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INTERVIEW

India's Caste System: A Panacea for Peace or Conflict?
An interview with Dr. Kshemendra Kumar Upadhyay

Jack Shaka

Overview

For over 1,500 years, anyone born a Hindu was right at the centre of the caste system. If one was born among the lower castes – the *Dalits* or the *Sudra* (Untouchables), a life of struggle and torment began. But life is the exact opposite if one is born a *Brahmin*. Rape, torture, and killings continue to take place in the name of caste. Dalit massacres have been committed since 1947 and still continue. The massacres in Andhra are still memorable if not causing tears of sorrow. With globalisation, the caste system has begun to change and, as a result, new conflicts between the old and the new guards are emerging. Ethnopolitics continues to play a key role in India's inter-caste relations. In this interview with Dr. Kshemendra Kumar Upadhyay, he draws on his 25 years of experience as a development expert working with the marginalised in India.

Keywords

THE INTERVIEW

Question: Dr. Ubadhyay, there are a lot of misgivings about the caste system in India. That it enslaves others since membership is by birth. Do you agree? And how would you define the caste system in India?

Dr. Ubadhyay: It is a given at birth. So one can neither alter it nor fight it. Society in India is divided in castes, caste is decided by birth. One cannot change it. It is divided into different strata: high caste low caste. It was also based on the profession of an individual in older days.

Question: The caste system in India is receiving a lot of scrutiny from the media. It has been blamed for lots of conflicts taking place in India as a result of the oppression and discrimination. Do you think the caste system is embedded in society or in religion? Or both?

Dr Ubadhyay: Both. The media look for sensation and breaking news and not really for deep analysis. One does not follow the dictates of caste because he is not aware, but because he is economically dependent on it. On one hand, governments and reservation systems provide opportunities for the deprived but at the same time also reinforce the caste

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system, to the disadvantage of the ones who are deprived of opportunities because of their caste.

Question: Elite Indians have been on the forefront saying that the caste system is no longer there – that no one cares about it anymore. Is this true?

Dr Ubadhyay: No. This is the view of some activists only. Please note that the caste system is still propagated by the people in power. Ordinary people now understand the issues of development. In Bihar, where the caste system is very strong, people now want to vote for development. But the caste system continues. Also, remember that 40% of the population live in poverty and they can't break away from the existing caste system. On the other hand, the preference for a government job has decreased with the emergence of private and international players, and people are getting jobs on merit.

Question: There are a number of inequalities associated with the caste system, such as cases of children born to 'slavery' where they have to work in the worst possible conditions till they die. Is it correct to say that the caste system is responsible for the huge levels of inequality in India?

Dr Ubadhyay: This is really complex. People should understand that the caste system is linked to poverty, helplessness, and lack of support for the poor from the government. For inequalities, the caste system is hugely responsible but the political and economic systems in India are also responsible. But it's hard to unlink one from the other. The population is massive, and a voter turnout of usually 50% of the population decides who will govern. Therefore the rate of change is very slow.

Question: In the traditional caste system, members of the lower caste were strictly discriminated against. Has that changed now? What is the situation now?

Dr Ubadhyay: To some extent yes, in percentage terms. But in absolute numbers, no.

The low caste has been excluded for a long time, that's for certain. It is good to know that agriculture is the 75% job provider in India. But this has decreased over time – the labour available for low caste in villages is low. It must be understood that the majority of low caste members work in agriculture.

Question: The high ranking members of the caste system such as the Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaishyas, enjoy many privileges while the low ranking, the Untouchables, such as the Dalits (the downtrodden), live in abject poverty serving the Brahmins. Is this socially and morally acceptable in modern day India?

Dr Ubadhyay: This is not a right statement. Lower caste has a creamy layer; their ways are no different from the upper caste behaviour 50 years back. And the upper caste has a sizable economically-vulnerable population. Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state of India, has a low caste Chief Minister (Ms Mayawati), who is spending huge amounts of money on installing her own statues rather than on welfare of the low caste. In this way she only uses the low caste tag to gain votes.

Question: In looking further at inequalities, do you think that the Dalits and Brahmins should not have dinner at the same table? In the traditional caste system a dinner hosted by a Dalit cannot be attended by a Brahmin. And at a dinner hosted by a Brahmin, the Dalit will be sent away. Is this still the case?

Dr Ubadhyay: Not today. There is a new caste system, made of the "haves" and the "have-nots". It depends on the economic status and power of the individual. But somewhere, the mind set is like that, there is still hesitation based on the old system.

Question: Inter-caste relations have been a sore topic in India. There have been cases of Dalits being tortured or killed if information or knowledge of their involvement with a man or woman of a 'clean' caste (Brahmins-Kshatriyas) came out. What is your observation?

Dr Ubadhyay: Yes, especially in north and central India; mainly because the traditional caste-based lords feel threatened by the newly evolving social order. Social aspirations are changing, everybody wants to grow. These changes are a result of globalisation that India is going through. There is also the rise of multiculturalism in India.

Question: Many years after the independence of India, caste based discrimination goes on. What is the Indian government doing? What about social movements and the international community?

Dr Ubadhyay: The caste-based system is in melting phase at the moment. But the political parties and religious 'lords', as religious leaders are called, want it to continue in order to promote their own ethnic interests and wants. They want to use it to fuel sectarianism. These are the things that breed conflicts.

Question: Over the years the Dalits have worked hard to improve their status by going to school, thereby increasing their literacy levels. Some have converted to Buddhism and Christianity as a demonstration of protest to the ranks of the Hindu caste system. You just mentioned conflicts – do you

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believe that the caste system is responsible for the conflicts which have at times resulted in killings, torture or rape?

Dr Ubadhyay: Part of it is caste-based and some of it is circumstance-based. Say in Delhi, there are so many rapes, the rapists do not ask for the caste, they look for the most vulnerable target. Most killings are to extract money. However, the caste system takes its share of the blame.

Question: The Brahmins and the Kshatriyas are among the pure or 'clean' castes while the Dalits are considered 'unclean'. How does one explain to a child that they are born unclean?

Dr Ubadhyay: You don't have to explain it. The way society functions, they observe it. They see it. They know about it. They learn from the behaviour of elders. Children are told to behave in a certain way, and they learn it fast. The main explanation is that it is created by God.

Question: Wow! That's food for thought. In dealing with caste issues that have been arising, do caste councils still exist? If so, what is their role in modern day India?

Dr. Ubadhyay: Yes, they exist. And with the fast changing social order, they are trying to be in control and to make themselves relevant for society. Say in Haryana, a rich state with good agriculture, influential people in villages try to re-enforce the caste, and within the caste system, the *gotra* system (people born in the same sub-section of a caste), by killing lovers from the same *gotra*. It has happened many times in the past and still continues.

Question: But then, is there a struggle between the traditional and modern rules of the caste system in India and if so, what are some of the positive changes that have taken place so far?

Dr. Ubadhyay: Yes, there is. Everyone is looking for a better life. They want development, avenues for growth. They want to vote for people who can steer them towards a path of development. This might shock some politicians.

Question: Has the caste system fostered peace in India as regards inter-caste relations? If so, how?

Dr. Ubadhyay: There is still turbulence in inter-caste relations in India. It fosters peace in maybe up to 50% of the cases and then it creates problems in the other 50%. At the same time, it is important to note that there have been, and are, many successful inter-caste marriages in India today. But the media likes to focus on the negative examples of failures of inter-caste relations.

Question: As an expert who has worked with the marginalised for over 20 years, what would you suggest as a way forward for tackling the problems associated with the caste system in India?

Dr. Ubadhyay: There are so many things I would suggest, but I would focus on the following:

- Inclusive growth, which is to say, create infrastructure, development will follow!
- Opportunities for all, irrespective of caste. Merit should be the criterion. Lower castes should receive support for education and jobs reserved for them at entry level only (not beyond it).
- We also need livelihood opportunities and health facilities.
- To promote family planning and meet the need for it without caste reservations.
- It is necessary to create awareness about the girl child and for the empowerment of women without caste concerns.

BIOGRAPHY

Dr. Kshemendra Kumar Upadhyay has worked in the development sector in India for over 25 years. He has managed projects, at a national level, to prevent migration, human trafficking and the spread of HIV/AIDS, and has also spent time working on the Building Livelihood Options project for communities in Maharashtra, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar States of India. He has coordinated other projects and done research commissioned by Plan International, the Royal Danish Embassy, USAID, UNIFEM and IIED London.

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ARTICLE

Exploring how Conflict Management Training Changes Workplace Conflicts: A Qualitative Case Study

Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen

Abstract

While many organisations offer conflict management training to both staff and management, there has been little research investigating the changes resulting from such training. Using an interpretive framework of analysis, a qualitative case study was conducted to understand how 'sensemakings' about conflicts change when enacted from the perspective of staff and management in a non-profit organisation that participated in conflict management training. The case study was constructed as a longitudinal investigation with ethnographic fieldwork as the primary method of inquiry. The training worked as a catalyst for the development of new sensemakings about workplace conflicts. These included increasing acknowledgement of workplace conflicts, recognition of interdependent and context embedded relationships in interpersonal conflicts, and enactment of active resistance in a subordinated occupational group. Some conflicts did not change through training, where the perpetual structural bases of the conflicts remained intact. Insights from the study call attention to the embedding of conflict in the organisation's social fabric. As a practical implication of the study, trainers in conflict management are recommended to give more weight to the structural dimensions of conflict and organisational level conflict management when putting training programmes together.

Keywords

workplace conflict, conflict management training, sensemaking theory, change

INTRODUCTION

While many organisations offer conflict management training to both staff and management, there is little research that describes the outcomes of workplace change resulting from this training. This dearth of studies is remarkable, given that conflict research literature has, for more than four decades, posited that conflicts in organisations are inevitable processes that need management through particular forms of intervention. The literature claims that, if *managed* correctly, conflicts can bring about development, collaboration, problem solving, and organisational change (e.g. De Dreu, 1997; De Dreu and Van de Vliert, 1997; Jehn, 1997, 2001; Johnson, 1991; Pondy, 1967, 1969; Rahim, 2000, 2002; Ramarajan et al., 2004; Thomas, 1992; Tjosvold, 2006, 2008; Van de Vliert, 1998, 1999).

Only a few studies have examined the effect of conflict management training in organisations: where they have done so, the focus has been on the effects on clients or the public at large, with overwhelmingly positive results. Johnson (1991) measured the effects of conflict management training on teachers, finding that the majority developed a more problem-solving way of managing conflicts. Zacker and Bard (1973) measured the effects of conflict management training on police performance, finding that officers who had taken the training as part of the police academy curriculum scored higher on performance than those who had not. Ramarajan et al. (2004) found that

UN peacekeepers on international intervention missions in complex humanitarian emergencies experienced fewer conflict situations with NGO workers after receiving training in negotiation.

The three studies in the previous paragraph focused on how training in conflict management and negotiation affects staff relationships with different external groups (pupils, citizens, NGO workers). In contrast, the following case study was undertaken to explore the change outcomes of conflict management training in the workplace itself. It does so by comparing how staff and management in the same workplace enact and describe changing meanings of conflicts in the workplace before taking part in the training and in the year after it. Research within conflict and negotiations studies conceptualises conflict and its management as interpretive processes strictly dependent on human observation and the making of meaning (Barley, 1991; Kolb, 2008; Kolb and Bartunek, 1992; Van Maanen, 1992). Several researchers have adopted a focus on the context-specific meanings of conflicts and negotiation and the processes that shape such meanings (Bartunek et al., 1992; Collier, 2009; Friedman, 1992; Friedman and Berthoin Antal, 2005; Gadlin, 1994; Kolb and McGinn, 2009; Morrill, 1989; Putnam, 2004).

Building on an interpretive epistemology represented by Weick's theory of organisational sensemaking (1995, 2001), the present case study follows training in conflict management longitudinally to investigate how staff and management make sense of conflicts. Focusing on the actual processes of change resulting from the training, the research question is: how does changing sensemaking enact and affect conflicts at work? I use interview and observational methods to trace the meanings and fates of workplace conflicts longitudinally. The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I provide the theoretical background for the study, and then describe the methods of data collection and analysis. I then present four narratives of how changing sensemakings enacts and affects conflicts at work, and conclude by discussing how the study informs our understanding of how organisational conflict management can change.

1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Weick's theory of organisational sensemaking (Weick, 1995, 2001; Weick et al., 2005) contributes to understanding the meaning of conflict, including how the dynamics of conflict meanings unfold and shift in the organisational context. While much of (organisational) life is routine, comprising situations that do not demand our full attention, we engage in a process of searching for meaning whenever something that needs or demands our attention occurs – a process that Weick (1995) terms *sensemaking*. Sensemaking theory has evolved from microsociology, particularly symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1956; Mead, 1967) and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). Symbolic interactionism is concerned with how "human beings act toward things on the basis of the meaning that the things have for them" and "that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows" (Blumer, 1969, p. 2). The roots of sensemaking theory, in symbolic interactionism, emphasise the dynamics of interactions between individuals and groups on the one hand and the organisational social context on the other. The lineages from Goffman and Garfinkel stress the need for careful attention to the micro-particulars of every interaction context.

According to Weick, sensemaking is ongoing, subtle, social and easily taken for granted. It makes circumstances comprehensible both prospectively and retrospectively. Much of the time we make sense routinely, invoking rationalised accounts of actions, past, present and future. Rationalised accounts do not always hold, however, especially where jolts that disturb these accounts are experienced (Meyer, 1982). Jolts transform routines and rationalised accounts by introducing ambiguity that prompts revision of meaning. On these occasions when normalcy is disturbed, new forms of sensemaking often emerge: these occasions might include shocks, changes, or unexpected actions that may be small or massive. Conflicts epitomise challenges to the ongoing flow of inter-subjective sensemaking. Changed sensemaking happens when people make a different sense of situations in which they find themselves. While social context influences how people interpret events in many ways, people also participate in creating and maintaining their social contexts, which makes sensemaking iterative and reflexive (Weick et al., 2005). With a sensemaking perspective, the focus is on the development of meanings and how such meanings motivate engagements, actions, and practices. Weick et al. (2005) argue that the concept of sensemaking keeps action and cognition together. Central to a sensemaking perspective is how people enact the environments they interpret and constitute their identity within these enactments, shaping how they interpret events, things, phenomena. Identity and identity construction are therefore central to sensemaking.

The goal of a sensemaking perspective is to understand organisational life (Drazin et al., 1999). From this perspective on workplace conflicts, the focus is less on reducing the level of conflicts in the workplace than it is on understanding the processes through which individuals and organisations enact and make sense of them. As with other micro-sociological theories, sensemaking is concerned mostly with the actions of groups and communities (Weick et al., 2005), where it provides a useful framework for understanding how social phenomena, such as conflicts, play out in organisational cultures and group dynamics. Organisational situations dedicated to changing sensemaking are, from the point of view of research,

naturally occurring experiments (Silverman, 2007). Conflict management training, as a form of organisational intervention that aims to transform behaviours around conflicts, provides a unique, naturally occurring, experimental situation. The researched conflict management training took place in a Scandinavian non-profit development organisation, referred to as NGO Plus.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. The setting

NGO Plus works to promote democracy in post-conflict developing countries. Funding comes from the state, represented by the Development Agency as well as private funding agencies. Founded in 1970, NGO Plus employs 30 full time staff members, all of who participated in the study. The average age is 46, mean tenure is eight years, and the majority are female. The organisation has a clerical unit, a fundraising department, and a programme department. The management group, consisting of the three departmental managers and the general secretary, administers NGO Plus.

2.2. Data collection

The data collection was conducted through ethnographic fieldwork (Brewer, 2004; Neyland, 2008; Van Maanen, 1988) over a two-year period (June 2008 to September 2010), including six months full-time fieldwork in NGO Plus (see fig. 1). The fieldwork included several interviews with staff and management (Kvale, 1996; Schensul, 1999; Steyart and Bouwen, 2004), collecting qualitative accounts, and training and on-site participant observation (Bernard, 1994; Waddington, 2004). Following Kolb and Putnam's (1992) view that conflict has a sensitive nature, I chose the method of ethnographic fieldwork to gain participants' trust before conducting interviews and to obtain insight into the daily life of the organisation, as a way of investigating cultural meaning systems encompassing conflicts (Dubinskas, 1992). In total, I conducted 52 individual interviews and four focus-group meetings. Individual interviews lasted from 20 to 75 minutes, and focus-group meetings from 90 to 120 minutes. Interviews addressed issues of community, collaboration, and conflict management in the department/organisation. In the pre-training interviews, participants were asked to bring up any situations that were frustrating them and that involved other staff members. They were encouraged to talk about what had happened and how they had experienced it. Post-training interviews addressed the situations that had been brought up in the pre-training interviews to detect if any changes had occurred.

Fig. 1. Research process timeline

2.3. The conflict management training

The purpose of the 35-hour programme of conflict management was to promote knowledge about conflict resolution and provide training to deal more constructively with conflicts. The training programme was normative: it was considered that providing participants with methods and tools for understanding and working with conflicts would enable a more productive resolution of conflicts. The training programme was presented to 18 of 30 staff members in NGO Plus. All four managers at NGO Plus participated in the training. All staff members who wished to participate in the training were given a place on the course, resulting in participation from all areas of the organisation.

An experienced external trainer, from a local agency, conducted the conflict management training, which included knowledge and skills development in the following areas: defining what conflict is; working with escalation and de-escalation of conflicts; distinguishing between destructive and constructive negotiation styles; reframing the issues in conflict; differentiating between underlying needs versus positions; working with dialogue and active listening; working with phases in mediation and win-win solutions, and negotiating values for the organisation. The training methods alternated between presentation of theory and models as a large group, and exercises in pairs or small groups.

2.4. Data analysis

Using qualitative methodology congruent with phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994; Van Maanen, 1979) I was able to learn how participants viewed the world by attending to how they talked about it. I acknowledge that my interpretations are not the only possible ones. The analytical strategy focused attention on the empirical materials in terms of changed meanings and enactments of conflicts. After the fieldwork, I thoroughly analysed the interviews, line-by-line, and the field data to uncover as many as possible potentially relevant narratives about conflicts in the empirical

material. I used a narrative approach (Czarniawska, 1998) for analysis to make sense of events and bring them into a meaningful whole. Chronology is used to give logical coherence to events and actions over a time period for the data collection process, thereby giving a temporal scope to a particular narrative, while contextualisation links the narrative to actions and events beyond its immediate scope (across space), thereby embedding the narrative in organisational social dynamics and structure. The narrative approach allows the pursuit of storylines in empirical material. I distinguish between narratives *from* the field, produced by analysing the data and narratives of the field, that are my collection of stories from the organisation members (Czarniawska, 1998).

3. FINDINGS

3.1. From denial to increasing acknowledgement

Generally, conflicts were not talked about in NGO Plus. For staff and management the notion of conflict was heavily associated with violence and war. Conflicts were something that the organisation tried to resolve through its human rights and development work overseas, they were not something that happened in its own backyard. Whenever I tried to get people to talk about conflicts, they would praise the sense of community within the organisation and emphasise colleagues' mutual support. Staff members talked about collaboration in their departments as being more or less conflict-free. Additionally, both staff and management frequently used unifying metaphors of the organisation that conceived it as a family and co-workers as friends, and emphasised narratives of NGO Plus as a horizontally structured organisation with strong values of egalitarianism. The metaphors and the narratives were like a cultural lens (Friedman and Berthoin Antal, 2005) that served to confirm the organisation's self-image as functioning well without dysfunctional elements such as conflicts. It was not that conflicts were avoided, I was told – conflict just did not happen in this organisation. The denial of conflicts also emphasised that there was no outspoken need in the organisation for training in conflict management. Staff and management, however, were generally interested in participating in the training and explained their interest as wanting to learn more about the nature of conflict due to the kind of work in which the organisation was engaged abroad.

Everyone in NGO Plus knew about my role as a researcher and that the organisation would participate in conflict-management training; nevertheless I was assured, more than once, that I had chosen the wrong organisation as my research site if conflicts were my object of study.

However, I gradually realised that whenever staff and management *did* talk about the subject of conflicts happening in their organisation, they would use particular cultural codes such as *frictions* to describe tensions and clashes between people. In contrast with the negative connotations they attached to conflicts, frictions were more tractable and much more harmless. Due to the preponderance of the family metaphor and the organisational values of egalitarianism, they were an accepted way of making sense of the tensions and clashes that occurred between people: staff and management interpreted these as something they could work around in daily working life. While *frictions* was a euphemism for conflicts in NGO Plus, this dynamic also emphasises how sensemaking of conflict is shaped by the social structures and cultures where it occurs. Although the euphemism created access to studying conflicts in NGO Plus, staff and management primarily conceptualised these frictions as certain individuals' personal problems.

A year after the conflict management training, staff and management had changed their way of making sense of conflicts. The change showed incremental acknowledgement of conflicts as something that *does* occur in NGO Plus: "One probably sees it more as conflicts than one would have done before" a staff member said in a focus-group interview. With the changing belief that conflict is not always synonymous with violence and war, staff and management at NGO Plus had begun to develop a broader idea of what the term conflict comprises. "Viewing conflicts, not only negatively, but rather viewing conflicts as being resolvable", another staff member said in the focus-group interview, as a summary of the changes that had occurred. Moreover, a manager said that it was when she worked with a particular training exercise that she realised a certain level of conflict always exists in organisations:

> "Well, I remember in the last part of the training where we worked through an exercise about the latent level of conflict, which exists in all organisations. I suppose in a way this is healthy as long as it remains deep down. For me this has been a tool to say to myself 'ooh, don't be so afraid of conflicts'. It's okay that conflicts occur when we meet each other and see things differently".

The manager talks about how she tries to deal with her fear of conflict by acknowledging "the latent level of conflict" present in all organisations. For her, the latent level of conflict assumes that different people inevitably have disagreements and conflicts. She accepts that conflicts exist in NGO Plus, as long they remain deep down, underneath the organisational surface, which emphasises her sustained fear of conflict. This fear stems from uncertainties about how to deal with conflicts: "But we must also face the fact that, although many of us participated in the training we simply don't know how to resolve conflicts", a staff member

said in another focus-group interview. While broadening their understanding of conflicts, staff and management increasingly acknowledged conflicts as being inevitable when people work together, gradually toning down their concept of frictions as being attributable to certain individuals' personal problems. Interestingly, over the course of the study, those individuals significantly changed their behaviour in conflicts.

3.2. From personality deficiency to interdependent and embedded relationships

Frictions in NGO Plus were mainly conceptualised as being about personal differences and incompatibilities between staff members and termed as, "bad chemistry between individuals". In this way of making sense of frictions, staff and management pointed to the odd personalities ascribed to certain staff members as the problem. Because these individuals could not get along with everyone else, they were regarded as the black sheep in the organisation. Frictions between the black sheep and others were cyclical and repetitive in nature and would go on for years. Given that management essentially regarded such frictions as personality problems, frictions were considered both unavoidable and very difficult to resolve. "These sorts of frictions will always be here, it's a matter of working around them", one manager said. Management's approach to dealing with these frictions was typically through one-to-one talks with the problematic personality involved, trying to help this individual be less problematic. More often than not, however, the parties involved were left to deal with the problems themselves.

One example is the frictions between a clerk and a fundraiser. Every time they had to communicate about tasks to be processed between them it ended in friction. The fundraiser saw the clerk as a support person, who was there to help her process administrative tasks. In contrast, the clerk felt that the fundraiser's way of communicating signalled non-appreciation of her work effort. Moreover, the fundraiser always turned up in the clerk's office expecting administrative assistance to be performed right away, which the clerk felt showed the fundraiser's lack of respect for her work. The clerk, sensitive to being taken for granted, often refused to help the fundraiser and claimed that she was busy with other work. "You are not first in line here and if you so urgently need me to help you today, you should have asked me yesterday", the clerk would say without hiding her resentment. Such remarks made the fundraiser angry and would only make her stand even more rigorously on her right to administrative assistance. Usually these episodes ended with the clerk verbally dismissing the fundraiser from her office.

A year after the training in conflict management, both the clerk and the fundraiser independently noted that their relationship had changed, mainly, they claimed, because

the training had made them aware of their ways of communicating. Gradually, both realised that they had a mutual responsibility for having kept the conflict going by not having communicated respectfully with each other. For example, in stressful situations likely to turn into conflicts because the clerk was busy when the fundraiser asked her to do something, the clerk now tried to tell the fundraiser, gently, that she did not have time to help her now. "I think twice before saying anything to her now, and I really don't want our communication to end up in the wrong" the clerk said, "I want us to have a collaborative relationship". As an alternative, the clerk would suggest that she could help the fundraiser the next day, as a way of maintaining a positive relationship. As far as the fundraiser and her peers had been concerned, problems with the clerk were entirely within her personality. But now the fundraiser saw their relationship differently.

Although the organisation had a self-image of being horizontally structured, an invisible system (Gadlin, 1994) of hierarchy placed the fundraising group above the clerical workers: "I have to consider that, in the hierarchy, I am placed above her", the fundraiser said. Despite the narratives of being an egalitarian organisation, the fundraiser acknowledged that her relationship with the clerk was embedded within the broader processes of cultural life in NGO Plus, which in reality meant that different occupational groups had different status. In situations with the clerk, the fundraiser therefore realised that the way she asked for administrative assistance mattered greatly.

Their changed sensemaking about the conflicts meant different things for the clerk and the fundraiser. While the clerk became aware of their actions in conflict situations being interdependent, the fundraiser realised how their relationship was embedded in social structures. Although both continued to hold grievances towards each other, they had invented new meanings for past conflicts that made it difficult for each to locate faults with the other. Exemplified by the conflict between the clerk and the fundraiser, some conflicts in NGO Plus changed from being conceptualised as certain individuals' personality problems to embracing a more relational and contextual perspective on conflicts. But the changes in the conflict between the clerk and the fundraiser were also shaped by changes going on in broader conflicts between groups in the organisation, which emphasised the clerk-fundraiser conflict's entanglement with another conflict at the collective level in the organisation.

3.3. From an identity of subordination to active resistance

In NGO Plus, staff and management metaphorically saw the organisation as a family, and emphasised egalitarian organisational values. The clerical workers however, did not see themselves as an equal part of this family. They felt

that some members of staff and management acted as if the clerical workers were only there to serve them. People outside the unit would turn up in the clerical unit and expect instant administrative assistance, which made the clerical workers feel that they were not in charge of their own work. Furthermore, people outside the unit expected the clerical workers to take care of tasks such as arranging meetings and receptions, and set up courier services and transportation – tasks that, although commonly termed services, were accounted for as just the clerical workers being nice. Although the clerical workers had been steadily assigned more tasks that had nothing to do with supporting people outside the unit, they still felt a service image cast its shadow upon their contribution to the organisation.

Given that the clerical workers' performance in service tasks was neither recognised nor appreciated, they felt such tasks were invisible work that only took time away from activities that "counted". Despite communications to the rest of NGO Plus, emphasising that the clerical unit no longer had the resources to offer its range of services, some members of staff and management outside the unit still expected the clerical workers "to be at their disposal", as the clerical manager explained. This created a lot of frustration and irritation among the clerical workers because they felt that their work was not as important or equally valued as other types of work carried out in the organisation. Essentially, the clerical workers felt inferior to the other occupational groups in NGO Plus.

The clerical workers did not openly express their feelings of inferiority, but in private expressed their resentment at being taken for granted, which intimately tied their identity of being clerical workers to a collective experience of subordination in the organisational hierarchy. From the outside, tolerance and avoidance constituted the clerical workers' way of dealing with these frictions, which could explain why most staff and management from the other departments viewed their relationship to the clerical unit as positive.

A year after the training, it was evident that the clerical workers had acquired a new attitude when people outside the unit expected them to perform service tasks and expected instant administrative assistance. They had begun to respond through active resistance by explicitly refusing to comply with such requests. One clerk explained it as a process where "we are better at confining ourselves. I think that people, little by little, seem to know what they can and can't ask of us. I also think that we are no longer so irritated". In the process, the clerical workers had discovered that explicit refusals to perform service tasks and instant administrative assistance gave them more time to do the tasks that were accounted for in their job descriptions.

The clerical workers retrospectively used the training elements on conflict escalation and de-escalation as an extracted cue to help them decide on an acceptable explanation for enacting active resistance. Weick (1995) argues

that extracted cues are "simple, familiar structures that are seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring" (p. 50), and which help them decide what information is relevant. Through the theory of escalation and de-escalation of conflicts, the clerical workers realised that they themselves could prevent grievances and feelings of irritation by "nipping the matter in the bud, before conflicts about service tasks would escalate and create tensions", a clerk explained. They used the theory of conflict escalation and de-escalation to redraft a narrative of legitimacy for refusing to perform service tasks and give instant administrative assistance.

Feelings of being taken for granted constrained the identity of being clerical workers because it meant that they essentially only had value through supporting other people in the organisation. Their enactment of active resistance was about negotiating a clerical identity as more than a service provider – that is, as an occupational group in their own right. In particular, they had begun to emphasise the importance of meeting deadlines for their work. One morning when a clerk came into work, a staff member from another department was waiting for her at her desk claiming that he needed her support immediately. She said that he would have to wait until she had gone through her morning routines, which made him feel annoyed and try to persuade her to leave her routines until after she had helped him. She would not give way however, and told him that if she did not get on with her morning routines, others could not get on with their jobs. The staff member ended up leaving the office in annoyance, but the clerk felt satisfied that she had not given in to his demands, because it was important for her and for everyone in NGO Plus that she got through these routines first thing in the morning.

When the clerical workers enact active resistance they meet resistance from people outside the unit as they realise that they cannot always expect the clerical workers to give instant assistance. The clerical workers know that conflict levels may rise when they enact active resistance. But something more important is at stake here: claiming respect for the clerical work area and challenging the status quo in NGO Plus. Enacting active resistance is their collective way of dealing with grievances. "We help and support each other in saying no to carrying out tasks that we don't have time for or that we don't think are our responsibility", one clerk said. The shared focus among the clerical workers highlights how sensemaking is inherently social. The clerical workers look to each other to get advice and support, which positions them collectively as they individually negotiate in frictions with people outside the unit. They moreover feel that they act on behalf of the whole group when they enact active resistance. For the clerical workers, the conflict-management training signified a distinct shift in sensemaking of conflicts. Rather than identifying themselves with subordination in the organisational hierarchy, they now actively try to claim that their work is equal to that of other staff members.

3.4. Conflicts resolved?

Another friction, conceptualised in NGO Plus as being about personal differences between individuals, involved two collaborating fundraisers that would not acknowledge each other's way of doing the job. There was continuous friction over the power to decide right from wrong in work procedures and their exchanges frequently led to frustration. After the conflict-management training, both fundraisers noted that, through the training elements of dialogue and active listening, they had gained a shared language to use in difficult situations, and that they were better at discussing things they disagreed about without taking it personally and getting annoyed with each other. One of the fundraisers said, "Now we are better at saying 'well okay, now we have this disagreement so what do we do now?' You know, ask more questions to find out what she really thinks rather than making an early conclusion on something that we really don't know, but we think we know". Although they feel that they are now better at managing their frictions, they are still ambiguous about whether this common language of dialogue really resolves anything. The fundraisers do not experience any change in what each perceives to be the core of the friction, which is that they disagree about how the job should be done. Despite improvements in communications, friction continues to occur between the two and is still conceptualised as being about personal differences, despite the training.

To understand the lack of change in how some frictions were made sense of, we need to look at the collective level of the organisation. We find the roots of the friction in the relationship between staff and management at NGO Plus, and how that relationship is shaped by structures beyond the organisation's control sphere. Ongoing conflicts about staff general complaints with management were attributed as being due to management not being sufficiently clear about the organisation's strategy, direction or leadership. These conflicts were played out particularly in the programme and fundraising departments.

In the fundraising department, when it came to prioritising tasks and goal achievement, the staff found the manager lacking, but no one confronted her with their grievances. She, however, was aware that there was a problem but perceived it as a result of the organisation's funding system, where the entry of neo-liberal political ideals had forced non-profit organisations to fulfil certain conditions to obtain funding from the Development Agency. The manager regarded this compliance with external conditions as "a constant pressure affecting the social climate in NGO Plus, particularly the ways in which people behave towards one another". Accordingly this "pressure" was manifestly to blame for conflicts erupting between people, highlighting management's conceptualisation of conflicts as being mainly an interpersonal phenomenon.

A year after the training, the fundraising manager talked about how, in several critical situations with her staff, she has tried to apply some of the theory from the training, only to experience that the theory did not work as it was supposed to: "I make an effort to de-escalate critical situations but on many occasions people do not join me in my attempts". The quote shows sustained sensemaking of conflicts as an interpersonal phenomenon, because it is in situations between individuals that the manager has tried to apply tools for conflict de-escalation. Additionally however, the manager acknowledges that her workload is spread over too many tasks, not sufficiently prioritising tasks to do with leadership. To understand the lack of leadership in NGO Plus, we need to look at the organisation's social and structural context.

The last decade's trend for neo-liberal political ideals in the funding system has led to commercialisation of the NGO sector, which has pushed the NGO Plus managerial practices in a new direction. Whereas the organisation used to engage itself only in activities concerning aid and development, it now also has to be engaged in marketing and branding to raise funds. In NGO Plus, this broadening of managerial practice and focus has only reinforced the staffs' needs for direction and leadership. Over the course of the study, however, the staff saw no changes: management's lack of leadership and failure to meet staff needs for direction and leadership continued to form trajectories of conflicts at various levels of the organisation. Given that the training course in conflict management did not deal with how conflicts can be built into organisational structures, the ongoing conflict between staff and management in NGO Plus was not explicitly addressed either during the training or in the months that followed. For the two disputing fundraisers the lack of leadership means that it is up to them to decide the direction and strategy for their team, resulting in continuing disagreement about the right one. While this illustrates how, in some conflicts in NGO Plus, overemphasis continued to be on interpersonal conflict management, conflicts that were not appropriately placed within their particular social and structural context by staff and management only changed marginally.

CONCLUSION

The case study highlights the understudied dimension of change outcomes resulting from conflict-management training in the workplace. The conclusion from the study is twofold.

First, in conflicts where structural changes ensued from the training, the training worked as a catalyst for different sensemaking of conflicts. For example, among some staff members involved in conflicts, training changed this sensemaking from being about personality deficiency in individuals to being more about shared communication

responsibilities. Participants' changed sensemaking also saw conflicts as being embedded in intergroup hierarchies, an organisational dynamic that similarly underwent changes following the training. Changes particularly consisted of the clerical workers enacting active resistance to claim that their work was equal to that of other staff members. Conflicts that continued to be conceptualised as individual or interpersonal problems, however, only changed marginally. This was illustrated through the interpersonal conflict between two fundraisers, was deeply embedded in a structural conditioned conflict between staff and management, in which no changes were observed in the year that followed the conflict-management training.

At the organisational level, staff and management incipiently changed their sensemaking of conflicts as being associated with war and violence to acknowledging conflicts as inevitable organisational processes that can potentially be resolved. The change was illustrated by how staff and management began talking about conflicts in NGO Plus. One interpretation of this change is that conflict had become more widespread since the training. However, the ethnographic method employed in this case study shows that this change concerned new ways of framing and understanding conflicts in NGO Plus, emphasising increasing acknowledgement of conflicts rather than increasing prevalence of conflicts. Had the study only measured the level of conflict before and after the training course, the results would have shown more conflicts after the course, because they were rarely framed as such before.

Second, focusing explicitly on meanings and the processes of change resulting from conflict-management training, this study contributes to the strand on conflicts and negotiation in organisations made using an interpretive epistemology (e.g. Bartunek et al., 1992; Collier, 2009; Friedman, 1992; Friedman and Berthoin Antal, 2005; Gadlin, 1994; Kolb and McGinn, 2009; Morrill, 1989; Putnam, 2004). Using insights from Weick's theory of organisational sensemaking to show how different people attach different meanings to conflict, this study offers a more holistic view of conflicts in organisations. Insights from the study call attention to how conflicts are embedded, by showing how they occur and are entangled across organisational levels and with the organisational cultural system and broader societal structures that create conditions for actions that lead to conflicts. Indeed, through its interpretive framework, the paper has shown that conflict and the meanings that staff and management attach to it is part of the social fabric in organisations, giving weight to a more complex understanding of how conflict management operates in organisations.

Practical implications of the study are that trainers in conflict management are recommended to give much more weight to the cultural and structural dimensions of conflict – how conflicts are built into organisational structures and are shaped by organisational cultures – and organisational-level conflict management, when putting training programmes together. Conflict-management training elements that deal with conflict framing, communication, and techniques for managing interpersonal relationships could be enriched with more attention on power analyses (Hansen, 2008) and organisational influences on conflict.

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ARTICLE

Why Did They Join? Exploring the Motivations of Rebel Health Workers in Nepal

Bhimsen Devkota and Edwin van Teijlingen

Abstract

There has been little systematic research on the factors that motivate people to become rebel health workers. This study explores the motivating factors of individuals who joined the Maoists as health workers in Nepal and presents the findings based on semi-structured interviews conducted with the Maoist health workers trained and mobilised by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist during the armed struggle with the government (1996-2006). Maoist ideology, service attitude, state injustice, involvement of a family member in the armed conflict, grievance over poor health services and gaining status were the motives for joining the rebel health services. Their motives are categorised as: (a) individual; (b) political and (c) socio-cultural factors. Post-conflict social policy in Nepal should take into consideration the reasons individuals joined the rebellion and listen to their voices to help promote sustainable peace and improve health care services in communities affected by the conflict.

INTRODUCTION

The reasons which motivate individuals to become civilian health workers include a number of intrinsic or individual, organisational and socio-cultural factors (Franco, Bennett and Kanfer 2002; Malik et al. 2010). Motivation can be defined as a person's degree of willingness towards achieving an individual goal that is consistent with that of the organisation (Bennet and Franco 1999, Willis-Shattuk et al. 2008). For example, a systematic review shows that financial rewards, career development, continuing education, hospital infrastructure, resource availability, hospital management, recognition, and appreciation are key motivators for health workers (Mathauer and Imhoff 2006). These findings also suggest that financial incentives alone are not enough to motivate civilian health workers. Satisfaction of professional conscience, vocation and ethos were important triggers for enhancing health worker motivation in Africa (Mathauer and Imhoff 2006). Health workers' individual needs, self-belief, expected consequences and organisational aspects are some of the more important determinants (Bennett and Franco 1999). Research findings from the Asia-Pacific region indicate that salaries and benefits, together with working conditions, environment, supportive supervision and recognition from superiors, and education and training opportunities, are important determinants for health workers' motivation (Henderson and Tulloch 2008; Peters et al. 2010). One recent article suggests five 'C's to keep health workers generally motivated and productive: (a) communication (the Internet and telemedicine facility); (b) continuing medical education; (c) connection with a higher hospital; (d) community management of hospital/s; and (e) children's education (Shankar 2010).

Health workers have always tended to move in search of better living and working conditions, improved salaries and opportunities for professional development, be it within their own country - from rural to urban areas or from public to private sector - or from one country to another (Awases et al. 2003). Moreover, health workers tend to leave underserved and neglected areas, including those susceptible to armed violence, because of lack of modern facilities and insecurity (Dolea, Stormont and Braichet 2010; Zurn et al. 2010).

How to motivate and retain health workers remains a critical problem for public sector health systems, particularly in low and middle-income (so-called 'developing') countries (Willis-Shattuck et al. 2008). The problem is even more alarming in countries disrupted by armed conflicts which experience a high shortage of health workers (Pavignani 2011). Whilst war and violent conflict commonly destroy human life and property (Buhmann et al. 2010; de Jong 2010), many volunteer to risk their lives for a cause in which they believe (Panter-Brick 2010; Guichaoua 2007). This paper deals with the question: Why do people join wars as rebel health workers? Joining a political party for ideological reasons is common practice in peace time in many societies, but what specific factors motivate individuals to work as rebel health workers in a violent conflict is not well researched. It is important to have an understanding of the motives behind joining rebel health service as it can help (a) address the root causes of the armed conflict; and (b) post-conflict redevelopment of health services.

However, systematic information on Nepal's rebel health workers mobilised by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), during the insurgency, is limited. Therefore, our study examined the factors which motivated health workers to join health services established by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist during the decade-long (1996-2006) armed conflict in Nepal. The uprising against the government began in February 1996, launched by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). The Maoists mainly gained control in the more remote and rural parts of the country. In 2005 King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and took over power. This side-stepping of parliament brought seven political parties together to form an alliance with the CPN-M in 2006 against the king. This united opposition movement in turn resulted in a shift in power and ultimately a peace agreement in 2006.

Maoist health workers interviewed for the study had been working in remote areas and provisional camps, and some of them were working in, or managing, the operation of primary health centres in areas controlled by the Maoists. During the insurgency, they worked largely underground, but their work became more public after the peace negotiations of 2006. At the time of the study, these Maoist health-care workers were waiting for the outcome of the peace process, as the peace negotiations could affect their future career. This study was conducted immediately following the peace negotiations in an attempt to explore their career aspirations.

Bhimsen Devkota (BD) interviewed 15 Maoist health workers, six females and nine males, who were recruited using snowballing sampling (MacDougall and Fudge 2001; Shaver 2005). The interviews took place between November 2007 and March 2008, and, to maintain anonymity, quotes in this paper only identify interviewees by a number. The Nepal Health Research Council granted ethical permission for the study while the Health Division of the UCPN-M (United Communist Party Nepal-Maoist) and ANPHWA (All Nepal Public Health Worker's Association) facilitated access to their health workers (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010).

Semi-structured interviews (van Teijlingen and Forrest, 2004) were conducted with the Maoist health workers; each lasted between 1 and 1½ hours. The interviews were first transcribed in Nepali, and subsequently translated into English. The transcripts were initially analysed using NVivo version 7 (QSR International Pty. LTD, 2007) to generate key themes and sub-themes. The themes were further analysed by using steps of the framework analysis (Krueger 1994; Pope, Ziebland and Mays 2000; Ritchie and Spencer 1994). The process followed: a) familiarisation of the recurrent themes; b) identifying a thematic framework; c) indexing; d) charting and e) mapping and interpretation. The findings below are reported with relevant quotes from the 15 interviewees.

The following section presents the conceptual framework, discussing the multiple factors determining motivation to join rebel health services. Next, the study findings are presented, starting with the characteristics of the rebel health workers followed by their motivation for joining. The discussion section analyses the motivating factors suggested by the study, compared with studies conducted in Nepal and other countries, where available and relevant. Finally, in the conclusion, the findings with suggestions for ways forward are summarised.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MULTI-FACTOR APPROACH TO REBEL MOTIVATION

Literature on motivation of civilian health workers exists but specific studies on what motivates rebel health workers are scant. Therefore, we undertook a literature review on the motivation of rebels in general and that of rebel healthcare workers in particular, in order to establish a conceptual framework. We included literature covering armed conflicts elsewhere as well as the conflict in Nepal. Figure 1 is a schematic overview of the literature highlighting that people's motivation to join a rebellion is

determined by a number of individual, political and socio-cultural factors.

Fig. 1. Framework for analysing motives for joining rebel health services

Individual factors:

Studies suggest that economic or material incentives and non-material incentives such as power, status, autonomy and opportunity for career development drive individual rebels. Studies also found materialistic gain (greed), position and power (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier and Sambanis 2002; Gates 2002; Weinstein 2002), and lack of fulfilment of needs (Mitchell 1981; Venhaus 2010) as possible reasons for joining the rebellion. Collier and Sambanis (2002) and Weinstein (2002) suggested economic endowment or materialistic gain theory as rebel motivation. The few studies carried out in Nepal reiterate that economic underdevelopment and poverty were key causes behind the conflict (Devarajan 2005; Leve 2007; Macours 2010; Parwez 2006).

Political factors:

Several structural factors compel individuals to participate in armed insurgencies (Galtung 1969; Galtung and Tschundi 2007). Ideological consciousness is a key factor for joining (Hudson 1999; Bandura 2003). Previous studies in Nepal suggest frustration with political expectations, lack of political access and autonomy, political exclusion and grievances (Gersony 2003; Gurung 2005; Hossain, Siitonen and Sharma 2006; Hutt 2004; Leve 2007; Parvati 2003; Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004; Thapa 2003), bad governance and inequitably-distributed development (Hossain et al. 2006; Kumar 2003; Leve 2007; Pathak 2006) as the enabling factors of rebel motivation. Police violence and repression (Hossain, Siitonen and Sharma 2006; Singh, Dahal and Mills 2005) also turns some people into rebels.

Socio-cultural factors:

A number of socio-cultural factors are associated with rebel motivation. They include gender inequality and caste/ethnic exclusion (Gurung 2005; Gautam, Baskota and Manchand 2001; Leve 2007; Parvati 2004), family connectedness (Olsson 1988; Venhaus 2010), and the desire to gain social prestige and serve the people.

These three sets of motivating factors apply to the motivation of armed insurgents and there is paucity of systematic information on why individuals choose to work as a rebel health worker. Moreover, most published findings are based either on secondary data, or studies at agency level. Our paper, however, is based on primary research with a sample of rebel health workers.

RESULTS

The age-range of the interviewed rebel health workers varied from 21 to 49 years and their education from eighth grade to degree level (15 years old to undergraduate). The majority had completed less than ten years of education. Maoist health workers generally had some clinical experience in the paramedical field, had basic education, knew a little English and had an interest in health services.

Two-thirds of the Maoist health workers had received paramedical or health training prior to joining the Maoists, while four of them had undergone 'ordinary' training (1½ months) provided by the Maoists, and one remaining health worker had taken 'medium' level training (2½ months), again provided by the Maoists.

Four of the 15 health workers interviewed were executive members of ANPHWA, an open health front of the UCPN-M. Two of them were responsible for treatment and rehabilitation of wounded members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Two of the Maoist health workers had worked in a Maoist health centre in a remote district whilst the rest had worked in various PLA cantonments.

Our qualitative findings suggest five sub-themes of individual, political and socio-cultural factors motivating individuals to become a Maoist health worker. They are: a) wanting to serve; b) Maoist ideology; c) state atrocity and injustice; d) involvement of family in the armed conflict and e) grievance over poor service delivery. Interestingly enough, despite asking specifically about it we found that the two sub-themes 'financial incentives' and 'gaining social recognition and status' had not acted as motivating factors for joining as a rebel health worker.

Desire to serve people

Interviewees often wanted to serve people or the wider society, as one of them put it:

> "I thought I could serve the people best being a Maoist health worker. It offered me an opportunity to serve people on their doorstep. I could help on the war front

(yudda morcha) and in treating people from our base areas." (ID 11)

Another health worker claimed:

"I thought if I did not serve these poor people, no one would help them out. To realise this, I had to work with a force that wanted to change the status quo ideologically. I found Maoists very appropriate for this." (ID 05)

Maoist ideology

Several Maoist health workers were driven by their political conviction, as expressed by the following Maoist health worker:

"While I was working as a government health worker, I had studied the ideology of the Maoists. The policy ideology that it embodied shook me (uddelit). It gave me thoughts (chetana). I realised that for a change to materialise, politics was necessary. Therefore, I concluded that the politics of change could be the Maoists' politics of class struggle. Gradually, my contacts with the Maoists party workers increased. I decided to resign from my post. One fine morning, I left my job and walked away." (ID 03)

A former Maoist health worker, turned lawmaker, had a rather theoretical source of inspiration:

"I was personally motivated with the work of Norman Bethune in the Chinese revolution and Dr. DD in India. In the twentieth century, the revolutionaries could not train medical doctors, we had to depend on paramedical staff. We accepted this reality and trained our own health workers." (ID 14)

He added:

"It was the Maoist ideology and our courage (bichar ra shahas) that encouraged us to work with the Maoists." (ID 14)

Maoist health workers mentioned Maoist mass meetings and cultural programmes motivating them to join:

"I was associated with the revolutionary student front in 2001/2002. There was a public awareness campaign in the village. At that time, everybody was a Maoist in the village and I thought why not I? I also started to attend their programmes and became a Maoist. I got a part-time position in the Party in 2002 and, in the same year, I became a full-time member." (ID 12)

State atrocity/injustice

The respondents mentioned police arrests, torture and false allegations as reasons for joining the Maoist rebellion. Almost all those who had been students prior to their recruitment reported repression by the police as a main push factor. One paramedical student who had joined the Maoists said:

"The police arrested me while I was studying to become a Community Medical Assistant (CMA) … They [the police] jailed me for several days … in the Far-West Region. One day they released me from jail but I was always under police surveillance. I felt my life at risk from the enemy. I joined the Maoists after my release from jail." (ID 01)

A key member of a Maoist support organisation and coordinator of one of the nine autonomous states declared by the UCPN-M made a similar response:

"I joined the Party seven years ago. After completing plus two education, I was admitted to study CMA. Right from my admission, the class enemies[1] started to chase me. As a result, I joined the Party." (ID 04)

Another Maoist health worker, who was a government village health worker (VHW), used the term *Prashasan* (administration) as a push factor.

"The People's War greatly intensified in my district in 2001. The District Administration (Prashasan) tortured me, accusing me of being a Maoist supporter. I was not allowed to continue my job. I left the job and joined the Maoists as a part-time member." (ID 08)

Another female Maoist health worker who had worked previously as a government Maternal and Child Health Worker (MCHW) recollected:

"After the declaration of the State of Emergency in 2001, the police started to come after me. I used to go to [the local administrative centre] to submit a monthly progress report on my health post. The police followed me many times. They suspected me of being a Maoist. They came to search my house twice. They even killed my buffalo and demolished my house. They beat my

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1   'Class enemies' in this quote refers to people opposing or oppressing members of the working class/proletariats.

two children and me, and threatened to kill us. They wanted me to show them my husband, who I had not seen for a long time. How could I show my husband to them to kill? They came to my house many times. It was too much. They forced me to leave my house. I went underground in 2002." (ID 06)

She further added:

"I think many of our colleagues were compelled to join because of atrocities of the police and the army. Two of my colleagues who are working in this hospital now were nearly killed by the 'enemies'." (ID 06)

Following in the footsteps of family members

Family legacy was also a pull factor for the Maoist health workers. A less frequent view was that their family members were associated with the Maoist Party prior to their recruitment. Having relatives within the party meant individuals were put under police surveillance and ultimately forced to go underground. This is reflected in the following statement:

"My husband was a full-time member of the Party for 18 years. I worked in a government hospital in Kathmandu for many years. During the janayuddha (People's War), I used to treat war-wounded secretly in the hospital or used to treat them in personal residences in Kathmandu. When the war reached its peak, I became a full member, in 2003, and started my service." (ID 02)

One interviewee had joined Maoists after her husband had gone underground:

"I was a government health worker for five years. My husband had been involved in the Maoist party since 2001. He became Chief of the Maoists Village Government and went underground after 2002. But I was not a party supporter at that time, nor was I a member of it. When the circumstances turned unfavourable, I left my children and family and joined the Party." (ID 07)

Parental involvement in the conflict was a key factor for another health worker:

"I joined the war because my parents were forced to go underground. The 'reactionary government' declared my father a "terrorist" and put a million cash reward on his head. Both my father and mother went

underground. Police used to search our house from time to time. Later on I also went into hiding." (ID 15)

Poor health services delivery

A few Maoist health workers highlighted the inequity within the health services and poor health services delivery in their localities as factors for his joining the Maoist movement:

"Well…. at that time, I was in charge of a health centre in the SS district. I did not know that I was a sympathiser of the Maoists in the beginning. I used to keep some personal medicines at my residence. My health post had very limited drugs, hardly sufficient for two months, to distribute to the needy people. I was the only help for the people. They could never buy a full dose of drugs out of their pocket. …. When my stock ran out, I could not give them any drugs, not even a tablet of Cetamol. I could do nothing for them, except disappointing and frustrating them. This was commonplace for the majority of people in rural villages." (ID 03)

He further added:

"What happens if you have water in a cup and people ask you to fill their vessels? I realised it was impossible within that system." (ID 03)

Another health worker said:

"There were no drugs in the health post; and people had no access to hospitals, even if they went to hospital, the doctor would not be present. …The status of people was vulnerable (jarjar). I could not bear this situation and I felt that I should help these people through bringing a system that could help them. I did not see any alternative other than the Maoists to improve the situation of the poor people." (ID 08)

Financial incentives

Maoist cadres were generally not motivated by economic benefits. One fifth of the health workers interviewed reported that they were salaried government workers before joining the Maoists. They reported that the Maoist Party gave them a very small amount of money for expenses. One health worker claimed she worked almost voluntarily, compared with her previous government salary:

(Her face lightens up.) "Do you know our party gives us 500 rupees (US $ 7) each month as pocket money.

This is equal for all of us, no matter how high or low the position. We live here and eat at the mess. I am happy with this money. You know my salary was nearly 5,000 rupees in the government at that time, but I was not satisfied. I am very satisfied now. I cannot compare. The main thing is that the Party has given chetana (ideology) to me, before this, I could not analyse things on a political basis." (ID 12)

One female health worker stated that, instead of gaining financially from the Maoists, she had 'proletarised' herself by giving her property to the Party:

"We had our house, land and little properties in the past. After my husband and I joined the Party, we gave whatever was left to us to the Party." (ID 06)

One health worker who was from a cantonment also got only 500 rupees per month from the Maoist Party during the conflict. This payment increased to 3,000 rupees after entering the provisional camp agreed between the United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN), UCPN-M and the Government of Nepal. The conversation follows:
Interviewer: Did you get a regular salary or money from the Maoists?

"Before the peace negotiation, the Party used to provide us with 500 rupees per month for snacks, toothbrushes and paste, soap and clothes." (ID 07)

Interviewer: How did you feel getting such a tiny amount?

"We used to feel proud at that time as we thought that we were working for liberation of the poor people. We were guided by an ideology. Now the government pays us 3,000 rupees a month. We were more satisfied when we used to get 500 from the Party." (ID 07)

Another Maoist health worker, who had previously worked with an international organisation and also in a government hospital, mentioned that pocket money given by the Party was sufficient because of her 'simple living':

"I wouldn't have to pay for food normally. While I used to work in the rural districts, I used to wear on lungi (loin cloth) and T-shirts I had carried with me from home. I even used to save some money out of this salary (Rs.500)." (ID 02)

Gaining position and status

Interviewees had mixed discourses regarding being motivated by status and/or power. None of the Maoist health workers reported that they were attracted by power and positions in the Maoist organisation. Rather, they expressed pride in joining the People's War. One government health worker, who had joined the Maoists at a time when the success of war was uncertain and the government repression of the Maoists was severe, said:

"I was on the government staff and I was also running a private clinic successfully in a mid-western district. In the beginning, the UCPN-M had no health workers with it. The development of war demanded many of us to join. I decided to support the war and joined in." (ID 10)

When he was asked further about his position in the Maoist Party, he replied:

"In the past, I looked after the mid-western region of the Maoist health sector as a full-time member. During the conflict, I coordinated the health sector of the 'new regime' (naya satta). At present, I am a lawmaker on behalf of UCPN-M." (ID 10)

Another Maoist health worker recollected:

"I provided treatment to many wounded comrades during the Kilo Siera and Romeo operations launched by the enemies. The reactionary government had announced that Maoists were finished. But when we captured hundreds of policemen, including a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) … people recognised our strength. We were involved in providing treatment to the injured policemen captured in the war. This was the first time I treated people whom I used to hate." (ID 14)

DISCUSSION

Our findings suggest that, while some Maoist rebel health workers had one dominant reason for joining the armed struggle, many others joined for a combination of factors. Becoming a member of a rebel group depends on a combination of factors, as suggested in research conducted with ex-combatants in Guatemala (Hauge 2007) and Burundi (Fuhlrott 2008).

One recurrent view of the interviewees was that Maoist ideology was a key driver for joining the insurrection. There existed a strong link between self-reported class-based revolutionary consciousness of the Maoist health workers and their motivation to become a rebel health worker (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010, p. 112). This finding is similar to Adams' (1998) that Nepalese state-funded general paramedics working in rural areas were dedicated to political

movements and their conscientiousness. Moreover, our study supports previous findings that political indoctrination and education through one-on-one contacts, door-to-door campaigns and cultural programmes were key elements of the Maoist recruitment strategy (Eck 2007; Karki and Bhattarai 2004).

The Maoist health workers tended to claim that there were no economic incentives for joining the rebellion, in contrast to the general economic endowment or materialistic gain theory (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Devarajan 2005; Leve 2007; Macours 2010; Parwez 2006; Weinstein 2002). Previous studies conducted in Nepal considered poverty, geographic suitability for insurgency (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 2006; Lecomte-Tilouine and Gellner 2004) and political exclusion and grievances (Gurung 2005; Hutt 2004; Thapa 2003) to explain growth and sustainability of the rebel motivation. Parwez (2006) concluded that the probability of conflict is higher in areas with lower life expectancy, income and road density. The Maoists' base areas in the mid and far-western regions are considered to have similar characteristics. In contrast to this, one study indicates the probability of occurrences of engagement in conflict is higher among individuals with higher levels of educational attainment (Gautam, Banskota and Manchanda 2001; Leve 2001). The low literacy rates in the Maoist regions contradict this, but the higher educational level among the mid and upper level leaders of the UCPN-M is in line with the above finding (Shah and Pettigrew 2009).

Whatever the political affiliation, it is likely that the Maoist health workers tended to be a group of individuals motivated by concern about public well-being and more willing to serve in the parts of the country most in need of health workers.

Having a family member sympathetic to the Maoist ideology, and/or a family member or close relative killed, tortured, disappeared or prosecuted by the state apparently attracted interviewees towards the Maoist rebellion. According to Olsson (1988), these elements trigger violence. The work by Gersony (2003), Hossain and colleagues (2006), Leve (2007), Pettigrew and Shneiderman (2004) and Parvati (2003) support our findings that grievance, frustration and police atrocities trigger the motivation towards rebellion. Venhaus (2010) suggested that people get socialised into seeking revenge in these environments, and joining the rebellion is the next logical step.

None of our research participants mentioned gender and caste discrimination as the reason for joining the insurgency, as found in studies by Danida (2005) and Gurung, (2005). However, it supports Gersony's (2003) finding that caste and gender were not important reasons behind the Maoist rebellion in the western hill districts.

We also explored whether any of the Maoist health workers joined involuntarily. All participants claimed that they joined voluntarily and they painted positive experiences on their involvement with the Maoists. Our find-

ings concur with studies carried out among female fighters in Guatemala (Hauge 2007) and in Nepal (Ogura 2004; Whelpton 2005). Our findings might have been different if the interviews had been conducted during the time of open conflict and with general combatants instead of the Maoist health workers. In a negotiated post-conflict situation where the Maoists have the opportunity to share government power and enjoy many privileges, their response might have been coloured. However, this is an on-going debate among scholars of conflict (Brett and Specht 2004).

People can have a multitude of motives for joining an ideologically-guided rebellion. It could be individual, social, ideological, economical or psychological, or a combination of these motives. Many of the study findings seem similar to studies carried out elsewhere. We consider that there is no single mindset and the dynamics are not clear, as they tend to be complex and context specific.

Our study suggests that the Maoist health workers followed a pathway while becoming involved in the violent conflict. They followed a socialisation process in a violent environment (Olsson, 1988). Their journey to Maoist revolution often started right from the family. They gained revolutionary consciousness through interaction with the family members who had some form of grievance and had encountered violence from the state, and who may have had connections with the Maoist workers and activists. The process further extended to their peers in the community and gained momentum. As our research participants reported, in many remote villages of the western districts of Nepal, the entire village supported the Maoist cause and that was how they became a Maoist, as highlighted by the statement, "Everybody in this village is a Maoist." It suggests that people from a community with a history of general conflict are more likely to be involved in violent conflict.

Many villages, particularly in western Nepal, have a history of brutal state repression during the time of the absolute monarchy and the post-democracy governments (e.g. Romeo and Kilo Sierra operations) under the constitutional monarchy, which generated strong public opposition against the state and its security forces (Gersony 2003; Leve 2007).

Further, on the socialisation in a violent environment, the Maoist health workers joined the support organisations of the Maoists such as its revolutionary wings for students, youth, teachers, women, farmers and labourers. At some time, they came into contact with Maoist party members and activists and took part in their mass mobilisation activities and meetings. When the state became aware of this involvement or sympathies through its 'informers', it stepped up repressive measures to maintain 'law and order', and the security forces started harassing these supporters of the Maoists, even though some were only passive sympathisers.

The Maoist health workers were frequently arrested by the police. Because of the animosity with the police and government military forces, some saw no option other than joining the Maoists. The Maoists were quick to issue

them membership, part-time membership in the beginning, which after six months to one year, normally became full-time. However, those who were recruited directly to the militia during the height of the Maoist war might not have followed this trajectory.

Unlike the civilian health workers, the Maoist health workers appeared to be motivated more by political ideology, political exclusion, grievances against the government health care system and state repression and less by financial benefits, personal career development, and personal status or working conditions.

Finally, this study has several strengths and weaknesses. The key strength is that this was the first academic study on the motivation of Nepalese Maoist health workers. Similar to other studies conducted in dangerous environments (Kovarts-Bernat 2002; Shah and Pettigrew 2009), we consider the possibility of limitations such as self-selection bias of interviewees, issues of relationship, complicity, representation (Pettegrew, Shneiderman and Harper 2004) and access, ethics and security (Sriram et al. 2009). Some interviewees may have tried to satisfy their superiors or the Party while responding to the researcher, despite efforts to create an environment to elicit anonymous or confidential answers from them. However, we did not find any evidence of coercion during interviews. The government health workers from the Maoist stronghold areas could have been included to assess and compare their motivation in their job as a health worker. Future research should examine whether the motives of the Maoist leaders and followers converge or not. We suggest using additional methods to triangulate the study methods and findings.

CONCLUSION

The Maoist ideological consciousness tended to be the main driving force for joining the Maoist rebellion. The course of socialisation of violence appears to be built into the individual, their family and communities. Apart from ideological considerations Maoist health workers tended to be motivated by concern about public well-being. They also expressed a willingness to serve in the rural parts of the country most in need of health workers.

At present, Nepal is in the post-conflict transition. There is an attempt to integrate Maoist ex-fighters into the regular Nepalese army. It might be useful to consider the Maoist health care workers as a slightly separate sub-group. With the appropriate re-training, they may offer a solution to another key problem in Nepal, namely the lack of effective and sustained health care provision in rural areas (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2009). These Maoist health workers have worked in many remote areas, exactly the kind of areas where there is a critical need for trained staff to deliver minimum health services. Understanding their original motivation to become rebel health workers is a first step towards dialogue.

We suggest that those involved in the process of post-conflict peacebuilding in Nepal should examine and address the factors that motivated the disenchanted and frustrated health workers to turn to armed violence. It is important to know their aspirations and ideas about their future careers as both have implications for the redevelopment of health services and peacebuilding in the current transition period in Nepal.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ARTICLE

Negotiating Pathways to Manhood: Rejecting Gangs and Violence in Medellín's Periphery

Adam Baird

Abstract

Gangs around the globe are paradigmatic of urban violence and predominantly made up of male youths from poorer neighbourhoods. However, even in the most violent urban contexts, the majority of young men do not join gangs. This paper uses original empirical data collected in Medellín, Colombia and a conceptual focus on masculinities to understand why some male youths negotiated a pathway to manhood without joining a gang, arguing that two factors are central: family support in developing a moral rejection of gangs during childhood, and these youths' subsequent ability to form socialisation spaces away from the street corner. These factors helped them circumvent the influence of what this article calls the "gang male role model system".

INTRODUCTION

Almost a century ago literature began to emerge from the Chicago School, where scholars such as Thrasher sought to understand the phenomenon of urban gangs (Thrasher, 1927; also see Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Yablonsky, 1997). Although the definition of gang has been contested (Pitts, 2008), since then substantial literature has been produced on gangs around the globe. Much has been published on gangs including multi-country comparisons (Rodgers, 1999; Alexander, 2000; Klein et al., 2001; Bourgois, 2003; Covey, 2003; Rodgers, 2006; Jensen, 2008; Hagedorn, 2008; Pitts, 2008; Pitts, 2011). This has included a surge in policy-oriented publications over the last five years, as governments, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean region, scramble to control rising urban violence,

which has become a major political issue (for example: Small Arms Survey, 2010; UNDP, 2011; OECD, 2011a; World Bank, 2011b; The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2011; Costa, 2012).

Research on civil society responses to gangs and violence is less common than studies of the gang phenomenon itself. In fact, in Colombia, the focus on belligerent groups has been so intense it has led to the emergence of the disciplinary term *violentología* – 'violentology'. Gangs themselves have long been the targets of state-led intervention policies where punitive *mano dura*, or zero-tolerance, approaches reflect the dominant discourse across the region. However, such intervention has met with limited long-term success and has been strongly criticised by the academic world, civil society organisations and international development agencies. Urban violence in the southern hemisphere is largely conceived as a reproduced,

multi-causal and socially generated phenomenon,[1] where gangs are understood as epiphenomena of deeper systems of structural exclusion linked to the political economy of the modern city (see Bourgois, 2003: 319; Rodgers, 2010). However, some debate the importance of exclusion and poverty as a motivational factor for gang affiliation (Rubio, 2008), and in policy circles in Latin America and the Caribbean, the penetration of the narcotics industry into communities has been presented as the main factor correlated with homicide rates (Costa, 2012). The socially generated conceptualisation of violence has led to recent human security (UNDP, 1994) perspectives gaining ground, which advocate more nuanced approaches to violence reduction with a focus on prevention and development (Abello Colak and Pearce, 2008: 11-15). This discourse is increasingly reflected by multilateral institutions including the UNDP, OECD (OECD, 2011a; OECD, 2011b; UNDP, 2010; UNDP, 2011) and the World Bank, whose recent report argues for a developmental response to crime and violence in Latin America with the increased involvement of civil society organisations (World Bank, 2011a). However, methods of urban violence reduction remain highly contested and linked to regional political-institutional cultures, the debate about which is beyond the scope of this paper.

Since the mid-1990s, in Medellín, Colombia, amongst civil society organisations there has been a generalised shift in violence reduction methods from direct intervention and conflict resolution with gangs, to prevention work with vulnerable youths living in socio-economically deprived contexts with abundant gang activity (Baird, 2011: 125-8; Baird, 2012). Despite significant levels of civil society activism in Medellín, few scholars focus on the progress made by such activism or on nonviolent youths in Medellín but rather, in the *violentología* tradition, focus on belligerent groups (for example Hylton, 2007; Rozema, 2008; Bedoya, 2010). Pertinently, Barker (1998; 2005) argues that scholars need to ask why, even in the most violent urban contexts, *most youths do not* actually engage in systematic violence and join gangs. If we are to interrupt the continuum of gang membership – hence cycles of violence – it is crucial to understand why youths *do not* join gangs.

This article seeks to address this point by investigating a particular group of young men in the poor and violent Montecristo neighbourhood in Medellín. These youths not only avoided joining gangs, but came to work with the local community organisation, Corporación Vida para Todos (Corporation Life for All) from now on *CoVida*,[2] and developed values that strongly rejected violence and crime.[3] It should be noted here that this group of youths was chosen in particular because of the *antithetical positions* they took towards gangs, crime and violence, with the intention of uncovering how such positions developed.[4] The wider intention of this paper is to contribute to debates around the prevention of gang membership and hence the reduction of urban violence.

First, this article provides a brief contextual background of the Montecristo neighbourhood. Secondly, it argues the relevance of masculinities in understanding modern-day urban violence. Third, the empirical data is analysed to reveal how youths negotiated pathways to masculinity whilst rejecting violence, and in particular, the gang.

SOCIAL CONTEXT IN MONTECRISTO

Medellín has been affected by urban violence since the 1950s, which became more intense from the late 1980s onwards (Medina Franco, 2006). Most of this violence occurs in poor neighbourhoods. In 1991 Medellín achieved the ignominious record of the highest per capita homicide rate in history, at 381 per 100,000 inhabitants (Suárez Rodríguez, 2005: 203).[5] This violence is linked to the dynamics of the broader armed conflict in Colombia, and was brought about by a cocktail of gangs, youth assassins (*sicarios*), cartel violence, urban militias linked to left-wing guerrilla groups, paramilitary and state violence. This period coincided with the childhood of the young men interviewed for this paper. There were still large numbers of gangs and paramilitary groups[6] in the neighbourhood in 2008 when the data was collected despite the paramilitary demobilisation process, about which there has been much debate (Amnesty International, September 2005; Rozema, 2008; Llorente, 2009; Palou and Llorente, 2009; Insuasty Rodríguez et al., 2010).

Montecristo is the last neighbourhood in north-western Medellín before the slopes become too steep for any

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1 Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois claim that violence is mimetic and reproductive "so we can rightly speak of… a continuum of violence" (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004).

2 *CoVida* and *Montecristo* are pseudonyms.

3 Other literature describes these youths as 'prosocial' (see Daly and Wilson, 1997; Barker, 2000).

4 When interviewed, these youths estimated that only a small minority – approximately 5% – of local young men work for community organisation. As such, this group can be described as an 'outlier' compared to the 'average' youth in the neighbourhood.

5 In a city of 1.6 million a staggering total of 6,349 homicides were recorded that year, and in total between 1986 and 1993 there were 33,546 homicides (Márquez Valderrama and Ospina, 1999: 14). For comparative purposes, Perlman refers to Rio de Janerio being one of the most violent cities in the world in 2004. The homicide rate then was 37.7 per 100,000 (Perlman, 2008: 52), a tenth of the homicide rate in Medellín in 1991.

6 Paramilitary groups controlled many street gangs from 2003 in Medellín, although their control began to fragment in 2009. During the fieldwork period in 2007-8, in the eyes of community members the words *gang member* and *paramilitary* became largely synonymous, both of which are used in this article.

dwelling to be built, and is classified as socio-economic strata one and two, the poorest on a scale of one to six. The location of CoVida, after a long, winding ride on the 247 bus from the city centre, is itself an indicator of the exclusion of the neighbourhood. Life history interviews were conducted with fifteen male youths with an average age of 23.4 years old during a period of participant observation at the organisation in 2008 (for detailed methodology see Baird, 2009).

Growing up in Montecristo is particularly challenging. Generalised poverty and socio-economic exclusion limit opportunities for young people. The ubiquity of the drugs trade and irregular armed groups spanning a number of generations has led to chronic levels of violence, which promote social and family disorder with fatherless households the norm. Generalised police and institutional corruption at a local level and absence of the rule of law provided illegal armed actors with a space to proffer 'security services', which, although based on extortion (Bedoya, 2010) , have gained local legitimacy. Sexual and domestic violence are pervasive in the community, as are levels of alcoholism and drug addiction – the latter the principal economic pillar of gangs and paramilitaries. Whilst Montecristo is not in a Durkheimian anomic state, turf wars between rival gangs shaped the childhood experiences of the youths interviewed: "In the 90s I watched my friends die, and even at school you weren't safe. I was there when they [a gang] came into school and grabbed a classmate of mine, dragged him off to the toilets and killed him… so we ended up spending our youth either locked up at home or at school, because that's what you had to do." (Gabriel, 11/07/2008) Life is hard. Home economics – putting food on the table – alongside security remain the main preoccupations of local inhabitants. Whilst these realities bite, there is another face to Montecristo; it is also a vibrant community and locals have developed tremendous resilience to poverty, exclusion and violence, using agency to find creative ways to get by – known locally as *rebusque*.

THE GANG MALE ROLE MODEL SYSTEM AND THE REPRODUCTION OF VIOLENCE

Ninety-five percent of the 5,450 homicide victims in 1990 were men, and 65% were between the ages of 15 and 29 (Revista Planeación Metropolitana, 1991: 3). Young men are also the main perpetrators of lethal urban violence – the human capital of insecurity. This male youth demographic rubric has remained remarkably constant over the last two decades.[7] At a global level, young men remain the protagonists of violence: In 2002, the WHO reported that "Males accounted for three-quarters of all victims of homicide, and had rates more than three times those among females: the highest homicide rates in the world – at 19.4 per 100,000 – were found among males aged 15-29 years" (Krug et al., 2002: 6).

Given the overwhelming amount of youth male-on-male violence, it is logical to conclude that something about the construction of the male identity makes this possible. Despite increasing literature linking the urban periphery – namely inequality, poverty and exclusion – to violence, very little research brings these perspectives together to reveal how masculinities might interact with contexts of exclusion and poverty to generate violence.[8] Masculinities alone do not generate urban violence (Rodgers, 2006); but rather, the way that deprived socio-economic conditions interact with masculinisation can cast light on the generation of violence. For this reason it is pertinent to ask how some youths become men, in contexts of exclusion, without joining gangs and engaging in violence.

Understanding how masculinity is reproduced can help us understand the reproduction of violence itself. Youths are *disposed* – that is, they have a less than conscious tendency – to reproduce existing versions of masculinity they are exposed to while growing up. This is understood here as masculine *habitus*,[9] drawing on French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's 'thinking tools' from his *Theory of Practice* (Bourdieu, 1977). In short, boys are disposed to 'become men', or go through a process of masculinisation that reflects existing masculine identities. Whilst, of course, this reproduction of practice is imperfect, allowing for multiple identities, agency and social change, masculine *habitus* helps explain the generalised intergenerational transmission of masculine comportment. To understand how the reproduction of certain masculinities are related to the reproduction of violence let us consider the meanings of masculinity in peripheral Medellín, and in particular in relation to violent armed actors.

Masculinity can be employed in a variety of frameworks. In this paper it is understood from a sociological perspective as the cultural construction of the gendered self (see Hearn, 1996: 203-4), an 'achieved' identity. Recognising that there are multiple masculinities (Hearn, 2005: 61), hegemonic masculinities (Connell, 1987) in particular

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7   In a longitudinal study between 1990-2002, the vast majority of homicide victims in Medellín were consistently young males between 15-34 years old, a trend which remained unchanged in 2009 (Suárez Rodríguez, 2005; Hylton, 2010).

8   Gary Barker and Steffen Jensen have studied masculinities and violence in contexts of exclusion (Barker, 2005; Jensen, 2008). Pearce also asks pertinent questions about masculinity, socialisation and the transmission of violence (Pearce, 2006).

9   Masculine habitus has also been used by Coles (2009).

have been related to violence.[10] Basic hegemonic characteristics of becoming a man are: success, status, income, strength, confidence, independence, aggression, violence and daring (Edley and Wetherell, 1996: 101). A somewhat exaggerated form of hegemonic masculine identity is widespread in much of Latin America, and commonly referred to as *machismo*, although we should be careful not to essentialise concepts of masculinity in the Latin American region (Gutmann, 1996: 245; see also Gutmann and Viveros Vigoya, 2005: 115). These masculinities are synonymous with social status, respect, money, sexual access to women and often violence, but there is contextual definition, or localised nuances, to masculine performance. The young men interviewed in this paper from a poor neighbourhood in Medellín were asked to outline what was locally understood as being a man.

> **Sammy:** Here you notice particularly the strong difference between men and women. Being a man is to be strong, being a man is to be a brute, being a man means bringing home money, being a man means being a protector, being a man is being skilful, being a man is being a womaniser, being a man is being a chauvinist, being a man is being macho, being a man is being manly, being a man is to have power, being a man means being respected. Being a woman is the inverse of being a man… being weak, fragile, not having power, not having status, to be subordinated… (Sammy, 03/06/2008)

They go on to explain how gangs, particularly gang leaders, become strong symbols of male success, the standard bearers of masculinity for boys and young men, becoming localised models of hegemonic masculinity.

> **Pepe:** …Well, there is one stereotype of a man, which is the armed actor, the head of the gang, or the person who has been getting involved with armed groups, and has begun to rise through the ranks. The one that starts as a *carrito* [a child] who carries guns and then the next thing you know he has become the boss… They enjoy significant status and recognition. (Pepe, 11/04/2008)

Licit opportunities to secure desired, or dignified, livelihoods are scarce, leading to many "frustrated dreams" (Pelicorto, 10/06/2008). A number of youths then search for other options through crime and gangs. These illicit options, by contrast, appear ubiquitous and accessible in the youths' immediate social world when presented with the imaginary[11] or role model of the materially wealthy gang members and standard bearers of male success.

> **Pepe:** One of the reference points here that is latently constructed is that of the *cacique* or boss [the leader of the local gang or armed group]. Well of course, imagine during their whole life at home there's not enough food or basic utilities; there are no loving relationships but high levels of domestic violence; and the whole time they see this bloke who lives locally who enjoys strong economic solvency, who's got… I don't know what to call them, but accessories. He's got a motorbike, designer trainers, girls, expensive clothes, all that sort of stuff. But also he's got *respect*, *recognition*, *power* [emphasis added]. So of course the young lads round here say "fuck me, this is the ticket!" It's also seen as the easy route… So they are given *a gun, and a gun is already a big deal* [speaker's emphasis]. I think that a gun is a very resounding symbol. (Pepe, 11/04/2008)

Although multiple male role models exist at any one time for boys and young men growing up in these communities, it was common for gang members, particularly gang bosses, to occupy a significant ontological position in the field of masculinity, symbolised, albeit in an exaggerated way, through the masculine capitals of power, respect, money, access to women and so on.[12] The gangs and their members can become powerful imaginaries and role models for impressionable boys, a mechanism to 'do masculinity', accumulate and show off such locally valued capitals. In addition, gangs' ontological significance in the field of masculinity is enhanced where young boys and youths have narrow perspectives of the world, due to stymied spatial and social mobility. Hernando noted, "four blocks" would become the youth's nation state from which they would rarely venture (Hernando, 21/06/2008). In the masculinisation process, youths would gain more esteem, status and masculine capital by joining a gang, than by working for a poverty wage in the informal sector. The gang therefore had the added incentive of catering for youths' need for respect or dignity.[13] As such, the meanings of masculinity for boys and young men in Montecristo were significantly shaped by what this paper calls the gang male role model system – *system* indicating reproductive capacity.

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10 When we theorise men and masculinity, a sociological approach should rightly talk of 'masculinities' rather than 'masculinity'. Like all identities, masculine ones have to be constructed and negotiated via interaction in different socialisation spaces, and at any one time there can be multiple expressions of masculinity itself (Hearn & Morgan, 1990; Hearn & Collinson, 1996; Hearn, 1996).

11 The youths interviewed often referred to the *imaginario* of the gang boss. *Imaginario* can be translated from Spanish as 'imaginary' or 'role model'.

12 *Field* and *capital* after Bourdieu (1977). Capital is used here in reference to 'masculine capitals', the localised assets or signifiers of identity. These *capitals* confer male identity in a relational field, linked to male esteem and dignity.

13 Bourgois and Jensen have written incisive accounts on urban socio-economic exclusion and individual struggle for respect and dignity respectively (Bourgois, 2003; Jensen, 2008).

The following section analyses how these youths managed to grow up and establish dignified masculine identities whilst rejecting the gang as a pathway to manhood. This can provide us with an insight into how positive, non-violent masculine identities emerge in contexts of violence in the urban periphery where gangs are most widespread.

CHILDHOOD UPBRINGING AND THE ROLE OF THE FAMILY

Whilst all of the youths interviewed suffered from social and family challenges caused by poverty and exclusion (see Dowdney, 2007), they viewed their upbringings in a largely positive light. Eleven out of fifteen youths said they were taught good values, felt cared for in affectionate relationships and supportive homes, and in nine cases mentioned their parents' insistence on education. In general, they spoke of good communication with both mothers and fathers. Only Pepe and Pelicorto appeared to view their family upbringing in a predominantly negative light, and there was only one experience of significant domestic violence. Of course, there were some bad experiences and fractured relationships at home. In three cases the father was absent, due to his death or a parental separation, and in three more cases the fathers had problems with alcoholism. However, these cases are not straightforward, for example absent, alcoholic or violent fathers could demonstrate both positive and negative facets of influence over their children.[14]

As they grew up, each youth's decision-making and consequent social action was shaped by a complex of context, agency, opportunity and happenstance. However, their narratives suggest two factors that helped keep them out of gangs. First, their families contributed to the emergence of a moral self that rejected violence, criminality and gangs in their neighbourhoods. Second, youths were encouraged to participate in socialisation spaces that were alternatives to hanging out on the street corner, particularly after dark, or other places associated with gangs. The relevance of socialisation will be explored below.

Here we should mention that these life experiences were nuanced and at times contradictory; even youths from the best families could join gangs (Galán, 19/06/2008). Hence, whilst some authors have made efforts to categorise resilience factors[15] we should caution against using them in a straightforward deterministic fashion.

Ángel: Look, in my family, my life was always about education… My Dad wanted me to be *really* educated [speaker's emphasis]… I ask myself why I did not get into drugs and violence if I grew up with them all around me… Sometimes I arrive at the conclusion that it's because of the education I received at home, because I'm someone who thinks differently because I wanted to finish my studies… (Ángel, 15/05/2008)

Chiner: …When I got to the age that I could join a gang I was conscious of things. Because apart from having a reference point at home we also had reference points through our friends… and despite the fact that we were only young, we had a clear understanding… I think because of the education that we received. That's important because we studied hard… (Chiner and Felipe, 10/07/2008)

The case of Quien shows that we should not generalise that single mothers find it more difficult to deal with sons (see also Moser, 2009: 239). Interestingly, Quien refers to his mother's disciplinary side as a male attribute.

Quien: The paternal figure in my life has never been present… Normally when mums say "don't get involved in drugs, don't join gangs" and all that, their sons don't pay any attention… So it depends on having a strong figure in the family. Probably that's the father but with me it was my mum. If I arrived home late she'd say "Hey dickhead! Where have you been! You son of a bitch, what are you thinking!" She'd speak like a bloke… she'd be tough as if she were a man… My mum's a real personality! I think she was the paternal figure as well. (Quien, 20/06/2008)

ALTERNATIVE SOCIALISATION AND JOINING THE COMMUNITY ORGANISATION

Parental influence did have an impact on these youths' choice of socialisation space when they were growing up. In turn, socialisation spaces appeared particularly influential in shaping their identities and masculinisation processes.

14 In the cases of Chiner, Pelicorto and Sammy, even though their fathers had significant problems with alcohol they were strong advocates of their sons' education. Pelicorto's father was very violent domestically, especially when he came home drunk on payday, but also tried hard to keep Pelicorto away from the dangers of violence on the streets and was persistent in making sure all of his homework was done. Sammy's father had alcohol problems and separated from his mother when Sammy was seven. Nevertheless he still drove his three children to and from school every day in an attempt to keep them safe from local gang violence. Chiner stated that despite his father's alcohol problems he supported his children's education strongly and was affectionate at home.

15 See gang prevention theory around risk and resilience (Small Arms Survey, 2008: 229; Small Arms Survey, 2010: 234).

These youths tended not to hang out on street corners at night getting up to no good, and avoided being *amurrao* – literally: "sitting on the wall", figuratively: sad, bored and desperate (see Henao Salazar and Castañeda Naranjo, 2001: 90). *Amurrao* after dark was generally perceived as a precursor to gang exposure and potentially gang membership. The youths at CoVida tended to demonstrate alternative interests and pursuits, which led them to socialise in spaces away from the street corner. They were often studious, church-going, had strict parents, were members of youth groups or school clubs, or socialised with small peripheral peer groups who liked niche music such as rock, punk or reggae. Their upbringing was an influential precursor to the development of alternative socialisation spaces, except perhaps following 'niche' music tastes, which appeared more arbitrary.

Galán is an example of how strict parenting kept him away from gangs.

Galán: When we were young, thirteen or fourteen years old, I wasn't allowed out later than 10 pm on the street… So at 10 pm I'd have to say to my mates "I'm going home, it's 10pm". So they would all say "Haaaaaaaaaaa! Piss off then so [your parents] can put your nappy on!" …It's easier to stay out than go home because of the pressure… If you don't have resilience… if you don't have those values, then you get sucked in really easily. It's a lot easier being accepted in these parts being a delinquent than being the goody-two-shoes of the neighbourhood… (Galán, 19/06/2008)

Joining the community organisation CoVida involved elements of chance, agency and opportunity. Eighty percent of the male youths in Montecristo, as estimated by those interviewed, were not members of gangs, but only a small minority of local youths went on to join CoVida. Although rejecting crime, violence and gangs did not lead them directly into CoVida, it did make joining a possibility. Two factors stand out; first, a fundamental precursor for joining CoVida was that youths were not members of gangs. Furthermore, no 'reformed' gang member had ever joined, pointing to a strong organisational culture that rejected violent actors. Secondly, their socialisation spaces were crucial to staying out of gangs and joining CoVida. Church, youth or extra-curricular school groups acted as foundational processes to enter the organisation where several youths joined because they had friends there.

Pepe: I think that they are not conscious that they want to take part [at CoVida]. They don't say "oh, I want to participate and I want to do that". I think their first organisations, like the youth group for example, are important factors that influence the development of youth towards social views and interest in doing something for the community… We worked on

characterising these youth groups and found that, first of all, someone gets involved in a youth group because they can meet friends there, because they want to share, to find a socialisation space with peers, to hang out and have fun. But also with ideas about supporting the community, to take care of kids, clean the streets, celebrate Easter, things like that. Supporting the community themselves. This begins to develop another type of attitude and other types of public action by these youths, different to a youth that isn't in a youth group, one that simply hangs out on the corner doing nothing… (Pepe, 11/04/2008)

These processes influenced youths' decision making when some of them were confronted by violence in their lives: they became tools with which to negotiate violence. However, this negotiation is complex and youths struggled to articulate why they followed one pathway and not another. For example, Pelicorto sought refuge in CoVida when a friend was murdered; he did not seek revenge but could not explain why. Gato's cousin was shot in gang-related activity; he reflected that it had pushed him closer to the church youth group. Sammy said he didn't join a gang like his older brothers because he had the opportunity to join a youth group which saved him.

Gato: To go through that is really tough… Yeah, you can have money, women, motorbikes, luxuries [as a gang member]… but it doesn't last, it's fleeting. [After my cousin's death] I said to myself once and for all "this is not what I want to do with my life"… It made me more religious… I started to get involved more with youth groups at the church… (Gato, 19/06/2008)

Sammy: Put it this way, I had a different option to [my brothers], they offered me a youth group but not them. That's it! I found a youth group and they didn't… After seeing the damage that guns do, that the conflict did… and no, I don't want to be bad, I don't want to be one of those guys, I want to be someone else. And I got the opportunity to do that… (Sammy, 03/06/2008)

DEVELOPING POSITIVE MASCULINE IDENTITIES AT COVIDA

In Montecristo in the early 1990s, at the height of the violence in Medellín, there were a number of community and youth groups struggling to survive. This was when CoVida was established, as a coordination of disparate local organisations, with the accompaniment of experienced

NGOs, academics, and staff from the municipal welfare system Fundación Social. CoVida aimed to organise local civil society organisations and give them a vision and strategy for the future. CoVida founder member Gabriel stated:

> "There were a lot of community groups but they weren't articulated and we didn't know how to work in a conflict context… so CoVida was formed with the Fundación Social and Corporación Región [NGO]. With community organisations we decided to form an organisation that would accompany us, make us more dynamic and help us form a mission and vision for the future" (Gabriel, 11/07/2008).

However, by 1999 financing for this support had run out and the adults left CoVida, so local youths stepped into the void taking over the organisation as volunteers. Remarkably, as Gabriel says, "we produced results that the municipality, Fundación Social, or even we didn't expect. We stayed open, became self-sustainable and gained respect for our work in the community… Youths began to join because they wanted to help the community to learn something" (Gabriel, 11/07/2008). CoVida began to run workshops as a community centre and youth club, opened a public library, a kindergarten, as well as a small audio-visual business supplying PA services at local events, and later an Internet cafe. In recognition of their competence the municipality let them administer the funding for the local Social Action Plan welfare programme in 2006, and they became instrumental in the implementation of the Mayor's Participatory Budget in Montecristo between 2008-2011. Perhaps the most striking feature of CoVida is that in 2008 it was run almost entirely by youths with an average age of 23.

Given the influence of expert NGOs, academics, the Mayor's office and even the international donor community, not surprisingly, the youths running CoVida developed a different outlook on life than the average youth in their community. They had a strong ability to reflect critically and analytically upon the realities of violence and exclusion in their neighbourhood. They promoted nonviolence, participation, equality and inclusion, and politically, most could be considered liberal or left-wing and progressive. It was unsurprising that a former member of CoVida later became the director of Metrojuventud, the Mayor's Office on Youth, for the entire city.

As a workspace and socialisation area CoVida was significant for these youths in terms of the development of their identities and values. The organisation helped them expand their horizons despite the generalised lack of mo-

bility in their community. CoVida also broadened the field of masculinities for these youths, that is, what it meant to be a man, by providing a number of alternative models of masculinity to the gang male role model system. The organisation also gave youths opportunities to replicate these models by working at the organisation and acquiring recognition, belonging and identity there.

> **Hernando:** I looked up to Pelicorto [former Director of CoVida] and we became good friends… He was a reference point for me because he had a different discourse to many people, a community discourse… I ended up coordinating a project… and became Director of CoVida and I got recognition from that. (Hernando, 21/06/2008)

This process was not uniform or easy, and not all identity development can be attributed to CoVida alone, but the organisation did influence what it meant to be a man for these youths and then provided them with dignified possibilities to masculinise.[16] These were tied to developing self-esteem and importantly, a reputational project. They ran workshops on community development and human rights, organised local youth and sports events, helped run the audio-visual business and made video documentaries, participated in local and municipal level political debates, amongst other activities.

> **Pepe:** I've also had the chance to get to know a lot of people [via CoVida]… to travel and get to know other spaces, other places in the world… This has helped me to see the world in a different light… That's basically down to my participation in CoVida… I've been linked to social processes… That has given me job opportunities, training, so I've been able to develop skills that other youths don't have… We have status and a position in the community, we're not always out with girls, showing off in an ostentatious way… (Pepe, 11/04/2008)

The organisational culture and maxims at CoVida had a strong influence on these youths. The environment facilitated personal development, broadening their horizons beyond just four blocks, contributing to these youths growing intellectually and becoming critical thinkers, particularly of violent groups. As these boys were coming of age, the organisation allowed them to forge identities with recognition and status, shaping what it meant to be a man, and simultaneously provided them with masculinisation opportunities to plot pathways to manhood and to construct their gendered self. These youths, disposed via masculine

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16 Individuals are complex and youths at CoVida were not committed to a single version of masculinity *all of the time*, nor were they entirely disassociated from hegemonic versions of masculinity, for example occasionally displaying macho traits in their attitudes towards women.

habitus to achieve a form of normative manhood that would give them locally valued recognition, and ultimately self-esteem, found positive ways to establish male identity through CoVida. Ten of the fifteen youths interviewed spoke about gaining recognition specifically. For example, Pepe, Galán and Hernando:

> **Pepe:** CoVida has created a very strong image in the community, which means that the youths here gain a certain status. People have always been keen "hey it's cool being in CoVida" and that's because you get recognition from it… (Pepe, 11/04/2008)

> **Author:** For you, what are the elements of your life that make you feel good?

> **Galán:** First of all my family. Second, being listened to [in CoVida]. They make you feel important, they make you feel like you are part of another family. That's really important because… when the youths join the group they make themselves heard using their own initiative, they mobilise and do loads of things. That's good for self-esteem, which is completely different from the youths who don't mobilise… they organise themselves with guns, and the gun becomes the object of self-esteem for them… (Galán, 19/06/2008)

> **Hernando:** Lots of kids… [just want] money but others want to feel recognised in a context of poverty, to feel recognised to have a certain status… I think that what [CoVida] did was give us kids another status, a type of recognition… In other words, another way to link themselves to life of the city, to feel like someone in the city. [I] felt recognised and that energy fills you up. (Hernando, 21/06/2008)

CoVida became a central formative space for many of these youths, where they developed strong convictions to work in community development. Social actors in violent communities respond in a range of ways to mitigate the negative effects of violence. These factors militate against simplistic perceptions of exclusion, fear, and passivity and show how communities confront, collude with, and judge violent crimes (Moser, 2009). CoVida developed the rejection of gangs that emerged during the childhood of these youths, demonstrating that the Montecristo neighbourhood was not a passive recipient of social violence. The youths at CoVida faced significant challenges that were commonly financial - much of the work at CoVida was voluntary, part time and poorly paid. There were also threats and intimidation from armed groups; in one case, a member was assassinated by militias.[17] Friendship, camaraderie

and shared adversity bonded individuals to CoVida, which became a refuge from the violence on the streets, and vitally, a key socialisation space for these youths "like you are part of another family" (Galán, 19/06/2008). Galán and Pelicorto said:

> **Galán:** I think the difference between us [and gang members] has to do with our principles. What I'm saying is that each of us has moral standpoints and we share collective moral beliefs. Us lot at the organisation, there's something inside each of us that has developed. (Galán, 19/06/2008)

> **Pelicorto:** …We had a feeling of resistance as well. "We're not gonna give in… And whenever there's a shoot out we'll close the doors"… I said to Hernando, we took the most difficult decision given everything that's happened. For us it would have been easier to buckle under pressure from our family or friends, that we should leave, or join one of those [armed] groups…

> I feel that we have to be role models, but we have to be good role models, brother… But I insist that these factors of resilience are very important in these communities, but there is something that makes me worry a lot. How far do factors of resilience go? (Pelicorto, 10/06/2008)

CONCLUSION: MASCULINISATION, DIGNITY AND EXCLUSION

Medellín's periphery and the young men that inhabit it are undoubtedly complex. Whilst charting the life-histories of these youths can help us identify resilience factors that contributed to them rejecting violence and engaging in community development work, it is important to warn against excessive neatness in the analysis and conclusions of this article. In one case, Ángel a former member at CoVida, joined a so-called community organisation funded by a paramilitary group because he could not bear the financial pressures upon him after his father died. He said "I'm the man of the house… It's lots of pressure… How can I have a dignified life without money?" (Ángel, 15/05/2008). This shows the complexities of real life circumstance and how it interacts with youths' agency to shape their decision making when seeking pathways in life that dignify them (for a discussion see Greig, 2010; also Rodgers, 2006: 286). We should not expect individuals to fall easily into neat categories.

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17 The militias were urban vigilante groups linked to left-wing guerrillas from the broader armed conflict.

In Montecristo life is hard. For these youths CoVida was a symbolic and practical refuge from the hostile outside world, a site of opportunity for the development of ambition, the employment of agency and the construction of identity. This was bound together by the friendship and camaraderie of the socialisation space of CoVida itself. On balance, despite the case of Ángel, these youths reflected the field of influence at CoVida, developing nonviolent and largely pro-social male identities. In this way, the organisation nurtured their masculine *habitus* – their dispositions to become men – presenting them with opportunities to secure positive type masculine capital, status, recognition, self-esteem and dignity.

Hernando was clear that CoVida gave him "another status, a type of recognition". The struggle for dignity is the domain of the impoverished and excluded; "it is what powerless people have left when all else fails" (Jensen, 2008: 9). These processes were perhaps summed up best by Pelicorto who simply said: "you don't dream of packing biscuits in a factory". If we are to interrupt the reproduction of violence through young men living in contexts of exclusion and violence, we need to take this into account. ■

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
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ARTICLE

Rethinking Development from a Postcolonial Perspective

Sidi M. Omar

Abstract

The article aims to proffer some thoughts on development practice and discourse from the standpoint of postcolonial studies. Based on an understanding of development as an intervention or a series of sustained interventions in certain social realities, with the explicit aim of improving the latter qualitatively, the article will examine development as a set of historically contextualised discourses that inform certain practices that are meant to produce perceptible effects in economic, social and cultural spheres. It is against this backdrop that critical insights derived from postcolonial studies will be drawn on to question the underlying assumptions of these discourses in order to reveal the interests that inhabit their production as a form of knowledge. It is therefore hoped that rethinking from a postcolonial perspective will contribute to enriching the on-going critical engagement with development and its associated practices and discourses.

Keywords

modernity, development, underdevelopment, postcolonial studies, discourse

INTRODUCTION

Development has been the organising and guiding principle of economic, social and even political policies of most underdeveloped and developing nations in the post-war era. Throughout this period, a host of financial and political supporting institutions, professionals, scholarships and doctrines were mobilised to assist parts of the world population as they embark on an ineluctable march towards the achievement of the universally desirable goal of economic growth. The attainment of this goal was predicated on a predominant, persistent idea consisting in the desirability and need for developing underdeveloped areas and in the associated assumption that this development would be possible only with some assistance from or intervention by the developed world. Indeed, this is the major idea that continues to underpin the different discourses that collectively comprise the development 'grand narrative'.

However, over the past three decades, the entire development enterprise has increasingly been the object of much criticism and rebuttals. Indeed, the very notion of development has been recurrently challenged and put into question. Arturo Escobar (2000, p. 11) points out that, despite the initial and clear agreement on the need for some sort of development, the consensus around it gradually began to erode due to a number of factors. A social dimension of the backlash against development consisted in the increasing inability of the enterprise itself to fulfil its promises, coupled with the rise of movements that questioned its rationality. This social aspect went hand in hand with a renewed intellectual criticism due to the availability of new analytical tools, chiefly post-structuralism. In particular, during the 1990s, post-structuralist critiques succeeded in casting serious doubt not only on the feasibility but also on the desirability of development. Going beyond most previous critiques, development was shown to be a pervasive cultural discourse with profound consequences for the production of social reality in the Third World.

Based on its continuous engagement with the legacies and effects of colonialism in (post) colonial societies, postcolonial studies has also contributed significantly to this on-going critique and rethinking of development by foregrounding the concerns and views of those most affected by its practices and discourses. In this context the article will seek to proffer some reflections on the development debate using tools of analysis and insights derived from postcolonial theory and critique. Due to the complexity of the issues in question, it does not intend to present an exhaustive analysis, but rather some reflections that may contribute to enriching the on-going critical engagement with the development problem and its associated practices and discourses.

DEVELOPMENT AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES: SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS

To frame the present discussion, I shall begin by briefly delimiting the main concepts, which will be employed throughout this article, namely development and postcolonial studies.

A cursory glance at the terminology of development shows that the word, in its current use, is enmeshed in a semantic web of meanings referring to growth, evolution, progress, maturation, and so forth. In its generic meaning, however, as Gustavo Esteva (1992, p.10) points out, the term development

"always implies a favourable change, a step from the simple to the complex, from the inferior to the superior, from worse to better. [It] indicates that one is doing well because one is advancing in the sense of a necessary, ineluctable, universal law and toward a desirable goal."

Yet, as a historically contextualised discourse, *development* has witnessed terminological shifts in line with social changes and transformations. In his discussion of the evolution of development, Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2010, p.7) surveys the meanings that *development* had acquired over time. He highlights, for instance, the shift from a development discourse emphasising economic growth and industrialisation in 1940, to a discourse focusing on structural reform and liberalisation in 1980 and then the renewed emphasis on structural reforms, starting in 2000, as reflected in the Millennium Development Goals.

Despite innovative approaches, such as Amartya Sen's (1999, p. xii) proposal that expansion of freedom should be the primary end and the principal means of development, development discourses nevertheless continue to suffer conceptual inflation and imprecision with obviously adverse consequences on its practices. As Gustavo Esteva (1992, p.10) points out, for two-thirds of the people on earth, the positive meaning of the word development, profoundly rooted after two centuries of its social construction, "is a reminder of *what they are not* [emphasis in original]. It is a reminder of an undesirable, undignified condition".

Against the backdrop of this brief discussion of the meanings of the word, development will be construed here to refer generically to an intervention or a series of sustained interventions in certain social situations or realities with the explicit aim of improving these situations qualitatively. Obviously, such interventions take place in a specific historical and institutional framework within specific discursive formations and in the context of certain relations of power. The aim, therefore, is not to focus on mapping out the terminological and genealogical analyses of development, but rather on conceptualising it as a historically contextualised discourse, or set of discourses, that inform certain practices that produce perceptible effects in economic, social and cultural spheres.

For its part, postcolonial studies here refers to that important subfield of literary and cultural studies which crystallised in the 1980s, and focuses particularly on investigating the intimate relationship between culture and politics, highlighting the interrelations between certain cultural forms and particular political and historical practices (Omar, 2008, p. 228). It directs its critique against the cultural hegemony of European knowledge in an attempt to reassert the epistemological value of the non-European world (Gandhi, 1998, p. 44) as well as its knowledge, which has been denigrated and silenced by colonial canonical systems. A more extensive discussion of postcolonial studies will be presented later.

THE DISCURSIVE RE-INVENTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

To better understand the context in which the modern discourse of development emerged, there is a need to conduct a genealogical analysis and go back about three hundred years in history, to the era known in Europe as the Enlightenment. This analysis reveals that development was one of the founding ideals of Western modernity in the 17th and 18th century and its belief in a rationality capable of improving the world. In other words, development emerged as an enlightened concept that attributed the modern and scientific reason with a fundamental role in the improvement of human existence in almost all its dimensions.

In his book, *Outlines of a Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind*, the enlightened philosopher Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet (1796, pp. 251-256) pointed out:

"Our hopes for the future condition of the human race can be subsumed under three important heads: the abolition of inequality between nations, the progress of equality within each nation, and the true perfection of mankind. Will all nations one day attain that state of civilization which the most enlightened, the freest and the least burdened by prejudices, such as the French and the Anglo-American […] have attained already? Will the vast gulf that separates these peoples from the slavery of nations under the rule of monarchs, from the barbarism of African tribes, from the ignorance of savages, little by little disappear? These immense countries […] to arrive at civilization, appear only to wait till we shall furnish them with the means; and, who, treated as brothers by Europeans, would instantly become their friends and disciples."

I have chosen to cite these paragraphs in full because they encapsulate the major ideas that would constitute the ideological bedrock of the civilising mission of the European colonial enterprise and subsequently, the modern development discourse, as is discussed below.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the most conventional theories and practices of development are still framed within the ambit of the same logic of the civilising mission that synthesises the idea of the supremacy of the West and its dominating relation with the 'rest'. In this context one can appreciate the emergence of modern discourse on development during the period following the Second World War, the time of the Cold War rivalry between West and East. To confront its rivals and obtain global domination, the US-lead West set out to re-invent a modern discourse of development.

The emblematic moment of this discursive and institutional re-invention of development was represented by the inaugural speech delivered before the Congress, on 20 January 1949, by Harry S. Truman, as the 33rd President of the United States of America. Among the key proposals in his speech, Truman mentioned the following:

"We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for

housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens." (Truman, 1999, pp. 591)

Three key conclusions may be drawn from Truman's speech. First, more than half of humanity was living in "underdeveloped areas"; second, their poverty was an impediment and threat not only to them but also to prosperous and developed areas; and third, the self-ascribed mission of the US and its allies was to help those areas grow economically and industrially (following the US model) to achieve prosperity.

In his discussion of the invention of development Gilbert Rist (2008, pp. 72) points out that Truman's inaugural speech synthesised a number of ideas that were obviously in line with the Zeitgeist, and put forward a new way of conceiving international relations. Furthermore, the introduction of the term *underdeveloped* areas, as a synonym for *economically backward* areas, altered the meaning of development by relating it in a new way to underdevelopment.

Truman delivered his speech more than six decades ago, at a time when a growing number of institutions, resources and bureaucracies were mobilised to bring the developing mission to a successful conclusion. However, if we look briefly at the situation of the so-called underdeveloped areas, we are confronted by compelling facts that question the development enterprise and its lofty ideals and promises. Let us look, for instance, at the following data compiled by *End Poverty by 2015 Millennium Campaign*:

- One third of deaths – some 18 million people a year or 50,000 per day – are due to poverty-related causes; that is 270 million people since 1990, the majority are women and children, roughly equal to the population of the US (Reality of Aid, 2004);
- Every year more than 10 million children die of hunger and preventable diseases – that is over 30,000 per day and one every 3 seconds (80 Million Lives, 2003/ Bread for the World / UNICEF / World Health Organization);
- More than half a million women die in pregnancy and childbirth every year – that is one death every minute. Of these deaths, 99 per cent are in developing countries. The lifetime risk of dying in pregnancy and childbirth in Africa is 1 in 22, while it is 1 in 120 in Asia and 1 in 7,300 in developed countries (UNFPA);
- In our world today, nearly 11 million children under the age of five die every year – well over 1,200 every hour most from easily preventable or treatable causes (*Why do the Millennium Development Goals matter?* Brochure);
- One in four adults in the developing world – 872 million people – is illiterate (Oxfam UK – Education Now Campaign);
- More than 100 million children remain out of school (UNFPA);

- Forty six per cent of girls in the world's poorest countries have no access to primary education (ActionAid);
- In our world today, around 2.5 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation and some 1.2 billion people do not have access to a clean source of water (*Why do the Millennium Development Goals matter?* Brochure);
- In 1970, 22 of the world's richest countries pledged to spend 0.7% of their national income on aid. Thirty-four years later, only five countries have kept that promise (Save the Children);

These are simply some data that show what can be described as a gloomy picture of the world today. If we add to these facts other serious problems that confront the world such as the environment that has become vulnerable due to climate change, deforestation, extinction of species and global water crises, among others, the image of the world becomes even gloomier.

In the face of this situation, we cannot but ask the following questions: what has gone wrong? What happened with the promises of development and the improvement of the lives of people in underdeveloped areas? Why have development policies and programmes failed to improve the situation of the largest part of humanity? These are crucial questions that no policymaker, development-aid donor or practitioner can afford to ignore because they are at the heart of the development enterprise itself. More precisely, they indicate the urgent need to embark on a critical and informed rethinking of development to reveal the defects inherent in its discourse and practice and to present viable alternatives.

To answer the above questions, Wolfgang Sachs (1992, p. 1), states in *The Development Dictionary* that:

"The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have vanished: development has become out-dated. But above all, the hopes and desires which made the idea fly are now exhausted: development has grown obsolete."

In Sachs' view, the development project has failed, and the proof of this failure is that, instead of improving the lives of people, it has condemned them to subhuman conditions. For his part, Arturo Escobar (1995, p. 44) has also shown that this new doctrine of development has come with a heavy price — the scrapping of ancient philosophies and the disintegration of the social institutions of two-thirds of the world's people. In other words, as he further maintains: "Development was — and continues to be for the most part — a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocrat-

ic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of progress" (Escobar 1995, p. 44). In short, these critical positions demonstrate that largely, notwithstanding its publicly professed noble objectives, development was not an enterprise aiming at satisfying the needs and desires of its 'objects', namely the underdeveloped populations, but an instrument for serving the hidden agendas of some hegemonic powers vying for global domination.

In this context, two agencies were established in 1944 to advance the new development project. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was designed to help countries tackle balance of payment problems and stabilise their economies by providing them with short-term credits. The World Bank (or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) offered credits for long-term investment in productive activities. The two agencies formed the axis of the international financial institutions that were tasked with bringing the development project to a successful conclusion.

Sachs' comments, cited above, also demonstrate that development is a polemical issue that continues to be the subject of unending debates, with some critical approaches defending the complete abolition of development in its current form and practice. Post-development thinking, for instance, clearly puts forth an anti-development position (Pieterse 2010, p. 7) which repudiates economic growth as the ultimate goal of development, as well as its results, that have proven disastrous for the majority of the population. However, I do not think that throwing the proverbial baby out with the bath water is a practical option. What is needed, instead, is a critical rethinking of development as both a discourse and a practice in a way that may help us reflect collectively and proffer viable and remedial alternatives.

POSTCOLONIAL REFLECTIONS ON DEVELOPMENT

A key defining characteristic of postcolonial studies is its emphasis on revealing the interests behind the production of knowledge and introducing an oppositional criticism that draws attention to, and thereby attempts to retrieve, the wide range of illegitimate, disqualified or 'subjugated knowledges' (Foucault 1980, p. 82) of the decolonised peoples. In doing so, it seeks to investigate the structural relations of domination and discrimination that are expressed, manifested, constituted, and legitimised in and by discourses. In its discursive analysis of ideological domination, postcolonial studies focus particularly on hegemony, which is achieved not only by physical force but also through consensual submission (consent) of the dominated (Gramsci, 1971, p. 268) and perpetuated by the active implication of the

plurality of the "Ideological State Apparatuses" (Althusser, 1971, p. 144) including education, religion, law, media, etc.

A prime example of this kind of postcolonial critique is Edward Said's *Orientalism* of 1978, which is commonly regarded as the principal catalyst and reference point for *Postcolonial Theory* (Gandhi, 1998, p. 23). Employing the insights of French post-structuralism, in particular those of Foucault, Said set out to analyse a range of nineteenth-century European representations of oriental cultures — the works of geographers, historians, travellers, and early anthropologists as well as literary works and memoirs — and to highlight the forms of language and knowledge that were intimately connected to, and colluded with, the history of European colonialism. In conclusion, for Said, Orientalism was not only an academic study of the Orient, but a discourse which, through the complicity of knowledge systems with political power, not only constructed but was also instrumental in administering and subjugating the Orient. In other words, Orientalism was a form of epistemic or cultural violence in line with peace research terminology. As may be recalled, Johan Galtung (1990, p. 291) defines cultural violence as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence […] that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence".

Within the context of this critique of the epistemological hegemony of European systems of knowledge, many postcolonial critics centred their analyses on the Western modern project and its link to the history and practice of colonialism. As outlined above, development, as a discourse and practice, was the offspring of this project with European colonialism being an instrumental tool in propagating its ideals. Aníbal Quijano (2007, p. 171) has argued that, during the same period as European colonial domination was consolidating itself, the cultural complex known as European modernity/rationality was being constituted. Moreover, since there is no modernity without colonialism (Escobar, 2007, p.184), there is a need to recognise that Europe's acquisition of the adjective *modern* for itself is a piece of global history of which an integral part is the story of European imperialism (Chakrabarty, 1992, p.352).

The fundamental question now is the following: is it possible to engage in a critique of this kind from a space outside the discursive space delimited by the Western modern project of which development discourse is an integral part? Many seem to agree that it is difficult to do this, given that there are neither privileged terrains nor original or uncolonised spaces from which to present the discourse, including postcolonial theory itself (Venn, 2002, p. 51). Moreover, as Ashis Nandy (1983, p. xi) argues, colonialism has particularly helped to transform the concept of the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity into a psychological category. In his view, "the West is now everywhere, within the West and outside, in structures and in minds" (1983, p. xi).

In the context of this overlapping of histories, geographies and systems of knowledge, I contend that any critique of modernity, or development for that matter, should in no way mean a regression to cultural particularism or ethnocentrism. Nor can it avoid dealing with the historical legacy and epistemological dominance of Western systems of knowledge, and the forms of epistemic and cultural violence that they may generate. As Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000, p. 16) argues, "European thought is at once both indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations." Recognising that this thought is now a common heritage that affects us all, Chakrabarty maintains that the task of the postcolonial critic lies in investigating how this thought could be transformed and renewed from and for the margins. This position echoes the call made by Quijano (2007, p. 177) who called for "an epistemological decolonisation" to clear the way for new intercultural communication, for an interchange of experiences and meanings, as the basis of another rationality which may legitimately aspire to some universality.

In summary, as a project of cultural analysis, the postcolonial critique seeks to investigate the role of cultural forms and systems of knowledge in legitimising and sustaining asymmetrical power relations and the associated processes of exclusion and domination. The foregoing reflections are thus aimed at problematising and calling into question the established concepts and interpretations of development, and critically reviewing our habits and ways of thinking and acting with regard to its discourses and practices, in light of the many forms of violence that development has generated in the lives of its putative targeted societies. However, one has to recognise that the simple production of a critical and counter-discourse of development is necessary but not sufficient. That is why this deconstructive enterprise should always be coupled with a commitment to opening new possibilities for remedial alternatives and innovative ways of thinking and transforming the social world.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the postcolonial perspective on development, which is informed by various critical methodologies, one may conclude that the concept of development is essentially a social construction that is contextualised historically and discursively. Historically, development, as we now understand it, emerged as a discursive product within a geopolitical climate characterised by the confrontation between two camps vying for global domination. More precisely, the modern discourse of development arose at a time when the US was emerging as a hegemonic power. The above-mentioned inaugural speech of President

Truman was the initiator of a new era in the management of international relations in which the Western dream of progress was transformed into a hegemonic imagination on a global scale.

With its origin in the state institutions, bureaucracies and academia, the discourse of development represents a set of ideas that inform and sustain certain forms of conduct and social and economic practices. Compared with the concept of Edward Said's Orientalism (1978, p. 2), referred to above, development may hence be construed as "a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabularies, scholarships, imaginaries and doctrines" through which the developed West constructed the underdeveloped Other, in the post-Enlightenment period. The dichotomy of development and underdevelopment has determined almost all interactions between the West and other regions, in which the West defined itself as the contrasting image of the underdeveloped world in the same way in which the Orient was constructed as Europe's spatial and cultural Other.

Operating in the service of hegemonic powers, the apparatuses of knowledge production (development agencies, professionals, scholarships and so forth) established a totalising discourse that delimited the conditions under which the objects, concepts and strategies were incorporated in its discursive dominion. Similar to the orientalist discourse, development was another style of Western knowledge designed for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the underdeveloped world. In this context it becomes imperative to rethink the development project in its entirety and to proffer fresh insights into its issues from as many perspectives and critical methodologies as possible. However, any approach to this question should take into account the overlapping of histories and geographies of the developed and underdeveloped areas.

Development practice, in this sense, should be conceptualised not as a one-way exercise, but as a mutually negotiated and collectively implemented process of social, political and economic reform, guided by certain ethical guidelines defined on the basis of social justice. The principle of the satisfaction of urgent and basic human needs should be at the heart of any development intervention adaptable and responsive to the needs and concerns of all agents involved. Amartya Sen's book, *Development as Freedom* (1999), is a good example in this context as it puts special emphasis on the need for individuals and groups to restore their capacity to create their own systems of subsistence, manage their own affairs and participate in their autonomy.

From the perspective of peace and conflict studies, the wide range of peace building endeavours could contribute to overcoming some of the problems raised by development and relief aid activities in post-conflict situations. For peace-building activities to yield sustainable solutions that effectively address the underlying causes of social conflicts, they should be predicated on clear operational definitions and comprehensive, transformative social and institutional programmes in which local and external stakeholders should be actively involved. In other words, peace-building should be conceptualised as long-term, multi-track and dynamic processes which, whilst recognising the specifics of each post-conflict situation, seek to elicit and tap into local peace resources to transform conflictive social relationship (Lederach 1995) and foster local capacities in a way that may lead to constructive processes of social and institutional change. In conclusion, it is a question of empowering individuals and groups to expand their freedoms and enhance their local capacities to be able to manage and name the world in their own words, as Paulo Freire (2000, p. 88) has succinctly put it.

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ARTICLE

An Analytical Evaluation of the Cost of the Conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta

Abosede Omowumi Babatunde

Abstract

This paper examines the nature and magnitude of the cost of the perennial oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta. Data collected from field survey and literature were utilised. The costs of the conflicts ranged from loss of lives and property, negative impact on welfare of the people, reduction in oil production and revenue generation, to a general state of insecurity. Government conflict management strategies in the Niger Delta have been defective. An integrated bottom-up participatory process that secures the quality of life of the people and protects the environment is the path to sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa's largest oil producer, is a classic illustration of natural resources as a developmental trap. Nigeria produces approximately two million barrels of crude oil per day (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Proven oil reserves in Nigeria are currently estimated to be 25 billion barrels. The current production capacity of 2.6 million barrels per day is expected to rise to 3 million barrels in the next few years (Iwayemi, 2006). Nigeria has earned an estimated $340 billion over the past 40 years. Oil accounts for over 83 % of Federal Government revenue, more than 95 % of export earning and approximately 40 % of GDP (Onimode, 2001; Onosode, 2003; Imobigbe, 2004).

However, the Nigerian oil economy has remained largely underdeveloped and its citizens, particularly those in the oil-producing communities are impoverished. Equally disturbing is the incidence of unrest fuelled by oil exploitation in Nigeria and other mineral dependent countries in Africa such as Sudan, Algeria, Angola and the Republic of Congo. While oil exploitation is the main cause of the restiveness in the Nigeria's Niger Delta region,

in the other oil-dependent African states, oil revenues have provided the resources for all sides in the wars and conditioned the intensity of the fighting (Imobighe, 2004). I argue in this article that economic deprivation and inequality in the Niger Delta oil region of Nigeria engender grievances manifested in different forms of violence. The cost of this violence is enormous in terms of human lives, displacement of people and material destruction. The incessant crisis in the Niger Delta could have more serious consequences in the near future, for Nigeria and for the international oil market.

The link between conflict and natural resources, such as oil and diamonds, has attracted a plethora of studies but there is a lack of consensus on the nature of their relationship. Researchers at the World Bank link violent conflict in countries with abundant natural resources to greedy citizens who take up arms to capture these resources. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) suggest that countries whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities are highly prone to civil violence. They further argue that conflict may be explained either by grievance or greed and conclude that if we want to understand the

causes of contemporary civil wars we should ignore explanations based on grievances and look instead at the greed of rebel groups.

However, by claiming that violent conflict is a result of the greed of rebels, the research promotes a bias against rebel groups, and ignores the role that governments play in promoting violence, even with evidence from situations in African countries such as Sudan, Algeria and Angola, which points to the role of the state in fostering conflicts. In the case of the Niger Delta, the negative impact of oil has severely affected the traditional means of livelihood and created a propensity for conflict and violence. Oil-related activities have affected people's livelihoods, food security, personal security, and physical and mental health.

From the early 1990s, many of the Niger Delta states have assumed the characteristics of a conflict-ridden region. There has been a cycle of protests and conflicts in the Niger Delta, notably in the Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states. Youth restiveness was the major factor in these protests (Human Rights Watch, 1999, 2002; Ukeje et al., 2002; Imobighe et al., 2002; Imobighe, 2004). Communal disturbances have become a persistent feature of the Niger Delta. These disturbances come in the form of conflict between oil communities and oil companies, between communities or ethnic groups and within communities. In whatever form it may take, these conflicts are invariably tied to oil one way or another. In all these conflicts, the main instruments of violence have been the marginalised and alienated youth groups in the region. Most of the local people lack the skills required to be employed by the oil companies, since the industry is technologically driven, capital intensive and less reliant on human labour. If they are employed at all, it is in the most menial and poorly-paid jobs, where they suffer the indignity of seeing outsiders arrive to take pre-eminence over them in the oil industry. Therefore, the oil communities perceive the oil companies' action as a deliberate policy of exclusion, even though most people are not qualified to be gainfully employed by the oil industry.

The activities of the aggrieved youths, in the form of pipeline vandalisation, oil bunkering, piracy, hostage taking and inter-community hostilities, have often provoked counter-violence of a more destructive nature from the country's security forces. These conflicts have not only given rise to human displacement and loss of lives and property on a massive scale, but they also pose a serious threat to national security and economic prosperity in Nigeria. This paper analyses the magnitude of the cost of the oil-induced violent conflict in the Niger Delta region. It specifically evaluates the cost of the conflict to the major stakeholders in oil activities. It also examines and reviews competing analyses of the nature and cause of the intractable conflicts in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Finally, it explores the Nigerian government's conflict management strategies as it seeks to find ways to resolve the conflict. In the light of this, there is an urgent need for concerted efforts to find an enduring solution to the intractable crisis in the Nigeria's Niger Delta.

NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

Several arguments have been advanced as to why conflict is rampant in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta. A key factor repeatedly cited in the literature is that conflict is linked to oil being exploited in the region. The devastation wreaked on the environment by the oil-producing communities, a major grievance of the people whose livelihood is threatened by oil exploitation, has been reflected in the various studies on these communities (Iwayemi, 1991, 1995; Isumonah, 1998; Okonta and Douglas, 2001; Onosode, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2006).

In particular, Onosode (2003) examined the general oil and gas exploitation-induced conflicts in the Niger Delta, their intensity and the growth of environmental concern, all of which are linked to the politics of resource ownership, its mode of appropriation and its use. He noted that the critical issues of environmental pollution, resource rampage and degradation, and socio-economic, cultural and psychological dislocation in the Delta have constantly raised both local and international interest. The findings of the research generally suggest that the prospects of producing areas have been affected by both the character of modifications introduced in revenue sharing and the management and implementation of the proportion allotted to derivation for the producing areas over the years. Also, the plight of the oil minorities has become a global concern. Indeed, the study raised critical issues on the challenges facing the oil-producing areas. However, there is a need for further empirical investigations on the issue of governance and the development of the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta.

It has been argued that the struggle by the local communities is primarily directed towards securing increased local participation in the oil business and adequate access to the oil revenues (Ogbogbo, 2004). Various ethnic militias have emerged in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta to challenge the activities of the oil companies. The objective of these groups is the economic and political emancipation of the Niger Delta, largely through ownership and control of its petroleum resources. Some of these groups or militias have produced charters, declarations, agendas and resolutions to express their demands. These began with the Ogoni Bill of rights in 1990, followed by the Kaiama Declaration by the Niger Delta youths, the Oron Bill of rights by the Oron people of Akwa-Ibom State and the Warri accord by the Itsekiri people of Delta State. All these charters and declarations contained various demands

for resource control. However, the genuine agitations of the youth for resource control have gradually assumed some elements of criminality. It is clear that taking hostages, initially a means of expressing grievances about the activities of oil companies, has become an avenue for obtaining monetary compensation, by payment of a ransom.

Oil exploitation has created life-threatening ecological hazards and deterioration of health and the social fabric of the inhabitants of the oil communities. The implication is that the oil industry has exploited the ecosystems for resources beyond the level of sustainability (Ashton-Jones and Douglas, 1998). The ecological problem is a reality, which has to be tackled.

Indeed, a delicate balance exists between the human population in the Niger Delta and its fragile ecosystem (Bisina, 2006). Bisina, like other writers on the issue, held the view that there is a strong feeling in the region that the rate of environmental degradation is pushing the region towards ecological disaster. It has been argued that by destroying the environment, man destroys himself and this, directly or indirectly, leads to conflict (Egunjobi, 2005). One of the basic premises of sustainable development, therefore, is the recognition that environment and development are not, in the long run, mutually reinforcing. Egunjobi based his analysis of the Ogoni-Shell crisis on the context of the pervasive under-development of the oil community coupled with the environmental pollution caused by the activities of Shell.

However, generally, oil companies always refute these allegations by oil communities, claiming that their activities are carried out according to the highest environmental standards. Oil company officials claim that they have been granting scholarships to the youths and providing infrastructure such as classrooms, healthcare facilities, water boreholes and landing jetties. Fieldwork observation revealed that oil companies in the oil-producing areas have been completely neglecting their communities and have not fulfilled their corporate social responsibility to them. Many communities reported they rarely receive sufficient compensation, or any at all, for land taken by oil companies, or rendered useless by oil spills, acid rain, and other forms of pollution. The Nigerian government, through its development commissions, claimed that, despite the difficult terrain and developmental challenges confronting the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta, it was determined to improve the well-being of the people in the areas. The recently set-up development commission, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), has initiated various physical infrastructure projects and human development programmes throughout the Niger Delta region. However, these efforts did not make any significant impact on either the living or environmental conditions of the oil-producing areas, which remain pervasively poor and underdeveloped. The government development agencies focused on the provision of physical infrastructure but failed to address human capacity development. Besides, these physical amenities were insufficient; many projects were abandoned and the few commissioned ones lacked necessary facilities.

The intensity of violent agitation by the oil-producing communities against the oil companies has increased since the early 1990s. Ukaogo (1999) lent credence to the view that communities in the Niger Delta have been in conflict with oil-producing companies in the region over allegations of widespread oil spills and gas flaring, which have undermined livelihoods and exacerbated impoverished conditions. This negative trend has angered communities in the Niger Delta, provoking armed conflict, and kidnapping of oil company personnel and seizure of their facilities. He also identified the rising incidence of hostage-taking as a means of expressing grievance in the Niger Delta. It should be emphasised that intensified conflict in this region could have implications for security in Nigeria as well as the West African sub-region. It could also disrupt gas flows to neighbours who are partners and potential beneficiaries of the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP).

Environmental degradation resulting from oil exploitation has negatively affected the economic activities of the people, resulting in the subsequent loss of income base, thereby accentuating poverty in an area which, prior to oil exploitation, was seen as largely economically self-sufficient. In this regard, Owabukeruyele (2000), apart from highlighting the environmental factor, also attributed the root cause of the conflict that has emerged in the Niger Delta, as a result of the extraction of oil, to the violation of the rights of the local community through the promulgation of obnoxious legislations. This legislation, which includes the petroleum act of 1969 and the land use Decree/Act of 1978, regulated community access to communal or open access land, and they were primarily promulgated to restrict access to such land, while making it possible for multinational oil companies to have unrestricted access to explore for oil unchallenged, even on sacred land. The research generally suggests that, as the available land gets smaller, the struggle for its ownership and control increases while the potential conflict over ownership of land increases.

A critical examination of the nature of the Niger Delta crises has been conducted by Imobighe (2004) and Ukeje (2001). In particular, Imobighe explored the monstrous nature of conflict in the Niger Delta. He alleged that oil production in the Niger Delta, instead of spreading contentment and harmony in the region, has brought about frustration and a complex multi-level conflict which has persisted for a very long time, and has, since March 2003, escalated into unprecedented inter-communal violence of the most destructive nature. It is important to note that youths are at the centre of the violence project that has become recurrent and intensive in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta. Ukeje (2001) sought to "bring the youth back" into the discourse on violence in the Delta region. In

his opinion, youth played a pivotal role in conceptualizing and giving expression to community moods and feelings, transforming these into useful resources for political action that invariably included, but hardly ever started, with violence.

COST OF THE CONFLICT TO THE NIGERIAN STATE AND OIL MULTINATIONALS

In Nigeria and other oil-dependent countries in Africa such as Congo, Sudan, Chad and Angola, the ownership of enormous oil resources played a pivotal role in the crises and insurrections that have engulfed these countries. In general terms, oil-producing countries tend to be unaccountable, and, therefore, misappropriation, corruption and plunder are common. The Transparency International 2007 corruption perceptions index stated that, over the decades, around $20 to 40 billion has been illegally and corruptly appropriated from some of the oil-rich countries in Africa, by politicians, soldiers, business-persons and other leaders, and kept abroad in the form of cash, stocks and bonds, real estate and other assets. In addition, oil-induced conflict has created instability, disrupted crude oil production and revenue and increased defence spending (Fearon, 2005). In Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, the availability of substantial onshore production makes oil companies vulnerable to attacks by insurgent groups who are agitating for control over the resources in their country because of marginalisation and environmental dislocation, brought about as a result of oil exploitation activities. Where oil is produced onshore, or where surface pipelines are present, bunkering – the theft of oil from wells and pipelines – has become a growing problem for the oil companies (Wolf Christian, 2004)

Attacks on oil facilities by militant groups, particularly MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) since December 2005, including a spate of oil worker kidnappings, have forced oil production shutdowns of up to 800,000 barrels per day, threatening Nigerian government plans to double production to 4,000,000 barrels per day by 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2006). As a result, the entire region has been militarised. The navy has guarded oil installations and escorted oil shipments since the late 1990s. The Joint Task Force on the Niger Delta, Operation Restore Hope, has about 4,000 military personnel deployed in the region (Ogwuda et al., 2004; Omonobi, 2004).

The theft of processed crude oil involves the vandalisation of pipelines. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) reported that there were 114 line breaks in the Port Harcourt and Warri areas of its distribution network between April and May 2000 alone. The NNPC,

in collaboration with the Nigerian Police Force, arrested about 589 persons and investigated 101 cases of pipeline vandalisation between April 2000 and December 2001. Industry experts have estimated that the amount of crude oil Nigeria loses to illegal bunkering ranges from 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day, which is the equivalent output of a small oil-producing country. In its 2006 annual report, Shell Nigeria estimated illegal bunkering losses at 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day in 2005, down from 40,000 to 60,000 in 2004. In a December 2005 report, the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force calculated that a loss of just 70,000 barrels a day at a price of $60 a barrel would generate over $1.5 billion per year, which is enough to fund arms trafficking and buy political influence.

In 2004, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Alhaji Dokubo Asari, threatened to unleash war on the state if the government refused to give greater control of the region's vast oil resources to the Ijaw people. And the incessant clashes between the NDPVF and a rival armed group, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom, provoked an immediate response from multinational oil companies, global financier markets, and Nigerian government officials. Shell Petroleum Development Company, which produces about half of Nigeria's approximately 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) production, shut down a facility that produces around 28,000 bpd because security concerns prevented the company from travelling to the area to fix a technical problem. The threat of supply disruption rattled already twitchy oil markets and helped push global crude prices above an unprecedented 50 US dollars a barrel (Human Rights Watch 2005).

There are varying estimates of the quantity of crude oil that is stolen daily. Some estimate that between 10% and 15% of national daily production is stolen, ranging from 75 to 300 million bpd per day. In 2001, Shell lost on average about 30,000 bpd. The losses to Shell increased to 100,000 by 2002. The other oil companies lost about 100,000 bpd. Total losses to the nation in 2002 were about 200,000 bpd which was almost 10% of the total production of approximately 2 million bpd (Oduniyi, 2003). Shell alone lost about 100,000 bpd, a total of 9 million barrels, in 2003. It is also estimated that the nation loses about 3.5 billion USD annually. Profits in excess of 1 billion USD are said to be made from the illegal business annually (Oduniyi, 2003).

The attack on Nigerian navy units guarding the Shell facility, the kidnapping of four foreign contractors and blowing up of pipelines, in January 2006, led to a $1 a barrel jump in world oil prices (International Crisis Group, 2006). The special Adviser to former President Olusegun Obasanjo on petroleum matters, revealed in 2004 that 300,000 barrels of crude oil, an equivalent of $8.5 million a day, are lost to illegal pipeline tapping, and the volume of crude oil spilled per incident can be as high as $5 million. In 2003, vandalisation of oil equipment left a bill of

$5.8 billion to the oil operators and the government. Lastly, from 1999 to 2003, oil industry production deferment led to a loss of 6.8 billion dollars.

Indeed, the perennial violent conflict in the Niger Delta region has significantly affected the level of crude oil production and revenue generation, caused national insecurity and an increase in defence spending (Human Rights Watch, 1999, 2002, 2005). However, the recent amnesty programme of the Yar'Adua Government has led to temporary ceasing of hostility in the region. The present government of President Jonathan has sustained the amnesty programme of its predecessor. Some of the ex-militants have been sent overseas for training in various capacities, as part of the ongoing re-integration process of the programme. The implication is that multinational oil companies are able to operate in a crisis-free environment, thereby increasing oil production output. The amnesty programme is perceived as a short-term solution to the crisis in the Niger Delta. The youth militants have threatened to renew hostilities even after accepting the amnesty, accusing the government of insincerity in their management of the conflict and development of the region.

COST OF THE CONFLICT TO THE OIL-BEARING COMMUNITIES

In the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta states, the negative impact of oil production has severely affected the traditional means of livelihood of the people and created a propensity for conflict and violence. This area has witnessed both violent intra and inter-communal or ethnic conflicts and clashes with oil companies in which the core issues involved have not been resolved. Among the oil-related conflicts in the Niger Delta is that between the Ijaw in Nembe/Kalabari, Basambiri/Ogbolomari, and Okpoma/Brass in Bayelsa state. In Ondo state, there is the Ilaje/Ijaw conflict. Also, inter-ethnic conflict was witnessed between Ogoni/Adoni, Ogoni/Okrika in Rivers State (Human Rights Watch, 1999, 2002, 2005; Environmental Rights Action, 2000; Imobighe, 2004; Iwayemi, 2006). These clashes are usually caused by conflicts over ownership of land where oil wells are located, and claims to oil company compensation and contracts. The violent inter-communal and inter-ethnic conflicts have led to more loss of lives and property than conflict within community or ethnic group and between community and the oil companies or government.

Incessant conflict in the oil-producing areas has taken a toll on the people, particularly the women and children who have been internally displaced: the psychosocial impact on them is enormous (Obi, 1998; Isumonah, 1998). The consequences of the violent conflict may range from disruption of children's education because of insecurity

and displacement and the inability to cater for the children as a result of disruption of economic activities, to exposure to trauma and diseases. The internal displacement caused by the violent conflict has resulted in loss of livelihood in the form of physical, financial, human, social and economic assets (Ukeje, 2001; Ojo, 2002).

The result of the state management of the economy of conflict has taken an enormous toll on the region in terms of loss of life and property, livelihood as well as physical infrastructures. The state security agencies have been accused of wanton recklessness, ruthlessness, brutality and excessive force.

The state security agencies have been known to attack and indiscriminately shoot in towns and villages, burn property and raze communities. They also kill, torture, flog and rape civilians and protesters (Human Rights Watch, 1999). People in the communities have been forced to flee, thereby creating and swelling internal displacements. For a long time, oil companies hid behind the shield of security agencies rather than institute a regime of corporate responsibility and sensitivity to host communities. It is alleged that some of the oil companies purchase arms, as well as provide logistics and support for state security agencies in their repression and brutality against community members (Onojowo, 2001). Although, difficult to verify the allegation that the oil companies provided ammunition for the state security agencies, it has been argued that these practices generated resistance by the region's citizenry and finally produced a rag-tag army of enraged, lawless and militant youths (Onojowo, 2001).

Tampering with oil pipelines and illegal bunkering has led to violence and accidental death. Thousands have died from explosions on lines tapped by oil thieves. Oil-related fires and explosions is another dimension of the environmental cost of the oil activities, which occurred quite frequently between 1993 and 2001. In the best known case, in October 1998, a pipeline exploded after a leak flooded a large area near the village of Jesse in Delta State, killing over 700 people, many of whom were women and children (The Guardian, 7 November 1998). In another of numerous similar disasters, in early May 2006, more than 200 people were killed when a pipeline exploded outside the commercial capital of Lagos. (International Crisis Group, 2006). The fires in Jesse, Oviri Court, Ijalla Swamp, Ebute Oko and other parts of the country, often the result of sabotage of oil pipelines, have wreaked havoc on human lives and the environment through the loss of several hectares of farmlands and plantations. Oil pipeline vandalisation took a dramatic turn in the mid-1990s. In 1999, there were 524 cases of oil pipeline rupture, of which 497 were due to vandalisation. By the end of 2000, cases of oil pipeline vandalisation in the Niger Delta had reached almost 800. Thousands have perished from these spillages or leakages in the last five years. The economic cost of this vandalisation has been substantial at both local and national levels,

often including product shortages and black marketeering, sale of adulterated fuel and lower refinery utilisation due to disruption of crude supply to the Kaduna refinery. These harmful behavioural patterns generally reflect economic, political and environmental discontent in the region (Ikporupkpo, 1996; Iwayemi, 2006),

The use of mobile police forces as security by oil companies, particularly Shell, led to security force abuses. The Umuechem incident in 1990, in which Shell used these security forces, led to the killing of eighty unarmed civilians and the destruction of homes (Human Rights Watch, 1999). An armed force attack on Odi, a community in Bayelsa state in response to the murder of policemen sent to investigate the activities of the youth militant, led to the death of over one hundred inhabitants, displacement of thousands of people, and destruction of houses and property. Graffiti was found that included ethnic slurs and reflected views that the town and the whole Ijaw ethnic group should be punished for the crimes committed by their youth (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Albert, 2003). Protests by the oil-bearing communities against environmental degradation were met with brutal force by both the oil companies and the government. In May, 1998, a peaceful protest staged by youth of Ilaje, Ondo State, at the Chevron Parabe platform off the Awoye coast, demanded running water, greater local employment, medical facilities, and the fulfilment of pledges made by Chevron to grant scholarships to local students. It was met with brutal force, resulting in the death of two youths and a host of others injured (Environmental Rights Action, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Protests by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which generated international attention, ultimately led to the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP activists in 1995. The government responded by creating a special security force, the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, which was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Ogonis during the period it occupied Ogoniland, from 1993 to 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2002).

It is hardly contentious to conclude that the cost to the host communities of violent conflict in the Niger Delta region is enormous, and far greater than the little benefit derived from oil exploitation.

CONCLUSION

Oil production in the Niger Delta, instead of spreading contentment and harmony in the region, has brought about frustration and a complex, multi-level conflict, which has persisted for a very long time. Since March 2003 it has escalated into unprecedented inter-communal violence of the most destructive nature. These conflicts have at different times escalated so much as to generate a reign of insecurity, oil-production disruptions and

violence. Thousands have lost their lives and have been displaced.

The escalation of violence in the Niger Delta, apart from the loss of hundreds of human lives, has led to the disruption of oil production and a huge loss in export earnings, to the tune of 800,000 barrels per day, which is the equivalent of 40% of Nigeria's total oil production of about 2.6 million barrels per day. Estimating the exact human cost of the perennial conflict in the Niger Delta is extremely difficult. The official estimate of the financial loss is put at about $3.5 billion annually (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Oduniyi, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2006). Given that Nigeria spends $2 billion annually to service its external debt, it follows that a resolution of the Niger Delta conflict would save the country more than what it needs to service its external debt. In fact, the country would have an additional $1.5 billion to pursue its developmental programmes and quickly transform the Niger Delta.

The destabilising effect of the Niger Delta conflict on the oil industry made the government of Obasanjo grant amnesty to the militant leaders and their supporters. The government reportedly made payments of more than $1,000 for each rifle and $10,000 for each machine gun handed over to the government. However, the ensuing peace was negative. After some months, there were renewed hostilities by the militants. Even the recent amnesty programme of the present government has not brought any significant change to the prevailing situation in the Niger Delta. Rather, the militants are already accusing the government of insincerity in tackling the intractable conflict and the developmental challenges confronting the people of the region.

A cohesive, engaging and ultimately successful Niger Delta peace process, which is urgently needed, would be a significant achievement for the government. The alternative is to risk a spiralling insurgency that is still in its early stages but shows signs of strengthening. Although it is difficult to predict the outcome, some analysts have characterised the conflict as a separatist insurgency in its initial stages. International analysts have warned of the possibility that an upsurge of violence could result in a one to two-year shutdown of oil operations in the Delta.

Government conflict management strategies which involve the use of force to repress protests by the oil-bearing communities have been grossly ineffective. The oil multinationals have contributed to the conflict by creating a condition where violence is the only means of obtaining benefits and good corporate governance. The oil companies' management of the ensuing hostility and resistance has tended to engender more violence and illegal appropriation of benefits. Oil multinationals have seen the ineffectiveness of the use of force and now support a new partnership of all stakeholders in the petroleum industry. They have shifted emphasis from community assistance to community development.

The prospect for sustainable peace and development in the Niger Delta region requires a critical policy reorientation. An integrated bottom-up participatory process that secures the quality of life of the people and their psychological health, and simultaneously protects the environment, is undoubtedly the path to peace and productive enterprise in the oil-producing areas. The youth should be motivated and mobilised for public participation and for political, social and economic empowerment. There should be a political commitment on the part of the Federal Government and magnates of the oil industry to deliberately reverse the injustice done to the oil-producing areas and put the area back on the road to justice, stability and development.

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The Bradford Model and the Contribution of Conflict Resolution to the Field of International Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

David Manus Curran

Abstract

This article outlines the important contribution made by the Department of Peace Studies, particularly the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), at the University of Bradford, to the field of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It adds to Woodhouse's examination of the crucial role of Adam Curle, the first chair of the department, in the field of peace studies (Woodhouse, 2010). In the spirit of Woodhouse, this article provides further investigation into how the department has developed research into one of Curle's main strands of activity relevant to peacemaking, "to nurture social and economic systems which engender cooperation rather than conflict" (Woodhouse, 2010, p. 2). Woodhouse's article speaks of how Peace Studies at Bradford University explored this strand with a focus on "critical research on institutions for international co-operation and interdependence" (Woodhouse, 2010, p. 2). This article complements the approach by examining the impact the Centre for Conflict Resolution has had on the practice of peacekeeping over three generations, and how, in turn, the practice of peacekeeping has informed critical enquiry of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

THE FIRST GENERATION OF PEACEKEEPING AND GALTUNG'S 1976 STUDY

The insights developed in conflict research since its conception have had a symbiotic relationship with peacekeeping practice. At this time, in the 1950s, and as it became established as an academic discipline, the concept of international peacekeeping as a method of conflict management was being implanted in the United Nations (UN). The 'first generation' of peacekeeping, where UN operations were largely deployed in inter-state conflicts, was widely regarded as a step in a political and diplomatic process, with limited engagement with the conflict resolution community. Nevertheless, studies at the time provided critical insights into the role of peacekeeping as a form of conflict resolution. Johan Galtung's analysis offered quite radical theoretical implications of international peacekeeping, considering that a basic dilemma is distinguishing between, and reacting to, different types of violent conflict. Peacekeeping, for example, can effectively deal with horizontal conflicts, which he defines as conflict

between equals with no element of dominance (between two states). However in conflicts where both parties are not equal (i.e. a conflict between the centre and periphery within a state), peacekeeping runs the risk of preserving a status quo as a result of intervening. Through containing the conflict and maintaining the status quo the peacekeeping force is actually taking sides in the conflict (Galtung, 1976b, p. 284).

Galtung noted that doctrines of non-intervention in the affairs of a state must be rejected. Only by doing this, Galtung argued, would peacekeeping operations "unequivocally… break through these artificial walls called regions and states mankind has built around itself" (Galtung, 1976b, p. 286). To normalise intervention, Galtung examined three ways in which peacekeeping could react to vertical conflict (conflict between a strong centre and weaker periphery):

1) the formalistic stand (third party intervention which handles any war in the same way);
2) the let-it-work-itself-out stand (no third party intervention);
3) the use-peacekeeping-on-the-side-of-peace stand (third party intervention seeks to remove both direct *and* structural violence).

Galtung rejected the first two approaches outright, and chose to explore the third. Although he outlined problems in it, Galtung argued in favour of this approach, and stated that:

> "A peacekeeping operation in a vertical conflict should be more like a one-way wall, permitting the freedom fighters out to expand the liberated territory, but preventing the oppressors from getting in." (Galtung, 1976b, p. 288)

Importantly, Galtung's work showed that peacekeeping could have a role in radical conflict transformation, and move beyond containment of overt violence. This was very much a case of incorporating peacekeeping into conflict resolution theory, and placed military forms of peacekeeping within the wider context of conflict transformation.

Following in this tradition, the CCR has examined how peacekeeping practice can move beyond negative peace and towards transformation and emancipation. This set of important theoretical insights have linked micro and macro-level processes, and helped to develop a reciprocal understanding between those who carry out the practicalities of peacekeeping, and those who engage in wider theoretical debates in the field of conflict resolution.

CCR ENGAGEMENT WITH PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S

The early 1990s heralded the first contributions from the CCR to the field of peacekeeping research. The end of the Cold War and the early 1990s was a period characterised by a sense of optimism at the UN, encapsulated in Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali's Agenda for Peace (UN, 1992). Moreover, there was a rapid expansion in peacekeeping deployments, with operations covering a much wider set of peacebuilding tasks. However, not all multidimensional operations worked as well as was hoped, with operations deployed in environments which had not reached the point of consent and agreement with the goals of the mission. This led to problematic engagements, most notably in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.

Although such problems were ongoing, the period heralded the engagement of the CCR with peacekeeping operations, with a burgeoning number of publications examining the role that peacekeeping can play in conflict resolution processes, and the specific conflict resolution skills which may be required for peacekeepers to carry out their roles effectively.

A major contribution made by the CCR in this period was Fetherston, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's analysis of the UNPROFOR[1] operation in 1994 (Fetherston et al., 1994). This analysis posed a number of areas where the field of conflict resolution could contribute to improving the operation,[2] and outlined important contributions that conflict resolution could make in wider peacekeeping interventions.

The authors advocated the use of conflict resolution principles to help understand how peacekeeping personnel relate to the parties in a conflict. By doing so, they could greatly benefit from understanding the social dynamics of belligerent groups and those they were sent to protect. Preparing peacekeepers to understand this was seen as critical for them to provide security amongst the groups, and open up avenues for peacebuilding. It also raised the chances that operations would engage with groups who might *not* have had access to power structures during the conflict. Fetherston et al. also highlighted how conflict resolution theory and practice could facilitate relations between the military and non-military components of the peacekeeping operation.

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1   United Nations Protection Force, Bosnia
2   The nature of conflict; stages and types of conflict intervention; levels of conflict intervention; 'hard' and 'soft' power intervention options at macro- and micro- levels; relations with conflict parties; relations between military and non-military mission components; multinationalism and multiculturalism; the training of peacekeepers.

In modern-day operations this is formalised through civil-military cooperation and coordination strategies, at the time it was written, 1994, the linkages between the civil and military actors were not formalised at all (Slim, 1996). Finally, through developing an understanding of the multinational and multicultural aspects within peacekeeping deployments, the authors firmly established conflict resolution as a tool which could develop understanding between the various nationalities within a peacekeeping deployment. Peacekeeping is still a global undertaking (more so than in 1994), and for peacekeeping operations to function effectively, there is a requirement for military peacekeepers to understand cross-cultural communication *within* the operation, as well as towards external actors.

Fetherston's early work on training for peacekeeping advocated the strengthening of links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution, both at theoretical and tactical levels. Her 1994 study of training suggested that existing definitions of peacekeeping were "inadequate" because they "have not been placed within a larger framework". She offered a theoretical framework to "analyze the utility of peacekeeping as a third party intervention and as a tool of conflict management" (Fetherston, 1994, pp. 139-140). She further argued that:

> "It is not enough to send a force into the field with a vague notion that they should be impartial and help to facilitate settlement. To act as a third party in a protracted violent, polarized conflict is an extremely difficult and delicate task. Diplomats, academics and others who have acted in the capacity of a third party are generally well trained, highly experienced individuals with a good base of knowledge about the particular conflict. On the whole, peacekeepers have limited preparation and experience." (Fetherston, 1994, p. 140)

Noting that peacekeeping operations represent a form of third-party intervention and that there exists no framework for understanding when to intervene, she linked peacekeeping to the contingency model outlined in Fisher and Keashly's 1990 research, arguing that it "seems to offer the best possibility for a more effective management of conflict" (Fetherston, 1994, p. 123). The model was devised to match third party intervention to certain characteristics of the conflict (Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

In order for peacekeeping to fit the model, Fetherston advocated that effective coordination must be made between the traditional security aspects and the civilian peacebuilding aspects of the operation. Without this, in Fetherston's view, operations faced "insurmountable odds" of moving beyond controlling violence and maintaining a status quo (Fetherston, 1994, p. 150). Within this

framework, she also considered that peacekeeping could be visualised in a two-tiered approach. Firstly with peacekeeping personnel "working in the area of operation at the micro-level, facilitating a more positive atmosphere", and secondly with peacekeeping operations "cooperating and coordinated with peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts at the macro-level" (Fetherston, 1994, p. 150). Fetherston suggested that peacekeeping could play a valuable role in the successful resolution of conflicts by creating an environment conducive to further resolution of conflict (much like the important role of pre-negotiation). She found that:

> "Co-ordinating peacekeeping at the micro-level at least begins the groundwork of what might be called a pre-resolution or a pre-peacebuilding phase. This has taken the form of coordination of local level resolution processes, either at the initiative of local people or at the initiative of the peacekeepers." (Fetherston, 1994, pp. 151-152)

So peacekeepers were seen as a critical interface between micro and macro approaches to conflict resolution. To facilitate this link, Fetherston emphasised the importance of peacekeepers possessing the two 'contact skills': skills in conflict resolution, such as mediation, negotiation, conciliation, and the skills required for effective cross-cultural interaction. She emphasised the importance of these skills for deployed peacekeepers, arguing that the "essence of peacekeeping as a third party intervention must be contact skills". She adds:

> "It is through the use of communication skills, methods of negotiation, facilitation, mediation, and conciliation that peacekeepers de-escalate potentially violent or manifestly violent situations and facilitate movement toward conflict resolution." (Fetherston, 1994, p. 219)

Her findings also supported the view that it is important to provide "specific training to effect a shift from a military to a peacekeeping attitude and to learn and practice contact skills" (Fetherston, 1994, p. 217).

This work is supplemented by the 1994 article, *Putting the peace back into peacekeeping* (Fetherston, 1994a), which outlined the importance of training for peacekeepers. Here, she argued that a lack of training for peacekeepers means that the task peacekeepers undertake, representing the international community's message of non-violent consensual conflict management, becomes increasingly difficult. In a 1998 article, she warned that, without basic research on what peacekeepers do and why they do it, "training will continue to be inconsistent and inappropriate". She added "[...] if we only prepare people for war it is far more likely that is what we will get." (Fetherston, 1998, p.178)

Alongside the development of Fetherston's work on training, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham both furthered research into peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Their 1996 paper, "Terra Incognita: Here be Dragons", applied Azar's Protracted Social Conflict theory to contemporary conflict. From this, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham suggested that peacekeeping operations be deployed in International Social Conflict (ISC): a conflict neither purely inter-state, nor intra-state, but somewhere between the two. Using this framework, their response to the failures of peacekeeping deployments was to advocate the use of the 'middle ground' between peacekeeping and peace enforcement (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 1996). Also in 1996, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict* was published. This book examined approaches to, and attempted to widen understanding of, humanitarian intervention by drawing together existing analyses from the field of international relief organisations, and studies from the security field. It was also an early indication of the work that Woodhouse and Ramsbotham would later carry out on cosmopolitan approaches to peacekeeping (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996). Further contributions by Woodhouse were his analysis of the psychological aspects of peacekeeping, and the requirements for military personnel to understand conflict resolution concepts and techniques (Woodhouse, 1998), as well as an analysis of national policies, such as the development of UK doctrine and practice, (Woodhouse, 1999).

Woodhouse and Ramsbotham also formalised the links between peacekeeping and conflict resolution in two particularly important contributions to the field. The first, *Encyclopaedia of International Peacekeeping Operations* (published in 1999), offered a comprehensive approach to all facets of international peacekeeping, but also included entries from the conflict resolution field, incorporating the scholarly work that had been ongoing within the CCR and other institutions (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999). The second major publication was Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall's *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. Also published in 1999, it incorporated peacekeeping practice as part of international efforts to alleviate conflict and facilitate positive peacebuilding (Ramsbotham et al., 1999). The publications were aimed at different audiences: one was more specifically concerned with the intricacies of peacekeeping, and the other predominantly for conflict resolution scholars. However, through incorporating both fields into a common endeavour, the publications further solidified links.

Research at the CCR widened towards the end of the 1990s. Tamara Duffey's research advocated the incorporation of Betts Fetherston's contact skills into military training for peacekeeping operations (Duffey, 1998, p. 106) and argued that military peacekeepers preparing for Cold War operations received virtually no specialised peacekeeping training

in mediation, negotiation and other conflict resolution skills. Because of this, they would often find themselves in "dangerous and stressful situations unprepared to effectively handle them" (Duffey, 1998, p. 129). To address this deficit in training, Duffey's analysis outlined the importance of cultural training which should have two components. Firstly culture-general training, which focuses on basic understandings of culture (including how culture influences one's own assumptions, values, actions and reactions, along with intercultural communication skills, and developing an awareness of other organisational cultures). Secondly, culture-specific training, which concentrates on developing an understanding of the specific culture in which the intervention takes place (Duffey, 1998, p. 270). Overarching this is the need for all involved in peacekeeping (including the military, civilian agencies and conflict resolution scholars) to carefully consider the "culturally appropriate ways of re-evaluating and reforming peacekeeping" (Duffey, 1998, p. 271).

Research in the late 1990s also reflected the dynamic changes that were occurring in the field of international peacekeeping. Langille's thesis on the development of training, role specialisation and rapid deployment of peacekeepers took the case study of his attempts to develop the idea of a specialised peacekeeping training establishment in Canada. Langille's research mapped the debates leading up to the development of a training centre, reporting on the considerable amount of opposition to the notion of turning a redundant military facility into a peacekeeping training centre. (Langille, 1999, p. 101). As the manifestation of these efforts resulted in the creation of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, it can be seen that the thesis and the CCR itself were at the forefront of developments in the field of peacekeeping.

THE SECOND GENERATION: REFLECTIONS ON 1990S PEACEKEEPING AND THE ADVENT OF PEACE SUPPORT

The end of the 1990s highlighted a shift in how peacekeeping practice was conceptualised. At the UN, Kofi Annan launched a period of reflection, through official reports into the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This reflection culminated in the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* – a wide-reaching report into all aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding deployments (UN, 2000c). In the UK, a doctrine was developed to meet the wider operational demands of deployment in peacekeeping operations where robust peace enforcement needed to be linked with civilian expertise. Whilst uncertainty existed

about exactly how operations could achieve the ambitious targets set out in the Security Council Resolutions, the turn of the century also heralded the third generation of peace operations, with multifunctional and robust deployments in Sierra Leone and the DRC.

Ramsbotham and Woodhouse's 2001 book *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, published during a time of transition and uncertainty, reflected on the current debates, underscoring peacekeeping operations by stating that:

"[...] the future of UN peacekeeping will depend on the capability and willingness to reform and strengthen peacekeeping mechanisms, and to clarify its role in conflict resolution." (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2001, p. 3)

Thus, the authors argued, the purpose of the collection was to consider the contribution that conflict resolution can make in the development of future peacekeeping practices. The book offered the viewpoints of academics, who applied conflict resolution theory to peacekeeping practice, and "experienced military peacekeepers seeking to enrich peacekeeping by uses of conflict theory" (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2000, p. 6). It included articles spanning the spectrum of international conflict resolution efforts, from prevention to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, providing a crucial contribution as it solidified links made between the two fields. Articles provided by practitioners included Philip Wilkinson (who wrote about the role of conflict resolution in the UK's Peace Support Operation doctrine), John Mackinlay (examining the role of warlords) and Peter Langille (who examined the development of standing capacities for UN peacekeeping). Articles by scholars in conflict resolution examined the role of culture in peacekeeping practice (Tamara Duffey's article highlighting the difficulties encountered in the UN operation in Somalia), how operations can best address the peacebuilding capability gap, and complementary approaches dealing with ethno-political conflict. Further articles linked peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions to wider theoretical approaches from the conflict resolution field. Woodhouse provided a response to criticism of international conflict resolution processes, Ryan looked at integrating peacekeeping strategies into wider conflict resolution approaches, Ramsbotham examined the UN approaches to peacebuilding, and finally, Fetherston (in a radical change from her early work on peacekeeping) provided a critical assessment of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and advocated that peace operations provide a wider transformative process to promote a post-hegemonic society.

PhD scholarships at the CCR continued throughout this period, and provided significant analyses to peace-

keeping and conflict resolution practices. Solà i Martín analysed MINURSO to understand why the mission failed to provide space for transformative conflict resolution, after the successful reduction of violent conflict. He found constraints on the operation as a result of power politics (Solà i Martín, 2004, p. 22). The second part of his research examined the potential of new ideas in peacekeeping research, in particular, through the use of a Foucauldian analysis of power versus knowledge to assess peacekeeping operations in the context of power relations at a local and international level. He found that through the examination of the parties' production of power and knowledge, conflict resolution could have a larger impact on peacekeeping research (Solà i Martín, 2004, pp. 241-244).

Yuka Hasegawa focused on the UN operation in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and provided an analysis of the role of peace operations in the protection and empowerment of human security. His research also asserted the importance of UN peacekeeping forces as a third party intervener, with their impartiality derived from the UN's pursuit of basic human security (linked to Burton's Human Needs theory). This impartiality is the most important facet of peacekeeping operations. In the case of UNAMA, the pursuit of impartiality was key in its effectiveness. Hasegawa concluded that the significance of UN peacekeeping missions is that they represent a collective means to address issues of human security, as opposed to being "yet another tool with which to coordinate various interests both at the global and micro levels" (Hasegawa, 2005, pp. 332-337).

As well as advances in the field of peacekeeping, wider social and cultural developments were beginning to impact on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. One critical development was the spread of the Internet and other tools to increase global communication in the first decade of the 21st century. Laina Reynolds-Levy sought to document the real-world use of the Internet by organisations operating in the post-conflict context of Kosovo in the period 2000-2003, focusing on understanding how the Internet could contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding. She considered the potential impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on peace and conflict issues, and offered practical examples of how the Internet was used as a vehicle of change in the working practices of peacebuilding organisations (Levy, 2004, pp. 61-97). Informing this is the importance Levy attached to the emergent uses of ICT in this post-conflict Kosovo, particularly, "in order to formulate ideas on how ICTs could be best used to build stable, peaceful and just societies in the aftermath of war" (Levy, 2004, pp. 1-2). In terms of peacekeeping, Levy links the role of ICT to recommendations in the UN Brahimi Report, which was explicit in making the case for ICT to be used to link peacekeeping operations (Levy, 2004, p. 108).

THE THIRD GENERATION: CRITICAL APPRAISAL AND COSMOPOLITAN PEACEKEEPING

The third generation of conflict resolution interaction with peacekeeping has come as a result of wider theoretical critiques over the type of peace that peacekeeping operations attempt to achieve. The backdrop to this is continued reflection and uncertainty over peacekeeping practice, with operations in Sierra Leone and Burundi successfully making the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, operations in the DRC and Lebanon suffering setbacks on wider peace processes, and new operations in Darfur and Chad/CAR failing to deploy rapidly. This period is also informed by four main thematic debates. Firstly, within overarching peacekeeping and peacebuilding practice, there has been an evolution of normative values for protecting civilian populations, a responsibility to protect, and a wide and varied approach to the phenomenon of human security. Secondly, through the practice of robust peacekeeping, military peacekeepers have been more able to use force in deployments in a pre-emptive manner, and at times under the rubric of protecting civilians. Thirdly, there has been a rise in studies and assessments that ask questions about the liberal economic underpinnings of peacebuilding. Finally, this era is characterised by unilateral and, at times, non-UN sanctioned intervention under the rubric of the Global War on Terror. At the CCR, the arrival of Professor Mike Pugh meant that the journal *International Peacekeeping* was housed at the centre. It is a cornerstone for contemporary debates in the field and has succeeded in becoming an "important source of analysis and debate for academics, officials, NGO workers and military personnel" (Pugh, 1994),

On a wider scale, challenges to the role of conflict resolution in peacekeeping practices came from the background of critical theory. There was increasing criticism of problem-solving approaches to peacekeeping in the literature on peace operations, arguing that it devoted "too much attention to policy relevance" (Paris, 2000, p. 27), and overlooked "larger critical questions that could be posed" (Whitworth, 2004, p. 24). Bellamy and Williams took the critiques a stage further in *International Peacekeeping* (Bellamy and Williams, 2005), examining peacekeeping from a critical theory standpoint and challenging many of the overarching conceptions of peacekeeping. They offered a substantial critique of problem-solving approaches to peacekeeping operations:

> "By failing to question the ideological preferences of interveners… problem-solving theories are unable to evaluate the extent to which dominant peacekeeping or peacemaking practices may actually help reproduce the social structures that cause violent conflict in the first place." (Bellamy, 2004, p. 19)

The authors suggested that critical approaches to peace operations would open up a new stage in how they were theorised. This critical appraisal was reflected in the CCR, most pertinently spearheaded by Professor Mike Pugh, who elaborated on this by arguing that peacekeeping operations were not neutral, but served an existing global order within which problem solving adjustments could occur. In this framework, peacekeeping can be considered as "forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace" (Pugh, 2004, p. 41).

Pugh furthered this work with Mandy Turner, and Neil Cooper, in *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. The collection provided an analysis of present peacebuilding strategies, separated into seven inter-related areas (liberal war and peace, trade, employment, diasporas, borderlands, civil society and governance), and argued that largely disregarded local bodies struggle against universal presumptions of a "particular liberal-capitalist order" (Pugh et al., 2008, p. 2). From the analysis, the authors found that concepts of human security had either not been followed through or had been "captured to work in the interests of global capitalism". Thus, the authors propose a less securitized life welfare approach to peacebuilding:

> "[…] there is a need, then, to develop a new, unsecuritised language and to contemplate a paradigm that takes local voices seriously, rejects universalism in favour of heterodoxy, reconceptualises the abstract individual as a social being and limits damage to planetary life – in short, a 'life welfare' perspective." (Pugh et al., 2008, p. 394)

The authors make a strong case for the development of a life welfare perspective. The process would not so much be a prescription of resigned relativism, but more a prescription for a politics of emancipation in which the need for dialogue between heterodoxies is a core component. *Whose Peace* demonstrates the crucial role that the approaches of critical theory provide in deepening understanding about the role of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as a vehicle for conflict resolution.

Although these approaches have been criticised themselves for not elaborating on how suggestions for transformation can be operationalized, there are signs of policy considerations in wider transformation projects. Pugh finds a role for deployments akin to peace support operations (PSO) in a transformative framework.

He argued that PSO would be likely to be increasingly subtle and flexible in responding to crises, providing expert teams similar to disaster relief specialists, taking preventative action, and offering economic aid and civilian protection. Pugh's article contended that this may only happen if such expert teams are released from the state-centric control system, making them "answerable to a more transparent, democratic and accountable institutional arrangement" (Pugh, 2004, p. 53). Moreover, Pugh found that such a scheme would be based on a permanent military volunteer force "recruited directly among individuals predisposed to cosmopolitan rather than patriotic values'" (Pugh, 2004, p. 53).

TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN FRAMEWORK

This links to Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's 2005 article, *Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalisation of Security*, where the authors examined how future peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations could work within an emancipatory framework. It posits that the framework of cosmopolitan peacekeeping is situated in conflict resolution theory and practice, engaging with peacekeeping practice in a way in which the authors believe critical theory does not (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005, p. 141).

The article noted the revival of UN peacekeeping operations as a commitment by the international community to peacekeeping as a "vital instrument in pursuing conflict resolution goals internationally" (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005, p. 142). Looking at theoretical approaches to future interventions, the authors[3] argued for a cosmopolitan approach, "for deeper reforms, an accountable permanent rapid reaction or a standing UN force and an enhanced resolution capacity, including gender and culture-aware policy and training" (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005, p. 152). Developing such an architecture could release the potential of peacekeeping operations "as a component of a broader and emancipatory theoretical framework centred on the idea of human security" (Ramsbotham et al., 2005, p. 147).

Woodhouse followed up on this in an article with Curran, (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007) which investigated the emergence of a cosmopolitan ethic in African peacekeeping through the emergence of the African Union standby brigades and conflict prevention network, as well as the response to the peace operation in Sierra Leone. The authors concluded that peacekeeping in general, and African peacekeeping in particular, is seen as a:

"[…] force in the making for cosmopolitan governance, characterized by an impartial, universal, democratic, cosmopolitan community which promotes human security (positive peace) over national security and state-centric interest." (Curran and Woodhouse, 2007, p. 1070)

The understanding of cosmopolitan peacekeeping developed at the CCR links to the cited works of Galtung, who argued strongly against peacekeeping operations being placed in positions where they are unassumingly supporting the status quo in vertical conflicts. For peacekeeping to be effective, he argued, it must protect those who are trying to alter the status quo and remove the violent structures that are creating conflict. This is an area where critical theorists have made an important contribution. Without a strong body of research into the role of peacekeeping in global politics and the global economy, it will most likely fail to alter the status quo. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham's work on cosmopolitan peacekeeping elaborates on Galtung's 'one-way wall' concept of peacekeeping operations, but instead of protecting what Galtung termed the *freedom fighter*, it protects the vulnerable groups within conflict zones, who may possess the capacity for emancipatory political transformation.

CONCLUSIONS

In outlining the contribution of the Bradford School to peacekeeping research, this article has outlined the critical role played by the Centre for Conflict Resolution in approaching the micro-level debates over peacekeeping practice, and linked them to wider understandings of the process of conflict resolution in post-conflict environments.

Cosmopolitan approaches propose an avenue to engage in critical appraisals of peacekeeping, but they certainly do not propose an 'end of history' with regard to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. What this article demonstrates is that conflict resolution research (if the CCR is used as a case study for other centres of its type) is sufficiently robust

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3 The full list is: Realism, which rejects the whole concept of enhanced UN peacekeeping; Pluralism, which only countenances a limited form of traditional first generation peacekeeping; Pragmatic solidarity, which favours the incremental development of existing arrangements; Cosmopolitanism, which argues for deeper reforms, an accountable permanent rapid reaction or a standing UN force and an enhanced resolution capacity, including gender and culture aware policy and training; and Transformation which argues for radically reconstructed peacekeeping configurations.

to effect change in the field of peacekeeping practice, and foster developments in understanding and appraisal of the practice of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The question as to how conflict resolution will adapt in the future is, according to Ramsbotham, Miall and Woodhouse, dependent on the ability of the field to become truly global (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). This will be facilitated by the multiple effects of the expanding role of ICT in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Firstly, ICT will allow the dissemination of information and sharing of examples of good practice. The wide use and availability of peacekeeping training over the Internet is an example, where peacekeepers can learn about the skills necessary for peacekeeping (including many of Fetherston's contact skills) without the need to travel to a recognised training institute. Secondly, the spread of ICT and the 'shrinking' of the globe will allow information and critique to influence overarching theories of conflict resolution, by allowing greater theoretical input from practitioners, academics, and groups from areas previously untouched. Finally, the expansion of the Internet and social media has already made a wealth of information available for those engaged in the field of conflict research and encouraged transparency on the part of institutions, leading them to advocate transparency in other institutions and actors. Hopefully, the outlined processes will give the conflict resolution field greater depth and allow it to continue to engage with peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

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PROFILE

The Enough Project

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Abstract

The Enough Project fights to end genocide and crimes against humanity, focusing mainly on areas like Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Horn of Africa where civilians continue to be the victims of mass atrocities. Enough is also working on prevention of the crises of tomorrow, by using three key elements - analysis, advocacy, and activism.

Keywords

genocide, Sudan, Congo, Satellite Sentinel Project, celebrities

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WORK

The Enough Project at the Center for American Progress – a think tank based in Washington, D.C. – works to fight genocide and crimes against humanity. Founded in 2007 by Gayle Smith and John Prendergast, this NGO focuses on areas where some of the world's worst atrocities occur: Sudan and South Sudan, eastern Congo, Somalia, and areas of Central Africa where the Lord's Resistance Army operates. Enough strategically selected these conflict areas based on the scale and immediacy of the crises, and its direct ability to affect change in these regions.

The Enough Project combines on-the-ground research with policy analysis and recommendations to inform and influence decision-makers. It aims to develop sustainable, innovative policy solutions and to mobilize public pressure on the United States and the international community to implement them.

Enough is distinguished by its creative use of social media such as Twitter, Facebook, Flickr and You-Tube, and its earned media campaigns – often involving celebrities – to raise awareness and focus a spotlight on complex human rights issues. In 2011, Enough's communications team generated over 12,000 media mentions in broadcast, print and online media worldwide.

ENOUGH IN SUDAN AND IN THE CONGO

In Sudan, the Enough Project combines field research with eyewitness testimony to monitor hotspots, analyze conflicts, and provide field-based policy recommendations that position the US as a leader in global efforts to end the ongoing violence. To bolster these efforts, George Clooney and Prendergast launched the Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP) in December 2010. It is the result of a unique collaboration funded by Not on Our Watch and led by Enough, the commercial satellite firm DigitalGlobe, and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. The project utilizes satellite technology to provide irrefutable evidence of war crimes in near real-time, and draw the world's attention to crimes against humanity, perpetrated by the Government of Sudan. For example, SSP has documented the razing of five towns and villages in the border areas of Abyei, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile state. It has also documented eight sites in and around South Kordofan's capital of

Kadugli with apparent mass graves. In December 2011, *Time* magazine's Mark Benjamin reported that the International Criminal Court had launched a war crimes probe based largely on field reports gathered by the Enough Project and DigitalGlobe satellite imagery analyzed by Harvard for SSP.

As a result of Enough's solid reputation for gathering pivotal intelligence and offering sound, well-informed policy recommendations, it is consistently a go-to organization for high-level decision makers in the US Congress and the Obama Administration.

The groups Resolve, Invisible Children, and the Enough Project gave the Obama administration high marks for engagement and efforts to apprehend the Lord's Resistance Army leaders, but also assigned lower marks for protecting civilians and encouraging Lord's Resistance Army fighters to defect in the groups' LRA Strategy Report Card. The groups noted that hundreds of thousands of civilians remain vulnerable to rebel raids across the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.

Enough has also demonstrated unparalleled success in galvanizing public pressure on human rights issues. The Enough Project, which works to end genocide and crimes against humanity, has partnered with many celebrities (George Clooney, Javier Bardem and Ashley Judd, among others) to raise awareness about African human rights campaigns that strive to end genocide in Sudan, and stop the deadly conflict minerals trade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Celebrity partners have advocated for these issues by participating in videos and interviews, traveling with the Enough Project to Africa, writing op-ed pieces, and initiating further efforts to support these growing human rights concerns. Likewise, as a founding member of the Sudan Now campaign, Enough has created and nurtured solid partnerships with other organizations (such as Humanity United, Investors Against Genocide, United to End Genocide, Stop Genocide Now, iAct, and American Jewish World Service) working on Sudan to maximize their collective capacity to improve the lives and well-being of people on the ground.

The Enough Project is also a founding member of the Darfur Dream Team Sister Schools Program, an initiative that links students in US schools to those in 12 Darfuri refugee camps in eastern Chad. Through the unique collaboration between Enough, iAct, Facing History and Ourselves, and UNHCR, Enough connects the students over a closed social network similar to Facebook where they can exchange messages, photos and videos. One of the partners, iAct, provides the necessary equipment and computer training for students and teachers in the refugee camps, while Enough engages middle schools, high schools and universities around the US. DDT provides educational materials and technical support for student-led fundraising efforts to improve the quality of education for their Darfuri counterparts. In doing so, the project is building a sustainable source of funds to educate children displaced by the conflict in Sudan, and sowing the seeds of activism and philanthropy on these issues among the next generation in the US.

Field research and hard-hitting policy analysis is also the cornerstone of the Enough Project's comprehensive advocacy strategy aimed at ending sexual- and gender-based violence and bringing lasting peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Enough's ability to deliver well-informed, durable policy solutions to key targets in Congress and the White House has, time and again, helped galvanize the political will necessary to effect change, most notably with the passage of the conflict minerals provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform bill that was signed into law by President Obama in July 2010. The law requires companies that are publicly traded in the US to disclose whether they are sourcing conflict minerals (tin, tungsten, tantalum or gold) from DRC or one of its neighbouring countries. If a company finds that its minerals do originate in Congo or one of its neighbours, it must report on the measures it has taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the minerals. Most important, companies must provide independent verification of these steps through an independent private sector audit of their reporting. The Enough Project plans to work with companies on the specific terms and actions to ensure they are able and willing to meet their commitments.

Enough's high-level advocacy efforts are considerably bolstered by its ability to forge strong relationships with celebrities, grassroots activists, collegial organizations, and members of the media. For example, Enough has elevated conflict minerals to the forefront of international debate, publicizing the associated violence and humanitarian concerns in global media outlets such as CNN, CNN International, Al Jazeera, the BBC, *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and Forbes.com. Enough also works with celebrities such as Javier Bardem, Ryan Gosling, Robin Wright, Julianne Moore, Ashley Judd, Mary-

Louise Parker and Mariska Hargitay to produce compelling multi-media pieces and to raise mainstream awareness around what people in the US can do to end conflict in the Congo.

Through the Raise Hope for Congo campaign, Enough engages grassroots activists around the U.S. to empower and support them in demanding that their college and university campuses, cities, and states adopt policies that support conflict-free supply chains. In the last year, the campaign expanded its Conflict-Free Campus Initiative to more than 70 schools, supported the passage of the first-ever Conflict-Free City Resolution, and supported state conflict-minerals legislation in the states of California, Massachusetts and Maryland. To capitalize on growing grassroots engagement on this issue, Enough launched the first-ever ranking of electronics companies' responsiveness to conflict minerals, offering a resource to conflict-mineral-concerned consumers and providing a new platform for corporate advocacy. These rankings have since been incorporated by Greenpeace as part of its Green Rankings of corporations.

The Enough Project's field research, policy papers, and targeted advocacy efforts have also paved the way for taking down the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) once and for all. Enough field researchers have been covering LRA-affected areas and have written extensively on the current configuration of the LRA, as well as the challenge of promoting its disarmament and demobilization. Through a series of in-depth reports and direct engagement with the Obama Administration, Enough facilitated drawing up the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, which the president signed in May 2010. Since then, Enough has been working with its LRA partners to assess the Administration's progress toward implementing this legislation. To ensure this issue remains a priority, Enough plans to replicate its proven campaign strategies to mobilize public pressure around leveraging international military assets to apprehend LRA leaders and bring an end to this crisis of conscience.

In the coming year, Enough plans to continue to develop its staff and its organization's core strengths and proven methods so that it can build upon the momentum it has generated, and continue to drive the movement to end genocide and mass atrocities.

The Enough Project websites include its main site, www.enoughproject.org, as well as sites of several campaigns and initiatives, including the Satellite Sentinel Project: satsentinel.org; Darfur Dream Team: darfurdreamteam.org; and Raise Hope for Congo: raisehopeforcongo.org.

Recommended citation

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
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BOOK REVIEW

Lost in Transformation: Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in Northern Ireland

Audra Mitchell
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011

Reviewer: Darina Lucheva

Conflict does not necessarily lead to violence. Rather, it can be a powerful means of resisting, constraining, and even preventing acts of violent expression. Transformative interventions designed to tackle conflict and foster peace often do not prove effective in reality. Moreover, they can enact continuous cycles of violence between opposing populations. Peaceful coexistence does not simply stem from the removal of the root causes of violence. What is, instead, dearly needed is a critical shift from peace-building alone to plural world-building.

These are the foundations of Audra Mitchell's argument about the need for a serious reconsideration of the nature of peace interventions in conflict-ridden contexts. To illustrate her point, Mitchell embarks upon an in-depth analysis of how the initiatives that have been implemented in Northern Ireland since the mid-twentieth century affected the major conflicting parties. A value added to the study in this regard is the key incorporation of primary sources of information, providing insights into the personal experiences of members of the Irish Republican and Ulster Loyalist protagonists in the events of the Troubles as well as the viewpoints of the institutional actors responsible for the policies that affected the belligerent groups. Through the lens of constructive criticism, Audra Mitchell questions both the success and relative serenity of the Northern Ireland peace process against a backdrop of widespread praise of the process as an exemplary model of peace-building. The alternative to this conventional intervention is envisaged by her as a new ethos of orientation toward the interrelation between violence, conflict and peace. It is one that promotes the concept of plural world-building in an effort to ensure that more is consciously created in peace interventions than is inadvertently destroyed.

BACKGROUND

A key idea in Audra Mitchell's theory is the notion of world-building. It is based on an understanding of the term *world* as a social entity that incorporates everyday communal structures, patterns, and practices (p. 4). The process of world-building, therefore, constitutes a wide range of daily social interactions which naturally involve the construction, preservation and alteration of multiple worlds (Ibid.). World-building is thus "an essential part of being human, and necessary to sustaining communal life," as Mitchell frames it (p. 6).

The inability to partake in forms of world-building, move between worlds, or protect one's world is categorized by the author as an acute violation (p. 7) of human and civil rights. The destruction of worlds, or even the emergence of threats to the existence of worlds alone, in turn engenders feelings of insecurity and resentment which may find outlet in the violent behaviour of affected social groups, especially when the changes initiated cannot be resisted otherwise. Audra Mitchell unravels in her study how the transformative peace initiatives in the fragile context of Northern Ireland actually exacerbated the already tense relations between the Loyalist and Republican communities, and initiated cycles of radical violence due to a lack of consideration of the world-building activity of the adversarial actors in question.

The peace and securitization interventions that are critically analyzed in the book comprise the range of policies implemented since the beginning of the Cold War by the British and Irish governments and municipalities, the European Union, and other international actors. Mitchell reveals in the course of the study that the largely flawed approach of these efforts originated from the common misconception among the intervening actors about the interrelation between conflict and violence. This resulted in poor strategic decisions that hindered conflict transformation efforts in the Northern Ireland polarized context.

The problem, as viewed by Audra Mitchell, lies in the reality that, in their strategies, transformative interventions normally employ a presumption of a one-way correlation between conflict and violence, namely that conflict is a root cause of violence (p. 12). Consequently, these initiatives are aimed at the eradication of conflictual forms of world-building in an effort to bring about positive change. Such attempts, however, skate on thin ice. By hindering, to the extent of completely removing, conflictual worlds and ways of world-building, they often impose their own (hegemonic) visions of world-building that erase others (p. 93), and so may initiate cycles of violence (pp. 34-35), which might not have existed beforehand. Furthermore, transformative peace initiatives fail to take into consideration the potential role of conflict in balancing different worlds, as a means of resisting, constraining, or preventing violence.

IMPLICATIONS

The way forward is envisaged by Audra Mitchell as interventions whose aim is not to remove conflict, but rather to enable parties to engage in conflict non-violently, and thus resist violence (pp. 217-218). Her idea is that unstable societies should perhaps be allowed more non-violent conflictual activity than relatively peaceful ones, as a way of dealing with the greater threats they experience. In other words, the more social groups are enabled to conduct forms of plural world-building, the less they should be prone to actual violence. The broader implications of these findings relate to the critical re-conceptualization of the field of peace and conflict studies. The proposition of the author entails an essential reframing of the term to peace, conflict and violence studies for the purposes of a more conscious reflection of the relationship between the three highly debated terms.

Lost in Transformation is an intellectually stimulating read. Drawing upon the work of prominent theorists such as Hannah Arendt, Agnes Heller, and Dorothy E. Smith, Audra Mitchell's approach to the attainment and preservation of non-violent coexistence promises to be of interest to practitioners, scholars and students alike, since it challenges the established practices of conflict transformation in ways that seek to enhance the efficacy of peace interventions. The time for such rethinking is ripe, especially in a reality where traditional conflict resolution efforts are proving insufficient to address the myriad of contemporary intra-state conflicts.

The value of *Lost in Transformation*, to both the study and practice of conflict resolution, is not only significant but also radical. Despite the fact that the findings of the book are based on a case study of the Northern Ireland peace process, their implications transcend country-specific contexts and introduce valid points to the broader peace and conflict field. The questions it raises about the actual peacefulness of peace initiatives as well as the modifications in the conflict transformation practice it proposes are ideas worth considering by professionals. While the findings of the book do not seek to condemn the established approaches to conflict resolution as such – neither do they intend to provide policy prescriptions – they highlight the dire need for integrating a plural world-building approach into transformative peace interventions. This approach is characterized as the creation of conditions that allow multiple worlds to coexist in a non-violent manner (p. 1). If given the chance, Audra Mitchell's theory of plural world-building has the potential to initiate constructive change in the attainment of non-violent coexistence between communities. It is up to the competent reader to give it a chance in the first place.

Recommended citation

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