while at the same time occasionally wondering whether they had the capacity to join the ‘just’ struggle of the working classes and act in the direc-



tion of History. If we consider the movements which are today transforming the Arab and Muslim world, they are also extremely popular which means that they do include, but not exclusively, numerous actors from the educated middle classes. It is unjust to postulate the unity of the indignados on the basis of them supposedly belonging to the petty bourgeoisie or the middle classes. Apart from the fact that little thought is given as to whether or not these are the actors in question, this reduces them to their prime characteristics, pays no attention to the meaning of their action, and fails to consider their orientations. And, finally, it reduces them to the image of intermediary categories endeavouring to retain an acquired position, or else to ensure their opportunities for upward social mobility. This is singularly lacking in imagination.

c. Networks and communication

In these situations, does the unity not reside in the forms of the action which, according to Charles Tilly, are always the same 'repertoire', particularly social networks and new communication technologies? This observation is almost useless: who does not use these networks and these new technologies today? Who believes that the indignados and the actors in the Arab and Muslim revolutions have made a highly original use of these technologies?

This being the case, it is tempting to postulate a lack of unity. It is true that, for example, the non-violent overthrow of a dictatorship to establish democracy and social justice, the occupation of schools and universities to effect change in the educational system or protests against the damage caused by neo-liberalism or the austerity measures imposed to deal with the crisis, are obviously not of the same nature. Moreover each of the present-day movements are defined first and foremost in the context of a nation-state and do not allow themselves to be side-tracked by international concerns. Thus, the movement of erecting tents in Israel is not concerned with the Israeli-Palestine conflict. In the demonstrations in Egypt and in Tunisia we saw national flags being waved. And those who went under the banner 'Occupy Wall Street' had nothing special to say about the mobilisations in North Africa or the Near East.

In fact, insisting on the heterogeneity of the actors reveals the extremely vague nature of the vocabulary of indignation and the ambiguity of the references to the people. Neither 'indignation' nor the theme of the 'people' enables us to envisage the political and historical dimensions of the action, informs us as to its precise meanings or the social relationships which it challenges. They both set action at the pre-political stage and preclude any prediction of what could be a democratic passage to the political. They note and denounce injustice, oppression and exclusion, marking the entry into a public sphere with no political structuring. Indignation is politically unspecified and the same applies to the idea of the people. Moreover,

both can open the path to violence or to radical temptation whether Islamist or other.

4. THE RETURN OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

This was our starting point for thinking about the unity of the struggles of the indignados and the movements in the Arab and Muslim world. Other conflicts could be added, which have attracted less attention from the media beginning with those that, in their thousands and even tens of thousands, have mobilised urban and village populations alike, in China, against the local leaders, the misuse of their authority and their links with corruption and private speculation.

The unity of the present struggles resides neither in a revolutionary awakening of history, with the actors belonging to a particular social circle, nor in their resort to social networks and the Internet – which has become commonplace today in all sorts of fields. It is only a very small extension of alter-globalism. Even if, in October 2011, Chilean students came to Europe to request the support of their French counterparts and others, with the help of Edgar Morin and Stéphane Hessel, or if attempts are being made to make the action international and to give it a planet-wide meaning which leads us to a criticism of neo-liberal capitalism. While these struggles do challenge dictatorships or weak and inadequate political systems and have a strong political impact, their unity is not to be found in the idea of an action which is primarily or exclusively political. They appeal to social justice, they denounce forms of exclusion, social rejection and the lost or denied opportunities for upward social mobility. They express frustrations and disappointments which are all the more intense as, with modern means of communication and information, every individual can see inequalities becoming greater and those who are better off having full access to the fruits of modernity.

No, over and above possible violent deviations, over and above the criticisms which the actors express about the established political systems, unity resides in the growing desire which they signal to force a change in politics and in the social and cultural accusations which this criticism and this desire convey. These actors indicate the mobilisation of generations who were not involved in politics, distrusted it or were not interested in it, who wish to participate in the life of the City in a different way. They do not want to be involved in parties and classical forms of mobilisation and so those who contribute to the re-enchantment of democracy by inventing new forms of participation and deliberation. In passing, they also challenge the classical figure of the intellectual; they do not want the meaning of their action to be defined from the outside by an intelligentsia who considers it has the monopoly of political analysis and



knowledge. This does not exclude them from forming relationships with intellectuals, or discussing with them, as we have just seen in relation to Morin and Hessel.

The indignados, the movements which traverse the Arab and Muslim world and many other worlds such as the Russia of Putin, or China and its free market socialism, in their best and most innovative aspects, invent words, practices and a repertoire. They no longer burden themselves, as did previous generation, with ideologies, categories, militant reactions or methods which date from another era. On the contrary, they are telling the parties in power, the classical representatives of politics and the intellectuals, that it is high time they changed, invented new ways of being committed, a new culture for action while at the same time they express strong moral protest. And they are saying this not to take over power but to ensure their living conditions change, a future opens up and their social and cultural demands are listened to and dealt with.

Their action has considerable and even decisive implications; it mitigates the violence which is the contrary of institutionalised conflict and not its condition, its expression or its extension. This explains why the present decline of Al Qaeda is not only due to the death of Bin Laden but also, and primarily, to the loud and clear message which the Tunisian, Egyptian and other movements are sending to Muslims all over the world. Namely, for the whole of the Arab and Muslim world there is a way of living other than armed struggle and terrorism. Similarly, if violence does sometimes occur when the indignados mobilise, it is not the result of the democratic core of the movement, its demands for social justice or its non-violent refusal of inequalities. This violence takes place at the margin – where the place of a programme or vision for the future is taken over by ideology, the desire for revolution or anarchy, or even the recourse to violence for its own sake.

We are entering, in a faltering and uncoordinated manner to be sure, a period of renovation of social, political and cultural protest. It is possible that the struggles which have given rise to this image may disintegrate, and that radical Islamism, violence, processes of hatred and

closed communities may triumph. But how can we not see that cultural innovation, the appeal to morality or justice, the assertion of democracy and the non-violent challenge of various forms of domination have sustained the emergence of these movements?

If we accept the definition of the concept of social movement proposed by Alain Touraine, it is then clear that the various challenges and protests which have just been described do include a social movement component. Of course they involve more than that, and their political input, in particular, is considerable. But their actors, by their conflictive behaviour, also contribute to the production of social life, providing new cultural directions, endeavouring to orientate them in the expectation that the state will create the conditions for their action, without necessarily attempting to take over power. There is a possibility that these struggles will come to a sudden end or go wrong, that their actors be crushed by forces of repression, or tempted to deviate to radicalism. But whatever the case, these struggles either signal the return of social movements in societies which thought they had more or less forgotten them, or else their emergence in societies which public opinion at a global level had considered incapable of acting by themselves.

To add a last remark, the sociology of social movements is somewhat romantic, mainly open to the more positive or constructive aspects of the struggles they take into consideration. However, this sociology is not blind when it is necessary to also take into account the dark side of social conflicts: tendencies towards sectarianism, violence, racism, xenophobia, or when the risk or realities of terrorism or totalitarianism appear. Its first goal is to analyse the more positive and constructive meanings of an action, but it also has to be able to deal with dimensions that may be called ‘anti social movements’, which I called “evil” in a recent book. Social sciences are there in order to produce knowledge, not to propose apologies or ideologies. They analyse specific struggles, aiming to find a social movement, but they can also discover other important dimensions, including those that are counterproductive or the complete opposite of a social movement. ■

■ References

AGRIKOLIANSKI, Éric; FILLIEULE, Olivier; MAYER, Nonna (eds.) (2005). *L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause*. Paris: Flammarion.

BADIOU, Alain (2011). *Le Réveil de l'Histoire*. Paris: Ed. Lignes.

BECK, Ulrich (2006). *Qu'est-ce que le cosmopolitisme*. Paris: Aubier.

CROUCH, Colin (2004). *Post-Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

FARRO, Antimo L. (2000). *Les mouvements sociaux*. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal.

FUKUYAMA, Francis (1989). “The End of History?“. *The National Interest*. Summer 1989.



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Michel Wieviorka The Resurgence of Social Movements ■

HESSEL, Stéphane (2010). *Time for Outrage: Indignez-vous!* Translation by Marion Duvert. Paris: Indigene Editions.

PLEYERS, Geoffrey (2010). *Alter-Globalization Becoming Actors in a Global Age*. Preface by Alain Touraine. Cambridge: Polity Press.

TARROW, Sidney (1998). *Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

TOURAINE, A. (1978). *La voix et le regard*. Paris: Seuil. P. 103.

TOURAINE, A. (1981). *The Voice and the Eye*. Cambridge: Maison des Sciences de l'Homme and Cambridge University Press. 1st ed., p. 77.

WIEVIORKA, Michel (2012). *Evil*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

WIEVIORKA, Michel (2010). *Neuf leçons de sociologie*. Paris: Hachette-Pluriel.

■ Recommended citation

WIEVIORKA, Michel (2012). "The Resurgence of Social Movements" [online article]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 13-19. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-wieviorka/vol3iss2-wieviorka>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1413>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.

■ About the author

Michel Wieviorka
wiev@msh-paris.fr

Michel Wieviorka is a French sociologist whose publications on violence, social movements, racism and terrorism have been translated into numerous languages. Wieviorka is the director of the Centre d'Analyses et d'Interventions Sociologique (CADIS) at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and founder and editor of *Le Monde des Debats*.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



ARTICLE



Transcending Constructed Boundaries: The Role of the State in Managing Cultural Diversity through Multiculturalism

Hastings Aid Amurani-Phiri

Submitted: June 2012

Accepted: August 2012

Published: November 2012



Abstract

Managing cultural diversity is inevitable today. Globalization, advances in communications and transportation technology, historical and ongoing migrations, and the legacy of territorial expansion and colonization, have heightened cultural diversity and identity differentiation. Multiculturalism offers an alternative approach to diversity management. However, it has its theoretical and practical fault lines that require deep understanding as state policies are formulated and implemented. Society is a melting pot of cultures and identities interacting, fusing, disengaging and evolving. The interaction is by no means rational, devoid of ethnocentrism or free from pressures to conform, even with the most oppressive acts against human rights. It is argued that cultures are never monolithic, immutable, good or bad. Each should be viewed as textured – a tapestry of interwoven elements enhancing and constricting individual potentials, espousing beliefs in peace as well as in violence. The state is strategically placed to adopt policies that maximize the strengths of each culture, expand cultural liberty and enable cultural transcendence. Cultural transcendence is the ability of individuals and societies to draw connecting lines between seemingly disparate identity points, instinctively rising above differences into coherence and synergy.



Keywords

cultural diversity, cultural transcendence, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism

INTRODUCTION

Managing cultural diversity is inevitable. Globalization has increased the interaction between economies, peoples and cultures mainly through cross-border investments, trade in goods and services, and free movement of individuals across state boundaries. Advances in communications and transportation technology have allowed faster and more efficient travel as well as quicker and more sophisticated information sharing, making way for the quick absorption and fusion of varied social norms and political values. Historical and ongoing migrations (whether economic,

social or political in nature) and the after effects of expansion and colonization (e.g., slavery, subjugation of populations, occupation of lands inhabited by ‘first nations’) have likewise forced interaction, although to varying degrees, among identities, cultures and societies within state-defined territories.

Increased plurality not only gives rise to integration of and interaction among cultures. It polarizes individuals and groups when cultural differences and divisions are magnified. Interestingly, as globalization, migration and technology bring people together, there is a counter tendency for individuals and groups to distinguish themselves



on the basis of their distinct culture, ethnicity or identity, from the amalgamation of norms and values, for reasons of psychological, symbolic, economic, social or political importance. This duality arising from pluralism should be understood well before proceeding with the task of managing diversity and striking a balance between people's need for integration and the demands for recognition and accommodation of different identities.

THE MERITS OF DIVERSITY AND MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism is one of various social and political theories that fully acknowledge the inevitability of diversity and prescribe measures as regards its management. It underscores the appreciation of the value of all cultures and traditions as well as the validity of the various norms, values, traditions and standards that exist in pluralistic societies. Multiculturalism challenges the common tendency of states and societies to either deny the existence of diversity, so fail to resolve societal frictions, or to institute policies of tolerance and assimilation, where minority groups and identities are subsumed under a more dominant set of cultural norms and values (universalism of dominant culture). It differs widely from the perspective of liberalism in which human rights, individual freedom, personal liberty and opportunity (Rohmann, 1999, pp. 232-233) triumph over group rights and entitlements. The pluralist/multicultural model is premised on all ethnic groups being granted equal rights in all spheres of society, without having to give up their diversity (Costoiu, 2008, p. 6).

The imperative of recognizing cultures and identities is justified along three lines of argumentation. One is the *communitarian* view of cultural identities and languages as social goods of equal worth and of communities as preceding individuals. Another justification is the *liberal egalitarian* view which argues that culture, with its capacity to provide the context for a range of choices, is elementary to the development of individual autonomy, and the status and recognition accorded to it is essential for the formation and strengthening of individual self-respect. A third, *post-colonial* justification is the recognition of the value of tribal culture and membership, the correction of historical injustices against native peoples, reinstatement of 'stolen' indigenous sovereignty, and the recognition that religious and moral perspectives other than the dominant liberal model exist, and are equally valid (Song, 2010).

Pragmatic considerations are as powerful as normative arguments in shifting to the multiculturalism approach. For instance, in Australia and Canada, expanding capitalist economies and the huge demand for labor required the loosening of immigration policies which in turn increased cultural and ethnic diversity. Assimilationist policies

which were initially used to manage the growing diversity proved ineffective, as immigrant communities reacted by fortifying their ethnic identities and they consequently drove a wedge between cultural and ethnic groups. State policy had to change course as a response to the growing politicization of ethnicity wherein immigrants increasingly exercised their political rights as electorates and ethnic communities progressively demanded for rights (Costoiu, 2008, pp. 7-8).

UNPACKING THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Multiculturalism has been linked with claims based on identity, 'identity politics', 'politics of difference' and the 'politics of recognition'. These concepts are most often invoked when attempts are being made to revalue the worth of peoples possessing minority status and to correct their economic and political disadvantages resulting from perceived inferior status in society (Song, 2010). Acknowledging and managing diversity necessarily have to deal with distinctive claims of identity groups for recognition and for rights, practices, freedoms, entitlements and benefits, based on their cultural attributes and differences (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 2011). Claims can be classified into three categories, namely: (1) *subcultural diversity* which seeks to pluralize the dominant culture; (2) *perspectival diversity* which seeks to reconstitute the dominant community; and (3) *communal diversity* which seeks to preserve a particular way of life of 'self-conscious and more or less well-organized communities' (Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 2011).

The most foundational of these claims is the call for the pluralization of society through policies and appropriate interventions of the state. An example would be the movement for increased awareness and recognition of the way of life, rights and protection needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. Other demands constitute the expansion of democratic space to enable certain collectives to participate and be represented in procedural liberalism with a view to effectively advocating their interests. Claims for entitlements range from demands for resource allocation and distribution to demands for opportunities where contribution to public policies and participation in political, social and economic life is made possible.

International human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have captured some of these collective rights. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights protects equality of peoples, the right to existence and self-determination, the right to dispose of wealth and natural resources, the right to development, the right to



peace and security, and the right to a healthy environment. These 'third generation' rights are generally seen as a reaction to the dominance of the traditional liberal conception of human rights that focuses on the individual as the rights bearer.

A more widely accepted collective right which is enshrined in Article 1 of both the ICPR and the ICESCR is the right to self-determination, whose foundation rests on the values of self-government and democratic representation. This right is two-faceted: (1) external self-determination, which means the "right to independence as a people, the right to be free of colonialism, and the right to form an autonomous state" (University of Peace, 2011, p. 11); and (2) internal self-determination, which is the right to a representative and freely chosen political and economic regime, the right to democratic rule and for a government that is responsive to the peoples' will.

The degree of self-determination can vary: from full secession, autonomous self-rule, to increased autonomy within a state or increased democratic representation. Self-determination claims can be a reaction to colonialism (*anti-colonial*) by a colony seeking independence, the quest of a group within a state (*sub-state*) for a greater share of power within existing political structures, or for independence, efforts of peoples found in more than one state (*trans-state*) to seek self-determination to protect their rights, or the claims of indigenous peoples (*indigenous*) for independence or self-rule (University of Peace, 2011, pp.11-12).

Another claim is in the area of cultural accommodation or 'group-differentiated rights' which could mean exemptions from generally applicable laws (e.g., religious exemptions), purposive assistance to minority groups (e.g., affirmative action), recognition of traditional legal codes (e.g., Shariah courts), or secured representation of minorities in the government (e.g., quota system).

MULTICULTURALISM AND ITS FAULT LINES

Multiculturalism has been weakened, as critiques would assert, by its legitimization of identity politics and claims based on identity. As Turner cautioned, multiculturalism is fraught with theoretical and practical dangers if linked with identity politics and claims (1993, pp. 411-412). There are various reasons for this warning. First, claims based on identity as outlined above beg the question of whether the distinctiveness of cultures and identities could legitimize and serve as a basis for social and political demands. Second, normative conflicts arise when a compromise between competing individuals or groups is not workable because the fundamental character of the issue at hand involves differences in deeply held values at the individual and personal level (Kaufman 1998, as cited in the UOC

Course Material on Intercultural Conflict and Diversity Management, 2011). This has serious polarizing effect on competing parties.

A third critique is on the incongruity of the logic behind identity-based claims with the nature of cultural evolution, of cultures constantly learning and reshaping from interactions. The unavoidable 'contamination' of cultures is a reality that is negated by developing rigid definitions as regards the content, bounds and membership of cultures. With identity-based claims, vibrant and interactive cultures run the risk of being 'fossilized' which, in the long run, could undermine opportunities for healthy interaction/integration essential for attaining social cohesion. An implied assumption of a rigidly defined cultural identity is the singularity of its membership, which is an anomaly. In reality, individuals can have different and simultaneous cultural affinity and identity affiliation (e.g., linguistic, ethnic, gender).

The fourth is in the area of rights. It is argued that the philosophical foundations backing group rights are not as clear or robust as those of human rights. One prominent human rights scholar argues that collective human rights are logically possible if it can be argued that social membership is an inherent part of human personality, in the same way as individual human rights were anchored on the inherent dignity of the human person (Donnelly, 1985, pp. 473-482). Another possible fault line concerns the pitting of group rights against human rights. For instance, the granting of religious, cultural or political freedom to certain groups could in turn adversely affect the individual freedom of marginalized and vulnerable sub-groups e.g., women. Therefore, collective rights can act as both a protector and threat to individual liberty, the latter posing a challenge to liberal democracy.

In the exercise of the right to self-determination, critiques of multiculturalism highlight the quandary in deciding what constitutes peoples who qualify for self-determination, when the right is to be invoked or exercised (e.g., when people feel powerless?), and what type/s of self-determination can be pursued and allowed (e.g., internal or external?). Additionally, how should the exercise of this right be limited in the interest of protecting the integrity of the state which is essential to the protection of human rights? The right to use customary systems of law (CSL) as an expression of indigenous identity and sovereignty, and as a way to assert autonomy from a 'monolithic state', is a concrete illustration of the tension between the state's formal justice and informal, traditional law systems practiced by ethnic communities (Perry, 2011, pp. 72-73).

Perhaps the most worrisome of concerns over external self-determination is its potential (real or perceived) to weaken the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, the international system of states and the territorial integrity of countries. Paradoxically, it is assumed that human rights can be protected only in a 'representative self-governing state' which would require, in some instances, for the right



to self-determination to be invoked (Kelly, 1999, p. 47). Where does one draw the line between state sovereignty and self-determination for the purpose of upholding and protecting human rights?

THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN MANAGING AND TRANSCENDING DIVERSITY

The responsibility of managing and transforming cultural diversity into a positive social force rests squarely on the shoulder of states. This assertion does not attempt to delimit the role of other local and international actors but rather emphasizes the inherence of this responsibility in the concept of internal sovereignty, wherein states are expected to act in the best interest of, and in accordance with, the 'social contract' forged with the citizenry. In the current international system, states are still formally accorded the 'juridical monopoly on sovereignty' (Ramsbotham et al, 2005, p. 100) and remain the subject of international law. This point is critical in regulating globalization and addressing rights claims as part of diversity management. In human rights discourse the state is the primary duty bearer, and in the face of competing rights claims has the responsibility of striking a balance. The monopoly on the 'key functions' of law-making, law determination and law enforcement (Malanczuk, 1997, p. 3) make it all the more strategic to lodge the task of diversity management on individual states, as they have the wherewithal to initiate, institutionalize and implement policies regulating social relationships in a heterogeneous population.

To avoid clouding the issues of policy fault lines, states should first separate the effects of multiculturalism from the social implications inherent in diversity. Putnam describes three hypotheses regarding the effects of diversity. First is the *contact theory*, which argues that diversity fosters interethnic tolerance and social solidarity. Increased frequency of interaction overcomes initial hesitation and ignorance, reduces ethnocentric attitudes, fosters solidarity and later builds trust. A second hypothesis, termed *conflict theory*, posits the tendency of diversity to foster out-group distrust and in-group solidarity, especially when involving competition over limited resources. A third hypothesis is the *constrict theory* which is the tendency of ethnic communities and groups to 'hunker down' or isolate themselves from the rest (Putnam, 2007, pp. 142-149). It is safe to assume that these three tendencies happen in any given diverse society. Therefore any state policy, be it assimilationist, integrationist or pluralist, is bound to affect the three social dynamics, magnifying, suppressing or tempering certain features. Multiculturalism was conceived to address these tendencies and respond to arising issues. In

short, multiculturalism should not be blamed for what diversity has brought about.

Against this backdrop, it is incumbent for the state to establish the mindset and principles that will guide policies on multiculturalism. Society has to be understood as a melting pot of cultures and identities interacting, fusing, disengaging and evolving. The interaction is by no means rational, devoid of ethnocentrism or free from pressures to conform with cultural practices deemed violent, discriminatory or oppressive of one's welfare and human rights. By the same token, each culture should be viewed as textured – a tapestry of interwoven elements and characters that enhance as well as constrict individual potential, or of beliefs advancing peace as well as espousing violence. Therefore, cultures should not be viewed as monolithic, immutable, good or bad. From this standpoint comes the key principle that society should not be coerced to homogeneity or dominance of one culture. The state should promote cultural diversity in societies where cultural interaction is a pressing reality and should also be able to draw strengths from cultural specificities.

The quest for cultural diversity is but a means to a higher end - the protection of cultural liberty and the expansion of people's choices (UNDP, 2004, p. 88). Preservation of cultures or tradition must be pursued in support of this enabling goal. The state should provide an environment that enables individuals and groups to choose which culture or identity to adopt, discard, weave and transform without fear of retribution, discrimination or isolation. Therefore, there is an underlying awareness that in tensions between cultural/collective rights and human rights, the state should ensure that the latter is upheld.

To provide an enabling environment for the recognition of diverse identities, equal opportunities and cultural liberty, a number of countries have implemented policy tools, not least to regulate competing claims based on identity, that can be adopted by states embarking on the path to multiculturalism (see Table 1 on Sample Policy Tools on Multiculturalism). These policy tools were studied in a research project, entitled Multiculturalism Policy Index, that monitored the evolution of such policies across 21 Western democracies from 1980 to 2010. In theory, these policies address the 'conflictual' and 'hunkering down' effects of diversity on certain communities that Putnam mentioned.

Perhaps the least appreciated or acknowledged aspect of multiculturalism, which states should take full advantage of, is its capacity to foster interethnic tolerance and social solidarity (contact theory). From the objective of protecting cultural liberty emanates the concept of intercultural/ethnic transcendence or the ability of individuals and peoples to draw connecting lines between seemingly disparate identity points, instinctively rising above differences towards coherence and synergy. Cultural transcendence, as in modern technologies, has the ability to process



Table 1. Sample Policy Tools on Multiculturalism.

Policy Area	Policy Tools
Indigenous Peoples	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition of land rights/titles • Recognition of self-government rights • Upholding historic treaties and/or signing new treaties • Recognition of cultural rights (e.g., language, hunting/fishing, religion) • Recognition of customary law • Guarantees of representation/consultation in the central government • Constitutional and legislative affirmation of the distinct status of indigenous peoples • Support/ratification of international instruments on indigenous rights • Affirmative action
National Minorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy • Official language status, regionally or nationally • Guarantees of representation in the central government or constitutional courts • Public funding of minority-language universities/schools/media • Constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism • Minority nations accorded international recognition
Immigrant Minorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities • Adoption of multiculturalism in the school curriculum • Inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing • Exemptions from dress codes • Dual citizenship • Funding of ethnic group organizations or activities • Funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction • Affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups

Adapted from Multiculturalism Policy Index, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University at Kingston, Canada, 2011.

the individual texture of cultural practices and relations while breaking through constructed boundaries.

As Putnam explains:

“Identity itself is socially constructed and can be socially de-constructed and re-constructed. Indeed, this sort of social change happens all the time in any dynamic and evolving society... The challenge is best met not by making ‘them’ like ‘us’, but rather by creating a new, more capacious sense of ‘we’, a reconstruction of diversity that does not bleach out ethnic specificities, but creates overarching identities... Tolerance for difference is but a first step. To strengthen shared identities, we need more opportunities for meaningful interaction across ethnic lines... Community centers, athletic fields, and schools were among the most efficacious instruments for incorporating new immigrants a century ago, and we need to reinvest in such places and activities once again, enabling us all to become comfortable with diversity.” (2007, pp. 159-164)

These concepts are not mere lofty ideas. A 2010 study on the Status of Multiculturalism in Canada confirmed that

the multiculturalism hypothesis of ‘integration orientation’, referred to in this paper as cultural transcendence, is possible and Canada’s experience in adopting a multiculturalism policy from 1971 to the present backs this assertion. The state’s policy targeted two levels – individual identity and institutional design. The study noted a positive policy outcome indicated by the high-level of mutual identification among native-born citizens and immigrants. It was noted that “immigrants and minorities come to identify with, and feel pride in Canada” while “Canadians view immigrants and demographic diversity as key parts of their Canadian identity” (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 9).

It is therefore argued that, more than providing equal opportunities, greater emphasis should be given by the state on spotting and cultivating ‘connectors’ of cultures and identities. Connectors can take the form of universal principles such as shared respect for and protection of human rights and collective rights (to the extent that the latter enhance individual rights). It can also take the form of civic responsibilities (e.g., uphold and abide by the rule of law, and civic and political obligations) as a common denominator that unifies people. Another would be unity in purpose (e.g., maximizing economic benefits, economic



prosperity for all and fairness) and active participation in strategic platforms for interaction such as offered by globalization, modern technology, communications and travel. There is no denying that these platforms of interaction cut both ways, therefore the state should be able to regulate their downside and not attempt to stop globalization for the sake of preserving tradition.

Cultural liberty and transcendence are in themselves a fusion of liberal thinking and cosmopolitanism that lend support to multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism argues that “all human beings, regardless of their political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community and that this community should be cultivated” and challenges “attachments to fellow-citizens, the local state, parochially shared cultures, and the like” (Kleingeld, 2006). Rooted cosmopolitanism, as advanced by Anthony Appiah, is a middle ground where universal values coexist with the specificities of identity, and where individuals and groups are aware that they are shaped by overlapping identities within their sphere of reality but that other identities exist beyond these demarcations. The duty to others outside these demarcations is probably the strongest argument for cultural transcendence.

CONCLUSION

Interpreting multiculturalism as a state policy has its limitations. For this policy to be successful, a lot depends on the willingness of individuals and variously defined communities and identities to contribute to the social paradigm. Secondly, the forces dictating the tempo of today's diversity, notably globalization, are not fully within the control of individual states. Regulation at state level can be very difficult and entails tedious and costly engagements at transnational and multilateral levels. Additionally, state sovereignty has never been absolute and state authority has recently been increasingly weakened by transnational business interests (e.g., corporations, transnational crime) and multilateral institutions. Therefore, policies and actions to help societies transcend constructed boundaries should happen at four levels: individual, community, state and transnational/multilateral.

Lastly, it is the author's hope that in due time, interactions between cultures will bring forth an innovative alternative, if not better understanding of the nature of human co-existence than what liberalism, cosmopolitanism or indeed multiculturalism have so far offered. ■

■ References

- COBURN, Veldon** (2011). “Multiculturalism Policy Index: Indigenous peoples” [online article]. School of Policy Studies at Queen's University at Kingston, Canada. [Date of consultation: April 15, 2012]. <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/indigenouspeople/evidence-1/IndigenousPeoples.pdf>
- COSTOIU, Andrada** (2008). “Modes of Minorities' Integration: Explaining historical, economic and political factors”. *Journal of Identity Migration Studies*. Vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 2-17.
- DONNELLY, Jack** (1985). “In Search of the Unicorn: The jurisprudence and politics on the right to development”. *California Western International Law Journal*. Vol. 15, pp. 473-482.
- DUVIEUSART-DÉRY, Caroline** (2011). “Multiculturalism Policy Index: National minority policies” [online article]. School of Policy Studies at Queen's University at Kingston, Canada [Date of consultation: April 15, 2012]. <http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/minoritynations/evidence/NationalMinorities.pdf>
- KELLY, Michael** (1999). “Political Downsizing: The re-emergence of self-determination and the movement toward smaller, ethnically homogenous states”. *Drake Law Review*. Vol. 47, pp. 211-278.
- KLEINGELD, Pauline** (2006). “Cosmopolitanism” [online article]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Date of consultation: December 10, 2011]. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/>
- KYMLICKA, Will** (2010). “The Current State of Multiculturalism in Canada and Research Themes on Canadian Multiculturalism 2008-2010” [online article]. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Canada. [Date of consultation: May 22, 2012]. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/multi-state/section2.asp>
- MALANCZUK, Peter** (1997). *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*. Seventh Revised Edition. New York: Routledge. 449 pages.
- PERRY, Robin** (2011). “Balancing Rights or Building Rights? Reconciling the Right to Use Customary Systems of Law with Competing Human Rights in Pursuit of Indigenous Sovereignty”. *Harvard Human Rights Journal*. Vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 71-114.



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Hastings Aid Amurani-Phiri Transcending Constructed Boundaries...

PUTNAM, Robert (2007). "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century, the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture". *Scandinavian Political Studies*. Vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 137-173.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2007.00176.x>

RAMSBOTHAM, Oliver; WOODHOUSE, Tom; MIAL, Hugh (2005). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Second Edition. Malden: Polity Press. 399 pages.

ROHMANN, Chris (1999). *A World of Ideas: A dictionary of important theories, concepts, beliefs, and thinkers*. New York: Ballantine Books. 496 pages.

SONG, Sarah (2010). *Multiculturalism* [online article]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [Date of consultation: December 10, 2011].
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/>

TOLLEY, Erin (2011). *Multiculturalism Policy Index: Immigrant minority policies* [online article]. School

of Policy Studies at Queen's University at Kingston, Canada. [Date of consultation: April 15, 2012].
<http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/evidence/ImmigrantMinoritiesApr12.pdf>

TURNER, Terence (1993). "Anthropology and Multiculturalism: What is anthropology that multiculturalists should be mindful of it?" *Cultural Anthropology*. Vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 411-429.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/can.1993.8.4.02a00010>

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (2004). *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural liberty in today's diverse world*. New York: 299 pages.

UNIVERSITAT OBERTA DE CATALUNYA (2011). *Course material on Intercultural Conflict and Diversity Management*. Barcelona.

UNIVERSITY OF PEACE (2011). *Lesson 6 on Collective Rights I: Theoretical Perspectives and the Right to Self-Determination*. Costa Rica. 18 pages.

Recommended citation

AMURANI-PHIRI, Hastings Aid (2012). "Transcending Constructed Boundaries: The Role of the State in Managing Cultural Diversity through Multiculturalism" [online article]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 20-27. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-amurani-phiri/vol3iss2-amurani-phiri>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1543>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.



■ *About the author*

Hastings Aid Amurani-Phiri

hastingsamuraniphiri@aol.com; amurani-phiri@un.org; hamurani@uoc.edu.

The author has been a Civil Affairs Officer with the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur since 2008. He previously served as a Political/Governance Affairs Officer with the United Nations peace support operations in Sierra Leone. He was also a senior civil servant and diplomat for Malawi, rising to Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He is studying a Masters in Conflictology at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



ARTICLE

Limits of 'Peace through Statebuilding' in Southern Sudan: Challenges to State Legitimacy, Governance and Economic Development during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Implementation, 2005-2011

Aleksi Ylönen

Submitted: March, 2012

Accepted: May 2012

Published: November 2012

Abstract

In January 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended the insurgency in southern Sudan, the longest-running large-scale rebellion in Africa at the time. However, although providing a roadmap for peace, the CPA, an exclusive power-sharing treaty, suffered from a number of weaknesses. The CPA implementation period (2005-2011) saw an unprecedented external intervention in Southern Sudan, which emphasised constructing sustainable 'peace through statebuilding'. This ongoing peacebuilding engagement was undermined by contradictions between its narrow focus on statebuilding and the local political, economic and social context in Sudan and Southern Sudan, even after South Sudan was declared an independent state in July 2011. This article posits that the externally imposed 'peace through statebuilding' approach in Southern Sudan during the period of CPA implementation, suffered from a number of limitations which were reflected in governance and economic development. Based on evidence from 2005-2011, it calls for a re-focus of both the continuing external peacebuilding intervention and the Government of South Sudan's approach to governance and development to overcome political, economic and social challenges to state legitimacy and consolidation.

Keywords

peacebuilding, statebuilding, South Sudan, governance, economic development

1. INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 marked the formal end of a protracted war that had ravaged southern Sudan since 1983. In it, local groups had fought for self-determination¹ for

the second time, and to counter the long-lasting political economic and social marginalization by a state dominated by a narrow and exclusively defined Arabised Muslim Elite (Ylönen, 2011).² These intractable wars had encouraged the sentiment of secession among sectors of the southern Sudanese elite and hindered the integration of southern

¹ See i.e. Eprile (1974) and Johnson (2003) for two prominent works on these insurgencies.

² The fact that the southern region had hosted the earliest and longest armed insurrections in Sudan owes largely to its particular historical trajectory in relation to the Sudanese state and the competing projects for national identity between the national and the regional elites (Deng, 1995; Lesch, 1998).



Sudan in the Sudanese polity. The CPA paved the way for the replacement of the state-imposed political, economic and social order (Nyaba, 2000; Rolandsen, 2005) with a regionally-based system. This regional political-economic order was centred on the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) as the strongest local political actor in southern Sudan, and was formalized in the CPA.

The CPA converted Southern Sudan into new ground for post-war intervention, arguably dominated by the Western liberal agenda. There was unprecedented external support in Southern Sudan to build state structures and boost economic development, aimed at enhancing political and economic viability so that the region would not emerge from the war as a 'failed' administrative entity. The primary objectives of the ongoing intervention since 2005 have been constructing authoritative and legitimate state institutions (statebuilding) and pursuing (re)construction and liberal economic development. It is argued here that, in the Western-led liberal discourse, this form of invasive 'peace through statebuilding' approach has replaced the earlier peacebuilding agenda, and, in the context of Southern Sudan between 2005 and 2011, was erroneously thought to be able to bring about increasing stability and lower levels of local violence.

This article discusses the external 'peace through statebuilding' intervention in Southern Sudan during the CPA implementation. It shows that this was based on a narrow approach, focusing mainly on the SPLM/A, the main former rebel movement turned government, as the dominant local actor. The article claims that given the SPLM/A's lack of legitimacy among sections of local communities in various parts of Southern Sudan due to war experience, the partnership between its leadership and the 'peace through statebuilding' interveners undermined the efforts for state consolidation during the 2005-2011 period. Thus, it is asserted here that reorientation of the approach to peace, governance and development in South Sudan is necessary if the Africa's newest state is to become viable and stable political entity in the long term. The article proposes that the external actors involved in the post-war intervention in South Sudan should push the South Sudanese government to generate more inclusive state and political institutions as well as to cater to the general population by offering wider access to services and economic opportunities. Specific suggestions for addressing issues of governance and development to build state legitimacy and authority are highlighted.

2. FROM PEACEBUILDING TO 'PEACE THROUGH STATEBUILDING'

The currently dominant model of liberal peacebuilding featured by multifaceted external interventions emerged after the Cold War.³ Its emphasis has been the so-called 'fragile' conflict and post-conflict states, with the premise that by ensuring democratic elections immediately after a peace agreement, and creating a foundation for a market economy, would result in long-lasting peace. However, the experience of these interventions shows that the expectation that the liberal agenda delivers sustainable long-term peace is largely illusionary (Paris, 2004; Paris and Sisk, 2009, pp. 1-20).⁴

Although Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (1985), among others, had already advocated the importance of 'bringing the state back in' in the 1980s, this became only emphasised in the peacebuilding interventions after the Cold War when armed conflicts were increasingly associated with failed and collapsed states. This led to the focus on (re)building and (re)configuration of the state as a central feature in interventions promoting peace and development in post-conflict societies, involving Western ideology such as democracy, human rights and 'good' governance (Doornbos, 2006). The United States (US), in particular, assumed a prominent role in this agenda,⁵ which, after the Cold War, increasingly merged security and development as preconditions for peace (Duffield, 2001). Since the 11 September attacks in 2001, this trend was further strengthened through the external interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq where the Western model of state (re)building came to be considered crucial for establishing long-term peace.

Arguably, the focus on 'peace through statebuilding' has featured an attempt to reach Western consensus on how peace can be made sustainable. The current focus on elevating the institutional capacity of the state to ensure long-term peace stems from the idea that sustainable peace, reconstruction, development and security (both internal and external) cannot be separated from state competences. In this, the social contract and the provision of essential needs, such as security and basic services, are emphasised (Lake, 2005, p. 257). The strategy also claims to target the origins of conflicts, such as inequality, by promoting the main pillars of liberal peace, including human rights, democratic governance, rule of law, sustainable development,

3 Peacebuilding was first emphasised in the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations "An agenda for peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

4 One of the main cases credited to the collapse of this approach was Rwanda, where peace and statebuilding through short-term political liberalisation without institutional guidelines and checks was one of the factors behind the escalation of violence to genocide. See i.e. Paris and Sisk (2007, 2009).

5 Arguably the US approach has emphasised "building legitimate states [based on] broad-based popular support for nascent states by creating democratic institutions and spearheading economic reforms" (Lake, 2005, p. 257).



equal access to resources and environmental security (Barnett and Zürcher, 2009, pp. 23-52). Thus, to an extent, the convergence of peacebuilding and statebuilding within the liberal peace paradigm in which foreign powers and international organisations play a crucial role has sought to counter the criticism of the formal-institutional top-down approach of external interventions. It has been argued that the continuing lack of society-oriented, bottom-up, focus stems from a simplistic understanding of the multi-faceted local social orders in the places of intervention, which fails to create legitimacy at the local level (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010, pp. 348-68). This means the interventions are often restricted to working in partnership with those local actors deemed as the most powerful, without first mapping the local social dynamics and engaging other relevant local actors.

Consequently, the 'peace through statebuilding' paradigm assumes the re-establishment of legitimacy of authority after a rebellion to be automatic, but this is problematic. For instance, contradictions between the society and the state, or constituencies of distinct rebel groups and militias, particularly in the previous areas of conflict, may be difficult to overcome and so hinder peacebuilding. It is also assumed that expanding state competences automatically promotes peace, although the imposition of a state may provoke resistance and even renewed armed opposition (Rocha Menocal, 2010, pp. 6-7). It is therefore important to consider the type of state being promoted and what kind of relationship it has with societal groups apart from its own constituencies, particularly in the former conflict areas.

Secondly, the promotion of economic (re)construction and development towards a liberal market system may be detrimental to peace. Liberal capitalism tends to increase material inequality, which in extreme cases can be politically polarising and provoke large-scale violence, particularly when inequality becomes perceived as injustice. In a post civil-war setting, for instance, a concentration of wealth in the governing elite and/or former rebel leaders may provoke such perceptions.

The CPA: A non-comprehensive product of 'peace through statebuilding'

The 'peace through statebuilding' approach was a significant element in the peace process in Sudan that culminated in the CPA. It was a long-term effort, from the early 1990s, by the interested external powers and Sudan's neighbouring countries, in part to minimise the regionally destabilising effects of the war. The final negotiations were mediated by representatives of the sub-regional organisation, the

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), backed mainly by a number of Western states headed by the US. As a result, major Western advocates of liberal peace largely dictated the external intervention (Ylönen and Malito, *in press*), and dominated the post-war CPA implementation programme.

Largely conditioned by the commitment to 'peace through statebuilding', the CPA adopted a prominent security dimension as well as an emphasis on sharing political power and wealth (CPA, 2005). As a result, the agreement sought to principally address economic marginalisation and the almost complete exclusion of southern politicians from state institutions (Grawert, 2010, p. 1). This approach to peace included questions of democracy, self-determination, human rights and citizenship, as well as promoting economic transformation in Southern Sudan from a war to a liberal (peace) market economy.

Yet, 'state through peacebuilding' promoted in Southern Sudan suffered from a number of shortcomings. For instance, the IGAD process and the resultant CPA were fixed on the two protagonists of the war, the Government of Sudan controlled by the National Congress Party (NCP), and the SPLM/A. It deliberately concentrated on these actors to facilitate the final peace agreement, which presented a simplified view of the complex history, dynamics and actors involved in the conflict. The aim was to resolve the differences between the main warring parties, which not only centred the process on the NCP and the SPLM/A, excluding other relevant local actors, but also undermined the CPA as a truly comprehensive solution because it failed to address the conflicts in Sudan's other peripheries.⁶

As a result, the widely recognised multi-faceted centre-periphery character of the wars in Sudan (Ylönen, 2012) was not addressed. Also, the CPA, which formalised the SPLM/A as the dominant actor in southern Sudan, failed to put pressure on the protagonists for a broad redistribution of political power and economic resources, services and opportunities. Thus, the Agreement produced a political and economic situation which continued to favour the NCP in the north, and paved the way for the narrowly based SPLM/A rule in Southern Sudan.

Moreover, although the CPA stipulated the referendum as the mechanism to ensure self-determination of Southern Sudan in case there was no political transformation towards making "unity attractive" during 2005-2011 (CPA, 2005, p. 2), the plebiscite was its only major provision in seeking to address popular grievances in the region. The CPA allocated 70% of power in the newly established executive and legislative political institutions to the SPLM/A, which allowed it to consolidate control over the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), while the NCP was left with 15% and other southern political parties with

⁶ The negotiations left out representatives of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, as well as the insurgents in Darfur and in the Red Sea region, and failed to deal effectively with the political and military fragmentation of armed groups based in southern Sudan.



the remaining 15% (CPA 2005 pp. 32, 33). This, together with the SPLM/A's military power in Southern Sudan, was an important factor in determining the external interveners' decision to enter in partnership with the SPLM/A, the dominant regional actor, during the CPA implementation and beyond. During 2005-2011, this partnership, with the local dynamics largely dictated by the SPLM/A, failed to address the limits of SPLM/A's authority and legitimacy, and to decrease violence at the local level in various areas of Southern Sudan.⁷

Finally, the exclusive nature of the CPA meant that there were no formal mechanisms for transitional justice and local post-war reconciliation beyond those dictated by the NCP and the SPLM/A. Justice issues were largely left to the protagonists' discretion, themselves hardly objective in evaluating atrocities committed during the war. This was particularly relevant in southern Sudan, where most of the war had taken place, and the responsibility of the so-called south-south dialogue and other reconciliation was left to the SPLM/A dominated GoSS.

3. 'PEACE THROUGH STATEBUILDING' SINCE THE CPA

The implementation of 'peace through statebuilding' in Southern Sudan based on the CPA began in 2005. Among the first measures was the establishment of the semi-autonomous GoSS.⁸ Heavily influenced by external actors, a major feature of the ongoing external intervention focusing on statebuilding has been an attempt to promote effective GoSS governance and stability through fomenting a region-wide SPLM/A 'monopoly of violence' and to a lesser extent 'good governance'. Common belief among the principal stakeholders appears to be that these and other related objectives can be achieved with the help of external actors, including international organisations, interested states and international NGOs, which form the main base of the GoSS's external support by allocating resources and assistance in capacity-building and security.

Between 2005 and 2011, the international statebuilding agenda influenced the highest leadership of the GoSS. For instance, Vice-President Riek Machar repeatedly em-

phasised the importance of statebuilding (Machar, 2011). Simultaneously, an effort was made for the southerners 'to get to know each other', not only through the establishment of formal institutions but also through cultural and sport initiatives, which culminated in the creation of symbols of common nationhood.⁹ The effort was aimed at increasing the legitimacy of GoSS, which needed to achieve stability through the establishment of national identity able to complement the prevailing strong ethnic affiliations (Jok, 2011). Indeed, the enthusiasm of GoSS in nation- and statebuilding, particularly towards the end of the CPA implementation period, shows that it had become increasingly inclined to secede from Sudan and establish an independent state of South Sudan.

The limited autonomy after 2005 strengthened self-governance in Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A's prominence in the GoSS that became responsible for local political decisions, such as security and economy, convinced a number of external interveners of Southern Sudan's potential to become an independent state led by the SPLM/A. However, the adopted model of governance, largely built upon the way SPLM/A had operated during the war, was extremely difficult to implement because it consisted of two diverging outlooks, one based on the centralised system of rebel governance, and the other on decentralised democracy (Branch and Mampilly, 2005, pp. 1-20) heavily supported by external actors.

Both the NCP and the SPLM/A obstructed democratisation in their respective regions between 2005 and 2011. The motivation behind this stemmed from their uneasy partnership: the NCP attempted to maintain its power at the national level and regionally in the north behind the formal institutional façade set up after the CPA, and the SPLM/A focused on consolidating its power in Southern Sudan. This became increasingly apparent after the accidental death of the SPLM/A supreme leader John Garang, in July 2005, which strengthened the secessionist leadership centre within the SPLM/A leadership. After a short period of uncertainty, a reputed secessionist, Salva Kiir was appointed to substitute Garang as the new SPLM/A commander, the President of the GoSS, and the First Vice President of Southern Sudan (*The New York Times*, 2005).

The respective NCP and SPLM/A strategies slowed down the CPA implementation process considerably. The NCP leadership, which had worked with the SPLM/A mainly through Garang, was uncomfortable with the strength-

7 This has been particularly the case in the Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states where local insurgencies, inter-group feuding and cattle-rustling have continued to cause large-scale violence.

8 Among the initial measures taken was the ratification of the interim constitution in Southern Sudan, followed by the adoption of the national interim constitution. The drafting of the regional constitution in Southern Sudan was undertaken under SPLM/A control. After developing the constitutional framework, the NCP and the SPLM/A initiated institutional reform at the national level through the formation of the Government of National Unity, GoNU (BBC, 2005), and the building of political institutions at the regional level in Southern Sudan.

9 For instance, these included a national anthem, drafting of which had been subjected to a public competition, adoption of the flag of the SPLM/A as the official state flag, and the taking up of a new currency. The adoption of some of these symbols was controversial, particularly among those groups seeking to contest the SPLM/A's power.



ened secessionist tendency in the SPLM/A. It had increasing reservations about the overall commitment of the SPLM/A to abide by its stated objective to maintain a united Sudan, which gave the already disenchanted NCP an excuse to slow down the process of power- and wealth-sharing. As a result, the working relationship between the parties deteriorated in 2007 to the extent that the SPLM temporarily suspended its participation in the Government of National Unity in Khartoum (*Sudan Tribune*, 2007a; 2007b) in which, according to the CPA, it held 28% minority representation behind the 54% of the NCP (CPA, 2005, pp. 20, 24). Concerned about the stagnating CPA implementation, the protagonists had little interest in effective power-sharing with opposition parties, neither in the institutions at the national level nor in the regional institutions in Southern Sudan. Instead, both sought to strengthen their grip on these political organs.

In this context, in spite of repeated promises of democratisation, the GoSS continued to constrain political liberties at the regional level in Southern Sudan. Although allowing some freedom to express political views, it continued to purge the media when working towards the consolidation of the SPLM/A-orchestrated political order (Freedom House, 2011), and targeted opposition parties. This was particularly the case during the general and presidential elections in April 2010, in which the SPLM and the NCP reportedly used coercion to ensure victory (Copnall, 2010) and further strengthen their control over the political institutions in the south and the north, respectively.¹⁰ At the presidential level, the NCP and the SPLM/A decided to let each other dominate their respective areas, as it was rumoured that they had covertly agreed to make way for each other's candidates (*Sudan Tribune*, 2010). This meant that neither party would interfere in the other's regional sphere of influence, and that the presidential race would be used to strengthen each party's control in its respective region.

In Southern Sudan, the SPLM/A had almost total control of the electoral process. Reportedly, the security apparatus intimidated voters and obstructed opposition candidates (The Carter Center, 2010, p. 3) to ensure an SPLM/A victory, and the so-called independent candidates were mainly SPLM/A members who had temporarily left the party because they had not been selected as its official candidates.¹¹

The elections were used to extend the SPLM/A's control of local political institutions and administrations, with the justification that it was necessary in order to manage political instability before the expected referendum of self-determination scheduled for January 2011.¹² In spite of this, external actors recognised the results of the elections (Copnall, 2010) and thus legitimised the prevailing political climate, which they had promoted by imposing few conditions on their support to the GoSS. Instead, they sought to portray Southern Sudan as a peacebuilding success story similar to Sierra Leone.¹³ This, in turn, stemmed largely from the need of external actors to justify their intervention.

The assumption that exclusive power-sharing between the NCP and the SPLM/A would generate peace and stability in Sudan was not matched by the prevailing reality in 2005-2011. This is because the 'peace through statebuilding' approach strengthened the rule of each protagonist relative to other local actors, and consolidated the polarised national political environment increasingly geared towards secession of Southern Sudan. While throughout the period from 2005 to 2011 the security apparatuses in both Northern and Southern Sudan reportedly continued to commit human rights violations,¹⁴ some opposition political parties and their constituencies complained about continued marginalisation, powerlessness and the lack of political freedom for the opposition. Although the CPA initially designated token positions to the opposition, after the 2010 elections most of this representation had been excluded. Having lost office in political institutions, some opposition politicians joined the governments in Juba or Khartoum, which fragmented and weakened Northern and Southern opposition further,¹⁵ while others staged armed struggles against the respective SPLM/A and NCP dominated governments.¹⁶

In spite of the successful election process, Southern Sudan continued to suffer from deeply engrained ethnic and clan-based political splits that had been deepened by the war. These divisions, locally referred to as 'tribalism', continued to inspire organised violence and political instability. Although the GoSS attempted to convince its allies that tribalism was a passing phenomenon of traditional socio-political order that could be addressed through modernisation and development, it can hardly be made to disappear in

10 Due to the wrangling over the CPA implementation, the national census results were announced one year late, in 2008, and the SPLM/A contested them by claiming that they deliberately excluded part of the southern population. As a result, the elections were also delayed and finally held in 2010 after an intensive electoral campaign. Both in Northern and Southern Sudan, various opposition parties and members of the media complained of having been intimidated, attacked and violently restricted by the security apparatuses in control of the governing parties of the respective regions.

11 Based on interviews in Southern Sudan in December 2010.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid. On Sierra Leone see Kurz (2010).

14 See, i.e. 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State (<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper>).

15 For instance, this was the case with the Democratic Unionist Party which joined the NCP government in Khartoum in December 2011, and the South Sudan Democratic Forum which held one ministerial and deputy minister position the same year in South Sudan. The main opposition party in the south has been the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC).

16 While during 2005-2011 a number of rebel groups fought the SPLA, particularly in the greater upper Nile region in the south, Khartoum faced armed challenges in Darfur, eastern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, the latter two bordering Southern Sudan. Juba and Khartoum have repeatedly exchanged accusations of the other's support of rebels in their territories and both have presented evidence for this.



the short term. This is largely because the social practice of tribalism, or ethnic political mobilisation, has deep roots in South Sudan. This reality can only be transformed gradually since currently only few of the over 8 million southerners are exposed to modernisation and development that can bring about social change in this sense. The limited understanding of tribalism as an obsolete and easily curable condition is counterproductive because it assumes a need for development and rapid social change through a tumultuous and destabilising transformative process. The assumption that development and modernisation will change local communities has also been contradicted by the persisting political behaviour in South Sudan, based on ethnic strongman-patronage loyalties, that tends to hinder broad-based 'national' development by confining it along ethnic, clan or family lines. One manifestation of this is the inter-ethnic and inter-clan violent practices, such as cattle-rustling, and the continuing tendency to refer to the neighbouring ethnic groups as enemies in parts of South Sudan.¹⁷

For this reason during the 2005-2001 period the GoSS officials often expressed the need 'to get to know each other', but little progress was made towards building a national identity since nationbuilding ranked low among the priorities of the GoSS and the external interveners. As a result, tribalism remained a major threat to the unity of Southern Sudan, and many observers and local politicians warned of the possibility of fragmentation, or 'Somalisation', of the region in the absence of a political climate able to accommodate and bring together the region's large and ethnically diverse communities.¹⁸

Governance and economic development during the CPA implementation

The CPA facilitated the initiation of 'peace through statebuilding' and reconstruction in Southern Sudan. Between 2005 and 2010, the GoSS received an undisclosed amount of funding from Sudan's oil exports, rumoured to have been more than US\$ 8 billion. This took place in a climate of major economic reconstruction and development, which resulted in large quantities of foreign investment from the GoSS partners: the World Bank, the UN, the European Union, Joint Donor Team and Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS); and the states of Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the US.¹⁹ Other significant private and public business partners investing in Southern Sudan came,

for instance, from a number of Asian (particularly China), Arab (Egypt and others) and some African countries (such as Kenya, South Africa and Uganda).

The CPA sought to establish a foundation for rapid economic development in Southern Sudan after the war. It stipulated the establishment of the MDTF-SS, but the achievements by 2011 were hardly as high as the expectations (The World Bank, 2011). Another planned initiative to promote a market economy was a private sector development programme endorsed by the World Bank along with the GoSS, the Netherlands, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Denmark, Ireland and Norway, but this was expected only to begin after the independence of South Sudan (*Sudan Tribune*, 2011a, 2012a). Along with a plethora of public investment and development schemes, Southern Sudan received an undisclosed flow of private financing during the 2005-2011 period.

However, external investment and economic support is not neutral nor does it directly lead to development and economic equality. External sources of funding are charged with diverse political imperatives and may have unintended consequences depending on local economic management. For instance, one of the initial impacts of capacitating the GoSS economically after the CPA was the strengthening of secessionist sentiment in Southern Sudan. This was not only due to the war experience of the general population, but also because the GoSS leadership cadres became increasingly influenced by the SPLM/A's secessionist power centre led by president Kiir. Consequently, the political climate imposed by the GoSS during the CPA implementation period was geared towards secession, as claims were made that the NCP lacked the will to make Sudan's unity attractive for southerners and that Sudan was a failed state.²⁰ The external support and financing facilitated these developments because they promoted the independent political capacity and economic viability of the GoSS.

A major downside of the situation during the CPA implementation was that the external interveners' partnership with the SPLM/A elite resulted in a weak institutional framework to manage the central government. The shortage of competent politicians and administrators, coupled with increasing opacity in managing government finances, largely through patrimonial networks, favoured the widespread use of state funds for private purposes, particularly among some SPLA commanders who had become civilian office holders after the war but continued to conduct economic affairs according to a 'war mentality'.²¹ This made

17 Interviews with SPLM officials in Juba and Torit (November-December, 2010). During 2005-2011 inter-ethnic violence resulted in the loss of thousands of lives in parts of Southern Sudan.

18 Interviews with local informants, Juba, December 2010.

19 See i.e. 'Development Partners', Government of the Republic of South Sudan (<http://www.goss.org/>).

20 Based on interviews in Southern Sudan in 2010. See also SPLM Today (2010).

21 Interviews with SPLM officials in Juba and Torit (November-December, 2010).



corruption particularly visible during the 2006-2008 period,²² after which it became less reported²³ and arguably more sophisticated, following the externally supported establishment of the GoSS Anti-Corruption Commission.²⁴ In January 2012, the GoSS president Kiir sought to engage eight heads of state in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the US to help to recover embezzled funds held abroad by GoSS officials. Since this did not bring the desired results, in June 2012, after it was revealed that an estimated US\$ 4 billion of government money had gone missing during the 2005-2011 period, Kiir wrote a letter to 75 senior SPLM/A officials, offering them almost full anonymity if they returned the funds (*Sudan Tribune*, 2012c).²⁵ Smaller scale pocketing of state funds for private ends is also widespread among civil servants and security officers in the case of issuing permits and when acquiring a visa at border posts or passing through road checkpoints. Finally, corruption in large-scale business affairs and contracts, along with speculation related to land and resources, involving some highly influential SPLM/A individuals, has continued to be a serious issue also after South Sudan's independence.

The GoSS institutions can be generally characterised by a patron-client system. This involves the so-called 'strongmen', high-level individuals who are able to access state resources, use them privately and channel them onwards to followers.²⁶ They are also able to influence the appointment of individuals for public posts. This tends to happen, to a high degree, along family, clan and ethnic lines. From this perspective tribalism is a socioeconomic issue, involving social hierarchy and power, patronage, hiring practices and public salaries. It has resulted in the employment of an estimated 150,000 civil servants, some of which exist only on paper, and of which approximately 60% are illiterate, with an average salary of US\$ 200 per month.²⁷

Public institutions have also been characterised by SPLM control. The SPLM/A has sought to monitor those individuals within the government administrations who

might pose a threat to its control of the institution in question by selecting lower ranked members according to party or strongman loyalties. This is in part why there have been complaints of powerlessness and inability to perform independently of the influence of the dominant party in particular among some of the GoSS ministers and directors of commissions and other institutions who are not members of the SPLM/A.²⁸

Also important in the process of reconstruction and economic rebuilding is the prevention of uneven development. However, in Southern Sudan between 2005 and 2011 development concentrated rather exclusively in those areas that were most firmly under GoSS control. In fact, in spite of a stated commitment to decentralisation, 84% of the state budget remains with the GoSS while only 16% has reached regional governments (*Sudan Tribune*, 2012b). The economic policy has favoured the regional capitals (particularly Juba) over rural areas in terms of infrastructure and services,²⁹ at the expense of promoting the state and its development in the outlying areas that have hardly benefited from infrastructure and services.³⁰ Overall, this situation had a negative impact on regionally balanced development and state legitimacy, and poses a threat to political stability. It bears a curious resemblance to the history of economic development in Sudan as a whole.³¹

In addition, the economic policy described above hindered economic opportunities and well-being, contrasting sharply with the high expectations of peace among the southern Sudanese. Instead, foreign businesses were allowed to dominate the local scene, from large to small-scale enterprises.³² This generated grievances and friction between sections of the local communities and immigrant entrepreneurs with small businesses, but was barely addressed by the GoSS arguably because a number of its leaders benefited personally from foreign investment and business partnerships. The partnership between foreign interests and economically powerful cadres of the GoSS

22 There is a widely known story of corruption circulating in South Sudan about a certain prominent individual and his family transporting US dollars in coffins to neighbouring countries after the CPA. Among other cases of corruption which have come to light are the grain scandal in which billions of Sudanese pounds were lost to fraudulent companies supposed to provide cereals to remedy food shortages, and the case of the Nile Commercial Bank which lost large quantities of capital through loans issued to GoSS officials without collateral (Gual, 2011; Garang, 2011).

23 This was partly due to occasional crackdowns of journalists reporting on corruption.

24 Interviews conducted by the author in Southern Sudan, November-December 2008 and November-December 2010.

25 Kiir's request came only months after the voluntary cutoff of South Sudan's petroleum exports (on which its official budget is almost completely dependent) due to a dispute over transit fees with Khartoum. The plea was likely prompted by the deteriorating economic situation, which has required the GoSS to pass far-reaching austerity measures.

26 See Utas (2012) for an excellent analysis on strongmen generally in Africa.

27 Expert interview in March 2012 in Juba.

28 Interviews conducted by the author in November-December 2010 in Juba. For instance, in ministries particularly, undersecretaries were used to control ministers and deputy ministers and were at times considered more influential than their superiors.

29 This is in spite of one of the SPLM/A's stated objectives during the war having been to develop the rural areas in the south by 'taking towns to people' (John Garang).

30 Based on interviews and author's observation in Southern Sudan in 2008 and 2010.

31 The economic and political centre-periphery divide in Sudan as a whole was one of the main causes of rebellion in its peripheries. The marginalisation of the southern periphery was precisely one of the major reasons why the SPLM/A took up arms against the central government, and similar motives are at the heart of insurgencies in Darfur and elsewhere in peripheries that have also been marginalised by the Sudanese state.

32 While large economic ventures are often related to foreign investors and powerful individuals related to the GoSS, smaller businesses tend to be operated by foreigners (i.e. Chinese, Eritreans, Ethiopians, Indians, Kenyans and Ugandans) or northern Sudanese. The immigrants are often seen to profit from the post-war context in which locals are considered to possess less entrepreneurial skills.



in the southern Sudanese economy therefore has undermined state legitimacy among local communities excluded from the benefits of economic development. This economic inequality, which many consider unjust, has continued to pose a threat to the state's political stability.

The slow pace of economic development and its uneven distribution in southern Sudan during the CPA implementation should also be viewed in the political context in which the SPLM/A sought to consolidate its power over the GoSS and secure the celebration of the referendum for self-determination. As a result, the secessionist SPLM/A power centre in charge of the GoSS pursued a strategy to demonstrate that the NCP lacked interest in developing the south and complying with the stated spirit of the CPA to 'make unity attractive'. This approach by the GoSS, indicating that development should follow peace, denied significant economic benefits particularly from the SPLM/A defiant groups. It therefore reversed the SPLM/A's earlier position based on the strategy of pursuing 'peace through development' (SPLM, 2000).

Moreover, one of the major socioeconomic effects of reconstruction and development during the CPA implementation was the continued concentration of wealth and political power in the most powerful sections of the SPLM/A elite. Many of its members have links to the northern elite, and some have occasionally associated themselves with the northern governments and maintained property in Khartoum.³³ The closeness with the northern leadership has also been maintained by the continuing negotiations related to post-referendum (post-independence) arrangements in South Sudan, and by the business arrangements for economic reconstruction and development. The business dealings have not been restricted to the oil sector in which southerners have required northern expertise, but there has been deeper collaboration through commercial partnerships involving southerners, external actors and the leaders in northern Sudan, as in the case of the USAID projects in South Sudan.³⁴

During the CPA implementation period, the GoSS also concluded a number of business partnerships with foreign private investors. For instance, between 2007 and 2011, 28 foreign companies, from Arab states, the US and elsewhere, sought, or successfully acquired, a total of 2.64 million hectares of land for agriculture, forestry or bio-fuel (Deng, 2011, pp. 7), and in March 2011 the GoSS signed an agreement with the Malaysian Petronas for collaboration in the oil business (*Sudan Tribune*, 2011b). Combined with the weak institutional structure and legislation on land management, selling and leasing land to foreign investors has increased the potential of land disputes, which

continue to be one of the major causes of local conflicts in South Sudan.

The evidence above reveals the intricate network of political and economic agendas between the local protagonists and international actors related to 'peace through statebuilding'. Firstly, it not only demonstrates how easily northern and southern elites collaborate, and how closely the GoSS has been linked to the northern leadership, but also the willingness to allow the continuation of northern economic influence in South Sudan as long as it is beneficial to the southern leadership. Secondly, the intimate north-south economic collaboration partly explains Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir's change of position in favour of southern secession in 2010, and his attempt to mend fences with the West, although a more pressing factor was his indictment for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur by the International Criminal Court (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Thirdly, the partnership of sectors of leading elites demonstrates that, in spite of imposing sanctions on firms related to the government and active in the petroleum business, blacklisting a number of Sudanese companies and enforcing the prohibition of American enterprises to do business in Sudan, the US continued to collaborate economically with the northern Sudanese elite. Although this was in the US interest at least until its primary objective, the independence of South Sudan, was secured in 2011, it also provided resources for the US-sanctioned NCP regime.

Finally, between 2005 and 2011 the international protagonists of 'peace through statebuilding' in Southern Sudan seldom expressed doubts about the gradual progress of economic development and related challenges. The peace and development euphoria tempered any external criticism of the GoSS, as long as the diverse interests of the external actors were respected and there was a desire to maintain a good working relationship. However, maintaining good ties at the expense of demands for transparency and efficiency perpetuated the opacity of governance and development in Southern Sudan. As a result, the moderate external intervention approach, with few requests for local accountability, failed to prevent the use of state funds for private ends or nepotism in government institutions, and hinder the concentration of wealth and political power in the leading sections of the ruling party at the expense of a wider distribution of resources and development. Arguably, many external actors viewed this development as acceptable, or 'inherently African' and conditioned by the 'African context'. Unfortunately for independent South Sudan, the kind of governance and economic development that prevailed in 2005-2011 continues to a large extent today, and undermines state le-

³³ Based on author's interviews and observations in Sudan (2005) and South Sudan (2008, 2010).

³⁴ USAID uses its partner Louis Berger, Inc., for construction projects and subcontracts local companies, some of which are northern Sudanese and linked to leaders of the NCP, such as the Eyat Roads and Bridges Company Ltd. (part of the Eyat Oilfields Services Company, Ltd.) chaired by Abdul Aziz Ahmed al-Bashir, who is Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir's brother.



gitimacy and stability in the long-term by defying political openness and balanced development.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Between 2005 and 2011, on its way to becoming an independent state, Southern Sudan faced a number major challenges. This article has highlighted some of them, focusing on the governance and economic development outcomes of the partnership between the external actors engaged in 'peace through statebuilding' and the GoSS.

During the CPA implementation, the external actors applied a 'peace through statebuilding' agenda in their approach to Southern Sudan. Allegedly, this was to prove that liberal peace could have a positive outcome by consolidating a stable political order and neoliberal economy in extreme post-war circumstances. Yet, between 2005 and 2011, the intervention had only limited success in curbing violence, while allowing a political climate of repressive rule with slow and uneven economic development to prevail. The international intervention failed to make the SPLM/A controlled GoSS to endorse political liberty and promote wider economic opportunity for the local population, despite one of the stated SPLM/A objectives during the war having been to establish democratic order. The exclusive SPLM/A rule undermined state legitimacy and authority, as well as the consolidation of a common national identity among the highly heterogeneous ethnic groups in Southern Sudan.

The widely shared hope among the actors involved was to promote peace and avoid state failure in Southern Sudan through successful statebuilding. However, this agenda was not successful in the short-term, largely because it failed to generate confidence in the GoSS at the local level in parts of the region, and instead often converted local and regional political institutions into vehicles of ethnic claims for resources and political power.

Thus, the article has also shown that the exclusive endorsement of the SPLM/A as the dominant local actor has had downsides. Although the SPLM/A received support from its external partners, it lacked legitimacy and authority mainly in some of the more remote areas of Southern Sudan where it had engaged in violent struggle against the local communities during the war and since then has deployed security forces in order to establish a monopoly of violence. This caused instability, particularly when the attempts to extend legitimacy and control were largely defined by the conventional security approach, by a dominant, but hardly hegemonic actor. This perpetuated local opposition among SPLM/A defiant groups many of which also saw no benefits from peace in terms of economic development and services.

Finally, between 2005 and 2011, the political system and culture in Southern Sudan was based on consolidation of the SPLM/A imposed order, drawing from its experience of governance during the war. This resulted in the political climate being dominated by one party and marginalisation of the political opposition. These dynamics failed to promote the democratic state that the SPLM/A repeatedly stated it fought for during the war. Rather, the experience of the CPA implementation period shows that the concentration of resources to strengthen the centralised administration resulted in a *de facto* one-party state propped up by its security apparatus. It also, to a large extent, converted state administrations into institutionalised structures characterised by controlled patronage systems, while corruption became a persistent problem throughout the political and administrative landscape. This situation is likely to be unviable in the long-term since previous experience from Sudan as a whole clearly indicates that governance based on exclusive rule and marginalisation tends to generate political instability and armed opposition.

Recommendations

The analysis conducted here has highlighted some of the controversial effects of the partnership between the external interveners and the GoSS in Southern Sudan during the CPA implementation period in 2005-2011, and based on this experience offers some recommendations for the future. Most importantly, it can be asserted that one of the main challenges for the state in South Sudan will continue to be its legitimacy among remote and SPLM/A defiant populations. The state will require large quantities of external financing and other support for an extended period of time in order to build its capacity, legitimacy and authority. However, support for statebuilding needs to be conditional, with international standards in governance and development being promoted. This should explicitly push for an increasingly pluralistic democratic state order and transparent state institutions, clearly detached from the ruling party, the SPLM/A, which would involve participation of broad sections of the population. The political opening should include not only *de jure* decentralisation, but specific, more extended, sharing of state resources with regional and local administrations in an attempt to build state legitimacy.

An important part of the political opening would be the increased extension of peace dividends, particularly to the communities from where armed elements opposing the state have emerged. Such benefits, for instance effective provision of functioning infrastructure, services and economic opportunities coming directly from the central government, should be accompanied by an orchestrated effort to promote a national identity and be used to gradually change local attitudes towards the GoSS which would elevate the level of its local credibility. Ideally, this approach



would address the real issues, such as poverty and lack of opportunities, behind the continuing violence and instability, and would undermine the local strongmen's capability to mobilise constituents for armed activities.

It becomes also apparent from the analysis that the GoSS should re-orient its approach to governance and economic development towards sustainable consolidation of the state through non-coercive activities. From this perspective, the most urgent task is the credible control of corruption, investing in quality instead of quantity of civil servants, and curbing ethnic, clan and family nepotism in public administrations. To this end, administrative and financial transparency ought to be promoted along with more emphasis on the pledged good governance, while credible anti-corruption mechanism and justice system should be established to deal with high-level individuals in a credible and efficient manner.

Moreover, it should be ensured that resources reach regional and local administrations, and it ought to be made widely known that these are provided by the central government. This effort to build local legitimacy should include an integrated approach to strengthen the ties between the GoSS and the local, traditional and particularly non-SPLM/A authorities. International assistance could be used to supervise this process and promote transparency in the relationship between the central, regional and local administrations.

Furthermore, the GoSS should scale back the involvement of security apparatus in the political sphere and allow the formation of effective peaceful opposition. Part of this

process ought to be the celebration of free and fair elections. This would demonstrate the ruling party's willingness to correct the distortions in the political environment after the April 2010 elections, and would be a major step towards advancing democratic legitimacy.

Finally, in terms of economic development, a profound diversification should be urgently promoted to minimise the state's high level of dependence on oil exports. Securing food production should occupy a central part of the strategy for economic development. The current focus on infrastructure ought to include providing basic facilities for local agricultural production and basic industries. A major objective of the economic development process should be to increasingly cater for the needs of the population, particularly due to the high expectations of peace and the new state after the CPA, and emphasise the delivery of functioning services and widely accessible economic opportunities especially in the rural areas. This includes not only infrastructure, but ensuring that good-quality services, such as health care and education, are delivered. In terms of extending economic opportunity, the support for small businesses and agricultural schemes ought to be prioritised by providing loans and training for farming ventures and cooperatives. This should provide incentives for small-scale farmers and cattle-keepers to produce a surplus to diminish the reliance on foodstuffs from neighbouring states, while the state's recognition of people's entrepreneurial potential would accommodate and empower the latter as productive actors in and for the domestic economy. ■

■ References

- BARNETT, Michael; ZÜRCHER, Christoph** (2009). "The peacebuilder's contract: how external state-building reinforces weak statehood". In: R. PARIS; T. D. SISK (eds.). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Pages 23-52.
- BBC** (2005). "Sudan swears in unity government" [online article]. *BBC News*, 22 September. [Date of consultation: 3 January 2012]. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4266872.stm>
- BLIESEMANN DE GUEVARA, Berit** (2010). "The state in the times of statebuilding". *Civil Wars*. Vol. 10, iss. 4, pages 348-68.
- BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros** (1992). *An agenda for peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. Report of the Secretary-General. A/47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992. The United Nations. http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf
- BRANCH, Adam; MAMPILLY, Zachariah C.** (2005). "Winning the war, but losing the peace? The dilemma of SPLM/A civil administration and the tasks ahead". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol. 43, iss. 1, pages 1-20.
- Comprehensive Peace Agreement between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (CPA)* [online]. [Date of consultation: 27 October 2012]. <http://www.sd.undp.org/doc/CPA.pdf>



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Aleksi Ylönen Limits of 'Peace through Statebuilding' in Southern Sudan...

- COPNALL, James** (2010). "Dream election result for Sudan's President Bashir" [online article]. *BBC News*, 27 April. [Date of consultation: 3 May 2010]. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8645661.stm>
- DENG, David K.** (2011). *The new frontier. A baseline survey of large-scale land-based investment in Southern Sudan*. Report 1/11. Oslo: Norwegian People's Aid. http://www.npaid.org/filestore/NPA_New_Frontier.pdf
- DENG, Francis M.** (1995). *War of visions: conflict of identities in the Sudan*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. 577 pages.
- DOORNBOS, Martin** (2006). *Global forces and state restructuring: dynamics of state formation and collapse*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. 225 pages. International Political Economy Series.
- DUFFIELD, Mark** (2001). *Global governance and new wars: the merging of development and security*. London: Zed Books. 304 pages.
- EPRILE, Cecil** (1974). *War and peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972*. London: David & Charles. 224 pages.
- EVANS, Peter B.; RUESCHEMEYER, Dietrich; SKOCPOL, Theda** (eds.) (1985). *Bringing the state back in*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. 404 pages.
- FREEDOM HOUSE** (2011). *Freedom of the Press 2011 – Sudan* [online report]. 17 October 2011. [Date of consultation: 15 January 2012]. <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,SDN,456d621e2,4e9bec27c,0.html>
- GARANG, Ngor Arol** (2011). *South Sudan pressured to combat corruption* [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 19 February. [Date of consultation: 15 December 15 2011]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-pressured-to-combat,38038>
- GRAWERT, Elke** (2010). "Introduction". In: *After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan*. Suffolk, UK: James Currey. Pages 1-26.
- GUAL, Philip** (2011). "The \$2 billion grain corruption scandal will likely be closed" [online article]. *The Upper Nile Times*, 2 August 2011. [Date of consultation: 5 January 2012]. <http://www.theuntimes.com/details/182>
- HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH** (2010). "Sudan: ICC warrant for Al-Bashir on genocide" [online article]. *Human Rights Watch*, 13 July 2010. [Date of consultation: 12 January 2012]. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-bashir-genocide>
- JOHNSON, Douglas H.** (2003). *The root causes of Sudan's civil wars*. Oxford: James Currey. 256 pages.
- JOK, JOK M.** (2011). *Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan*. Special Report. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace. <http://www.usip.org/publications/diversity-unity-nation-building-in-south-sudan>
- KURZ, Christof P.** (2010). "What you see is what you get: analytical lenses and the limitations of post-conflict statebuilding in Sierra Leone". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*. Vol. 4, iss. 2, pages 205-36.
- LAKE, David** (2005). "The practice and theory of US statebuilding". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*. Vol. 4, iss. 3, pages 257-84.
- LESCH, Ann M.** (1998). *The Sudan: contested national identities*. Oxford: James Currey. 299 pages.
- MACHAR, Riek** (2011). *Preparing South Sudan for statehood and a bright future*. A speech delivered at South Sudan Academic Forum, 22 February.
- NYABA, Peter Adwok** (2000). *The politics of liberation in South Sudan*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 240 pages.
- PARIS, Roland** (2004). *At war's end: building peace after civil conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 304 pages.
- PARIS, Roland; SISK, Timothy D.** (2007). *Managing contradictions: the inherent dilemmas of postwar statebuilding*. New York: International Peace Academy. 256 pages.
- PARIS, Roland; SISK, Timothy D.** (2009). "Introduction: understanding the contradictions of postwar statebuilding". In: *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Pages 1-20.
- PARIS, Roland; SISK, Timothy D.** (eds.) (2009). *The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 376 pages. (Security and Governance).
- ROCHA MENOCA, Alina** (2010). *State-building for peace: a new paradigm for international engagement*



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Aleksi Ylönen Limits of 'Peace through Statebuilding' in Southern Sudan...

in post-conflict fragile states? RSCAS 2010/34. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.

ROLANDSEN, Øystein (2005). *Guerrilla government: political changes in the southern Sudan during the 1990s*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. 170 pages.

SPLM (2000). "Peace Through Development". *SPLM Today*. <http://www.splmtoday.com/index.php/peace-through-dev-splm-33>

SPLM TODAY (2010). "Southerners 'locked in a failed Sudanese State'; time to decide: SG Amum" [online article]. *SPLM Today*, 26 November. [Date of consultation: October 28, 2012]. <http://www.splmtoday.com/index.php/news-mainmenu-2/560-sg-amum-registers>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2007a). "SPLM withdraw from Sudan national unity government" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 11 October. [Date of consultation: 8 December 2007]. <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article24184>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2007b). "Sudan's SPLM to rejoin national government" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 11 December. [Date of consultation: 3 January 2008]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-SPLM-to-rejoin-national,25130>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2010). "Sudan opposition stunned by Arman's withdrawal amid talk of secret NCP-SPLM deal" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 1 April. [Date of consultation: 3 May 2010]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-opposition-stunned-by-Arman,34607>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2011a). "South Sudan launches private sector development program with World Bank Group" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 1 March. [Date of consultation: 3 March 2012].

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2011b). "South Sudan, Malaysia's Petronas sign oil agreement" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 13 March. [Date of consultation: 20 March 2012]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-launches-private,38131>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2012a). "S. Sudan: World Bank earmarks \$9 for private sector growth" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 21 March. [Date of consultation: 25 March 2012]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article41980>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2012b). "Only 16% of South Sudan's budget reaches state governments – report" [online]. *Sudan Tribune*, 25 May. [Date of consultation: 25 June 2012]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/Only-14-of-South-Sudan-s-budget,42701>

SUDAN TRIBUNE (2012c). "President Kiir demands South Sudan officials return stolen money" [online article]. *Sudan Tribune*, 2 June. [Date of consultation: 12 June 2012]. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article42785>

THE CARTER CENTER (2010). *The Carter Center Election Observation Mission in Sudan Presidential, Gubernatorial, and Legislative Elections, April 2010*. Preliminary Statement. 17 April 2010. Khartoum: The Carter Center. <http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-041710.html>

THE NEW YORK TIMES (2005). "Salva Kiir Mayardit sworn in as Sudan's vice president" [online article]. *The New York Times*, 11 August. [Date of consultation: 27 October 2012]. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/world/africa/11iht-web.0811sudan.html>


THE WORLD BANK (2011). *Multi-donor trust fund for Southern Sudan: taking stock and a way forward*. A FR/OPCS Implementation Support Mission. Washington DC: The World Bank.

UTAS, Mats (ed.) (2012). *African conflicts and informal power: Big men and networks*. London: Zed Books. 288 pages.

YLÖNEN, Aleksi (2011). *Marginalizing state and insurgency formation in southern Sudan*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. 496 pages.

YLÖNEN, Aleksi (2012). "Sudán: el estado marginalizador y desafíos desde las periferias". In: I. RUIZ-GIMÉNEZ (ed.). *Más allá de la barbarie y la codicia*. Barcelona: Bellaterra. Pages 285-322.

YLÖNEN, Aleksi; MALITO Debora (in press). "Bypassing regionalism? International protagonism in the IGAD peace processes in Sudan and Somalia". In: U. SCHULTZ; M. REMPE (eds.). *Regionalism in Africa*. London: Ashgate.



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Aleksi Ylönen Limits of 'Peace through Statebuilding' in Southern Sudan...

Recommended citation

YLÖNEN, Aleksi (2012). "Limits of 'Peace through Statebuilding' in Southern Sudan: Challenges to State Legitimacy, Governance and Economic Development during the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Implementation, 2005-2011" [online article]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 28-40. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-yloenen/vol3iss2-yloenen>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1513>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.

About the author

Aleksi Ylönen
yloenen@hsfk.de, aleksi.yloenen@gmail.com

Dr. Aleksi Ylönen is an interdisciplinary scholar engaged in peace and conflict research. He is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, Germany, and is a member of the African Studies Group of the Autonomous University of Madrid. Dr. Ylönen specialises in causes of conflicts and external interventions in Africa with particular focus on states, elites and rebel movements.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



ARTICLE




Culture of Peace: Art and Play in the Carmen Serdán Centre for Social Integration, Zinacantepec, Mexico State, Mexico

Lizette Rodríguez Marroquín
 Martha E. Gómez Collado

Submitted: May 2012
 Accepted: July 2012
 Published: November 2012



Abstract

This article offers an analysis of theories of Xesús R. Jares, John Paul Lederach, Mario López, Pat Allen, Lilian Dabdoub and Violet Oaklander regarding the culture of peace, education for peace, non-violence and the way young children respond to artistic and play activities. This study is the result of research in the field conducted in the Centro de Integración Social N° 5 – Carmen Serdán, in the town Zinacantepec, Mexico State, Mexico.



Keywords

culture of peace, education for peace, art, play, toy library, conflict resolution

INTRODUCTION

This analysis was based on the model proposed in a 1999 declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Article 1 refers to the values and attitudes of the culture of peace:

- a) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;
- b) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

- c) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- d) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- e) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;
- f) Respect for and promotion of the right to development;
- g) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men;
- h) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;
- i) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace.



These points were used to observe the development of the culture of peace at the Centro de Integración Social N° 5 – Carmen Serdán (CIS N° 5) school, through the perception of the children and teachers with respect to it and the link with art and play.

The research was conducted from October to December 2010, with a population of 5th and 6th grade primary school pupils. These children were chosen because they shared specific characteristics instrumental to the study, such as participating in the plastic arts workshop, which, due to lack of resources, was not open to all pupils. School programmes of previous years meant the chosen group was more familiar with moral values, human rights and civic-mindedness – subjects related to education for peace – which increases the possibility of them having clear ideas of the topics that make up a culture of peace. They also receive a bilingual education at the school and, being old enough to understand its importance, and are able to provide information in this area. Within this context, the following question arose: How is CIS N°5 applying artistic activities and play to work on the culture of peace with these children?

The approach used for this article follows “it’s a process that collects, analyzes and links quantitative and qualitative data in the same studworks, in a series of researches that answers the outlining of the problem as well as to respond to researching questions of a statement of that problem” (Tashakkori y Teddlie, 2003).

Quantitative data were obtained by applying a Likert scale to the children’s responses, so identifying and distinguishing the reference points of culture of peace. The percentages gave a better insight into how majority and minority groups in the population felt about each of the points under consideration and about things related to the field of art and play.

For the qualitative results, questionnaires with open questions were used to reveal the games and toys that form part of the children’s daily routine. This led to an explanation of what for them were specific aspects of peace and violence. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the teachers, referring to the same topics dealt with in the groups of children to identify similarities and differences regarding the culture of peace, education for peace and the perception of the artistic and play activities.

Education for peace is considered to have several forerunners. First of all, the UNESCO recommendation concerning education for international understanding, co-operation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms (18th General Conference, 1974). This highlights the importance for each Member State to “formulate and apply national policies aimed at increasing the efficacy of education in all its forms and strengthening its contribution to international understanding and co-operation, to the maintenance and development of a just peace...” Secondly, there are the initiatives

of John Paul Lederach (2000), and Xesús R. Jarés. Their conceptualisation is the most complete to bring together the elements for this research:

“A process that is educational, dynamic, ongoing and permanent, based on the significant and defining concepts of positive peace and a creative outlook on conflict. By applying socio-affective and problem framing perspectives, the process aims to develop a new kind of culture, a culture of peace that helps individuals to unveil reality with a critical eye so they can place themselves before it and act accordingly.” (Jarés, 1999, pp. 124, 2004, pp. 31 y 2005, pp. 124)

MEXICO AND THE CULTURE OF PEACE

The present situation of children in Latin America is increasingly becoming a focus of attention:

“In a region like Latin America, which continues to be characterised by gross inequalities, investing in early childhood is a moral imperative that offers opportunities to overcome or reduce some of the huge challenges that the region faces, such as persistent poverty, inequality, social failure, chronic unemployment and violence.” (Aasen, 2010)

This confirms the need to rethink what is being done, in terms of education, contextualising and taking into account the factors involved in each of the schools that wish to start functioning in the framework of the culture of peace. Historically, marginalization in Latin America has determined the lives and destinies of millions of people. While under certain circumstances, thinking of resorting to violence may be considered by educated groups, for others, it is a factor in their daily lives rather than intellectual exercise. These extremes have resulted in a lack of information and prevailed over European thinking.

This is an awareness that enables the rebuilding of people who are freer, in control of their lives. The Argentinean Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, president of the Peace and Justice Service in Latin America and a teacher for almost 40 years, once had the opportunity to visit Maya communities in the Mexican state of Chiapas and, referring to their concept of development, stated:

“In our language the word *development* does not exist. What exists? What exists is the word *balance*, in balance with ourselves, with others, with the cosmos, with the supreme being, with god, the god of all names and the god without name, in balance with Mother



Nature. [...] peace as a permanent dynamic force in human relationships makes it possible to establish the balance we must have with life, with the universe, among ourselves.” (Pérez, 2004, pp. 7)

This suggests that every nation in Latin America is rooted in the basic notion of living in a non-violent way.¹ In the case of Mexico this dialogue with the world was based on observations of the dynamic cycles of nature, of the harmony of being in contact with a ‘whole’ (the idea of integral education), where each of the components of this universe is important, its existence being the roots of a cycle of life, and also its respect for life and death.

Exercising respect in education for peace means referring to and focusing on the pupil, starting with what violence, dialogue and human rights mean to them. “They also need to learn they can choose their own way of expressing their feelings. Children know how to familiarize with many variations of feelings to help them being in contact with what they are feeling.” (Oaklander, 2003, pp. 122). This allows us to see how, in play and art, children find the opportunity to produce representations of their conflicts, even of people they are afraid of facing in real life or situations they find difficult or impossible to resolve. At times they can be unreserved and release their emotions during these activities, making the individuals aware and showing them their reality.

According to the 2010 edition of the dictionary of the Real Academia Española, *art* (from Latin *ars, artis*) means virtue, willingness or skill in the performance of a task. It is a demonstration of human activity which expresses a personal and disinterested vision of things real or imaginary with plastic, linguistic or sound resources. The human body should be added to this definition, as another major resource.

“There was a time, before oncoming the industrialism and before the professional specialization was common, that one of the ways society had to produce culture was through a rich tradition of popular art. Common people made items and created images and icons to indicate births and deaths, as well as to commemorate important facts to intensify their way of living.” (Allen, 2009, pp. 12)

Both art and play have components that go back to prehistory and are a form of expression through which social progress became clear, not only in cognition but also in cultural aspects such as communication.

Therefore, thinking and acting within a framework of education for peace, requires taking into consideration that “play and artistic expression are fundamental for the integral development of the individual, throughout the whole process. This thinking and acting also has effects on personal development and on the relation to others and the environment” (Chávez, 2004, pp. 29). Integral development is fundamental for the conception and creation of educational programs, because the awareness of its importance includes principles and actions which take into account the possibility of educating for an intrinsic and common good.

Creativity, as a basic element of conflict resolution, is understood to be the form in which conflicts manifest themselves through certain capacities:

“Creativity, the capacity for constant learning and change, interrelate in a dance that translates into the transformation of the individual. Creative education is oriented towards the development of knowing how to create, allowing extension of the potential of knowing how to understand, knowing how to act, how to exist and how to coexist.” (Dabdoub, 2008, pp. 29)

Now we present the set of fundamental theoretical elements of the culture of peace that are important to observe in the daily lives of the children at CIS N°5.

FULL RESPECT AND FOSTERING HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

In virtue of the idea that the basic mission of education is enabling people to ‘grow’ in terms of dignity, freedom, rights and obligations, the field of human rights is part of a comprehensive education. The role education plays must be based on a complete pedagogical project that stimulates living and enjoying human rights (Jares, 2002, pp. 8).

Xésus R. Jares (2002, pp. 81) states that education for human rights is “a continuous and permanent educational process, based on the broad concept of human rights processes... and on a creative outlook on conflict, to develop the notion of a culture of rights whose purpose is the defence of human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, democracy and peace”. The premise of this definition is that education is ultimately based on values, because it is important for children to know and identify their rights

¹ The concept of *non-violence* can easily be confused with situations of a-violence, that is, lacking violence, but also, many media organizations and official bodies (such as UNESCO) employ it to refer to social movements, historical processes or individuals who use or used it to motivate or bring about social change. When writing the word *non-violence*, the reference is not just to a set of techniques and procedures that renounce violence and the use of weapons, but to an entire constructive and open program of emancipation and justice that has ethical-political, social and economic characteristics (a form of social change) whose aim is to reduce human suffering as much as possible. (Federal District Government, 2010, p. 13)



as an essential part of their development and to grow up promoting justice, cooperation, solidarity, respect, responsibility and creativity.

For these matters, 61% of the children state the field of human rights is dealt with and only a small minority affirms the opposite. This coincides with their teachers, who confirm they promote equal human rights between boys and girls, so that there is no form of abuse or discrimination, emphasising their responsibilities in the boarding school. Human rights education is not just identifying that the precepts have to be defended at all times, but that they correspond to freedoms that every human being requires to develop in a harmonic and integral way.

Having a clear idea of the rights they are entitled to avoids injustice, and clearly pointing out the responsibilities that come with those rights helps them to be able to answer for their actions, this being one of the principles of education for peace. A base is also created for them to become citizens of the world (Jalali, 2001), since the identification of human rights as universal rights gives them the opportunity to transfer the principles and values to a global level. This enables them to identify themselves in other regions of the world and live together with the world's citizens, feeling they are one of them.

PUTTING NON-VIOLENCE INTO PRACTICE


Non-violence, as defined by Mario López (2009), is a methodology, an ethical-political doctrine, a way to build peace that is oriented towards a coherent philosophy which seeks a love of knowledge, experimentation and life. The theory is inspired by Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Henry David Thoreau, John Ruskin and Leo Tolstoy, known for their messages of peace and their notable pacifist actions. Mario López (2004, pp. 785) defines the theory of non-violence as "an active methodology to influence the development and the peaceful outcome of a conflict, mixing with violence to denounce and transform it". He adds that non-violence is for inquiring, committed and determined individuals who want to both study and abide by the conditions required to achieve a more just, peaceful and lasting world. Its character is one of global responsibility, global brotherhood and universal love. This does not mean that a passive attitude is the best way to achieve peace: being passive is not synonymous with peace.

For the theory of non-violence, it is essential to use dialogue and negotiation as instruments because they stimulate thought and the construction of reality in a different way, unlike the many options that language and emotions lead us to. It is a method for action, opposed to passivity, fear or flight; it is like an ethical duty and conviction, demanding justice where a power capable of acting is needed.

One clear example can be found in the life and actions of Gandhi who peacefully carried out his actions. The future of non-violence lies in debating, spreading and consolidating a culture and education for peace, intertwining with democracy. These elements are vital for the construction of peace.

In this category there was a wide variety of responses with most being unaware of what the term *non-violence* stood for.

Graph 1. During everyday activities in the classroom I practice non-violence.



Source: authors, based on questionnaire results

Due to the varied responses and the experience during the presentation of the questionnaire, where the students immediately asked for the meaning of this question, it was clear that the term was confusing for some and completely unknown by others and subsequently the children had to be asked what *violent child* meant to them. For them it was related to direct violence inflicted physically by either hitting, pushing or forcing them to do things they do not like. But they also found words offensive, calling each other names, lies and humiliation. Violent people are seen to be those who do not obey anyone, do not work, steal things, damage buildings and forcefully demand money. Children who do not do these things and also are happy, smile, speak politely to everybody, respect and obey their teachers, were those considered to be not violent (pacific).

For the adults in the study, non-violence means treating each other with respect, and this is stressed before the children so that they do not hurt or discriminate each other. The teachers also believe that acting as a parent or a friend during the school period, gives the children the opportunity to express themselves and talk about their problems, and develop the ability to listen to people who have problems at home. They believe that non-violence means encouraging the children to share their belongings in the classroom. However, nobody provided specific details of the set of techniques and procedures: what it is, how it is used and its enormous potential. While the effort being



made by the teachers is beneficial, the children show clear signs of lacking tools to practice non-violence, and they are confused.

COOPERATION AS A PRINCIPLE TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS

Cooperation between children is often complicated: they have different tastes, ideas and forms of expression which are the result of the varied environments in which they grow up. Having goals in common is part of the training that helps foster respect and develop the ability to adapt to differences present in their classes. During childhood, it is very important that cooperation is not only addressed theoretically, but also put into practice among the children, stimulated by adults as part of the study plans and programs, and also in out-of-class activities such as games and art workshops.

Of the children at CIS N°5, 48% affirm they find it easy to cooperate with the group to achieve common goals. To a certain extent, this can be explained by their everyday living conditions since, being in a boarding school, they do things together outside of class, such as maintaining the garden and preparations and activities for festivals and special celebrations. These activities stimulate their perception of the importance of teamwork in achieving positive results. The teachers also have a positive view of the matter.


However, a significant 23% of the answers were “strongly disagree” and a further 11% was “disagree”. As in all groups, it is important to consider the opinions of those who say they have difficulties in cooperating. The culture of peace implies being able to analyse and reflect before sentencing or judging those whose response is not that of the majority, more so in the case of children still growing up. For these groups, detailed observation, promoting dialogue, providing non-violent options and timely attention are required to prevent possible antisocial behaviour and encourage behaviour in favour of peace.

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION IN YOUNG CHILDREN’S CONFLICTS

Conflicts exist in every stage of life. As mentioned above, they are part of normal development: support is required in the early stages of life to meet basic needs and later to meet the needs that derive from a person’s adaptation to the environment where they grow up and learn. At certain moments, children require external support to help solve their conflicts. It is important that their educational environment has a very clear view of when it is best to leave

children to resolve an interpersonal conflict themselves, and at what point third party intervention becomes necessary.

Graph 2. When I have differences or problems with somebody at school, I solve them with the help of somebody else.



Source: authors, based on questionnaire results

Third party intervention is important for children: 52% stated they “always” or “usually” solve their problems with the help of another person. This could be due to their age and lack of information on how to deal with their problems in a non-violent way. Also, in a cultural sense, it may be that they are not being taught to handle conflict creatively. As for the teachers, most confirmed that they do intervene when conflicts occur, although some indicated there were none and hence there had been no need to act. While the replies of these children and adults are coherent, 12% of the children claimed they needed no help and part of the adults seemed to deny the existence of conflicts.

Tools for mediation are needed to ensure that not only adults intervene in conflicts – the traditional top-down hierarchy – but that a horizontal approach is also possible, with children themselves engaging in an act that, beyond simply avoiding or denying violence, can become a form of conduct for life. This is a way to help shape citizens who are able to express their ideas and settle their differences peacefully by engaging in dialogue. Mediation is a technique that requires practice. From the very beginning its great advantages must be highlighted and the children made aware of what it means if they try to face problems without it.

Freedom is based on not being dependent on third parties to solve conflicts, as third parties are influenced by interests and ideas different from those directly affected by the problem. Freedom is to help children acquire the ability to find an equilibrium between their differences and be able to resolve them in the best way possible without being victims or transgressors.



RESPECT FOR AND PROMOTION OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MEN AND WOMEN

Today, the gender issue is of utmost importance and the children in this study have reached the age where they require instruction in the subject. Coherent theoretical and practical models are fundamental since gender violence is extreme and present in the whole country, up to the point of Mexico being among the countries with the highest levels worldwide. This can have adverse effects on younger generations.

Many of the victims are mothers, teachers, sisters, or people who are in direct contact with the children. A basic condition for creating more assertive and non-violent relationships is children knowing how to recognize or identify discrimination. For the children here, discrimination also means degrading people, either physically or verbally, and not doing anything together with them. While a large majority of the children (54%) state that they realise when acts of discrimination occur, there are others who are not sure.

The culture of peace requires constant analysis and reflection on the cultural patterns that are passed on from one generation to the next and impede the progress of gender equality, forms of behaviour which first appear at home and later at school. For the pupils under study, the school is also their home as they spend most of their time there and the role of the staff becomes hugely important. The teachers acknowledge that gender violence is closely linked to the cultural patterns of the children's place of origin as the source of the continued belief that men are superior to women. As a result, the girls unwittingly assume their 'role', which significantly affects the course of their lives and the effects are seen while they are at the CIS N°5.

EXERCISING FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION IN THE CLASSROOM

One of the basic human rights promoted by the culture of peace is freedom of expression, which requires dialogue, an ongoing effort to listen, participation and reciprocity. Constructive and non-violent conflict management needs children to express themselves, be able to express their ideas and emotions in various ways, and show respect towards other people who also exercise their freedom of expression. One of the features of the pedagogy of liberation is the possibility to use the spoken word as a

basic tool to get out of the alienating spirals of unfair and unbalanced systems.

In this context, education should no longer mean acquiring technical skills and political or economic training – or indoctrination (the criticism voiced by Freire). Nor can it be limited to instruction, memorisation or the typical reproduction of knowledge. It must be devoted to the conscious search of personalized education. To achieve this in children, the teachers need to radically change the way they understand and put into practice their teaching activity, and start building a new educational culture based on values.

The humanist educator Paulo Freire aimed to put freedom into practice through his ideas. Stating that in authoritarian societies the “dominant pedagogy is the pedagogy of the dominant classes” (Freire, 2005, pp. 11), he set out to find the opposite, to ensure that children have the freedom to propose teaching methods in which the oppressed are in a situation where they can discover and reflexively realise themselves. Wherever there is an oppressed individual, the act of love lies in committing to their cause, their liberation. This commitment, by its caring nature, is founded on dialogue. Therefore, for Freire, dialogue means the constitutive movement of consciousness, which opens to the finite and overcomes the barriers aiming to be reunited beyond oneself. One has to be humble, not ignorant, recognise the other. And not feel superior to them, be exclusive or set in one's ways. One must strive to overcome, not feel self-sufficient, but feel mature when communicating, have faith in doing and undoing, creating and recreating. There must be true and critical reflection. The logical consequence is that dialogue, once based on love, humility and faith in humankind, is transformed into a horizontal relationship in which trust resides in both poles.

As consciousness is developed, education for peace also suggests that the possibility arises, given a free context, to make decisions for change and social action. Freedom of expression in the social sense is a constant source of theoretical and practical reframing, and the basis for avoiding stagnation and maintaining a constant flow. At the individual level, games and artistic activities are the most assertive way to enable children to manage the wealth of information, ideas, emotions and concerns they come across every day.

In the dynamics of violence, freedom of expression offers people the possibility to avoid being victims, and for those who are already unfortunate victims to start the healing process, while others can learn through these acts of expression. In this study, 86% of the children assured they have the freedom to give their opinions and participate in their classes, to create and express themselves – a positive point in their upbringing, not only in the academic sense but also for their personal lives. The teachers' views match the perception of their students. In the classroom, they are not stopped from giving their ideas, and in the art work-



shop they have the freedom to choose colours, textures, materials and the subject matter of their creations. As for play and games, the same procedure is followed as in their free time: the children can choose what games to play and how to go about it, although, obviously, care is taken to make sure these games do not lead to situations in which they may hurt themselves.

ART AND ITS LINKS WITH THE CULTURE OF PEACE

The study included several questions regarding the relation between artistic activities and the culture of peace to identify the perception of both the children and their teachers. Additional open questions and direct observation also gave meaningful information for a better understanding of the situation at CIS N°5. Firstly, 21% of the children replied “strongly agree” and 54% replied “agree” on the issue of their artistic activities being directly linked to the culture of peace. They based their opinion on their experience at their young age – ideas that come mainly from their family background and the social environment in which they are growing up. The teachers, coinciding with the children’s perception, mentioned that the artistic activities are occasionally held daily and feature prominently in the special events that are held monthly.

The children’s understanding of the field of peace and art is important because 42% replied “agree” and 37% “strongly agree” on the question of their classes including artistic activities that help them to understand and practice peace. There is a discrepancy among the views of the teachers in this regard. While some state that the activities are held daily but not specifically to encourage a culture of peace, others said various activities are carried out daily, without specifying, and yet others openly stated that there is no specific number of activities or related planning.

The teachers also consider that there are artistic activities with a direct relation to the culture of peace, such as music. As the children learn and rehearse, they have to cooperate and create an atmosphere of harmony both musically and as a group. They need to listen carefully to stay in tune and play the music correctly, while at the same time being understanding and respectful to classmates who may be out of tune or do not pay attention.

Their readiness to do this shows the good work that has been done at the school with regard to artistic activities, which, added to the interest and adequate information coming from parents and teachers, will greatly help to consolidate the culture of peace. Conflicts did occur in the form of the children fighting over which instrument each could play, but the teacher solved this by naming them so that each pupil could take responsibility for their own in-

strument. The arguments stopped and there have been no problems about this since.

According to the teachers, the children have found the relation with peace through music, using songs with a positive message, rather than commercial material from the music industry. An interesting process involves working with melodies and changing the lyrics to Nahuatl or Otomi, since they have to think carefully about the meaning of the words and the rhythm to do it properly. Songs that tell legends or have historical meaning are also used, as the children enjoy them and they appear to help develop their imagination. Among the musical legends, *La Llorona* is their favourite.

The plastic arts teacher uses Mozart to create a special atmosphere in the workshop and, although the children do not like it very much, he observed it relaxes and helps the children work better. It also makes it easier for them to discuss problems they may have at home or with other people, and they are much calmer when they leave the workshop. The children being under less pressure in the workshop than in their classrooms also helps, as well as the fact that they are constantly being encouraged to think about how to use waste materials, such as medicine packaging, drink containers or even objects that are discarded in the kitchen, such as boxes.

The artistic activities are in the library and a temporary classroom that was adapted for those purposes. The teacher in charge has taken up recycling material from the old building. The playground is also used for the children’s ‘military band’ rehearsals. When asked if the spaces reserved by the school for artistic activities actually favour the learning process, 42% of the children affirmed “agree” and 26% “strongly agree”. The school has made good use of the space available but it is still important to make sure that the plastic arts workshop is not limited to 5th and 6th grade pupils, since a culture of peace involves all children: the youngest also need activities that complement their training and gives them an equal opportunity to create and share. The teachers mentioned economic difficulties and lack of space making it impossible to organise evening activities for all pupils and that they are waiting for the authorities to help them finish off the building project for new workshops.

Direct observations revealed that art occupies a fundamental place in the daily routine at CIS N°5. Although it is true that there is no conceptualisation of the culture of peace, respect for nature has been achieved indirectly, by recycling waste materials in the arts sessions and music has encouraged cooperation, respect, tolerance and the importance of multiculturalism.



THE CULTURE OF PEACE AND ITS RELATION WITH PLAYING GAMES

To promote a culture of peace through play, it is essential for all children to be involved (Jares 2004b). This leads to the introduction of cooperation games as necessary strategies to achieve participation, communication and cooperation. The main idea of these activities, where there are no winners or losers, is that everyone has the same opportunity to join in. This helps to develop communication, mutual appreciation, distension and cohesion between the participants: everybody joins in for pure enjoyment and earns the esteem of all.

The teachers note that, although the children play individually every day, during breaks and after school, most of the time they play together and even form groups according to the communities they come from. There is no doubt that the leisure activities generate multiple benefits, specifically in 10 to 11 year-olds where it is important to feel part of a group. Playing alone will give an idea of the importance that it has both at the individual level as in the future in group integration. A majority of the children affirmed they always play with others and 24% said they feel lonely during breaks. The fact that a majority play together may cause conflicts, which stresses the importance of fostering cooperative games.

For T. Orlick (cf. Jares, 2004b, pp. 9), the four features of cooperative games are cooperation, acceptance, participation and enjoyment. These games are said to be a positive reality, generating empathy, cooperation, communication, participation, esteem, a positive concept of oneself and enjoyment. These features are involved in non-violent education because it produces happy children. It has been demonstrated that cooperative work in education leads to substantial improvements in students of all areas of knowledge and in personality development.

It is important to foster both individual and collective games. At this stage of their lives, it is regarded positive for children to predominantly play together. However, opportunities to explore individual games foster the development of other important skills needed during adolescence: being able to identify your needs and preferences through playing games is fundamental for coexistence with other people. While the children experience changes in a natural way without pressure, these activities strengthen coexistence and integration of differences at school.

Playing games happens mostly in groups and sometimes the teachers join in. Games such as football, volleyball and basketball are played with the teachers, meaning their intervention is greater: they do not only coordinate the games but participate and are directly involved.

Games with rules are basic in that they enable the teachers to guide the children during the activity. It gives the children a feeling of security while playing the game and drawing the activity to a close. It also makes them feel confident timely intervention will be made in the case of disputes or aggression. In the culture of peace, the equivalent to the school monitor on the playground is the conflict-management mediator.

The children confirmed that in most cases there is an adult overseeing the games and giving instructions. A significant detail is that some children responded that there is never an adult present during playtime and 14% state that there is an adult only in a minority of cases. Games played without the presence of an adult can be a double-edged sword. On one hand, disorder is more likely to occur and can lead to moments of chaos and injustice, while on the other there exists the opportunity for the children themselves to mediate, help each other and experience non-violence.

The children have balls, sports equipment, skipping ropes, marbles and tops. Game themes are linked to traditional games such as tag, *la víbora de la mar* and *los encantados*. Preference is given to games that do not require many toys (since there are not enough) and are easy to play.

The teachers believe that the link between play and training for a culture of peace lies in the fact that concentrating on specific activities makes the children care about doing things well and takes away opportunities to bother other children or misbehave. As younger children are attracted by games played by older ones, playing together creates opportunities for older children to invite the younger ones to participate.

The toy library is a shelf where eight board games are kept, in the school library. These games are connected with traditional values and topics, such as lotto; however, they are still unopened. The librarian commented that the toy library is, unfortunately, rarely used because the games are listed on the inventory and cannot be given to the children that easily. There is more possibility of a teacher being allowed to take it out on request because the librarian is assured somebody is in charge. Still, at times, children come to ask for games and the librarian, who is also the music teacher, claims to be "between a rock and a hard place", worrying that the game may be damaged or get lost.

On visits made to the CIS N°5, the children were seen playing with balls, carts, marbles, cup-and-ball, skipping ropes, dolls, stones, sticks, bits of wood from pallets, water, sand and objects from the playground. The amount of toys varies from child to child since their families do not have enough resources or because their parents or tutors do not allow them to have more. Some children do not play and limit themselves to watching, finding it very difficult to interact with other children. It should also be pointed out that some children only play with relatives or members of their group.



CONCLUSIONS

Since education for peace aims to be coherent with the idea of respect for the environment and living beings, the school should consider the possibility of keeping animals. One of the advantages of CIS N°5 is the amount of land it has, suitable for growing plants and even for keeping farm animals.

The school has handled the issue of human rights in the best possible way, however, it is important to focus on promoting duty as shared responsibility. Human rights education needs to be a school subject in its own right since it implies not only being informed of each of the principles it promotes, but also analysis, discernment and, above all, helping people to assimilate the knowledge.

It is necessary for all at the school to have the same information on the implementation of non-violence practices: during the research it was found that pupils and teachers were confused in this regard. Working on this means offering help in the field of information and even more so in training, being a tool for life. Involving parents in this is also very important since there is a need to group, in the best possible way, the people involved in the human development of the children. In addition, this will provide a tool for decision-making at CIS N°5 to deal with conflicts without causing injury or hurt.

It is clear that the school community realises the importance of paying attention when listening to a fellow pupil's ideas or emotions. The ability to listen is an important part of conflict management, as is the ability to create things together. Without this skill it is very difficult to get to know people. Even people who are deaf can use sign language to show they are paying attention to what another has to say.

In the field of cooperation, children need to be guided by people who have full knowledge of what it means to work in groups, the main features of the age groups that correspond to each activity, as well as willingness, interest and patience in cooperating on tasks.

At CIS N°5, third party intervention is necessary for solving conflicts. Workshops focussing on this could be set up, which must be based on the interests and concerns of the children. This requires listening to them and perhaps giving them options of possible courses of action. In this process, dialogue is essential, as part of the development of their creativity lies in talking about their problems, as well as getting them to come up with ideas for non-violent intervention themselves. Above all they should be given information on mediation, what it involves, its elements and relevance to their daily lives. The way these tools are transmitted is very important as they are to be seen not only as a preventive measure, but also as a way of learning to live with less violence.

Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for men and women were seen to occur naturally when the children play freely, as, given a choice, they played indistinctly with all toys whether or not stereotypically for boys or girls. Collective games encourage equal participation through equal interaction, when acting as a leader or captain in the course of the game.

Regarding the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression in the classroom, the children generally perceive that they are allowed to express themselves freely. This must be enhanced on a daily basis through activities outside teaching hours that improve their ability to develop dialogue and communication capabilities.

One of the stronger points of CIS N°5 is the application of art and its relationship to the culture of peace. Adequate use has been made of time, space and, particularly, resources such as recycled waste material. The plastic arts activities are an area of opportunity if they are extended to include the younger pupils. The diversity of workshops should be increased and people should be involved in collaborating on them.

The school needs more activities that require group participation, not necessarily sport but rather cooperation and education activities. Through practical experience a wide repertoire can be built up so that the children do not depend on the constant presence of an adult to monitor the activities and the opportunity arises for the children themselves to take on the role of leader.

The toy library is the area that requires most attention. This is understandable as the librarian in charge has so many responsibilities that there is not much time left to organise the toy library. A person with the profile of a peace toy librarian is required to enrich this service, in dire need of more toys, and to set up games sessions and workshops. Above all there is the need to create and maintain games which will offer the opportunity to have a more equal and fair environment, since not all the children have access to toys or the financial resources to buy them.

The school has good prospects for continuing the process of building and maintaining the culture of peace. Specific attention is required in each of the areas that have been studied, and specific support is needed to make this possible.

Civil society can participate in projects that are beneficial to the children and generate cohesion with the culture of peace, the project to which everyone can contribute. Mexico State has a large number of talented people in various fields, particularly in the Autonomous University of Mexico State which has promising young individuals who are able to contribute to a school such as CIS N°5.

It is important to realise that, at this school, the culture of peace has been built up gradually through the efforts of those who work there, particularly through activities set up by the teachers, even though they lacked some



of the means required for a pedagogy that frees people and leads to a more just society. Activities like the art workshops, a fundamental part of daily life at the school, have caused the school environment to be more dynamic. The culture of peace has been maintained through active and ongoing participation of the children who, in their free time activities, can find more possibilities for comprehensive growth.

Efforts and actions that deconstruct violence are beneficial if they are realized from a position of knowledge and perseverance, and if there is continuous reflection and feedback by the individuals involved. The present situation in Mexico urgently requires active implication of all – we need to learn to coexist and grow together. At CIS N°5 the basic elements are present for this, and even more, to be possible. ■

References

- AASEN, Berna** (2010). “América Latina: infancia es un ‘imperativo moral’”. *La Jornada*, 18 August 2010 [Retrieved 3 March 2011].
<http://www.lajornadanet.com/diario/archivo/2010/agosto/18/3.html>
- ALLEN, Pat B.** (2009). *Arte-Terapia. Guía de autodescubrimiento a través del arte y la creatividad*. Madrid: Ediciones Gaia.
- CHÁVEZ, Ma. de los Ángeles** (2004). *Educación sensorial a través del arte*. México: CONACULTA.
- DABDOUB, Lilian** (2008). *Desarrollo de la creatividad para el docente. Estrategias para estimular las habilidades del alumno*. México: Ed. Esfinge.
- FREIRE, Paulo** (2005). *Pedagogía del oprimido*. México: Siglo XXI Editores.
- GOBIERNO DEL DISTRITO FEDERAL** (2010). *Manual para escuelas aprendiendo a convivir. Un proceso de intervención contra el maltrato e intimidación entre escolares (Bullying)*. México: Secretaría de Educación del Distrito Federal, Dirección Ejecutiva de Educación Básica.
- JARES, Xesús R.** (1999). *Educación para la paz. Su teoría y su práctica*. Madrid: Editorial Popular.
- JARES, Xesús R.** (2002). *Educación y Derechos Humanos. Estrategias didácticas y organizativas*. Madrid: Editorial Popular.
- JARES, Xesús R.** (2004a). *Educación para la paz en tiempos difíciles*. Bilbao: Bakeaz.
- JARES, Xesús R.** (2004b). *El placer de jugar juntos. Técnicas y juegos cooperativos*. Madrid: Editorial CCS.
- JARÉS, Xesús R.** (2005). *Educación para la Verdad y la esperanza. En tiempos de globalización, guerra preventiva y terrorismo*. España: Editorial Popular.
- LEDERACH, John Paul** (2000). *El abecé de la paz y los conflictos. Educación para la paz*. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata.
- LÓPEZ MARTÍNEZ, Mario** (2004). “Noviolencia”. En: M. López Martínez (dir.). *Enciclopedia de paz y conflicto*. Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada/Junta de Andalucía. Pages 783-795.
- LÓPEZ MARTÍNEZ, Mario.** (2009). *Política sin violencia. La noviolencia como humanización de la política*. Colombia: Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios (UNIMINUTO).
- OAKLANDER, Violet** (2003). *Ventanas a nuestros niños. Terapia gestáltica para niños y adolescentes*. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Cuatro Vientos.
- PÉREZ ESQUIVEL, Adolfo** (2004). “La paz, como fruto de la justicia y el alcance del equilibrio”. *Revista Novedades Educativas: Reflexión y debate*. Year 16, no. 164, August. Argentina.
- TASHAKKORI, A.; TEDDLIE, C.** (eds.) (2003). *Handbook of mixed methods in social & behavioral research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Pages 541-56.
- UNESCO** (1974). *Actas de la Conferencia General. 18a reunión*. París, 17 de octubre-23 de noviembre de 1974.
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140/114040s.pdf>
- UNESCO** (1999). *Declaración y Programa de Acción sobre una Cultura de Paz*. [Retrieved 23 February 2011].
http://www3.unesco.org/iycp/kits/sp_res243.pdf



■ Recommended citation

RODRÍGUEZ MARROQUÍN, Lizette; GÓMEZ COLLADO, Martha E. (2012). "Culture of Peace: Art and Play in the Carmen Serdán Centre for Social Integration, Zinacantepec, Mexico State, Mexico" [online article]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 41-51. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-rodriuez-gomez/vol3iss2-rodriuez-gomez>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1529>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.

■ About the authors

Lizette Rodríguez Marroquín
liz.uaemex@rocketmail.com

Lizette Rodríguez has a degree in Psychology and a Master's in Peace and Development studies from the Autonomous University of Mexico State, where she is a psychology lecturer at the Faculty of Law. She works as a psychotherapist and a consultant for municipal projects in various states in Mexico.

Martha E. Gómez Collado
marthagomez_tutoria@yahoo.com.mx

Martha E. Gómez has a degree in Political Science and Public Administration, a master's in peace and development studies from the Autonomous University of Mexico State and a PhD in peace, conflict, and democracy from the University of Granada, Spain. She has published *Fundamentos teóricos de los estudios para la paz* y *La tutoría académica en la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales de la UAEM desde la perspectiva de la Educación para la paz*.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



ARTICLE

Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence: *Les Événements*, a Lost Opportunity for Peace

Miquel Calçada

Submitted: June 2012

Accepted: September 2012

Published: November 2012

Abstract

This year is the 50th anniversary of the long-lasting and merciless campaign for the independence of Algeria. On the French side it was called *les événements* (the events), a euphemistic way to avoid the term war. However, it was a total war that lasted eight long years, and ended with liberty for the Algerian people. Unfortunately, all parties lost. The rage between the parties was so high at the late stages of the war that some of the French citizens — the so called *Pieds-Noirs* — lashed out. They burned hospitals, libraries, reserve fuel tanks, and all kinds of infrastructure, just to leave what had been also their land, like a desert, as it was back in 1830 when the French army defeated the Ottomans and took control of this great African territory. Grim atrocities took place throughout the conflict, but especially at the end of the war, forcing a French-European-rooted diaspora of barely one million people to flee.

Keywords

conflict resolution, peace culture, Algerian war, colonialism

“Don’t walk behind me; I may not lead. Don’t walk in front of me; I may not follow. Just walk beside me and be my friend”. Albert Camus

“The weak can never forgive. Forgiveness is the attribute of the strong”. Mahatma Gandhi

1. INTRODUCTION

From a historic point of view, Algeria’s war of independence (1954-1962) has been extensively researched. No other conflict since WWII has led to such an amount of mixed

feelings from everyone involved: feelings of rage, anger, deliberate indifference and melancholy, especially from those who had to leave the country in the last three months of the conflict.¹ In France, as late as 2002, the 40th anniversary of the settlement, the media were still cautious when speaking about the issue. Some did not mention it, and others were still condemning the turnaround imposed in 1959 by French President General Charles De Gaulle, who used the word “self-determination” in a speech for the first time.² Since the end of the war, a huge number of books has been published, and many explanations have been offered in films, on TV, and in songs, trying to justify, understand, and heal what was the cruellest, most merciless and senseless war since WWII.

1 A. Rowley (1990)

2 See <http://www.ina.fr/histoire-et-conflits/decolonisation/video/CAF88024409/allocution-radiodiffusee-et-telivisee-du-general-de-gaulle.fr.html>



During 2005 and 2006 I had the privilege to conduct a journalistic research for a TV series first broadcast in 2007.³ For this TV programme I became an Algerian history aficionado, often travelling to former Algerian war zones and conducting many interviews with witnesses. I gained knowledge of the native people as well as the Pieds-Noirs, the French citizens, born in Algeria, who were descendents of French settlers, and I developed various ideas regarding the subject, one of which I will develop in this paper.

To set the framework, it should be recalled that Algiers was France's second most populated city in the 1950s, and the most modern city in Africa, a vibrant capital with an interesting mixed population. The city was somewhat divided. There was a part of Algiers called the European city; modern buildings faced the Mediterranean, and there were wide boulevards and well-illuminated streets. On the other hand, there was the old Kasbah where the native people lived. There were also mixed neighbourhoods like Bab-el-Oued, one of the most popular. These were bustling quarters, where one could hear Italian, Maltese, Catalan, Spanish, and French (evidently with a special accent).⁴ Religions (Christianity, Islam, Judaism) also coexisted with absolute normalcy. Would it not be possible for such an incredible capital, in the second largest country in Africa, with a long history, a mixed population, many natural resources, and with such assets, to become a new California?⁵ This last thought has led me many times to think and rethink what could have been done after or before independence, if anything, to avoid the exodus of around 1,000,000 people, leaving Algerian society bereft of a vital and necessary part of its work force. Engineers, doctors, nurses, teachers, farmers, lawyers and more all fled in large numbers, mainly to France, a country that contemptuously referred to them as Pieds-Noirs. We can see the opposite in a fortunately successful case. What would South Africa have been if the thirst for revenge had succeeded?

2. BACKGROUND

It is largely accepted that the hostilities began in 1954, on November 1, on what was called *Toussaint Rouge* (Bloody All Saints, named after the Christian All Saints Day). A series of attacks occurred across Algerian territory. From that day on the situation escalated, following the known spiral of provocation and retaliation. During those first stages, when conflict emerged blatantly, the National

Liberation Front (FLN), had relatively few resources, although we do not know for sure if these attacks were planned and intended to be a provocation. They led to an overreaction on behalf of the French authorities, allowing the FLN to successively "gain support and create a revolutionary situation".⁶ This is the official version of how the war began. However, few people are aware of the mass execution that took place nine years before, which is where I think the roots of the conflict lie.⁷

On May 8, 1945, the day that Germany surrendered in WWII, many cities were celebrating the end of the war and the liberation of Europe. That same day, Sétif, a small market town located in the west of Algeria saw the first major clash between French authorities, the gendarme, and thousands of Algerian Muslims celebrating the victory of their brothers in Europe. It goes beyond saying that the majority of the French army that fought in Europe were from the French territories of northern Africa, mainly Algeria. For that reason, the celebration was special. Aroused by words like democracy, freedom, liberation, and so on, the clash began when some Muslims gathered at the festivities flying Algerian flags as a symbol of freedom. The parade ended with shootings and the gendarme killing several demonstrators: the fuse was lit.

Riots followed, and after five days of chaos, 103 French settlers were dead. The retaliation was brutal. Historians seem to generally agree on the number of casualties at what is known as the Massacre of Sétif. Near the town, around 15,000 Muslim inhabitants (a conservative count) were shot by the French army, mainly by Senegalese and other sub-Saharan troops. Although this event was barely reported in metropolitan France, the impact on the Muslim population was tremendous.

For the French authorities and Pied-Noir settlers, it was also a point of no return, and distrust spread through both communities. France had nearly a decade to try to mend relations but unfortunately, nothing was mended. It took 60 years for France to officially offer an apology. In 2005, the French Ambassador in Algeria Mr. Hubert Colin de Verdière, called the massacre an "inexcusable tragedy".⁸

In 1955, the population of Algeria had a 1 to 9 ratio. There were about a million European settlers, mostly living in big cities such as Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, though some were farmers in the countryside. And there was a combined population of nine million Muslim and Tamazight⁹ people.

3 M. Calçada (2007)

4 L. Mazzetta (1989)

5 P. Bloch (1961)

6 L. Kriesberg (2009a)

7 A. Rey-Goldzeiguer (2002)

8 See <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2005-05-09-voa29.html>

9 Original settlers were known as Berbers. This term derives from the Latin term *barbarous*, meaning stranger or wild, in a word, not Roman.



Among the population in France, a myth had spread regarding their counterparts in Algeria. The stereotype of a Pied-Noir was that of someone who was well off, care-free and owned land, and was rather hazy about much of the Muslim population. This, however, was not the reality. Although there were some landowners, the majority of the European immigrants were second or third generation, and their families had arrived mainly from the southern parts of Europe to do all sorts of jobs. Some were artisans, some were civil servants, and their peers did everything in between. Undoubtedly, it was worst for the original settlers.¹⁰

Illiteracy among the Muslim population was widespread, and nothing was being done to reverse this situation. Although there was no legal segregation, few Muslim children attended school, for instance. Unemployment was also a major concern because the economy was not sufficiently strong to absorb big numbers of unskilled workers. Another concern, also present in many other Mediterranean cities, was the increasing number of shantytowns surrounding the capital.¹¹ Besides that, the majority of Pieds-Noirs considered that the Muslim population was used to living that way, and somehow they were a 'tamed people'. Were these tamed people French, though? They were French of Muslim faith, and they had the same rights and obligations, although education and healthcare did not seem to be among them. They could also vote for the Algerian Parliament, but in a different polling station, so, although there was no segregation or apartheid, there was flagrant inequality precisely because a vote at those stations counted as half a Pied-Noir vote or even less: abstention was high.

Did anyone perceive that this situation could evolve negatively if it was not properly addressed? To answer this question, we have to set our minds in the immediate context of the aftermath of WWII. For instance, segregation was normal in the United States of America, one of the winners in that war, and even the American army at that time had segregated battalions. Apartheid in South Africa was at its peak. Although the world was evolving rapidly during the 1950s, colonialism was still in place. Many empires, like the British, still existed at the time. Many third world countries were ruled by the country which had overcome them, and some states were beginning to experience the communist economy.

In this context, it is easy to understand why, for the majority of Pieds-Noirs, there was nothing wrong, or at least palpably wrong, with that situation. Furthermore, as Algeria was officially part of France, the French govern-

ment had not ceased building infrastructures like railways, electric lines, roads, ports, and so on. Since the end of the 19th century, the French had treated this part of northern Africa in a substantially different way than they treated colonies like Morocco and Tunisia, not to mention Senegal, Ghana, Chad and all the other sub-Saharan French colonies. Therefore, there was no concern about this inequality. The ones who dared to speak out about their concerns were disregarded as communists or, worse, were branded as intellectuals. Henri Alleg, a member of the French Communist Party (PCF), was one of the voices that spoke out.¹² One of the first to notice these colonialist injustices was Albert Camus, a descendant of Balearic settlers. As well as the best seller *L' étranger* (The Outsider), a novel where he symbolises with extreme rawness the rage of the Muslim population, Camus wrote three specific essays.¹³ In the essays, titled *Chronique algérienne* (Algerian Chronicle), he called for an end of the violence from both French and Muslim sides, rejecting the idea of a binary world divided by good or evil, Christian or Muslim. This claim in favour of human rights won him the Nobel Prize in 1957, where he defined himself by claiming his Algerian heritage.

3. HISTORICAL MILESTONES

During the eight years of conflict, there were some significant milestones. A month after the Toussaint Rouge, the first military reinforcements were sent to Algeria. It is important to note that this war mobilised hundreds of thousands of French troops. In the First Indochina War (1946-1954), which ended with the absolute defeat of the French army in Dien-Bien-Phu, the use of recruits from France was forbidden. In contrast, the war in Algeria involved thousands of young recruits from all corners of France, who had never thought they would be involved in a war. Officially, there was not a war there — only some 'events'. Coming from a civilised world and originally thinking they would simply be spending a few months in sunny vacation spots, these young French army recruits were terrified when they found out what was going on.

France soon declared a state of emergency and nominated an army general as the General Governor. This was 1955, also the year of the first United Nations debate on the matter, something that upset French authorities. France, as a member of the Security Council, pressed the UN to enact powerless declarations. The declarations supported peace in Algeria but went no further, and they did not bring up the right of Algerian people to self-determination.

10 B. Stora (2004)

11 A. Rebahi (2004).

12 Henri Alleg was the editor of *Alger Républicain* and was detained and tortured in 1957 by military paratroopers. This experience was published in a book entitled *La question* (The Question). See <http://www.complete-review.com/reviews/divbiog/alleg.htm>

13 A. Camus (1958)



The first FNL attacks in Algiers began in 1956. In 1957, General Massu was given responsibility for bringing order to Algiers, an act that led to the infamous battle of Algiers. By 1958, the situation was getting worse. The French army battalion in Algeria was asking for more troops. The French government had been reluctant to send more troops, partly due to public pressure and partly because government officials were seeing that this strategy was going nowhere and draining the public budget. The situation worsened when an uprising in Algeria threatened to extend to France. The man who had been referred to by generals in Algeria as “the French myth of WWII”, Charles de Gaulle, was appointed head of the French Fifth Republic.

De Gaulle’s first political action was a well-planned trip to Algeria, punctuated by huge welcoming rallies, in early June 1958. At that time, General de Gaulle was popular. The people in France loved him because he had been their liberator. The Pieds-Noirs saw de Gaulle as the only man who could listen to and understand them. Muslims felt some affection towards him, because de Gaulle had been a liberator and the Commander-in-Chief of most who had served during WWII.

In fact, General de Gaulle was one of the high-ranking military who rejected the armistice with Germany that led to the invasion of France. In the French psyche, the armistice is still a bitter memory and De Gaulle did not deceive their expectations. In an impressive rally in the middle of Algiers, his first words were “Je vous ai compris!... Je sais ce qui s’est passé ici!” (I understand you... I know what’s been going on here!).¹⁴ The General reformed the French Constitution, was elected as President of the French Republic, implemented social changes for the Muslim population, and offered an honourable surrender to the FLN, but the reforms had come too late and the war was at its peak, in a kind of stalemate.¹⁵ The division in what once was, to some extent, a united community was now clearly insurmountable. One year later, in 1959, on a televised speech, De Gaulle pronounced, for the first time, the words the Pieds-Noirs had long feared: self-determination. Maybe because he realised that in fact change had come too late, or because he saw that the continuation of the conflict seriously threatened the population of France and the economy, or just because he came to the conclusion that France, as a sign of the times, could no longer rule colonies, he finally stepped in.

Reaction in Algeria was immediate. Pieds-Noirs felt betrayed and bitter towards everyone — the French people, the army as an institution, the French government, and above all General de Gaulle. This betrayal led to all manner of upheavals, a barricade revolt, and paradoxically,

Pieds-Noirs fighting against the French army. The bitterest result of this turmoil was the creation of the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (the OAS, the Secret Army Organisation), in 1961. At that time, the independence of Algeria was inevitable, although there had been no referendum. The OAS was the most sinister terrorist organisation, established by civilian Pieds-Noirs as well as army defectors, most of whom were paratroopers. Led by General Raoul Salan, the OAS sowed terror attempting massive bombings in Algeria as well as in France.

After negotiations in Évian (France) between the FNL and the French government, a referendum held in France approved the so-called Évian accords. Finally, on July 1, 1962, the majority of the Algerian population voted “yes” to the self-determination referendum. Two days later, the French government recognised Algerian independence.

4. FRAMING THE CONFLICT

A recent article from *The New York Times* about the rebellion in Libya, citing a study conducted by the self-same author, emphasised that “over 50 percent of the nonviolent movements from 1900 to 2006 succeeded, compared with about 25 percent of the violent insurgencies”.¹⁶ Obviously, the conflict we are framing falls within the last group, specifically as a type of conflict that Professor Kriesberg of Syracuse University outlines as those in which “the cost of the violence is huge (...) and alternatives may have been better”.¹⁷

An overwhelming number of African and Middle Eastern countries achieved their independence between the late 1950s and the beginning of the 1970s. Starting in Libya as early as 1951 and finishing in Zimbabwe as late as 1980, the peak of decolonisation was in the 1960s. The liberations were very diverse; for instance, Morocco and Tunisia, neighbours of Algeria, gained their sovereignty partly as a consequence of the events that were taking place in Algeria, and also because, as noted, decolonisation was a characteristic of the times. Algeria, although a colony, was believed by the French government and population to be part of their territory. This is a structural frame paradigm whose main concerns were defined by Professor Dayton as a blatant structural inequality (casting of ballots in a second-class polling station, and deficient, if any, access to health care and education by the Muslim population) and an unfair distribution of power and resources (best farmlands, energy sources, etc.) by the Pied-Noir.¹⁸ In fact,

¹⁴ See <http://www.ina.fr/media/petites-phrases/video/I00008238/charles-de-gaulle-je-vous-ai-compris.fr.html>

¹⁵ B. Dayton (2011, January 28)

¹⁶ E. Chenoweth (2011)

¹⁷ L. Kriesberg, personal communication, April 13, 2011.

¹⁸ B. W. Dayton (in print).



the French government did not want to recognise these structural asymmetries “that relate also on demography, economic resources, coercive resources, normative claims and other factors”¹⁹

The Algerian society, prior to *Les Événements*, was basically an absolute, tolerant and peaceful society. Yet the concept of *negative peace* matched this society completely. We are describing not only a lack of physical violence, but harsh relations, structural violence and a place “where poverty and death rates are greater than those of many others in the society”²⁰. Indeed, a great majority of the Muslim population had learnt to accept those inequalities as “the way things are”²¹.

Then how was it possible that this absolute, tolerant and negative-peaceful society engaged in such a horrendous conflict? There are several answers. For instance, the growing thrust of ‘identity’. It is known that this is a basic and “non-negotiable human need that cannot be suppressed”²². When describing the background earlier, I recalled that what was known as the Massacre of Sétif took place immediately after the end of WWII. That was a catalytic moment for Muslim-Algerian identity, and also one of the few times when a flag other than the French one, was seen publicly (afterward came the carnage mentioned above). The handcrafted Algerian flags raised that day were the expression of a sentiment by part of the community — the Muslim community — thus a symbol of a nation. And a nation is a community “which normally tends to produce a state of its own”²³. This fact is also related to identity. For the first time, Pieds-Noirs clearly were witness to a threat to their own French identity. For the first time, they were perfectly aware of a real psychological and physical danger.²⁴ Conflict took a little longer, but in terms of history, it was about to begin.

We can establish though that ‘threat’, the first step in escalation, and intractability appeared for the first time in Sétif or, nine years after, on November 1, 1954, *Tous-saint Rouge*. The emergence, maintenance, and growing affiliation of the FLN, led to this organisation becoming the main stakeholder against the colonialist power. This was only in part “attributable to the internal dynamics of the movement itself”²⁵ the rest was the ‘merit’ of the French government and army.

During 1954 and 1955, retaliation against the FLN was fiercely endorsed by the French government, but instead of defeating it, this overreaction meant the FLN won support in a classic strategy.²⁶ This support was achieved not only because of the retaliation itself, but as a result of the treatment applied to the whole Muslim population, “helping to merge movement and solidarity layers”²⁷. This treatment was especially dire in the countryside. Entire villages were displaced and the inhabitants separated to avoid any kind of contact or shelter for the so-called rebels. This was obviously very distressing but, as long as it happened far from the main cities, and far from the majority of European settlers, a sense of distortion arose among this population. Distortion is a “psychological response to threat”²⁸ that leads to rigidification, which was achieved when the conflict moved to towns and cities, especially the capital, Algiers. That was in 1957, and polarisation was clearly visible on the streets, especially when the French army took charge of the situation and turned the city into a battlefield to retaliate against the Muslim population. This was the time of countless bombing attacks by the FLN against French security officers and the general population with French counter-intelligence responding by setting bomb traps. Thus, polarisation aroused the behaviours of both populations, the Muslims and Pieds-Noirs. Not only these behaviours were considered ‘threatening’, but also the beliefs or even characteristics of the other (...) over time.²⁹ This is the classic stage when long-time relations among neighbours and between homeowners and servants, Muslim workers and employers, peasants and landlords, etc. began to break up. This phase of the conflict is described in detail in a 1962 pioneer documentary film called *Les oliviers de la justice* (The Olive Trees of Justice),³⁰ and more recently in the two-chapter TV series offered by French public television, TF1, *L’adieu* (The Farewell, 2003).³¹

A salient issue during the phase of rigidification is the reinforcement of the conflict by ‘dehumanisation’. This concept comes from maintaining the “domination-submission relationship, between low and high-status groups”³². Professor Tidwell’s description of hatred and enmification is consistent during this stage of the Algerian war, known as the “Battle of Algiers”³³. Actual violence was the norm

19 L. Kriesberg (2010)

20 L. Kriesberg (2009b).

21 T. Northrup (1989)

22 Lecture delivered by Professor B. Dayton. Friday, February 4, 2011 at 10.00 a.m. 111 Maxwell Hall.

23 A. Smith (1983)

24 T. Northrup, Op. cit., p. 65

25 K. Andrews (2001)

26 L. Kriesberg (2009a), p. 160 citing Debray, 1967 and Fanon, 1966.

27 W. Gamson (1991).

28 T. Northrup, Op. cit., p. 69 citing Kelly, 1995.

29 T. Northrup, Op. cit., p. 70.

30 *Les oliviers de la justice* <http://www.ina.fr/histoire-et-conflits/decolonisation/video/CAF97063633/un-film-sur-l-algerie-les-oliviers-de-la-justice.fr.html>

31 *L’adieu* http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xcfdv8_l-adieu-2003-trailer_shortfilms

32 T. Northrup, Op. cit., p. 72.

33 A. Tidwell (1998)



and became a cultural value. In fact, “without anyone to keep a watch, some people may simply go on a rampage of uncontrolled vilification”.³⁴ Unfortunately, this was not just ‘some people’, but the majority of the paratroops deployed to suppress the wave of bombings perpetrated randomly by the FLN, as torture and inhumane treatment spread.

On September 29, 2010, General Paul Aussaresses, former Captain and Chief Intelligence Officer, declared without reserve in an interview that he himself had perpetrated torture through the most atrocious methods.³⁵ What are the mechanisms that make ‘normal’ people commit such horrific actions? The explanation, as stated above, stems from the concept of dehumanisation as a precursor to enmification. This process dissociates humans from guilt and “creates a web of rationalisation, justifying and explaining enmity”.³⁶ Obviously, such a process makes violence more tolerable and makes it “easier to harm something or someone construed as not human or inhuman”.³⁷

The final stage in Professor Northrup’s process of escalation and intractability is collusion. This stage not only serves to crystallise the conflict; the awareness of ending the conflict “contributes to [its] intractability”.³⁸ We can clearly envision this stage in two precise phases of the Algerian war. Undoubtedly, one is more acute than the other. The first time the FLN unleashed its violence in Algiers was in retaliation for the bomb trap of the hard-liners. Pieds-Noirs organised the paramilitary group in Rue Thèbes in the Kasbah, killing 71 Muslims, including women, elderly people, and children. This was a fast track to violence — a step beyond, sudden escalation. The second time was in early 1961 (January 8, 1961), when the referendum on self-determination was first approved by 75% of voters in France. To the European population in Algeria this was the final proof of betrayal. As mentioned, they were clearly aware that their presence in their native land would be threatened. Like an animal backed into a corner, this perception was a key factor in establishing the OAS.

So far, I have intended to frame the conflict mainly from the point of view of the European settlers, the Pied-Noir population, which accounted for roughly a tenth of the 10 million inhabitants of Algeria at that time.

Knowing the dirty, and not-so-dirty, war waged by the French army and authorities, it is easy to understand that

they achieved exactly the opposite of isolating the so-called terrorist group, trying to “woo moderate constituents” to challenge the first skirmishes of the FLN.³⁹ This aside, what was the FLN strategy to demonstrate it was gathering all ‘combatants for freedom’ and, at the same time, get rid of any other stakeholders on behalf of the Muslim population? First, using the classical action-reaction model, the FLN, as mentioned, became much more than a minor piece on the Algerian political chessboard. Second, the historical context (decolonisation) could also explain their constant growth. The Muslim population’s general ingrained beliefs about revolution also led to the idea that “non-institutional tactics can advance that cause”.⁴⁰ As we have seen, FLN actions “produced an overreaction by the adversary that [made] them win wide support,”⁴¹ as “increased costs do not always result in decreased participation in the movement”.⁴² The FLN clearly managed the conflict within a structural framework, yet with a revolutionary and deconstructive technique. Indeed, the slogan of the FLN at that time was: *La Révolution algérienne, un peuple au combat contre la barbarie colonialiste* (The Algerian revolution, a fighting population against barbarous colonialism).⁴³

The second most salient framework would be the ‘emotional frame’.⁴⁴ As noted, the creation of OAS was the last resort to overcoming the mixed feelings of fear, grief, and loss, both physically and geographically, that the majority of Pieds-Noirs experienced by 1961. In the summer of 1962, when the whole Pied-Noir population fled from Algeria, most were not aware that healing would be needed. In fact, some of them, even today, in a sort of cognitive dissociation, deny that any wound exists.

5. TRANSFORMING THE CONFLICT. POLITICAL SCI-FI

...Mais les faits, eux, n’ont pas changé et, demain, il faudra encore en tenir compte pour déboucher sur le seul avenir acceptable: celui où la France, appuyée inconditionnellement sur ses libertés, saura rendre justice, sans discrimination, ni dans un sens ni dans l’autre, à toutes les communautés de l’Algérie.

34 Tidwell, Op.cit., p. 134.

35 See <http://www.ima.fr/histoire-et-conflits/guerre-d-algerie/video/CAB00060096/plateau-invite-general-paul-aussaresses.fr.htm>. See also *Le petit soldat* (1960) by Jean-Luc Godard, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJZ3xEkDaSs&feature=related>

36 Tidwell, Op.cit., p. 137.

37 T. Northrup, Op. cit., p. 74.

38 Ibid., p. 76.

39 L. Kriesberg (2009c)

40 E. Hirsch (1990)

41 L. Kriesberg (2009c), Op. cit.

42 E. Hirsch, Op. cit.

43 B. Stora, Op. cit.

44 B. W. Dayton (in print)



Aujourd'hui, comme hier, ma seule ambition, en publiant ce libre témoignage, est de contribuer, selon mes moyens, à la définition de cet avenir.⁴⁵

The words written by Albert Camus in the first foreword of his 1958 book *Actuelles III, Chronique Algérienne, 1939-1958* are both a premonition of future struggles and a claim for justice and equality. The whole book is filled with thoughtful opinions on the unstable Algerian situation. I would suggest that Camus was not alone in having these insights. In many other conflicts, a large portion of the population is not polarised. When a conflict escalates, people are forced to choose between one side and another. Fortunately for Camus, he was not forced to choose. Unfortunately for the rest of us, he died in a car accident on January 4, 1960, when the worst was still to come.

The Algerian revolution had no single strong leader but had powerful leadership. Many were from a completely new generation with new insights and perspectives. Young leaders like Ben Bella, Abane Ramdan, Mohammed Boudiaf, Didouche Mourad, Larbi Ben M'Hidi, and Yacef Saâdi were all in their mid-twenties and early thirties. They all realised that guerrilla warfare and sabotage were the only means by which the French government could be forced to redress the blatant inequalities.

Other more moderate political actors, such as Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas, were soon put aside, especially the Algerian National Movement, which had some clashes with the FLN in the beginning of the struggles and was rapidly wiped out. Therefore, despite the ongoing great examples of non-violent movements led by people such as Martin Luther King, Jr., who was engaged in the civil rights movement in the USA, and Mahatma Gandhi, who led India to independence in 1948, the FLN was still young and eager to overthrow the world around it. Would it have been possible before the Toussaint Rouge, or even after it, to have avoided these first steps in the conflict? In many other societies, these blatant inequalities mean "the struggle for social justice is likely to make [part of the population] feel that they have to stand by those under attack".⁴⁶ However, the huge majority of the European settlers had remained silent for decades. What should have been done to make the shift in the Pied-Noir psychology? How could they have been made to realise that the world was profoundly changing and that if they did not change they would be swept away? Once again, in my opinion, the answer is the

emergence of a great leader: a sort of precursor to Mandela. A great leader of the Muslim population who could have convincingly reassured European settlers that it was normal to be afraid and that, achieving the goal would not "damage the highly important interests and values of the adversary".⁴⁷ Maybe a leader of the Pied-Noir population who could have fostered a true sense of *jus soli*, law of the land, nationalism always heralded by France, a gigantic leader engaged in honest patriotism, the kind of patriotism that embraces all people living in a territory and that is "based on equal and shared political rights, and allegiance to similar political procedures".⁴⁸ Nelson Mandela is the quintessential example. He reassured the white population "regarding their property and the essential unity of all South Africans, whatever their colour".⁴⁹

I have mentioned two occasions, one prior to the Bloody All Saints and another just after, where handling the situation would have been feasible. Had the 1945 massacre in Sétif not taken place, possibilities would have been greater. A third occasion arose after the attack against the Muslim community in the heart of the Kasbah (Rue Thèbes). This resulted in the FLN, for the first time, indiscriminately attacking the European civil population of Algiers. In fact, before the Rue Thèbes attack, secret peace talks had been taking place between French government representatives and FLN members, but the Muslim deaths in the attack on the Kasbah by hard-liners escalated the conflict and resulted in this brutal retaliation from the FLN. Even then, despite the intractability of the parties, it would have been a great moment for the French government to shift its identity "involving core aspects related to the conflict. Such structural changes, or core changes in identity, [affecting] the entire system".⁵⁰

After a sort of coup by the commanders of the army in Algeria, General De Gaulle appeared to be the only one capable of disentangling the conflict. This opinion was held by the Pied-Noir, Muslims and the French. In June 1958, De Gaulle was a major celebrity and had absolute moral authority among his peers. Depending on his behaviour, he could have been a real threat to the FLN's violent goal, but unfortunately he came on the scene too late. He tried an honest approach to the conflict by attempting to redress some blatant inequalities. He initiated ballot reform together with reforms in education, housing, etc. All of these reforms came too late for a population that was ripped apart. Perhaps he should have taken assertive and effective action against the

45 "...however, the facts remain unchanged, and tomorrow we will have to take them into account to go towards the only acceptable future: a future where France, relying completely on its spirit of freedom, will know how to do justice, without discrimination on one side or another, within all Algerian communities. Today as yesterday, my only ambition publishing this witness-book, is a humble contribution to this very future". [Author's translation]

46 W. Gamson (1991), Op. cit., p. 47.

47 L. Krisberg, (2009c), Op. cit., p. 11

48 L. Krisberg, (2010), Op. cit., p. 22

49 L. Krisberg, (2009c) Op. cit., p. 13

50 T. Northrup (1989), Op. cit., p. 78



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Miquel Calçada Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence... ■

Pieds-Noirs from the first visit, instead of flattering them with his comment, “*Je vous ai compris*”. At that time, he had the opportunity, the capacity and the will to address the conflict. However, the Pieds-Noirs did not have the will. Yet, let us imagine how General Charles De Gaulle, with all his authority, could have pushed hard in all directions. As a first move, he should have addressed inhumane practices, such as torture basically against the Muslim population, in order to “promote nonviolent mechanisms that reduce adversarial confrontation [minimising] and ultimately eliminate[ing] violence”.⁵¹ In fact, he should have urgently put in place a credible mechanism for restorative justice on both sides. There were cases of extreme and indescribable horror that required reparation on behalf of the victims. That would have been a basic concern or a central focus in the words of Professor Zeher.⁵² Nevertheless, he attempted to implement basic structural changes too late.

After the settlement between the French government and the FLN was signed, many efforts to build peace should have been undertaken after such a destructive conflict. Regrettably, there were fewer conflict resolution paradigms than today. It was impossible to think of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission at that time. Reconciliation implies many more elements than merely understanding the word itself. Today’s reconciliation theories embrace elements as fundamental as truth, justice, and security. However, unearthing the truth often happens “many years after extreme acts of violence”.⁵³

Criminal justice without restorative justice makes peace somewhat illusory. “Simply put, truth plus justice equals a sustainable peace”.⁵⁴ In 1960, reflection on all these concepts was non-existent.

6. FINAL WORDS

In July 2012, تيبي عشال تي طارق دميدل تي ريزانجال تي وروهم جلا (the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria) celebrated its 50th anniversary. There are still many untold stories today that were willingly hidden. A deep sense of sorrow fills large segments of the population on both Mediterranean shores. There are still unchanged mental frames on both sides. In fact, we can recognise that “framing is [as] central to well-being as eating and sleeping”.⁵⁵ However, although a long time has passed, the old-fashioned mental frames have not changed. The French president should now take the lead by honestly recognising what the French did wrong at the time. He should do so clearly, bravely, and sincerely, without expecting anything in return, in an effort to foster reconciliation and to make the concept of France as a nation, even greater. He has a perfect reason to review the past. As Professor Arthur theorised: “The past needs to be reviewed because it has the capacity to be resurrected in a malign manner”.⁵⁶ Let us hope that this day of reconciliation will come. ■

References

- ALLEG, H. (1958). *La question*. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.
- ARTHUR, P. (2009). “Memory retrieval and truth recovery”. In: D. SANDOLE; S. BYRNE; I. SANDOLE-STAROSTE; J. SENEHI (eds.). *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. New York: Routledge.
- ANDREWS, K. (2001). “Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and The War on Poverty”. *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 71-90.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2657394>
- ATTOUMI, D. (2010). *Avoir 20 ans dans les maquis. Journal de guerre d'un combattant de l'A.L.N. en wilaya III (Kabylie) 1956-1962*. Algeria: Ryma.
- BLOCH, P. (1961). *Algérie, terre des occasions perdues*. Paris: Editions des Deux-Rives.
- CALÇADA, M. (2007). *Afers Exteriors: Algèria*. Part 1 & 2. Televisió de Catalunya.
- CAMUS, A. (1958). *Actuelles, I, II, & III. Chronique Algérienne 1939-1958*. Paris: Gallimard.

51 J. Lederach (2003)

52 H. Zeher (2002)

53 L. Kriesberg (2009b), Op. cit., p. 7

54 Lecture delivered by Professor David Crane. Wednesday, February 23, 2011 at 11.00 a.m. 100 Eggers Hall, Sponsored by the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs.

55 Lecture delivered by Professor B. Dayton. Friday, February 4, 2011 at 10.00 a.m. 111 Maxwell Hall.

56 P. Arthur (2009).



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Miquel Calçada Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence... ■

- CHENOWETH, E.** (2011). "Give Peaceful Resistance a Chance". *The New York Times*, 10 March 2011.
- DAYTON, B. W.** (2011, January 28). "Framing and Reframing". In: C. Merchant. PPA 601 Class. Maxwell 111. Maxwell School. Syracuse, NY.
- DAYTON, B. W.** (in print). *Four Conflict Analysis Frames*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.
- DUQUESNE, J.** (2001). *Pour comprendre la guerre d'Algérie*. France: Perrin.
- FROIDURE, M.** (2006). *Où était Dieu? Lettres de révolte et d'indignation d'un appelé en Algérie 1956/58*. Metz: Mettis.
- GAMSON, W.** (1991). "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements". *Sociological Forum*. Vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 27-50.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01112726>
- GIRARD, A.; LERICHE, J.** (1955). *Les algériens en France: Étude démographique et social*. Paris: PUF (Presses Universitaires de France).
- HIRSCH, E.** (1990). "Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment, and commitment in a Student Social Movement". *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 243-254.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2095630>
- KAUFFER, R.** (1986). *O.A.S. Histoire d'une organisation secrète*. Paris: Fayard.
- KRIESBERG, L.** (2009a). "Waging conflicts constructively". In: D. SANDOLE; S. BYRNE; I. SANDOLE-STAROSTE; J. SENEHI (eds.). *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*. New York: Routledge.
- KRIESBERG, L.** (2009b). "The Current State-of-the-Art of the Conflict Transformation Field". In: M. FISCHER; J. GIESSMANN; B. SCHEMELZLE (Ed.). *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Foundation.
- KRIESBERG, L.** (2009c). "Changing conflict asymmetries constructively". *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*. Vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 4-22.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17467580902898098>
- KRIESBERG, L.** (2010). "Challenges in Peacemaking: External Interventions". In A. BARTOLI; S. A. NAN; Z. MAMPILLY (eds.). *Peacekeeping: A Comprehensive Theory and Practice*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International.
- LACOUTURE, J.** (1985). *Algérie, la guerre est finie*. Brussels: Complexe.
- LEDERACH, J.** (2003). *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. Intercourse, PA: Good Books.
- MARFANY, M.** (2002). *Els menorquins d'Algèria*. Barcelona: Publicacions de l'Abadia de Montserrat.
- MÉFRET, J-P.** (2007). *Jusqu'au bout de l'Algérie Française*. Paris: Pygmalion.
- MAZZETTA, L.** (1989). *Le parler pied-noir, mots et expressions de là-bas*. Paris: Rivages.
- NORTHRUP, T.** (1989). "Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation". In: L. KRIESBERG; T. NORTHRUP; S. THORNSON (ed.). *The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- REBAHI, A.** (2004). *L'Algérie. Période coloniale. Splendeurs coloniales et misères autochtones. Un siècle de cartes postales et de photographies d'époque*. Algeria: Éditions Grand-Alger Livres.
- REY-GOLDZEIGUER, A.** (2002). *Aux origines de la guerre d'Algérie 1940-1945. De Mers-el-Kébir aux massacres du Nord-Constantinois*. Paris: La Découverte/Poche.
- ROWLEY A.** (1990). "La réinsertion économique des rapatriés". In: J. P. RIOUX (ed.). *La Guerre d'Algérie et les Français*. Paris: Fayard.
- SMITH, A.** (1983). "Ethnic Identity and World Order". *Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 149-161.
- STORA, B.** (2004). *Algérie 1954*. Paris: Le Monde et éditions de l'Aube.
- The Deplorable History of the Catalans*. London: J. Baker, 1714.
- TIDWELL, A.** (1998). *Conflict Resolved? A Critical Assessment of Conflict Resolution*. London: Pinter Books.
- VERGÈS, J.** (1993). *Lettre ouverte à des amis algériens devenus tortionnaires*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- ZEHER, H.** (2002). *The little book of Restorative Justice*. Intercourse, PA: Good Books.



■ Recommended citation

CALÇADA, Miquel (2012). "Analysis of the Algerian War of Independence: *Les Événements*, a Lost Opportunity for Peace" [online article]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 52-61. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-calcada/vol3iss2-calcada>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1552>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.

■ About the author

Miquel Calçada
mcalcada@syr.edu

Miquel Calçada is a Catalan journalist and media entrepreneur. Having an extensive communications background, in 1992 he established what later became Grup Flaix, with two leading radio channels: Flaix FM and Ràdio Flaixbac. In television, his latest works on conflict regions try to frame divergences from a different angle. Calçada has a Master's in Public Administration and International Relations focused on Conflict Resolution, from the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. Recently he has been appointed as the 1714 Memorial Commissioner by the Catalan Government. Calçada regularly publishes articles in the Catalan Press.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**



INTERVIEW

Journalists in War Zones: The Question of Objectivity

An Interview with Photojournalist Laith Mushtaq

Jack Shaka

Submitted: May 2012

Accepted: May 2012

Published: November 2012

Overview

Media reporting in war zones has changed over the years. The military realised that it needs the media and vice versa. You could call it a marriage of convenience. A better term to use would be a symbiotic relationship between the military and the media where each benefits from the other. As this symbiosis takes place, there are discordant voices discussing freedom of the press and objectivity of journalists. With each war fought there are lessons learnt. The military has learnt that it needs an ally: the media.

Military forces are now embedding journalists into their units in most war zones. You often see journalists in Kevlar jackets reporting from battleships or in Humvee vehicles. How objective are these journalists when they are given front row seats and protection on battlefields? How much are they allowed to report on?

It is vital to point out that armies and humanitarian missions around the world have embedded and continue to embed journalists in their units. Media networks did so with great numbers of journalists during the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Some also sent unembedded journalists to the same locations. Whose stories are more accurate? What is the price to pay for being unembedded? Veteran war photojournalist Laith Mushtaq of Aljazeera while in Helsingor, Denmark, in February 2012, gave answers to some of these questions based on his experience in war zones.

Keywords

military forces, embedded journalism, unembedded journalism, Iraq, battlefields, Afghanistan

THE INTERVIEW

Question: In the Vietnam War, journalists were blamed for fuelling the anti-war protests. During the first Gulf War, journalists used to complain that they were not being given access to the battlefield or getting access to information. What has been your experience?

Laith: The Vietnam and Gulf Wars changed the scope of war reporting in the world. I will try to explain the difference between embedded and unembedded journalism based on

my experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. I worked as an embedded journalist in Iraq with the American forces, and in Afghanistan with the French forces. The military forces give you possibilities that you can't get as unembedded journalist. They will provide security and make sure you are safe. They will take you by helicopter to places no one has been to and show you their version of events.

The disadvantage of being embedded is that the forces choose what you will see – in a nutshell, they control everything that you report. Since I was a former soldier in Iraq, I know the army and the media quite well. For example,



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Jack Shaka Journalists in War Zones: The Question of Objectivity ■

the chosen journalist will be told what they can or cannot report. While in the camp, they will tell you which parts of the camp you can film and which areas you cannot. The general or commanders will tell you which questions they will answer and which ones they will not. There is always someone telling them which questions to answer or not. In unembedded journalism, you reach more people, you get the full story from first hand narratives, but it is very dangerous since you have no security. In both cases, each side tries to front their views to the journalist. I like working unembedded since there is no censorship and no one dictates what or whom I will cover.

Question: Before joining their battalions, the embedded journalists have to sign a contract which restricts when and what will be reported. Do you have any comments on this?

Laith: Sometimes they make you sign a contract that you are going there of your own volition. If anything happens to you, they are not liable. These are their rules and if you are going as an embedded journalist, you have to tow the line or you don't get the access that you need. In most scenarios, you are not free at all since they are in charge of your itinerary: where you will go, when you eat and sleep and who you will interview. There is always an escort with you, for 24 hours, on the battleship or military base.

Going unembedded is the exact opposite. What most media networks do is send one journalist embedded and another unembedded to the same location, and then they compare the stories for accuracy.

Question: Embedded journalism has become the norm in war reporting. Do you think the relationship between the media and the military is changing? And if so, in what direction is it headed?

Laith: The relationship has not changed. The US has faced continued criticism from many media networks over Iraq and Afghanistan. They didn't want to be in the news for five minutes (given little time on air). That's why Congress funded Alhurra (a satellite TV channel that broadcasts in Arabic to viewers in North Africa and the Middle East) to tell the American side of the story. They wanted to have an avenue to justify their actions without criticism. They learnt from the Vietnam War where the media reports led to mass protests and great criticism of the war. The forces treat unembedded journalists as enemies since they show a different side of the story altogether.

Question: Journalists are also being embedded in humanitarian missions by international organisations nowadays, to report on what the missions are doing. Linda Polman, in her book *War Games*, mentions scenarios in Goma, Burundi during the refugee crisis after the genocide

in Rwanda. What's your opinion on embedding journalists in humanitarian missions?

Laith: You are not supposed to accept gifts from anyone. For example, Aljazeera does not allow its journalists to accept gifts. When organisations offer to pay for flights and accommodation, they are already wooing you. Media networks must make sure that they provide these things for their journalists. Freelancers or young journalists need to protect their reputation. Trust is very important in this profession and once you lose it, that's it for you.

Question: What are the perils of unembedded journalism?

Laith: I have been lucky to survive till now. I have lost great friends in the battlefields. This is the price you pay. It can happen even to those journalists who are embedded, since a missile can just be dropped on your secure location and everyone dies. Being kidnapped and facing torture or physical violence is a huge problem faced mainly by unembedded journalists. Despite the dangers involved, an honest journalist is concerned with the realities of war, the plight of civilians, and the true story behind the war. Other journalists are just there to transmit news like a cable. They don't care that much.

Question: What story does the embedded journalist tell and how objective is this journalism? Take the case of the late Tim Herrington and Sebastian Junger, who shot *Restrepo* in Afghanistan while embedded in the US Army.

Laith: If you can tell the story and still be objective that would be great. If you are filming soldiers in a camp, they will always say that everything is fine. We are helping people, building bridges, but eventually the viewers know that is not the truth. They are not stupid. They see the civilian casualties and then see the generals lying about the mistakes they made. This also depends on which unit a journalist is embedded in. If you are with NATO there is more room for you to tell your story and be objective, as compared to being with the American forces. The German and French military will also chaperone you but in the end will give you some leeway to tell your story the way you want. It is vital for any embedded journalist to mention at the end of their report that what the viewers are seeing is what he or she was allowed to report on or see by the military forces.

Question: There have been allegations of war crimes being committed in some of the war zones you have worked. Do you think some journalists are oblivious to the war crimes being committed in Afghanistan? One example would be the Bagram torture and prisoner abuses.



<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

Jack Shaka Journalists in War Zones: The Question of Objectivity ■

Laith: The soldiers themselves took most of the photos and videos that came out. When the journalists got hold of the photos and videos they published them so that the world would know what was happening in those places. Some journalists might have heard of the abuses, but, without evidence, they can't come out and make bold accusations against the forces. I don't think a journalist with evidence of such proportions would be silent about it.

Question: Let's look at the case of Afghanistan. Where does a journalist draw the line saying this is free press and this is censorship?

Laith: It depends on the situation, the people, and which military forces you are dealing with. Before you go in, you sign an agreement which stipulates what you can and cannot do. It is the responsibility of the journalist to push for more freedom in their coverage. One must distance themselves from the position of the military in order to be objective. You must remain neutral at all times but it is hard for a lot of journalists not to take sides.

Question: In your experience, how do you, as a war journalist, find the balance between skill and confusion (bombs, gunfire, noise...)?

Laith: The price for working in a war zone is that you end up having psychological damage. But the story must be told, no matter what. Just like doctors who specialise in different parts of the human body, we as journalists

train in different kinds of reporting. With the necessary skills, training and intuition, I have been able to survive the mayhem that I have seen over the years in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Nigeria. Those suffering from war need us to tell their stories. We are the messengers. We suffer and endure a lot of pain to bring you the stories that you see on your TV or newspapers, this is a holy duty.

BIOGRAPHY

Laith Mushtaq was born in Baghdad, Iraq, in 1970. He studied history and then started working as a battlefield cameraman during his military service in Iraq. While in the army, he covered the first Gulf War, which marked the birth of his career in war reporting. In 2003, Mushtaq joined Al Jazeera and went on to cover the first battle of Fallujah during the American invasion of Iraq in 2004. Laith Mushtaq was one of the only two unembedded cameramen during the first battle of Fallujah, in which 600 civilians died.

In 2004 he was sent by Al Jazeera to report from Afghanistan for six months. Between 2005 and 2009 he worked as a senior photographer and filmmaker covering the whole of Africa, Chad, Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Darfur, Sudan and Mauritania. He recently reported on the Egyptian revolution and the battles in the western mountains of Libya. During his career, Laith has faced numerous death threats and endured physical violence.

Journalists in war zones: The question of objectivity. An interview with photojournalist Laith Mushtaq ■

■ Recommended citation

SHAKA, Jack (2012). "Journalists in War Zones: The Question of Objectivity. An Interview with Photojournalist Laith Mushtaq" [online]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 62-65. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-shaka/vol3iss2-shaka>>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1528>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.



About the author of the interview

Jack Shaka
jackshaka@gmail.com

Jack Shaka is an International Consultant and Trainer on Peace Building, Conflict Resolution and Democratic Governance currently based in Denmark. He writes for Libertas Magazine-Macedonia on African Affairs. Jack is the author of *The Refugee: An odyssey into the refugee life* and coauthor of *Silent No More - Youth Legislative Theatre Process in Kenya*. He is working on his latest book entitled *Different Pigments*.



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**





<http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu>

PROFILE

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

U.S. Ambassador John W. McDonald, ret.

■ Abstract

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1992 by Ambassador John W. McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond. The mission of IMTD is to promote a systems-based approach to peacebuilding and to facilitate the transformation of deep-rooted social conflict through education, conflict resolution training and communication.

■ Keywords

diplomacy, multi-track, peacebuilding, education, training

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, based in Arlington, Virginia, USA, was established in May 1992 as a small, not-for-profit, non-governmental organization with the aim of promoting a systems-based approach to peacebuilding and to facilitate the transformation of deep-rooted social conflict. The Institute has more than 1,500 members in 35 countries and is supported by a wide range of key personnel, associates and interns.

The Institute is focused on identifying and understanding the causes of conflict within a nation. IMTD promotes the breaking down of stereotypes and other barriers to peace by providing conflicting groups with the following skills:

- 1) Transforming the view/perception of the adversary
- 2) Developing mutual understanding between conflicting parties
- 3) Building trust between adversaries
- 4) Reconciling past grievances
- 5) Negotiation
- 6) Creating cultural awareness

Aside from providing skills, IMTD's goal is to touch the heart of the participants, making them realize that the enemy is also a human being, with the same hopes and fears that they have. Once that is realized, IMTD begins to make true progress in peacebuilding.


Since 1992, IMTD has had 285 interns from 65 countries, all getting their Masters or PhDs in Conflict Resolution. None of them have been paid, and all have become Program Managers, with responsibility for a particular project. When funds are available, they are members of the training team that participate in training overseas.

IMTD has also taught Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding for the last twelve semesters at the U.S. National Defense University, in Washington, D.C. The goal of the course is to teach the participants that



there are other ways than the gun to solve conflict. When our twelfth semester ends in December 2012 we will have graduated 180 participants from 53 countries, 98 of the 180 graduates are non-American.

THE MULTI-TRACK SYSTEM



IMTD logo identifies nine tracks

The idea of multi-track diplomacy evolved over a period of years. In 1981 Joseph Montville wrote an article on foreign affairs, creating the concept of track one and track two. In 1985 Ambassador John W. McDonald wrote the first book entitled *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, which was published by the State Department in 1987. In 1989, McDonald wrote a chapter in the book expanding the two tracks to five tracks, and in 1991, McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond published the book *Multi-Track Diplomacy, a systems approach to peace*.

The Multi-track diplomacy consists of nine tracks, as follows:

Track 1 – Government, or Peacemaking through Diplomacy. This is the world of official diplomacy, policymaking, and peacebuilding as expressed through formal aspects of the governmental process.

Track 2 – Nongovernment/Professional, or Peacemaking through Conflict Resolution. This is the realm of professional nongovernmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by non-state actors.

Track 3 – Business, or Peacemaking through Commerce. This is the field of business and its actual and potential effects on peacebuilding through the provision of economic opportunities, international friendship and understanding, informal channels of communication, and support for other peacemaking activities.

Track 4 – Private Citizen, or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement. This includes the various ways that individual citizens become involved in peace and development activities through citizen diplomacy, exchange programs, private voluntary organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and special-interest groups.

Track 5 – Research, Training, and Education, or peacemaking through Learning. This track includes three related worlds: *research*, as it is connected to university programs, think tanks, and special-interest research centers; *training programs* that seek to provide training in practitioner skills such as negotiation,



mediation, conflict resolution, and third-party facilitation; and *education*, including kindergarten through PhD programs that cover various aspects of global or cross-cultural studies, peace and world order studies, and conflict analysis, management, and resolution.

Track 6 – Activism, or Peacemaking through Advocacy. This track covers the field of peace and environmental activism on such issues as disarmament, human rights, social and economic justice, and advocacy of special-interest groups regarding specific governmental policies.

Track 7 – Religion, or Peacemaking through Faith in action. This examines the beliefs and peace-oriented actions of spiritual and religious communities and such morality-based movements as pacifism, sanctuary, and nonviolence.

Track 8 – Funding, or Peacemaking through Providing Resources. This refers to the funding community – those foundations and individual philanthropists that provide the financial support for many of the activities undertaken by the other tracks.

Track 9 – Communications and the Media, or Peacemaking through Information. This is the realm of the voice of the people: how public opinion gets shaped and expressed by the media—print, film, video, radio, electronic systems, the arts.

The system requires all tracks to eventually work together to build a peace process that will last. The transition from track 1 to track 2 is difficult to achieve, becoming one of the main problems the organization has to face.

Another issue is the funding. These days it is especially hard to raise money for peace in the United States. In twenty years, IMTD has never had funding from the U.S. government directly. Funding comes from contributions from members (currently some 1,500, from 35 countries), family foundations and other individuals.

Over the last two decades, IMTD worked for eight years in divided Cyprus, five years in Israel-Palestine, eight years in Bosnia, fifteen years in divided Kashmir, and twenty-two years with the Dali Lama and the Government of Tibet-In-Exile.

IMTD has also worked in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Libya, Cuba, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea.

A MULTI-TRACK PROJECT

The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) has spent nearly 20 years working with the Tibetan Community in Exile, based in Dharamsala, India. Ambassador John McDonald's training programs with Tibetans started in 1990, before IMTD's foundation. Continuing a relationship with the Tibetan Government in Exile was one of IMTD's first initiatives in 1992. Since then, IMTD has conducted 15 annual training workshops with professionals from the Tibetan community on Conflict Resolution, Multi-Track Diplomacy, Mediation, and Forgiveness. We have trained participants from a variety of professional fields coming from Tibetan communities throughout India and the East Coast of the United States.

In August 2011, IMTD continued its rewarding work with the Tibetan refugee community and government in exile, conducting the training in Bangalore, India. This was a landmark event in the Tibet program, as it was the first training session conducted in South India, marking a new initiative to expand the reach of IMTD's work to large Tibetan communities outside of Dharamasala. IMTD's Director of Training, Dr. Eileen Borris, and Program Manager, Mr. Kevin LaFleur, conducted a week-long training course for twenty Tibetan professionals. These included teachers, official representatives of the Tibetan Government in Exile, Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders and monks, and members or staff of Tibetan civil society organizations.

The training is designed to be hands-on and highly interactive, utilizing activities such as group discussions, case studies, role plays, and simulations. Participants also watch and discuss documentaries on



case studies of nonviolent resistance and forgiveness and reconciliation movements as sources of inspiration that can be adapted to the Tibetan Community context. Classes such as Mediation Collaboration, Problem Solving, and Dialogue highlight trust-building skills while in-depth discussion sessions challenge participants to look at how to apply Forgiveness and Reconciliation skills in their community as well as personal and professional lives.

Participant evaluations at the end of the course showed a strong and positive response to the training. Participants were eager to engage in discussions, work together, and to teach others in their communities back home about the information they gained. Dr. Borrís and Mr. LaFleur feel that this particular training workshop was especially successful in identifying new needs of the Tibetan communities and in inspiring changed perspectives and continued long-term commitment to multi-track strategies of conflict resolution among participants.

Participants encouraged IMTD to expand the Tibet program and are eager for IMTD to return to South India for more training sessions in the future. After nearly 20 years of success in working with the Tibetan community, we are now exploring what an expanded Tibet program may look like in years to come. ■

■ Recommended citation

McDONALD, John W. (2012). "The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy" [online profile]. *Journal of Conflictology*. Vol. 3, Iss. 2, pp. 66-70. Campus for Peace, UOC. [Consulted: dd/mm/yy].

<http://www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol3iss2-mcdonald/vol3iss2-mcdonald>

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.7238/joc.v3i2.1629>

ISSN 2013-8857



The texts published in this journal are – unless indicated otherwise – covered by the Creative Commons Spain Attribution 3.0 licence. You may copy, distribute, transmit and adapt the work, provided you attribute it (authorship, journal name, publisher) in the manner specified by the author(s) or licensor(s). The full text of the licence can be consulted here: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/deed.en>.



Contact details

John W. McDonald, Ambassador (ret.)

Chairman & CEO
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
1901 N. Fort Myer Dr., Ste. 405
Arlington, VA 22209, USA
Tel:+1 703 5283863
Fax:+1 703 5285776
email: imtd@imtd.org
www.imtd.org



**CAMPUS
FOR PEACE**

