Journal of
Conflictology

Table of Contents

Journal of **Conflictology**

http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu

Journal of **Conflictology**

http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu

INTERVIEW

The Referendum in South Sudan: Is it Peace or Conflict Ahead? An Interview with Ambassador Daniel Rachuonyo Mboya

Jack Shaka

Overview

Over the years, Sudan, especially the south, caught the eye of the world with images of war, including children suffering from malnutrition, child soldiers, rape victims, amputees and images of slavery. The situation in Darfur is no better now than it was before. It is grim. The eruption of violence in the Abyei region during the referendum in the south leaves a lot of question marks over the future of the region. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese are abroad as refugees thanks to the conflicts that have dogged the region for decades. Now, an overwhelming majority –almost 99%– have voted for an independent South Sudan. Companies are lobbying for contracts, governments are sending emissaries and the world is watching. Is peace finally being realised in Sudan? Is this what Dr John Garang envisioned for the south? Veteran diplomat, Daniel Rachuonyo Mboya was Kenya's first Ambassador to Sudan and also the first Special Envoy to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat for the Peace Initiative in Sudan. In this interview he expresses his opinion about the referendum in South Sudan and the future of the volatile region.

Keywords

referendum, peace, conflict resolution, South Sudan, Sudan

THE INTERVIEW

Question: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has played a caretaker role in the negotiations between the north and the south. As the first Special Envoy for IGAD and the first Kenyan Envoy for Sudan, are you happy with the outcome of the referendum and do you think it will serve to quell the violence that has rocked Sudan for years?

Amb. Mboya: So far, the outcome of the referendum shows a sign of jubilation.

And with the recent announcement of the results, I can only hope the positive results are accepted by both parties.

If such an acceptance takes place, then there will be lasting peace in both the south and the north.

Question: Do you believe that the International Criminal Court's (ICC) issue of an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity made him not sabotage the referendum in order to look 'good' to the international community that has turned its back on him?

Amb. Mboya: Indeed, the ICC issue plus regional and international pressure made President Bashir to cooperate before and during the referendum.

Question: Most of the Northerners are Arab-Muslim and the Southern majority are mostly Christians. In your opinion, was the referendum also a war, a positioning between Christianity and Islam and, if so, what kind of effect is this going to have?

Amb. Mboya: The referendum was a war of many fronts. For example: freedom, slavery, discrimination, injustices, equality, culture, religion, development, marginalisation, self-determination among others. So, the outcome of the referendum has shown part of this but with time, we shall see more effects whether positive or negative.

Question: The civil wars between the North and South Sudan have gone on for years. Will the outcome of the referendum make things any different?

Amb. Mboya: Absolutely. Things will be different in that the South Sudanese will be in charge of their own destiny. This is something they have not had in a long time. As you know, many fled abroad because of the conflicts that were taking place in Sudan over the years.

Question: The referendum was deemed peaceful by international observers but as it went on, there were several deaths in Abyei, the oil rich region sandwiched between the North and the South. What's your analysis on Abyei?

Amb. Mboya: Although there were problems in Abyei during the referendum, these were just deliberate acts to cause tension with a view to disrupt the referendum in the south.

The history of Abyei indicates strongly that Abyei is an integral part of south Sudan. The inhabitants are members of Ngok Dinkas. Therefore, the nomads from the north who came to graze their animals in Abyei during drought in the north must not be allowed to confuse history. But rather they should support the outcome of the referendum so that peace is realised. I am also keen to see what will happen during the referendum in Abyei and what criteria will be used to decide who is a resident of Abyei.

THE CIVIL WARS IN SUDAN

Question: Dr. John Garang, the founder of Sudan People's Liberation Movement died before he could see a new South Sudan. Do you agree that this is what he wanted all along? An independent South Sudan?

Amb. Mboya: Dr. John Garang had written extensively about the conditions of the people of Sudan generally and those of the south in particular. From his writings, one tends to believe that he would have wanted to see a situation of lasting peace in Sudan where there is no marginalisation, slavery, discrimination but a situation that offers every Sudanese equal justice, equal economic opportunities, freedom, education, development and a sense of self-reliance to determine their own destiny.

Question: You worked in Sudan as the first Kenyan Ambassador to Sudan thereby being one of the longest serving Kenyan envoys to Sudan. What's your opinion on the role the international community has played in fuelling the conflicts in Sudan?

Amb. Mboya: I was the Ambassador to Sudan from 1982-1985 and left soon after the people's revolution which toppled President Nimeyi in 1985. A lot of things have happened since my departure from Sudan. So, any activities about which actors in the international community have been fuelling the conflicts, I would not be able to provide adequate information.

Question: The second Sudanese Civil War in 1983 began when you were still Kenya's Envoy to Sudan. Just as you left, Colonel Bashir seized Sudan in a coup d'état in 1989 and went on to call himself President. What did you think of this?

Amb. Mboya: Colonel Bashir seized power in a coup d'état in 1989 from Sadik Elmadi, an elected civilian. Democracy must be seen to prevail at all times. So, the coup was something unfortunate.

Question: Since the civil wars, there are hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees abroad. From Kenya to the USA. A call for them to return 'home' would be justified in your opinion or not?

Amb. Mboya: The Sudanese who left Sudan and are now refugees in other countries are very nationalistic and love south Sudan. When conditions that made them leave their country improve, then they will return and settle.

Already there is extensive settlement going on in south Sudan by those returning refugees. If one travels from Nimule to Juba, one can witness extensive settlement. These refugees do not have to be called to return, they are doing it voluntarily.

Question: Darfurians have suffered in the hands of the Janjaweed (militia) for many years. From rapes to racial slurs to deaths. Is this going to stop?

Amb. Mboya: It will continue until a peaceful solution is found for the people of Darfur.

DEVELOPING SOUTH SUDAN: WHAT NEXT?

Question: How does south Sudan plan to sustain its development agenda and is the international community going to lend a hand?

Amb. Mboya: The development of south Sudan will depend on its people and natural resources available. Agriculture would be the main occupation. The international community should provide assistance to south Sudan to enable them to begin development on a solid foundation.

Question: There is intense lobbying by big companies for a 'piece' of South Sudan. From road construction companies to banks and many more. Are these companies genuinely interested in the development of South Sudan, the post conflict reconstruction or in profiteering?

Amb. Mboya: Not all companies lobbying for construction jobs in south Sudan have profiteering motive. Banks in particular have provided excellent services necessary for economic development. In fact, without banks in south Sudan, the economy would have been paralysed due to the lack of these essential financial services.

Question: As a veteran diplomat, what advice can you give President Bashir and First Vice President Silva Kiir? And what advice can you give to the people of the South and the North?

Amb. Mboya: So far, both the south and north have handled themselves very well under very delicate circumstances. They should keep it like that. The same goes for President Bashir and Vice President Kiir: they should work hard to maintain peace and stability in the region. The world is watching.

Question: One of the core missions of IGAD is 'Promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs'. Would you consider IGAD successful in its mission?

Amb. Mboya: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has been successful in brokering peace between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was signed by the above parties is a deserving credit to IGAD and to Kenya as chair to the IGAD Summit Sub-Committee on peace negotiation.

Question: Lastly, do you believe that peace lies ahead for both south and north Sudan or is it conflict?

Amb. Mboya: Up until now, I believe it is peace. I can only hope that the remaining issues like the border between north and south, Abyei, South Kordofan and the Blue Nile will be resolved by the same spirit that has prevailed up to now. If this happens then total belief in peace will be a reality.

BIOGRAPHY

From 1999 to 2001, Ambassador Daniel Rachuonyo Mboya was the Special Envoy to the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat on Peace in the Sudan, appointed by His Excellency Daniel Arap Moi (former President of Kenya) to lead the mediation process between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

He was Kenya's first ambassador to the Republic of Sudan, from 1982 to 1985, and also the Second Secretary at the Kenyan Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 1973 to 1978 where he had multiple responsibilities covering the Sudan, the Organisation of African Unity and the East African Community. He headed the Asia Division at the Kenyan Ministry of foreign affairs and also spent time in Japan as a Counsellor and Chargé d' Affaires. He has held other high profile Presidential appointments as Permanent Secretary in various government ministries in Kenya. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Liberal Arts from the State University of New York at Geneseo, USA and studied diplomacy at Queen's College, Oxford University, UK.

Recommended citation

About the author of the interview

Jack Shaka
jackshaka@gmail.com

Jack Shaka is the Country Director, in Nairobi, Kenya, for Moving Framez Africa (MFA), a media, peace and development organisation. He is a reporter for Africa News, run by Africa Interactive based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and covers social issues. Jack is author of "The Refugee: An odyssey into the refugee life" and co-author of "Silent No More-Youth Legislative Theatre Process in Kenya".

Journal of
Conflictology

ARTICLE

Political Change in the Middle East: First Consolidated Reflections and Challenges Ahead

Hani Albasoos

Abstract

Years after the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the democratic reform in Indonesia, the Middle East and North Africa are beginning to change politically. The current popular uprisings sweeping across the region began in Tunisia in December 2010 and in Egypt on 25 January 2011. These uprisings are not the product of foreign interventions or a side-effect of non-domestic agendas. Rather, they are concerned with young men and women who are determined to take their future into their own hands. The younger generation wants their freedom, human rights, and dignity back, and they want to be politically represented in the governance of their countries. As they call for and usher in change and reform, they have brought a renewed vitality and insistence on democracy in many states across the region. They have also raised valuable lessons to be learned, both positively and negatively. These lessons need to be underlined and access to that knowledge should be available for the new emerging actors on the political stage in the region.

INTRODUCTION

The democratic political changes in Tunisia and Egypt took the world by surprise. Even more perplexed were the members of the ruling authoritarian regimes, who neither expected nor wanted the defiance of their youth. Yet it is with this younger generation that imminent democratic changes will materialise. A new wave of democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa has been brought about by a technological revolution.

In this technological revolution there is not only a battle being waged by young people calling for democratic change, but also between traditional and new technological information channels. In the past, people relied on traditional media and other forms to access information regarding events in their country, region and internationally.

Though many events made the front page in the traditional media outlets, many others were neglected.

The growing capacity of modern media to spread information, increasing awareness and activating political action, has certainly exceeded that of totalitarian regimes. From non-state actors to individuals around the world, governments can no longer shut off internet connections or block access to other individuals sitting on their living room couch anywhere in the continent. Together they are able to spread the news on events and what is taking place on the ground. They are able to do so instantaneously. There is a new reality for citizens living in the Middle East and North Africa and those that have been ruling for decades. None are impervious to the regional and international trends sweeping the world today.

Consolidated reflections from a regional perspective are necessary on the causal factors of the uprisings and on the way forward for the Middle East and North Africa. This research examines the regional context of the popular uprising using reliable and credible information. It examines the rationale for the changes and the causes behind the uprisings. The importance of democracy building and its applicability in the Middle East and North Africa in the wake of the uprising is identified. Attention is drawn to the uprising as a challenge to the United States policy in the region and the reaction of the US as a unipolar political player. Finally, the political implications of the uprisings, their collision with Western interests, and the future relationship between the United States and the emerging leaders in the region are examined.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT OF THE UPRISING

After a long period of deep frustration, the young, unemployed Tunisian, Mohammed Bou-Azizi, set himself on fire. This resulted in an instability that continues to reverberate throughout North Africa and the Middle East. On 17 December 2010, municipal inspectors prohibited Mohammed Bou-Azizi selling vegetables to make a living. He set himself on fire to demonstrate his desperation and was severely burnt and died two weeks later. Reports of his death were available on the Internet causing a series of demonstrations, and catching nearly everybody outside Tunisia by surprise (Rogers, Jan. 2011). The government's irresponsiveness and harsh posture against the demonstrators caused events to snowball. This uprising is a result of decades of oppression in which President Zain Al-Abidine Ben Ali's authoritarian policy stripped Tunisians of their dignity by banning opposition and rejecting religious freedom. Sustained inactivity on economic policies led to catastrophic unemployment rates, and corruption and nepotism resulted in instability (Tatari, 2011).

The powerful public protests culminated in the capital, Tunis, over the weekend of 8-9 January and led to the fall of the Ben Ali government, a repressive regime that had been in power for 23 years. The regime was ousted as a result of the widespread uprising that saw thousands of Tunisians take to the streets. A provisional administration in Tunisia, supported by the army, pledged to hold elections within six months. In the beginning, the administration had several members from the former regime and while some of them afterward stood down, opposition to the inclusion of any previous government ministers continued. Important decisions by the interim government included the discharge of many political prisoners, some of whom had been im-

prisoned for many years, and a readiness to guarantee some key exiled political leaders a safe return to Tunisia, particularly Mr Rashid Al-Ghannouchi, the leader of the banned Islamist party, Al-Nahda (Rogers, Jan. 2011).

From the beginning of the uprising in Tunisia, in mid-December 2010, it was clear that its roots were in profound social and economic trends along with more pressing political circumstances (Rogers, 2011). It functioned as the trigger for the successive uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, igniting the fire which turned deep feelings into action (Zohar, 2011).

Following the extraordinarily rapid change in Tunisia, demonstrations and self-immolations spread to several cities in Egypt, predominantly Cairo (Rogers, Jan. 2011). The brutal actions of the local police trying to crack down on the demonstrators, using excessive force, produced contradictory results. President Mubarak's address to the people on 29 January 2011, largely repeating slogans from the past, was not likely to be as an assurance for real change, and only triggered more protests in Egypt. Moreover, the reality of an army refraining from effectively imposing the curfew and not acting to suppress the protest encouraged the protestors to carry on and increase their activities (Zohar, 2011).

The Egyptian regime's late and half-hearted response to the protesters was further discredited by its forces violence against peaceful demonstrations. Its reaction to the demands intensified the protests, and ensured that activities would continue to have varying overflow effects across the region (Helgesen, 2011). A remarkable feature is the crossover effect, whereby protests in one country inspire those of another. As a result, ruling elites across North Africa and the Middle East were watching the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt with concern and apprehension. There were already some indications that the uprising in Tunisia emboldened opposition elsewhere in the region (Rogers, 2011).

From Tunisia, to Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the revolution that was triggered by the self-immolation and desperation of a street seller in Tunisia has erupted across the region. This is in fact a regional revolution of the Arab people (The Socialist, 2011). Turkish Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu, said "What we are facing is a political tsunami and we should react to it as such. The sense of common destiny is everywhere, and no one can ignore it" (Alibeyoglu, 2011).

The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt stem from unprecedented generational change unfolding simultaneously with the current media revolution (Alibeyoglu, 2011). Arab dictatorial regimes are now being traumatised and are anticipating their decline. They have been giving Western society misleading notions of the peoples of the Arab world. For decades, these regimes have used the risk of Islamist fundamentalism to manipulate their Western allies to sup-

port them against those extremists. Under this concept, the West decided to back such evil Arab regimes against the protests of their people. The long-marginalised Arab citizens have now exposed the insincerity of this claim, and in ways that have surprised almost everybody (Hroub, 2011).

The wider impact of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings on other regimes throughout the region has particularly worried leaders because of the intense media coverage on regional news channels, especially Al Jazeera. Yet, in a number of states there is a concern that a replication of the Tunisian changes is far from certain. The leaders of wealthy western Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates, have significant concerns, but their economies are largely buoyant, supported by the recent high prices for oil and gas. "In the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is the exception with a large and economically marginalised population, declining oil revenues and deep internal divisions" (Rogers, Jan. 2011). At the ends of the region are Jordan and Morocco, which are regarded as states with social environments that could develop into strongholds for opposition, similar to Tunisia. Rogers (Jan. 2011) said: "Both, though, are monarchies in which a significant part of the population holds the monarch in high regard. Morocco, in particular, is a state in which the King embraces the values of Islam in a very marked and public manner. In both cases, there is scope for rapid change, but in the context of the restraining influence of monarchist support."

The country with the highest potential, by far, for rapid change was Egypt, where a dictatorial regime backed by meticulous public order control was supported by several million citizens and police officers, while approximately 70 million people were marginalised, many of them impoverished. With such a majority of citizens on the margins, more well-off citizens were inclined to support the regime not least because of fear of disorder and violence. The protests which started on 25 January were the biggest for several years. The authorities began to clamp down by cutting off the Internet and arresting hundreds of demonstrators, with violent clashes extensively covered by the media. For the first time in many years, the Egyptian political elites have opposition figures of some significance, such as the former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr Mohammed Elbaradei who returned to Cairo on 27 January to join the young people in their protests (Rogers, Jan. 2011).

RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

The transformation is a political and social necessity, and no one should try to oppose the changes sweeping the region. The triggers of the uprisings include social tension and mass unemployment among young people, although the actual causes are more profound, and political. This ultimately meant that the types of top-down measures presented by President Mubarak at the peak of the protests, i.e. a cabinet reshuffle, concessions on food prices and public-sector salaries, the appointment of a vice-president, did not reduce power of the uprising (Helgesen, 2011). As Mikail (2011) said "these protests have two main causes: one political, the other socioeconomic. If the demonstrators had been in a better economic position, they would not have protested against their authoritarian leaders. When populations are hungry, unemployed, and can see nothing on the political horizon that gives them hope that change is possible, there is going to be some kind of eruption, and that is exactly what is happening in the Middle East."

The harsh realities of hunger, unemployment and oppression created the ideal conditions for revolution in the region, galvanising the antagonism of millions, inducing uprisings and demonstrations in the region and bringing down long-standing repressive regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. The instability continues to grow as events underway in other countries call for greater representation and democratic reform.

Arabs have finally had enough of their dictators. It took decades to get to this point. In this regard, Hroub (2011) identifies six factors underlining the rationale for the Arab revolutions:

First, most Arab states have been transformed into corrupt family businesses, encompassed by small opportunist elites, all protected by relentless security apparatuses supported by indifferent Western governments. The corruption and malfunctioning extend to all aspects of social, political and economic life. The people are no longer willing to put up with humiliation. They have declared an uprising against their rulers to create viable political and economic systems.

Second, the uprisings expose the rulers' frequent claim that the only possible alternative to them is an Islamist takeover. There is a lot of evidence that the young leaders of the uprisings are a third option and the way forward. In Tunisia and Egypt, the leading force of the uprisings is a generation of well-informed young citizens whose courageous activities have had an impact on all levels of society in a process that avoided the traditional and unsuccessful opposition parties. They have succeeded in mobilising many of the silent majority, emphasising the fact that most Arabs have had enough of the status quo.

Third, the change brought about by these uprisings is not the work of influential leaders, a military coup d'état or foreign intervention. It is stimulated and directed by the young people as legitimate players for change and by Arab people whose destiny is ultimately in their own hands. The new age will be influenced by the young people.

Fourth, this extensive Arab protest is essentially political. The demands for jobs or improved living condi-

tions may be the triggers, but while they are significant, political ambitions have quickly taken the lead. In Tunisia, the principal slogan was: "We live with only water and bread, but without Ben Ali". People were not hiding behind unpretentious and temporary demands, but wanted to change the entire political system, dramatically and uncompromisingly.

Fifth, the ruling influential figures, and their foreign backers, relying on armed security forces for their stability, is no longer an option. This situation may have endured for a long time, but current uprisings demonstrate that it does not work in the long run. The inconsiderate Western strategy of buying stability while turning a blind eye to authoritarianism exposes the emptiness of its democratic principles.

Sixth, the waves of protest throughout the Arab states reached social media such as Facebook and Twitter and so became evident on the street and subsequently broadcast by satellite and international TV channels This made it difficult for security and intelligence services to suppress such 'electronic civil-resistance movements'. "In face of massive unarmed determination, and under the world's vigilant scrutiny, these security apparatuses and the regimes they protect are unmasked as paper tigers" (Hroub, 2011).

The change in Tunisia has highlighted the fact that the opposition to Ben Ali's regime came not from a strong religious foundation, but rather from a broad opposition, encouraged partly by unemployment, inflation in general and high food prices in particular. Moreover, there was support throughout the country for an Islamic point of reference in politics. This is relevant to the development of the al-Nahda party, which was founded in 1981 by Rashid Al-Ghannouchi and achieved considerable recognition in the 1980s. In 1989, al-Nahda party won about 20% of the vote, but the election was substantially fixed in favour of President Ben Ali, so it is likely that the real support for al-Nahda was considerably higher. From 1990 onwards, the Ben Ali regime started a forceful campaign to destroy the party, imprisoning many thousands of its members. Mr Al-Ghannouchi went into exile and was sentenced in his absence (Rogers, Jan. 2011).

However, al-Nahda's perspective and willingness to work in a pluralist international atmosphere is not the same as accepting what is seen across the region as foreign military occupation and foreign pressure over ruling elites. Rogers (Jan. 2011) said "such external control is widely opposed with vigour, but that does not equate with opposition to ongoing political, economic and cultural contact. This may be the view within many elements of a party such as al-Nahda, but it is not shared in more conservative circles in Washington or some Western European capitals, and certainly not in Israel."

In contrast, in Egypt, the US foreign aid and its policy has been claimed as an investment in regional stability, based largely on long-running military cooperation to sustain the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Consecutive US Administrations have viewed the regime in Egypt as a moderate power in the region. At the same time, there have been increasing US demands for Egypt to adopt democracy. Recently, congressional views of US-Egyptian relations have varied. Many officials have viewed Egypt as a stabilising regional power, but some have argued for the United States to demand that Egypt's government apply political reforms, improve human rights, and take a more dynamic role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. These concerns, adding to economic disappointment, led to the public instability in Egypt. The US Administration called on the Egyptian government to respect basic human rights of protestors and expressed concerns about violence, while calling for a transition toward democratic governance to begin directly (Sharp, 2011). Nonetheless, the complex social structure causes feelings of aggravation and disaffection. In Egypt, there is an enormous gap between the rich minority and the poor majority. Yet, there is a general awareness that there was no anticipation for change with the previous social institutions in Egypt (Zohar, 2011).

Prior to this uprising, Egyptian politicians were prepared to consider the possibility of a leadership transition in the foreseeable future, as political and economic anxiety rose throughout 2010. In late 2010, the ruling National Democratic Party won over 90% of all seats in the parliamentary elections (slightly less than 80% in the previous mandate). The US Administration was criticised for restraining its public criticism of the Egyptian regime before and after the election. In addition to its democracy assistance funding, which was largely ineffective, US aid should have sought to improve the lives of common Egyptians. At least, the aid should have been conditioned on reforms for human rights and religious freedom (Sharp, 2011).

The popular protests in Egypt are a typical case of collective behaviour, a concept from political sociology: many people acting spontaneously, challenging the social order. Such collective behaviour brings various phenomena with it, some of which were apparent in Egypt: demonstrations, looting, clashes, etc. Protestors were essentially encouraged by an urgent and defined principle, which was to make the President step down, make the regime more democratic and improve the country's economic conditions. Given that, the crowd was influenced by a profound sense of marginalisation caused by the regime, and was extremely emotional. Thus, violence, looting and riots, took place. The oppression of the regime and the widespread corruption in Egypt formed the narrative that brought the protesters together. Egypt had been under a corrupt and dictatorial ruler for 29 years. The intention was to end Mubarak's regime and form a new political system that would be more accountable and receptive to people's aspirations (Zohar, 2011).

THE UPRISING AS A CHALLENGE FOR THE US

The protests in Egypt were particularly painful for the United States, a key ally. The US administration's early reaction was expressed by secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, who requested President Hosni Mubarak, a "friend of the US", to step down. Thus, the solid networks of arms sales, military-training agreements and diplomatic complicity that linked the US to Mubarak's regime, and the Egyptian army, were brought to an end (Hodgson, 2011). On 11 February 2011, President Mubarak resigned after 29 years in power. For 18 days, a popular peaceful uprising spread throughout Egypt and eventually forced Mubarak to concede power to the military (Sharp, 2011).

Egypt's transition to a democratic system in the months ahead will have foremost implications for US foreign policy in the Middle East and for other states in the region ruled by monarchs and dictators. US policy makers are currently struggling with the complex matter of future US-Egypt relations, and these deliberations are expected to sway consideration of authorisation legislation in the 112th Congress. The United States has provided Egypt with an annual standard of $2 billion in economic and military foreign aid since 1979 (Sharp, 2011). Nevertheless, the excitement and relative swiftness of the self-generated achievement in Egypt protected the United States from considerable embarrassment. However, the first stage of the North African uprisings, in Tunisia and Egypt, left the United States marginalised. The peaceful mass demonstrations in these countries, which led to the resignation of their presidents, have highlighted a gap between US theoretical aspiration to uphold democracy everywhere and the truth of its realistic commitment to dictators, just so long as they supported the US interests and refrained from explicitly opposing Israel (Hodgson, 2011).

In general, the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and other places in the region are motivated by an intense desire for democracy. This represents a test for international democracy actors. Tony Blair, the Quartet representative to the Middle East, confirmed the rather hesitant response of the international community to the democratic uprising in Egypt by saying: "You cannot be sure what type of change will be produced there". Helgesen stated that "If democracy is allowed to run its course, you cannot be sure. This is the beauty of democracy, of allowing citizens to freely elect their leaders" (Helgesen, 2011).

Currently, the third North African outbreak of violence confronts the US with a more realistic problem: Libya's serious internal conflict leaves the US without a clear policy towards the region. The crisis in Libya is confronting the United States with a fresh awareness of its military and political constraints. The US administration's public position has been cautious, despite a steady rise in strong rhetoric since the first outbreak of protest in Benghazi in mid-February 2011 gave way to armed conflict between Libyan insurgents and forces of Muammar Al-Gaddafi, the Libyan President. The certainty of change and willingness of the US Administration materialised in March 2011 by taking strong action against Al-Gaddafi's forces. International military forces led by the US army launched hundreds of long-range missiles against the Al-Gaddafi military apparatus. A no-fly zone was also imposed by the international forces to prevent Al-Gaddafi air forces from attacking civilians and insurgents. Nonetheless, these events raise the question about the future of the coalition intervention in Libya at a time when the Iraqi and Afghan precedents make United States intervention in a Muslim-majority country less attractive than ever (Hodgson, 2011).

The historic protests in the Arab region, and especially Libya, present the United States administration with a serious foreign-policy test. The conflict in this area is the first main challenge abroad since Obama took office in January 2009. The way he deals with this situation will have crucial consequences for his political future and for the US geopolitical position (Hodgson, 2011).

BUILDING DEMOCRACY

The citizens of the Arab countries are entitled to empathy, support and motivation to share knowledge and experience with the international community. The international readiness to support particular leaders has been tested and failed, and should therefore be abandoned. In Helgesen's (2011) opinion, requests made to external actors to uphold democracy should be met with admiration. But allowing democratic political change to take place will be more successful than repeating past efforts at producing societal change from a distance.

The average age of an Arab state in the post-colonial era is about sixty years. For most of this period, the new ruling elites were given adequate time and space to achieve state and nation building. In the early post-independence years, the major task was to support the new entities in acquiring national identities with the inherited colonial boundaries. The leading officials stressed that these strategic needs justified putting development ahead of democracy, maintaining that democracy did not suit the Arabs. The outcome was political models with well-established security and authoritarian control (Hroub, 2011).

The swift political changes in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, after decades of oppression may possibly lead to stable and accountable governments. If Tunisia and Egypt make successful transitions, then other regimes may rec-

ognise the need to endorse freedom and democracy, and there may just be peaceful transitions elsewhere. That is the most optimistic assessment according to Rogers (Jan. 2011). However, if Tunisia and Egypt do make the transitions and other states do not follow suit, then it is very likely that there will be disturbances elsewhere, even if they takes years to evolve. What is certain is that the combination of the profound socio-economic divisions across North Africa and the Middle East, and the increasing impact of environmental constraints denote the lack political reform geared toward human security, leading to great instability (Rogers, Jan. 2011). For Helgesen (2011), democracy is not the definite result of such an environment, even after the resignation of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt and assurance to pave the way towards elections within the next few months. Nevertheless, the need for democracy is definitely the driving force for the peoples of Tunisia and Egypt.

Democracy-building is practically the starting point for addressing political and constitutional change, electoral reform, and political dialogue. Building democracy in the region will take time. Democracy leads to stability in the long run, while the process of democratisation is often destabilising. It is about changing power relations in society. By now, people should have realised the danger of instability and conflict in the region. The citizens of Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in the region have a long way to go. Popular uprisings can remove dictators from power, but cannot build democracy. Extensive and profound changes are needed in constitutions, electoral systems, laws and regulations related to political parties, the media, and the judiciary (Helgesen, 2011).

Alibeyoglu (2011) thinks that the more people feel empowered to challenge the status quo, through grassroots uprisings aimed at overthrowing dictatorships in the region, the more their objectives will be met, achieving democracy, freedom, and the change they have yearned for. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu said in this regard, "everybody deserves democracy. People's demand should be respected. We are witnessing a natural flow of history because there was a need for change. Now, more than ever, the time has come to take a definitive and unified stance. We are already divided enough. We need more unification and more unity. There should be regional ownership. No foreign intervention. This is our region" (Alibeyoglu, 2011). In democracy, responsibility rests with the public. The people should use these efforts correctly in the years to come. Arab citizens must learn from history and not let their democratically earned power be seized by future dictators. Expressed resentment should be channelled to achieve better socio-political and economic conditions rather than hollowness and destructive disorder (Tatari, 2011).

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

The political change in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and other states in the region has raised significant questions concerning stability, security and the political state of affairs. The developments have produced innovative democracy across the Arab world, the degree of which is still unknown.

Rogers (January 2011) has observed a combination of considerable economic marginalisation, a young and aggravated population and demographic trends throughout the region, where the birth rates have not declined as in most parts of the world over the past three decades. This has resulted in large groups of young people with few employment opportunities. "Their predicament is made worse by low economic growth rates leading to limited job creation, but because of welcome improvements in education, they are particularly aware of their own marginalisation. These circumstances transcend political parties and even religious beliefs, but may lead to radicalisation rooted in a political ideology or, more commonly, an austere religious outlook" (Rogers, Jan. 2011). This means there is a fundamental state of affairs that may well lead to an unprompted outbreak of widespread revolution in the region or that may develop gradually into a fundamental social movement. For Rogers (Jan, 2011), it is very difficult to envisage when and how this may occur, as in Tunisia and Egypt, even though these circumstances strengthen the current towards change.

For some analysts, despite the nature of the opposition, and the speed of its emergence, it is incorrect to presume that events in Tunisia and Egypt mark the beginning of a region-wide revolution. They were based on the issue of speed of change first in relatively low-income countries with fairly well-educated populations, in which Internet and telephone communications are prevalent. A natural eruption was translated quickly into a very considerable movement, and this was aided by extensive and independent media coverage from regional networks, which were not controlled by a government (Rogers, Jan. 2011). In some ways Tunisia and Egypt are more advanced in this respect than other countries in the region. This, however, is changing, as communication and media technology is becoming more common across the region, including Libya and Yemen. However, Mikail (2011) believes that revolutionary enthusiasm could soon spread to other states and regions such as Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Few regimes will escape this revolution. He discards the notion that this revolution could sweep away every single Arab regime in 2011: "while this process can be controlled to some extent in closed societies with repressive regimes, it will ultimately engulf almost every country in the Middle East, from Morocco on the one hand to Saudi Arabia on the other" (Mikail, 2011).

It is largely recognised that any sweeping change in Egypt will have serious strategic implications for North Africa, the Middle East and beyond. Similar regimes in the region, predominantly those that are close to the United States, could face the same fate (Zohar, 2011). The increase of anarchy in the region, where popular uprisings take place, has aggravated retaliation by the elite in Libya, offering a view of the potential development of political change in 2011. This unexpected turmoil raises the question of the potential fundamental change across the region. However, doubts have accumulated as the revolutions in Libya, Yemen and Bahrain stall and become obstacles to the process that started in Tunisia and Egypt. Libya is the most dramatic challenge, but there may be other implications for other states in the long term (Rogers, 2011).

The speed and power of this political and social change make the regional power-shift possible. The Arab World has entered an era of political change that will have regional political implications and influence the Arab-Israeli conflict. Naumkin (2011) said, "the Middle East is now demonstrating the incredible potential and energy of the peoples living there. Once it tackles all the problems it currently faces, the region will ascend to a new level of development and become a full-fledged actor in global affairs." The regional revolution still astonishes and encourages others elsewhere. According to The Socialist (2011), the mighty movement of US workers in Wisconsin has been encouraged by the Egyptian and other revolutions. "We must do everything in our power to support the heroic struggling workers and farmers of the Middle East to complete the big changes in society that they yearn for. We must do the same here in Britain, Europe and the rest of the world until all aspects of the brutal, greedy capitalist society, that can offer nothing but unrelieved misery in the future, is abolished" (The Socialist, 2011).

The overthrow of dictatorships is just the first phase. No leader should think that they can rule forever. The achievement of democracy represents a great move forward, even though remnants of the old regimes stay be-hind as evident in the continuing influence of the police and army in Egypt and Tunisia. The revolution will totally accomplish its mission if it goes further than the framework of capitalism, and if it creates the social order for the eradication of unemployment, the destruction of all elements of corruption, and achieves democratic rights. This might be recognised through a confederation of the Middle East through efforts toward a peaceful transformation in the region (The Socialist, 2011).

CONCLUSION

The popular uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East are shaking the region's totalitarian regimes and the misleading notions adopted by these governments for many decades. Though the uprisings may have significant outcomes, they may not cover the general expectations of the peoples in the region. Nonetheless, the recent upheaval has led to an essential political change at least in Tunisia and Egypt, where massive crowds of people took to the streets to ascertain their rights against the local regimes' power. Such large-scale inspiration is extraordinary and has long-term implications.

Some have argued that the uprising across the region was provoked by outside forces and social and political instability that run much deeper. They have pointed out that people are calling on their governments to become more receptive and more accountable. Nevertheless, the foundation of the protests is legal, political and economic, driven principally by the fight against corruption, high unemployment, and low income. Young people are also calling for free elections, freedom of speech, and people's self-empowerment.

The leaders of these revolutions are now directing the process of political and social change in their countries. These young influential leaders are contributing to the emergence of a new world order.

Bibliography

ALIBEYOGLU, A. (2011). "The Audacity of Change" [online]. Aljaeera.Net. 14 March 2011.
<http://blogs.aljazeera.net/middle-east/2011/03/14/audacity-change>

HELGESEN, V. (2011). "Arab Democracy Rising: International Lessons" [online]. Open Democracy. 16 February 2011.

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/vidar-helgesen/arab-democracy-rising-international-lessons>

HODGSON, G. (2011). "America and the Arab Revolts: Faces of Power" [online]. Open Democracy. 8 March 2011.
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/godfrey-hodgson/america-and-arab-revolts-faces-of-power>

HROUB, K. (2011). "Arab Third Way: Beyond Dictators and Islamists" [online]. Open Democracy. 9 February 2011.
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/khaled-hroub/arab-third-way-beyond-dictators-and-islamists>

MIKAIL, B. (2011). "Unexpected Changes in the Middle East" [online]. Valdai Discussion Club, Opinions. 3 March 2011.
<http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110303/162841075.html>

NAUMKIN, V. (2011). "Unexpected Changes in the Middle East" [online]. Valdai Discussion Club, Opinions. 3 March 2011.
<http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20110303/162841075.html>

ROGERS, P. (2011). "Libya, Bahrain, and the Arab Spring" [online]. Open Democracy. 17 March 2011.
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/libya-bahrain-and-arab-spring>

ROGERS, P. (Jan. 2011). "Tunisia and Egypt in Context" [online]. Oxford Research Group.
<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/paul_rogers_monthly_global_security_briefings/tunisia_and_egypt_context>

SHARP, J. (2011). *Egypt: The January 25 Revolution and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy*. Congressional Research Service. 11 February 2011. Available at:
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6f4dc5c.html>

TATARI, E. (2011). "My Word on Middle East Uprising: Turn Resentment toward Better Life" [online]. *Orlando Sentinel*, Article Collections. 1 February 2011.
<http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-02-01/news/os-ed-mideast-chaos-myword-020111-20110131_1_tunisian-ben-ali-absolute-power>

"Widening Revolution in Middle East" [online]. *The Socialist*. Issue 659. 24 February - 3 March 2011.
<http://www.socialistparty.org.uk/pdf/issue/659/2.pdf>

ZOHAR, E. (2011). "The Egyptian Uprising: Analysis and Implications" [online]. CTTA: *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis.* Volume 3, Issue 2, February 2011. Singapore: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
<http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/CTTA/2011/CTTA-February11.pdf>

Recommended citation

About the author

Hani Albasoos
hani.adam@hotmail.com

Dr Albasoos has a PhD in International Relations, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK, (2005). He is an assistant professor in political science at the Islamic University of Gaza. He is Deputy Head of the Centre for Political and Development Studies and a Member of the Board of Trustees at the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Conflict Resolution & Governance in Gaza, Occupied Palestine.

Journal of
Conflictology

ARTICLE

Looking Beyond Conflict:
The Involvement of Tiv Diaspora in
Peacebuilding in Nigeria

Terhemba Ambe-Uva

Abstract

Examining the role of transnational migrant groups in peace processes is a particular area of field research within the broad area of studies on migration. This article examines the contribution of diaspora of the Tiv ethnic group in the USA to peacebuilding in Nigeria and argues that, contrary to recent findings in the literature that African diaspora had a negative impact on peace processes, the Tiv diaspora actively engaged all the conflicting parties in an attempt to ensure sustained peace and wider democratisation of power. They were mobilised as a result of the military massacre of two hundred unarmed Tiv civilians in their homeland. The initially weak ties of the Tiv diaspora with their home country have been strengthened, with the propensity to actively participate there. Despite their track record in peace processes, a weak social, economic and political position, as well as capacity constraints, may frustrate their efforts towards an enduring and sustainable peace.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

In the second week of October 2001, Nigerian soldiers killed more than two hundred unarmed civilians and destroyed homes, shops, public buildings and other property in more than seven towns and villages in Benue State, in central-eastern Nigeria. All those killed were from the Tiv ethnic group, an ethno-linguistic group and ethnic nation in West Africa. They constitute approximately 2.5% of Nigeria's total population, and number over 5.6 million individuals throughout Nigeria and Cameroon. Historically, the Tiv people are said to have migrated from central Africa to where they now live, in what is generally described as the Middle Belt of Nigeria, around 150 miles east of the confluence of River Benue with River Niger.

This military operation was part of the broader, long-standing inter-communal conflict in the area. As Human Rights Watch (2002, p.5) notes, "in a sense, it can be seen as a culmination of a series of attacks and counter-attacks by Tiv and Jukun armed groups, primarily in Taraba State and the areas around the Taraba-Benue border". The incident which provoked the violent response of the military in October was the abduction and killing of nineteen soldiers two weeks earlier. According to the government authorities, the soldiers were on a mission to restore peace in the area affected by the conflict between Tivs and Jukuns, and were abducted by a Tiv armed group in Vaase, in Benue State, on October 10. Their mutilated bodies were found two days later, on October 12, in the grounds of a primary school in the town of Zaki Biam, also in Benue State.

Less than two weeks after the discovery of the bodies, a large number of soldiers arrived in several towns and villages in Benue, between October 19 and 24, in a carefully coordinated operation designed to take residents by surprise. Soldiers rounded up the residents of these towns, separated the men from the women and children and suddenly opened fire on them. Following the shootings, the soldiers proceeded to burn the bodies and raze all the settlements. The army continued its callous vendetta in nine other Tiv settlements in both Taraba and Benue State over the next two days. The orgy of violence and massacre of unarmed civilians continued for days after, with women and children killed, maimed, and made refugees without shelter, food or basic means of livelihood, and property worth billions of naira destroyed, in various parts of Benue State.

The extra-judicial violence orchestrated by the Nigerian military was denounced by civil organisations, human rights groups and Nigerian diaspora. The killings by the government, it was argued, contravened Nigeria's obligations under international law. The Nigerian diaspora, specifically the Tiv community, condemned the attacks which destroyed lives and property, the systematic looting, and the rape of women and children.

In the literature on conflict and peacebuilding, Spear (2006) states that "the contribution of African diaspora to the promotion of peace in their countries of origin has been largely overlooked, yet it is a critical input for peacebuilding". While much of the media attention and recent academic analyses focus more on the money sent to the homelands (Orozco, 2007; IFAD, 2007), the potential of those behind these remittances to contribute to the resolution of past and ongoing conflicts has received little attention. Diaspora groups have constant links to their homeland and many have a lot of influence, not only as a result of the money sent there, but also as members of the society. Their input, if channelled through formal processes and institutional frameworks, could lead to breakthroughs in areas where Western-prescribed conflict resolution concepts have failed or only led to a temporary ceasefire.

Available data suggests that the flow of money sent home is high, and increasing. These remittances were estimated to be worth $268 billion in 2006, the vast proportion of which – $199 billion – went to developing countries (Mohapatra et al., 2006). Including unrecorded transfers, according to Mohapatra et al (2006), these contributions are greater than direct foreign investment, and more than twice the official aid received by developing countries. In Nigeria, commercial bank executives report that, in 2006, the recorded flow was 30% higher than in 2005, estimated at US$4.2 billion dollars, in 700,000 transactions. The overwhelming majority of these person-to-person transfers are said to come from the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and other Western European countries (Orozco and Myllis, 2007).

This article is an attempt to highlight the constructive role played by the Tiv diaspora community in responding to what has been described as "terrorism and ethnic cleansing against the Tiv" (Ijir, 2001). This group actively engaged the parties in the conflict in an attempt to stop further violence and change the structural conditions of the 'indigenes and settlers' syndrome. The broader aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the role of diaspora in peacebuilding.

METHODOLOGY

A review of the literature on diaspora in developing countries, with a particular focus on their role in conflict and peacebuilding was carried out, in addition to loosely structured interviews. The interviews are a constructionist approach aimed at discovering, as Silverman (2001, p. 95) said, how subjects actively create meaning. Thirty five interview subjects were selected from members of the Mutual Union of Tiv in America (MUTA), Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO), the media and other civil society organisations. So while the limited number of qualitative participants precludes any claim of being able to generalise the data gleaned from the interviews, purposive sampling is the most appropriate method for the aim of this project, which is to explore the subjects' perception of the role of diaspora in peacebuilding. As Arber (2001) notes, such a purposive sampling is ideal to "generate theory and a wider understanding of the social processes or social action" (Arber 2001, 61). As Holstein and Gubrium (1995) explain, the theoretical justification for interview methodology rests on the active selection of "people" over "population". That is, individuals are deliberately chosen as subjects for their competency in "narrative production" that serves to illuminate social context, interdependency, and construction of reality. However, it is imperative to stress that the interviews were not limited to survey respondents; in most cases, having arranged interviews with members of the Tiv diaspora and civil society organisations, the researcher was introduced to and handed over to a number of other groups.

TRANSNATIONALISM: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The engagement of diaspora in peacebuilding in their country of origin is within the framework of transnationalism. Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc (1994) offered a suitable definition of transnationalism: "We define 'transnationalism' as the processes by which

immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasise that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders."

Vertovec and Cohen (1999) consider transnationalism as a "site for political engagement". This is an allusion to many diaspora and ethnic groups who undertake transnational political activities as a dynamic interaction between the politics of their countries of origin and those of their receiving countries. Identity and political mobilisation of diaspora are the manifestation of vigorous practices of "long-distance nationalism" (Anderson, 1992), largely through transnational political, social, economic and cultural activities that refugee and immigrant populations sustain across the boundaries of nation-states.

DISCURSIVE ROLE OF THE DIASPORA IN PEACEBUILDING

Diaspora groups are clearly constituent elements of civil society and, as such, often take an interest in conflict and peacebuilding efforts in their countries of birth. The argument here is that diaspora groups are a central component of civil society and should be included in any analysis of its contribution to peacebuilding. One obvious example is the number of newspapers created to satisfy the appetite of diaspora communities for information about what is happening in their place of birth. These media outlets frequently comment, either positively or negatively, on the political processes linked to violent conflict in the homeland and efforts to end the violence through dialogue and negotiation (Cochrane, 2007 p. 21).

The literature on diaspora engagement with the home country is divided into two fields, each striving to explain the role of diaspora groups in peace and conflict processes. The first school of thought claims that their role in the peace processes is counter productive. In fact, it argues that diaspora groups, especially conflict-generated diaspora, are at the forefront in derailing peace process in the home country (Lyons, 2004). The second school claims that, under certain circumstances, the diaspora is a formidable force, with financial and social capacity and human capital that can be tapped for development, and by extension, peacebuilding (Spear, 2006).

Most of the literature links diaspora with conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2000, p. 26) conclude in their quantitative large-N study that: "[…] by far the strongest effect of war on the risk of subsequent war works through diasporas. After five years of post conflict-peace, the risk of renewed conflict is around six times higher in the societies with the largest diaspora in America than in those without American diaspora. Presumably this effect works

through the financial contributions of diaspora to rebel organisations."

When diaspora are mentioned within the context of violent conflict, the focus is frequently on their tendency to fund the continuation of warfare and their propensity to destabilise negotiations and peacebuilding efforts. It is recognised that large diaspora communities have the coercive power to raise funds for weapons, or lobby in support of the political objectives of militant liberation struggles in their countries of origin. This view is quite pervasive within the 'new wars' literature associated with theories of 21st century transnationalism and neo-liberal global governance (Kaldor, p. 2001).

Collier and Hoeffler's widely cited work, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* (2004), emphasises the destabilising impact of migrant groups, leading to the continuation of violent conflict. The 2001 report from the Rand Corporation, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*, is equally reductionist in its analysis of the destructive potential of diaspora communities. From a more nuanced perspective, Terence Lyons (2004) highlights the obstacles in the way of diaspora communities in Africa contributing positively to peacebuilding efforts. The example of Somalia and Eritrea suffices, where parts of the diaspora supported different clans with funding that was channelled through civil society groups and used to purchase weapons (Civil Society and Conflict Management in Africa: Report of the IPA/OAU Consultation, 1996:12).

And as Shain and Barth (2003, p. 450) note: "For many homeland citizens, territory serves multiple functions: it provides sustenance, living space, security, as well as a geographical focus for national identity. If giving up a certain territory, even one of significant symbolic value, would increase security and living conditions, a homeland citizen might find the trade-off worthwhile. By contrast, for the diaspora, while the security of the homeland is of course important as well, the territory's identity function is often paramount."

Werbner (2002, p. 120) adds one more twist to this debate by echoing this concern, noting that diaspora often "feel free to endorse and actively support ethnicist, nationalistic, and exclusionary movements". Finally, Fitzgerald suggests that some members of diaspora advance a "model of citizenship that emphasises rights over obligations, passive entitlements, and the assertion of an interest in the public space without a daily presence" (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 106).

The second school of thought holds that diaspora, by their very nature detached from frontline conflicts, are more inclined to contribute to, and play a positive role in the peace processes in their country of origin. While acknowledging the capacity of diaspora groups to contribute to violence in their countries of origin and accepting the arguments that they are slower to accept the political pragmatism often required for building peace processes within deeply divided societies, it is argued here that insufficient

attention has been given to their more positive contributions. It has been recognised by other scholars that diaspora communities cling to the political and cultural certainties associated with the conflict, through a combination of sentiment, guilt or even ignorance of the real situation. The Rand Corporation makes the reasonable point that "communities abroad often feel a genuine sympathy for the domestic struggles of their overseas kin. Sometimes these communities may also feel a sense of guilt because they are safe, while their kin are involved in brutal and bloody struggle" (Byman et al., 2001, p.55). Within this context, diaspora groups may become actively involved in finding means of ending conflicts at home. As a Nigerian proverb puts it, "only a mad man can go to sleep with his house on fire". This for example, has resulted in the putative efforts by London's diaspora from the Horn of Africa to work together to pressure their home countries to build more constructive political relationships.

In is imperative to distinguish between the empirical and theoretical arguments made for and against the diaspora with respect to peace processes. While the theoretical arguments of the 'New Wars' sees diaspora groups as a threat, empirical evidence from London's Horn-of-Africa communities, Polish-Americans in the United States during the 1980s, and Irish-Americans during the 1990s (sustaining the Northern Ireland peace process), and a host of others, show that under certain conditions, diaspora communities "are increasingly able to promote transnational ties, to act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy" (Shain and Barth, 2003, p. 450). Diaspora can therefore contribute positively or negatively to peace processes in their home countries.

THE CONFLICT IN THE TIV AREA OF TARABA STATE

The conflict in the Taraba-Benue area, which has lasted for decades, is principally between Tivs and Jukuns (HRW, 2002 p.16). While the Tiv and Jukun ethnic groups had a cordial relationship for centuries, that amiable coexistence progressively turned sour between the 1930s and the 1950s because of ecological as well as political changes, in the Wukari area in particular and in the Benue Valley in general.

The emergence of overt conflicts between the two ethnic groups, particularly from 1959, and their continuation since then, have turned this feud into what Nnoli (1995, p.220) has described as "the deadliest inter-ethnic clashes". There seems to be no end to the Tiv-Jukun problem, as each decade since the 1950s has resonated with new waves of conflict. This clearly indicates the existence of intractable, deep-rooted and fundamental disagreements between

the two neighbours. The Tiv-Jukun ethnic conflict has extended over various periods, with the first conflict-prone atmosphere surfacing in 1959, preceding the federal elections held in Nigeria that year.

The conflict in Taraba between Tiv and Jukuns has tended to centre on competition for land, as well as control over economic resources and political power (cf. Best, Idyorough and Shehu, 1999). Three major factors have been used to explain this ethnic conflict: the land issue, the political factor and the indigene-settler question. An emerging consensus among various scholars who have analysed the Tiv-Jukun conflict is that, inasmuch as other vital factors such as politics have often acted as a stimulant for the crises between them, land remains fundamental in understanding the standoff (Best et al., 1999), as both Tiv and Jukun are farmers. This is especially true for the Tiv, with 80% engaging in farming as their principal occupation.

Identity has manifested itself in the political calculus between indigenes and non-indigenes in this area, involving fierce competition not just for land, but also for political posts. Mitchell (2000, pp. 1-2) has noted that conflicts involving settlers and natives usually revolve around the question of land, in most cases with settlers wanting to dispossess the natives of their land through what he called "migratory overcrowding". This is particularly the case in Wukari. However, what is more worrisome about this conflict is that it brings to the fore the debate on citizenship in Nigeria. This debate is driven by questions that hinge on contestable issues such as who is an indigene in Nigeria, why should other Nigerians be termed non-indigenes, settlers or migrants in other parts of the country and what should be the rights of Nigerian citizens.

In broad terms, the Jukuns claim to be the original inhabitants of Taraba State, the "indigenes" or "sons of the soil", and consider the Tivs as "settlers" or "comers". The Tivs reject this view, on the basis that they too have been living there for generations and therefore have equal rights; they complain of being marginalised and excluded in Taraba, and consider it blasphemous if not absurd to be regarded as "foreigners". Likewise, the Jukun minority in Benue State also complain of marginalisation, lack of employment opportunities and insecurity.

Political polarisation and cultural identity has gradually led to physical segregation too: as violence has intensified in Taraba, an increasing number of Tivs have fled to Benue. Tivs have complained of persecution in Taraba and talk of a deliberate campaign of "ethnic cleansing" (Ijir, 2000), primarily by the Jukuns allied with the Fulanis, and, in October of 2001, in conjunction with the military and the federal government. They have claimed that the Jukun timed these operations deliberately to ensure a political advantage in Taraba in the run-up to the elections that were scheduled for 2003. In addition, and this represents a deep dimension of the conflict, the rivalries between the Tivs and Jukuns have always had the potential to escalate

into even more serious conflict at the national level, as both groups are well represented in the higher echelons of the national army.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF MUTA TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

Members of the Tiv group are found in many areas across the globe, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany. The most cited reasons for emigration is to find employment and for further studies. In these countries they form unions, the strongest being the Mutual Union of the Tiv in America (MUTA). Other, smaller groups, include the Tiv Network and numerous Tiv-diaspora internet-based organisations. MUTA Inc., registered as a 501(c)(3) non-profit and non-partisan organisation, is the umbrella organisation for the Tiv diaspora, with over 200 Tiv residing in North America, which provides a forum where members can assemble and discuss issues concerning their people across the world, but especially back in Nigeria. The Association is rather small considering the Nigerian diaspora population of 5,701,806 (Orozco, 2007, p. 3), and is financed through registration, charity and other donations, investments and funds from other sources. Even though MUTA does not explicitly have peacebuilding as its main objective, its involvement in peace processes, especially during the aftermath of the deployment of soldiers in October 2001 as a reprisal for the abduction and subsequent killings of the 19 soldiers, remains commendable.

A key area of investigation in studies of transnationalism is the expression of ethnic and national identities (McCarthy, 2007, p.223), and a major area of analysis is the historiography of Tiv diaspora groups. How these identities influence diaspora consciousness has been a subject of intense debate. The Tiv groups are a recent formation, from the 1980s. Although new on the stage, they have been able to engage both the host and native country, especially in what it perceived to be an orchestrated campaign against the Tiv people.

Scholars of immigrant associational culture have indicated that the incentive for forming immigrant associations can be motivated by offensive or defensive matters. As Moya (2004, p. 840) posits, "The principal stimulus for associational activity thus derived not from cultural backgrounds of the emigrants or the civic habits of their hosts but from a universal source: the migration process itself. This process tends to intensify and sharpen collective identities based on national, ethnic, or quasi-ethnic constructs […] the collective identities of arrivals were heightened not only by contrast to those of the native population but also by contrast to those of other newcomers."

In a press statement by the Tiv Development Association (TDA) on the Jukun-Tiv Crisis, Jos Branch, echoed that the Tiv nation and other minority groups were facing extermination under the Obasanjo-led federal government, and that a strategic plan to exterminate the Tiv nation may have been endorsed by the government of President Obasanjo (Ijir, 2001). The reasons that were put forward by TDA were varied. This perception of the Tiv individual as being marginalised gave shape to the recent identification of the Tiv diaspora community and those living in Nigeria, articulating their common plight, and repositioning themselves in the Nigerian polity.

In this globalised world, diaspora communities have the resources and knowledge needed to build social, economic and political bridges through transnational networks. Accordingly, the Tiv diaspora, a constituent of the Nigerian diaspora, can be a bridge-builder between the Jukun, the Nigerian government and the Tiv people, especially as it relates to the distrust, misrepresentation and misunderstanding between all three. As such, it is essential that these Tiv have a proactive role in ensuring that sustainable peace and development pervades their nation. For example, because of being in the USA and Canada and in EU countries, the Tiv diaspora is in a position to build up and tap the benefits from vast transnational social, economic and political networks. There are three areas where the Tiv diaspora in general and Nigerian diaspora in particular can contribute to the shaping of a viable Nigeria in the short, medium and long terms. These are the promotion of peace, the inculcation of democratic political habits and development.

In the context of MUTA, since it was established it has been concerned with the socio-political and economic development of the Tiv people, to enhance their participation in nation building in Nigeria and in North America and to reap the benefits of globalisation. Even though this organisation is new, it has embarked on several programmes to support the causes that are dear to its heart and that of every Tiv. The involvement of this group in educational assistance programmes, such as scholarships and the institutionalisation of a Chair at the state university attest to their financial and social capital. It has also been active in health delivery in the State.

MUTA has also engaged the Nigerian government in programmes intended to enhance civic participation, political enlightenment, campaigns to halt and reverse the HIV/AIDS epidemic, rural development, especially the construction of boreholes, water supply networks and rural churches. Recently, the Union had requested a slot to actively participate in the home government in order to ensure that their skills and talents were utilised for the development of the state. The request to tap into the pool of knowledge and experiences abroad to foster the development of the Tiv nation has been responded to, as the Benue State Governor, in 2010, allocated the cabinet position of the

Commissioner of Health to Dr. Orduen Abunku. The Tiv diaspora have also presented Professor Steve Ugba as an opposition candidate in Benue State to challenge the incumbent governor in the April 2011 general election in Nigeria.

RESPONSE OF TIV DIASPORA TO THE MILITARY INCURSION OF BENUE STATE

The response of the Tiv diaspora community to the military incursion into Benue State stemmed from the long-held belief of the Tiv and other groups that the ethnic group was a victim of state-sponsored violence. The crises are a result of the settlement pattern of the Tiv in these areas, characterised by contiguity either with kith or kin, clearly visible and as witnessed in documentary evidence from the British Colonial Governments. The intention, as mentioned in the *Tiv/Jukun Inquest*,[1] was to cause disorientation among ethnic groups which had previously lived together without rancour, with the Tiv being driven to Benue State, so losing their traditional lands.

According to Ijir (2001), the formation of the Tiv ethnic militia was a direct response to the long standing injustices which the state failed to address. As he argues, "It is an inevitable reaction to a threat to the very survival of the Tiv nation in modern Nigeria. The Tiv indigenous to Nassarawa and Taraba states since the dawn of the current political dispensation in Nigeria, have been subjected to all forms of harassments incompatible with human dignity and existence… It is amazing that in spite of all these atrocities committed against the Tiv people, this did not attract the attention of the Nigerian State's attention, concern and intervention" (p. 3).

While reaffirming their support for the Federal Republic of Nigeria, based on the current ethnic crises involving Tiv people, the MUTA issued a categorical statement that the Tiv were peace-loving and law-abiding people, wanting to live peacefully with all their neighbours, and would reject any reference to them as "settlers", without citizenship status, in any part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. They further called upon the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Benue State Government to exercise their constitutional duties to protect all citizens, including the Tiv people.

In a memorandum submitted to the Judicial Commission of inquiry into the Inter-communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba States, March 2002, the Tiv diaspora group argued that a fair and unbiased ver-dict of the Commission will inter-alia protect and enforce the fundamental and inalienable rights of citizenship, lives and property of the Tiv people. The diaspora acknowledged that certain issues had to be addressed, to find lasting and fair solutions to the crises in these states, related to citizenship rights, the role of the Army/Security forces in the crises, marginalisation of Tiv populations, the illegal build up of arms in the rural areas and the role of the federal government in the crises.

On many occasions, the Tiv diaspora has called on the Tiv nation to positively and purposively engage both the Jukun and the federal government in establishing longstanding peace, as well as participating itself in peace processes, democratisation and development initiatives in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Tiv diaspora has become an influential pressure group, through the broader Nigerian diaspora community, North American and European civil society organisations with which it is linked, with a positive impact on international efforts in Nigeria. As the African Diaspora Policy Centre (2010, p.5) states, "the Nigerian diaspora will capitalise its strategic position in the Northern countries to promoting policies that impact positively on the continent in terms of favourable policy changes, trade concessions, debt cancellation and appropriate development programs among others". Other areas include democratic governance and human rights issues, as well as reversing the injustices meted on the Tiv nation. Similarly, the international community out-rightly condemned and denounced the military action that led to the killing of over 300 Nigerians in the Niger Delta, what is referred to as the Odi massacre on November 20, 1999, as part of an ongoing conflict over indigenous rights to oil resources and environmental protection. These efforts have been attributed to the Nigerian diaspora (ADPC, 2010).

In their memorandum to the Judicial Commission into the Inter-communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba States, March 2002, the diaspora noted: "Tiv people have suffered innumerable discriminations in Nassarawa, Taraba and Plateau states. In all these states, they are denied the privileges and attributes of citizenship. These discrimination and denials are essentially invidious and relate to functions at the heart of representative government and also aimed at excluding their language from the mainstream of public communication as a way of undermining their rights to maintain and strengthen their social and cultural identity" (Memorandum, 2002, p.16).

The memorandum also noted the vexatious issues of political exclusion of the Tiv people in Taraba, citing the curtailing of Tiv rights to participate in public affairs, and the exclusionist policies designed to portray them as settlers and immigrants.

---

1 See "Tiv in the Valley of the Shadow of Death," *Vanguard* [Nigeria], November 27, 2001.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This study shows that diaspora communities can play a positive role in peacebuilding in their country of origin. Nevertheless, a constructive role in a sustained peace process demands that diaspora groups establish strong ties with their home community (Granovetter, p. 1973), characterised by substantial investment of time and money, emotional intensity, intimacy and the reciprocal exchange of services.

The peace process between the Tiv and their neighbouring brothers, especially the Jukun, has been in operation for some time now, with the diaspora and other stakeholders playing a key role as bridge builders. A key issue has been to tap into and benefit from the social capital of the Nigerian diaspora in North America, United Kingdom and other EU countries. It also necessitates joining forces and effectively mobilising all the available social forces, social capital, intellectual ideas, economic means, creative initiatives and activities in order to deal with the challenges of managing and resolving the conflict in Nigeria in a collective spirit.

Finally, the Tiv diaspora can promote peace through development. It has already contributed to community development in Nigeria in different ways. Some send money home each month to support families, thereby providing a lifeline to many on the bottom rungs of society. This has indeed become a reliable form of sustenance for increasingly impoverished households in Nigeria with relatives abroad. The Migration Policy Institute for the Department of International Development argued that: "remittances have a direct impact on poverty reduction, since they tend to flow directly to poor (although not necessarily the poorest) households and are used primarily for basic needs such as food, shelter, education and health care. The common observation that remittances are not used for 'productive' investment misses the point that poor households rationally give priority to these basic needs, which represent an investment in human capital as well as needed consumption. Spending on basic needs also has a multiplier effect in the community" (2004, p. 2).

Remittance directly helps people in Africa cope with poverty, a form of 'pro-poor'. Though financial support is important to the Tiv nation, social remittances, which have received much less attention are even more so, especially in the context of conflict mediating skills, rebranding of the psychology and socio-economic orientation of Nigeria, and protection of women, young people and the most vulnerable members of the society.

This article has highlighted the potential of the diaspora communities to contribute to peace processes in their country of origin. It brings together the insights that the Tiv diaspora articulated as a contribution to the peacebuilding initiative in Nigeria, especially in the context of the Tiv and Jukun crisis and the federal government's reaction to the massacre of Nigerian soldiers. This article further proposes the need to tap into the intellectual resources, information, innovative ideas, networks and human capital of the Nigerian diaspora for the promotion of peace and stability in Nigeria. It must be mentioned in passing that, for there to be peace between the three parties, there is a need for the diaspora community to insist on an integrated approach linking peacebuilding with the democratisation of power for better governance in Nigeria in the near future. This strategy is very important as this will increase the effectiveness of the intervention.

However, despite the many valuable benefits they dispense, Tiv diaspora in the USA, Canada, and the European Union, still operate on the margins of society because of their weak social, economic and political position. Strengthened, more effective institutional and organisational capacities would enable the Nigerian diaspora to play a much wider role in the peace, democratisation and development initiatives in Nigeria. It is through this proactive engagement that the Tiv diaspora in particular and the Nigerian diaspora in general may be able to create public support in the USA, Canada and the European Union regarding Nigeria.

References

AFRICAN DIASPORA POLICY CENTRE (2010). "Building Institutional Cooperation between the Diaspora and Homeland Governments in Africa: The Cases of Ghana, Nigeria, Germany, the US and the UK". *Policy Brief* . June 2010. ADPC.

ANDERSON, B. (1992). "The New World Disorder". *New Left Review*. Vol. 193, pp. 1-13.

ARBER, S. (2001). "Designing Samples". In: N. GILBERT (ed.). *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 18–24.

BASCH, L.; GLICK-SCHILLER, N.; SZANTON-BLANC, C. (1994). *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. The Netherlands: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.

BEST, G. S; IDYOROUGH, A. E; SHEHU, Z. B (1999). "Communal Conflicts and the Possibilities of Conflict Resolution in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State". In: O. OTITE; I. O. ALBERT (eds.). *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Pp. 82-117.

BYMAN, D.; CHALK, P.; HOFFMAN, B.; ROSENAU, W.; BRANNAN, D. (2001). *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

COCHRANE, F. (2007). "Civil Society beyond the State: The Impact of Diaspora Communities on Peace Building". *GMJ: Mediterranean Edition*. Vol. 2, iss 2, pp. 19-29.

COLLIER, P.; HOEFFLER, A. (2000). "Greed and Grievances in Civil War". *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*. No. 2355. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

COLLIER, P.; HOEFFLER, A. (2004). "Greed and Grievance in Civil War". *Oxford Economic Papers*. Vol. 56, pp. 563-595.

FITZGERALD, David (2000). *Negotiating Extra-Territorial Citizenship: Mexican Migration and the Transnational Politics of Community*. University of California San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies.

GRANOVETTER, M. (1973). "The Strength of Weak Ties". *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. 73, pp. 1360-80.

HOLSTEIN, J.; GUBRIUM, J. (1995). *The Active Interview Qualitative Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2002). "Nigeria. Military Revenge in Benue: A Population Under Attack". *Human Rights Watch*. Vol. 14, iss. 2, pp. 1-25.

IFAD (2007). "World Wide Remittance Flows to Developing Countries in 2006".

IJIR, T. (2001). "Terrorism and Ethnic Cleansing Against the Tiv in Nigeria". *Vanguard*, 28 November 2001.

IPA/OAU (1996). "Civil Society and Conflict Management in Africa: Report of the IPA/OAU Consultation". Cape Town, 29 May–2 June 1996. New York: International Peace Academy.

KALDOR, M. (2001). *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

LYONS, T. (2004). "Globalization, Diasporas and Conflict" [online paper]. [Accessed 13 March 2010]. <http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:MJHxrJoi54YJ:intlstudies.ucsd.edu/iicas_research_papers/Globalization,%2520Territoriality,%2520and%2520Conflict%2520Conference/GlobalDiaCon.pdf>

MCCARTHY, A. (2007). "The Scots' Society of St Andrew, Hull 1910-2001: Immigrant and Transnational Association". *Immigrants and Minorities*. Vol. 25, iss. 3, pp. 209-233.

Memorandum by the Tiv in diaspora submitted to the Judicial Commission of inquiry into the Inter-communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba States (March 2002).

MITCHELL, T. G. (2000). *Native Vs Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa*. Westport: Greenwood Press.

MOHAPATRA S. [et al.]. (2006). "Migration and Development Brief 2. Remittance Trends 2006". Washington DC: World Bank.

MOYA, Jose C. (2005). "Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 31, iss. 5, pp. 833-64.

MUTA Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Ninth Annual Convention of the Mutual Union of the Tiv in America (MUTA). Crowne Plaza Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia, August 5, 2001.

NEWLAND, K.; PATRICK, E. (2004). "Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries of Origin". Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.

NNOLI, O. (1995). *Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria*. Aldershot: Avebury.

OROZCO, M.; MILLIS, B. (2007). *Remittances, Competition and Fair Financial Access Opportunities in Nigeria*. Washington: USAID.

SHAIN, Y.; BARTH, A. (2003). "Diasporas and International Relations Theory". *International Organization*. Vol. 57, pp. 449–479.

SILVERMAN, D. (2001). *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*. London: Sage. 2nd edition.

SPEAR, J. (2006). "The Potential of Diaspora Groups to Contribute to Peace Building: A Scoping Paper". In: Post War State Building, International Studies Association Conference. March 24, 2006, San Diego, California.

TIV DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (TDA) (2001). "Tiv Nation and other minority groups face extermination under Obasanjo led Federal Government". Press Statement by the Tiv Development Association (TDA), Jos Branch, on the Jukun-Tiv Crisis, on November 2, 2001

TOFT, M. D. (2001). "Indivisible Territory and Ethnic War". Working Paper no. 01-08, December 2001. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

VERTOVEC, S.; COHEN, R. (eds.) (1999). *Migration, Diasporas and Transnationalism*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

WERBNER, P. (2002). "The Place which is Diaspora: Citizenship, Religion, and Gender in the Making of Chordic Transnationalism". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Vol. 28, pp. 1-18.

ZUNZER, W. (2004). "Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation". *Berghof Occasional Paper*. No. 26. Berlin: The Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Recommended citation

About the author

Terhemba Ambe-Uva
mneuter@gmail.com

Terhemba Ambe-Uva is Course Coordinator of French and International Studies at the National Open University of Nigeria, where he also lectures.

Journal of Conflictology

ARTICLE

Civil Society in Developing Countries – Conceptual Considerations*

Heidrun Zinecker

Abstract

In this article, civil society is defined as a non-normative, analytical-logic realm which constitutes a societal sphere distinct from the surrounding realms of family, economy and the state. Civil society, according to the concept presented here, is reality (not utopia), political, not democratic per se, not bound to democracy and not civilised per se. In the ideal situation, rare in developing countries, the surrounding realms (state, family, economy) as well as civil society are strong. In such circumstances, a zero-sum game is not played out between civil society and surrounding realms, but there is a balance, even mutual support. In developing countries, this is mostly not the case. Instead, in these countries, the particular deficits of the outside, surrounding realms influence the non-autonomous civil society. Moreover, in developing countries, civil society is fractured by 'non-emancipating' (non-democratic, non-economic, non-civilised) channels, defining socio-political processes which, starting from deficient surrounding realms, run through civil society and are 'stronger' than the corresponding 'non-emancipating' opposing channel. The respective combination of these and opposing channels serves as a basis for a typology of civil societies on which development policy can be built.

Keywords

civil society, democracy, developing countries, development policy

INTRODUCTION

Using the term civil society in the same breath as 'conceptual' and 'developing countries' might be regarded as bold. There is hardly any other term in social science that is more vague or Western-centric. "The history of thought over two hundred years has charged this designation with so many layers of meaning that it lacks sharpness of definition"[1] bemoans Axel Honneth (1992, p. 61). "We have reached zero level in a history of semantic deterioration" states Volker Heins (2002, p. 17). Helmut Dubiel writes: "The uninterrupted boom enjoyed by the concept – despite synchronous ritual laments about its vagueness – is (...) a phenomenon in need of explanation. In spite of its limitless geographic, cultural, disciplinary and semantic dimension, it obviously still retains the aura of an unfulfilled theoretical promise" (Dubiel, 2001, p. 135).

Even though the boom enjoyed by the term 'civil society' has its roots in the changes which have taken place in the East, the concept is of Western origin. When this concept is applied to the South, the problem remains that the latter, even today, is not consistently catching up: what the economic North, or rather the political West, have already demonstrated, namely that developing

---

1 All German quotations are translated by the author.

countries are still suffering from their subordinate position within the real power constellations. It is, of course, a simplification to speak of the developed countries and even more so of the developing countries, when one takes into account their extraordinary economic, political and cultural internal complexity. Nevertheless, all developing countries differ from developed countries in that they have been integrated into the world market and world politics in a catch-up way, under Western domination and with imported Western European state models, and they are still characterised by the domination of resource and/or agrarian exports over that of industry and technology. This implies a different configuration for each civil society, even though they are exposed to more recent globalisation processes and the influences of a world (civil) society, of which they are constituent elements, in the process of formation (Keane, 2003; Kößler and Melber, 1993; Florini, 2000, p. 211).

I could choose the easy option of refraining from any application of the Western concept to the South. Most authors living in the South are also engaged with this concept, yet only a few present alternatives. Volker Heins proposes a survey on "how non-Western communities generate institutional equivalents of civil societal outcomes" (Heins, 2002, p. 55). The very term "equivalent" demonstrates that this proposal also derives from Western models. Of course it is a worthwhile research perspective to examine Western and Southern civil society discourses in relation to each other. However, I am not in a position to do so at this point. My structure of categories is derived from Western theory, but with the pool of experience acquired inductively from area case studies in the South I am able to double-check that, by extension, my definition deduced from Western theories is also valid for civil societies in developing countries.[2]

In order to do this, an abstract social theory should be applied, one that does not at first have recourse to Western specifics, in order to mark the non-West as deficient (Heins, 2002, p. 53). Thus, civil society in this article will be defined as a universal category with particular characteristics, without – as is done with the term democracy – setting universality normatively (Zinecker, 2003). Since hunter-gatherer, and tribal societies have been transcended, universality in terms of civil society, as with the family, state or economy, has the common link only of ubiquity, rather than that of the fulfilment of norms. A defining attribution of quality will be restricted to what can be found equally in both industrial and developing countries – an approximate separation at least between economy, state and family. However, if the

existence of civil society is already linked to norms, then civil societies which do not conform to them a priori may be lost. This I want to avoid. A proper focus is still possible by separating civil society from the spheres that are otherwise occupied. This means that, in my conceptual framework, economy, state and family has no place within civil society. Therefore I locate civil society as a sub-function system within the social system,[3] or more precisely within a triangle, the sides of which are represented by economy, state and family.

Figure 1: Location of civil society in society

When defining civil society, the mainstream uses either the logic of an action-normative perspective by designating it as a collective 'good guy', or the logic of a realm-normative perspective by defining it as a realm in society that is free, per se, of all that is 'unimmaculate' (non-civilised/non-democratic) (Cohen and Arato, 1992).[4] I, however, propose to start from the logic of a realm-analytical perspective, i.e. from an interpretation of civil society that implies no normative setting. My concept of civil society is as a normatively neutral, structural space that is developed from the interactions of actors whose actions are reconciled, and which is accessible analytically, i.e. by logical dissection. Such a perspective, being in particular non-normative and non-teleological, and having a longer tradition within the Forschungsgruppe Weltgesellschaft [Research Group on World Society], means the flaws of civil society (exclusions, inequalities, violence) can also be taken into account and thus implies an open end (Forschungsgruppe Weltgesellschaft, 1996, pp. 5, 11, 22; cf. Menzel, 1998, pp. 20-38; for national civil societies cf. Pollack, 2003, pp. 46-52).

---

2 Case studies can be significant for theory-building and thus also for definition-building (Eckstein, 1992, p. 136).

3 In accordance with Luhmann, society is used here as a space that includes the sub-system civil society.

4 In between lies the position according to which the logic of action determination dominates within a space defined according to the logic of realm, so that the dimension of civil society can change in the historical process. (Gosewinkel, 2003, p. 11)

Figure 2: Perspectives of civil society determination

1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERM AND CONCEPT

Here I examine the various superimposed layers of meaning of the term civil society and attempt to remove those which are irrelevant, in order to advance to the viable core. I give a brief overview of those which can be removed in retrospect, as according to the great majority of specialists, since civil society was developed in its present classic Western form, these layers have already become indisputably obsolete for both developed and developing countries. These I shall outline shortly in a *tour d'horizon*. The more recent layers of meaning, which must still be cleared away, have not yet been sufficiently discussed in the scientific community. Here it is specifically the undisguised view with regard to developing countries that provides some insight. Finally, after deconstructing the term civil society, my aim is to refill this realm by defining its real – albeit problematic – quality. Therefore an initial conceptual approach, focused on developing countries, follows.

1.1. Clearing away indisputably obsolete layers of meaning

In the classical theoretical-historical discourse, there were layers of meaning, which stated that civil society was family, state and economy, now recognised to be indisputably obsolete (in the sense of extensive convergence) by the scientific community.

1.1.1. Civil society is not family

Ultimately for Aristotle, who clearly distinguished his *polis/ politiké koinonia* (political community), in Latin, *societas civitas*, from the *oikos* (private household), and explicitly for Hegel, civil society is held to be the opposite of family.[5] For Hegel, the gentrified/bourgeois society, therefore the civil society, represents the antithesis to the family within

the idealistic construction of the "sittlicher Geist", ethical Spirit, while the state functions as its synthesis.

1.1.2. Civil society is not the state

Apart from the family, civil society had not been separated terminologically from the state for centuries. With Aristotle's terminological fixation of *politiké koinonia* and later, during the 13th and 14th century, with the translation of Aristotelian works into the Germanic-Roman languages, *civilis* came to represent *politicus* and *societas* came to stand for *communitas* in the vocabulary of concepts. In *societas civilis* both are included: state (*civitas, res publica*) and society (*societas, communitas, societas civilis, populus*). Until the 20th century 'civic society' and 'civil society' shared the same meaning. Civic related to the entire political structure of society during the feudal era, albeit only with regard to the privileged and the ruling estates (Riedel, 1979, p. 737; Koselleck, 1991, p. 120). Here, there is no separation between state and society as a union of subjects.

The idea of differentiating between *civilis* and *politicus* gained momentum in the 18th century owing to the influence of Montesquieu. Montesquieu, and later Tocqueville, viewed voluntary political but purely non-state associations as bastions against the immanent, or indeed existing, despotism. In Thomas Paine's work, the state as a necessary evil is pushed back even further by civil society to its ultimate limits. Civic society becomes, for all three philosophers, especially Tocqueville and Paine, the counterbalance to the state (Taylor, 1991, pp. 66, 73).

With the French Revolution, freedom, political equality, property and security were claimed as the entitlement of all. These human rights already contained within them the antagonism which would later, after the end of the revolutionary era, erupt between the civic and the bourgeois society. Through the French Revolution, the emancipation of bourgeois society from the state appeared on the agenda. Only then did the dichotomy between 'state' and 'civil' enter the stage, although many still clung to Hegel's view that the state was a prerequisite for the existence of civil society.

1.1.3. Civil society is not economy

With the emergence of modern economics, the industrial labour society and the industrial revolution, which spread beyond England's borders at the end of the 18th century, the idea of civil society as a non-state identity received a new, this time economic, shift and became the arena of production, exchange and consumption. Following the English-Scottish-French theory of economics, which, along the lines of a (classical) national economy, no

---

5 I will not elaborate further on the change or, respectively, on the extension of meaning of the significance of the concept of family – such as, in the Middle Ages, for the collective of a manorial system – as this does not challenge the antipode of family and civil society.

longer limited economy to the private household, it was Hegel who provided civil society with the economic idea for its application. In Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, this is paraphrased as "economic system of needs", "nature of need, labour and division of labour". This system constitutes the core of civil society, even though it also contains material products of the state, such as ruling estates as bodies with in-built autonomy, including the bureaucracy.

Whilst Hegel envisaged the integration of bourgeois society into the state with its position secured, Marx called not for its integration, but for its overthrow (Brumlik, 1991, p. 991). In Marx's *German Ideology*, it is at first referred to as a universalist historical category of all material conditions of life, only to be later isolated as the economy of the bourgeoisie. Thus, Marx recognises the claims of the liberal concept, yet does not make the connection between this system of norms and that of individual freedom.

There were two turning points which dictated the delimitation of civil society from state and economy to form a separate sphere: the failure of Western European attempts to repeat the Russian Revolution (especially in Germany, Italy and Hungary), and the experience of fascism. The explanation of the reasons for the establishment of fascist regimes instead of a revolution led by the working class in Western Europe cannot be found within economy, but only in the civil society, which is of course structured differently in Western Europe and Russia. Set in particular against the background that society had long ago become universalised from the middle class down to the workers, these turning points were related to the late Marx's failure to conceptually recognise the very separate sphere in which individual freedom can express itself. He equated bourgeois society with bourgeois economy and his vision was that the separation of state and society would eventually be abolished.

1.1.4. Civil society is a separate sphere of society

The insight that civil society is a separate sphere from all realms, that is to say separate from state and economy (as well as, naturally, from family) was not formulated until the 20th century, most markedly by Gramsci (a proponent of Marx's theory of economics) and later by Habermas (a critic of Marx's theory). For both, civil society was an autonomous social sphere which contained all cultural institutions (for Gramsci in the sense of 'superstructures', i.e. unions, parties, schools, as well as the press and literature, church and daily life; for Habermas as an aspect of the life-world – the *Lebenswelt*) and remained rather aloof from economic and political steering functions. According to Habermas, civil society no longer included the economy that was constituted under private law and operated through labour, capital, and goods markets, as it was for Marx and Marxism. Instead, he considered its institutional core was made up of those non-state and non-economic organisations and associations operating

on a voluntary basis which anchored the communication structures of the public in the societal component of the *Lebenswelt.* Thus, it is about a system of associations which institutionalises problem-solving discourses on questions of common interest within the sphere of the organised public. According to Habermas, civil society is established through communicative action, not through force (Habermas, 1998, pp. 362-365, 442-448).

According to Habermas, civil society, in the ideal case when state institutions are receptive to the inputs of civil society, exercises a supplier function for the state, because it is thought to institutionalise problem-solving discourses for it; for Gramsci it is not an arena for "democratic policy consultation", but a battlefield between democrats, fascists and monarchists (Jehle, 1994, p. 514). In the context of emerging fascism, Gramsci argues in his *Prison Notebooks* that, in the West, democratic conditions are prerequisites for successful struggles by the labour movement. In contrast to Marx, and with Mussolini coming to power, he considers the loss of civil-democratic liberties profoundly important. Gramsci also turned to the specifics of civil society when trying to explain why a revolution was possible in Russia but not in Western Europe: in Russia civil society was "under-developed and frozen". The powerful state there could be swept away by a military coup. In the West, on the contrary, "in the trembling of the state one immediately saw a robust civil society. The state was only an advanced trench, behind which lay a robust chain of fortresses and earthworks" (Gramsci, 1980, p. 273). Gramsci understands civil society as activities which function without state sanctions and exact obligations, i.e. without state, but which still exert collective pressure on conventions, morals and patterns of thinking and behaviour. These activities are exercised through cultural bodies such as the church, schools, the press, libraries, social and literary organisations and clubs, and everyday culture in general, even architecture and street names.

Both Habermas and Gramsci separate civil society not only from the state, but also from the economy. However, in Gramsci's work its relation to the economy is closer than in Habermas's. The reason why revolution could not prevail in the West was conceived by Gramsci as being rooted in a high potential for consensus, which was economically determined. He found the combination of the economy, civil society and state in the rise of a class from the economic-corporative (a reference to 'basis' and meant in the sense of professional and class-specific convergence of interests), through the ethico-political (a reference to 'superstructure',meant in the sense of political and moral objectives) to the state phase (a reference to 'state' in the sense of the hegemonic class which constitutes itself as the driving force of the state), identified as a historical block by Gramsci in its combination or, as the case may be, synthesis.

In Gramsci's view, the state represents direct rule through force, while civil society is where there is a battle

for hegemony. Hegemony is considered to be the result of a spontaneous consensus, to which the actors submit voluntarily because they are convinced of the "radiant source of prestige" of a certain actor. This attraction is active, not passive as with Weber's view of legitimacy. The more hegemonic a class is, the more opportunities it leaves for adversarial classes to organise themselves, as hegemony requires voluntary allegiance. At stake, far more for Gramsci than for Marx, is the issue of political liberty (Gramsci, 1980; Kebir, 1991; Buci-Glucksmann, 1991; Buttigieg, 1994, pp. 529–554).

Whilst the problem-solving discourse capacity of civil society as a realm, free at first of ruling power in constructive cooperation with the state, as Habermas pointed out, it is at best a phenomenon of Western democracies. Gramsci's perspective of civil society as a battlefield, on which hegemony and counter-hegemony fight for power also opens up a realistic view, and especially so in developing countries – notwithstanding the fact that both Gramsci and Habermas related their analyses to the West.

In contemporary discourses, civil society is usually[6] no longer a duplicate of family, state or economy, but a separate sphere. Aristotle, with his differentiation of civil society from the family, followed by Paine, Tocqueville, Montesquieu, Hegel and Marx, with their non-state civil society, as well as Gramsci and Habermas with their non-state and at the same time non-economic civil society, have, from a theoretical-historical point of view, ultimately removed these layers. This serves as a basis for what follows, which is more controversial, since it examines the definition of civil society from 'within'.

1.2. Clearing away newer disputable layers of meaning

I can now move on to the inner space of civil society, whose external borders have so far been demarcated: on the one hand by critically scrutinising the layers of meaning that have been imposed on the inner space of civil society by controversial newer discourses, and on the other by inductively defining the social actors and structures that exist in society but do not, even in developing countries, belong to the realms of family, state and economy. However, as yet there is no consensus on this within the scientific community either. The following do not make any claims to truth, but merely to practical usage.

1.2.1. Civil society is reality, not utopia

If civil society were defined normatively, it would be bound to either a positive or a negative quality. A positive quality

can be real as well as utopian, the latter if it exists 'nowhere'. Usually, utopias of civil society are more a renunciation of everything negative (raw, brutish, barbarian, unrefined, etc.) and in that respect are to be defined positively. Exceptions are the Scottish Enlightenment of Ferguson, Smith, Hutcheson and others (cf. Varty, 1997, p. 29; Ioannidou, 1997, p. 49) – and Durkheim, who explicitly portrayed civil society as a positive, ethical ideal carried by a non-economic need for sympathy and appreciation, a counterpoint to selfish individualism. Newer concepts of civil society have tied in with this as well. However, there is no reason to elevate civil society to a "secular substitute for a civil religion" (Heins, 2002, p. 240) or to award it a "teleological virtue" (Bayart, 1986, p. 118; cf. Lewis, 2002, p. 575; Fine, 1997, p. 9). The presumption that civil society is morally good is inherently wrong, since moral purity is existentially impossible. Furthermore, there is no such thing as a single norm; rather, normative beliefs may compete.

Both communitarian and leftist radical-democratic philosophers tend towards a utopian perspective of civil society. The former want to revive vanished bowling clubs, that is to say, the socialising and solidarity generating function of voluntary association as social capital, in order to counteract the increasing separation driven by laissez-faire liberalism (Putnam and Goss, 2001, p. 15). The latter perceive civil society as a "surrogate for the loss of the great leftist concepts of meaning" (Sölter, 1993, p. 147). A showcase for the latter are Rödel, Frankenberg and Dubiel (1989), products of a late generation of the Frankfurt School and shaped by the peace and civil movements of the 1980s, which demonstrated against the NATO Double-Track decision and the ruthless exploitation of nature (e.g. *Waldsterben,* or the so-called 'die back' of forests). Their purpose was to transfer society in its entirety to a civil society, i.e. to expand civil society to the very boundaries of society as a whole in an attempt to approach the ideal of a common self-government, which they stylised as the counterpart of liberal democracy. In this way, it was thought civil society would be cleansed of the conflictive action of special interests, including power. This is where the so called 'emphatic civil society concept applies, by which civil society is an end in itself. This utopian-normative overload causes the concept to become exclusive, even though it is originally intended to be inclusive. Since then, participants in left-wing movements in particular have defined civil society time and again in such a way that they could promote themselves and exclude others, for they alone claim the right to define the (good) civil society.

Such a "term of anticipation" (von Beyme, 2000, p. 11) does not serve the analysis of reality. For this purpose an analytical-typological concept is needed, one that does not make realities disappear into insignificance. Only by

---

6   Of course there are exceptions, such as Keane (2003, p. 63), who perceives the market as part of civil society, or Budde (2003, p. 57), who assigns family to civil society.

focussing on the "real existing civil society" (Alexander, 1999) through a non-normative definition in an uncensored way, can one evaluate its quality by measuring the gap between normativity and actuality.

1.2.2. Civil society is a political space, it is not free of politics

With the conceptual separation of civil society from the state, the question arises whether politics itself, just like the state, can be conjured away from civil society, and depending on the dominant normative discourse, whether 'good' society can be contrasted with 'bad' politics. During the upheavals in Eastern Europe, advocates of this line used this to define civil society as a sphere free of politics and of interventions through a "custodial state" (Henrich, 1990, p. 262 ff.). In Eastern Europe, where the real socialist state had in fact usurped the whole of society, civil society had to articulate itself in an anti-state way. But did this make it anti-political, as György Konrad postulated? After all, the Eastern European civil movement strove for human rights and civil liberties and attended round tables, which could hardly be seen as being free of politics (Schmalz-Bruns, 1992, p. 247). In fact, the result of the anti-political, illusionary vision of the civil society was that "paradise was lost" (Vaclav Havel) and that civil society either failed as a collective actor or was integrated into the state after the upheavals (Tempest, 1997; Dryzek, 1996).

Gramsci and Habermas, both defined civil society as a political project (e.g. Brysk, 2000 and Chandhoke, 2001) but only a few authors do so today. Paradoxically, transition research (see for example Stepan, 1988, p. 4, Diamond, 1994, p. 7), also denies the political nature of civil society, criticised by other authors (Pearce, 1997, p. 60, Gellner, 1994, p. 69). If civil society were understood as being apolitical or even anti-political, then all non-state political actors and structures would have no place, or at least no place if one follows entirely the logic of realm. The issue is undoubtedly more complicated with the bowling clubs and choirs made famous by Putnam, just as with philatelic societies and sports clubs. Of course, not everyone who goes to a club to do gymnastics is engaging in politics. However, workers' sports clubs have participated in politics throughout history, and even philatelic societies would be political if they, for instance, organised themselves to oppose e-mail. Thus, the boundaries fluctuate, as the idea of bringing citizens into civil society and through civil society into politics, thereby turning them into citizens in the literal sense, is based upon the very diffuseness of these boundaries.

Yet, if civil society *is* political, then it is also part of the political regime (Przeworski, 1990, p. 199).[7] This perception implies a broad concept of (national) political regimes which includes formal as well as informal norms and relations. A regime defined in this way goes beyond the nation state (Strasser, 1996, p. 16). Apart from the relations in and between state institutions, it also covers the relations between state and civil society, and relations between the politically active citizens who exist without the establishment of any direct link to the state. In line with O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 73), I assume that the characteristics of actors who do not have access to governmental positions and who attempt to obtain this access through their actions are part of the political regime too.

Most criteria relating to the characters of a political regime cannot be scrutinised without taking into account the state's relation to civil society. Some regime segments may be part of the state, yet they can assert themselves only through their operations within, and influence upon, civil society: effective governmental power is only possible when there are no violent actors who exercise veto. Political liberties – freedom of speech and association – materialise only in civil society. Even elections will fail to work if civil society does not make use of them. Rule of law is not of itself in force if civil society has no access. Other regime segments are directly rooted in civil society: the civil nature of a political regime requires that of civil society. Without political inclusion that goes beyond the electoral regime, a politically active civil society is unthinkable.

1.2.3. Civil society is not per se democratic and its existence is not bound to democracy

When civil society is understood as part of the political regime and at the same time stripped of any norm, it has to be open with regard to the respective regime type in question. Thus, civil society can be both democratic and non-democratic.[8] However, in contemporary literature, civil society is often used as a synonym for democracy. As Shils writes: "Civil society has come to be used very loosely as equivalent to liberal democratic society" (Shils, 1991, p. 3). If there is a presumed identity, the question arises why anyone would need the category of civil society when they already have the category of democracy available. Most authors who share this view do not link civil society to just any democracy, but to a democracy that meets the highest standards. Kocka links civil society to a high degree of social self organisation, to resources such as the

---

7   In my view, the political regime encompasses the informal norms and relations (within and between state institutions) as well as the formal institutions (such as state institutions and processes) and the relation of the state to civil society and the civil relations between politically active citizens themselves within the civil society, which exist without them being in direct contact with the state.

8   This is also demonstrated by Carothers (1999), Puhle (1999, p. 328), Linz (1990, p. 129) and Lingnau (2003, p. 234).

ability to communicate, education and trust, legitimate plurality, conflict regulation, appreciation of tolerance, independence and achievement (Kocka, 2001, p. 10), just as Croissant, Lauth and Merkel tie it in with fairness and tolerance (Croissant et al, 2000, p. 18). A good many of the contributors to this anthology (Croissant et al, 2000) who try to apply the premise of the article which introduces this volume and sets its theoretical guidelines, are forced to conclude that they can find few civil society actors in "their" developing countries (Birle, 2000, p. 236; Bendel and Krennerich, 2000, p. 273).

Nevertheless, the advocates of a civil society that is intrinsically democratic go even one step further: not only do they understand civil society as being democratic, but its very existence as being linked to a democratic, state framework. Shils bases any civil society upon a state with limited power, an independent judiciary and a free press (Shils, 1991, p. 11). Kocka makes even greater assertions and lists as conditions a decentralised economy, compliance with human rights and civil liberties through the rule of law and the constitutional state, as well as a high level of participation (Kocka, 2001, p. 20). If these criteria are applied, civil society would barely exist in any developing country, and its existence would even be doubtful in some developed countries.

It thus becomes a circular argument: if an actor has to be fair and tolerant in order to belong to civil society, how can they, at the same time, demand changes to the system which include intolerance at least of those who try to preserve the system? How could one, according to this premise of democracy, deal with a basically non-democratically organised civil society which could bring down a dictatorship and thus initiate the democratic transition process, such as in Nicaragua with the FSLN? And would not a definition of civil society as democratic allow the disappearance into a definitional vacuum of those actors who, in 2003, vociferously supported Ríos Montt, a Guatemalan presidential candidate and former perpetrator of mass murder? Particularly in developing countries, civil societies are often "sadly undemocratic in both their organisational structures and their operations" (Makumbe, 1998, p. 311). If this is true, the often asserted argument that a strong civil society is good for democracy is not valid in the light of the lack of discrimination.

Civil society is neither homogeneous nor constant in its configuration, but a battlefield of elements in favour of and against democracy. In historically exceptional cases it is quite possible that it can become a democratic actor. As a consequence, this can result in non-democracies transforming into democracies under the pressure of such temporary democratic civil societies. Eastern Europe is a typical example of this, but it also provides evidence that civil societies may fall apart and deform after passing the transition-climax. Yet the mainstream worries instead about the opposite, that civil society could further evolve and radicalise its democratic potential in the course of democratisation, so that it could outstrip that of the newly

established regime (Arato, 1990; Lauth, 1999, p. 108). This leads to the attempt once again to position civil society in an "upswing phase" (Croissant, Lauth and Merkel, 2000, p. 33) and to "domesticate" a civil society that was once called upon for help because now "governability" by "self-restriction" (Arato, 1990, p. 112) of a "self-reflexive" civil society is the highest objective. "Societal autonomy can go too far, however, even for the purposes of democracy" writes Diamond (1994, p. 14). I doubt that Diamond is right when stating that civil society no longer exercises a crucial function during consolidation. This would imply an utterly static perspective on consolidation. It ignores the fact that the stability of democracy can only be accomplished when there is a corresponding consistency of involvement, to which democratic pressure from civil society contributes rather than being an impediment. If the regime has not yet transformed into a democracy, but has stabilised itself as a hybrid within the grey zone between authoritarianism and democracy (Zinecker, 2004a), the intervention of civil society is all the more important for completing the transition. All things considered, civil society can be a channel for action as well as a pitfall for democracy.

1.2.4. Civil Society is not civilised per se and free of violence

In the historical evolution of the term civil society, misunderstandings have appeared time and again, because *civilis* as an adjective can be seen as derived both from *civitas* = civil right/citizens/state/town = politics as well as from *civilitas* = civility. The dual origin of this term promoted the wish to present civil society as both capable of achieving civility through politics, whether it be as a counterpart to the animal in nature, and of war or bad morals or manners, and, according to Elias, to control the affects of the people through a process of self-disciplining (Elias, 1997). The mainstream thus agrees with Shils, who states: "Substantive civility is the virtue of civil society. It is the readiness to moderate particular, individual or parochial interests and to give precedence to the common good" (Shils, 1991, p. 16). Indeed, Shils outreaches the mainstream when, elsewhere, he excludes from civil society the "breakdown of social authority", "drug use", "homosexuality", "the growing, lawless *Lumpenproletariat*" and "strikes by public employees", because he considers that all these undermine civil society and lead to obscenity (Shils, quoted in Keane, 1998, p. 114). Anhelm (1996, p. 15) takes the same line, although slightly more modestly: "That which is evolving next to state and economy I would rather not yet denominate in all its manifestations as civil society. It also contains fundamentalisms, nationalisms, mafia practices and violent terror without civil quality […]."

The majority of even those authors, such as Lauth (1999, p. 109) or Schmidt (2000, p. 299), who concede that there *are* 'dark sides' of civil society, fix *one* limit beyond which they

will no longer acknowledge civil society – its civility.[9] I, on the contrary, claim that together with normativity, the postulation of civility as a condition for the qualification of an actor or a structure as civil societal is to be rejected.[10] In societies where violence occurs, civil societies may employ violence to counteract a state that fails with its monopoly of the use of force and violence, as well as countering it in a peaceful manner. We know only too well that politics is not necessarily civilised. If civil society were political, the non-civilised would not be content just to pass it by. The Mafia, violently active ethnic or religious groups, the Ku-Klux-Klan, vigilante groups, death squads, believers in lynch law, juvenile gangs and guerrilla movements – in which sphere of society would these non-state violent actors be located, if not in civil society? To repeat a notion by Michael Walzer: "Civil society does not (or at least not necessarily – H.Z.) provide the material of which heroes are made". (Walzer, 1992, p. 93) Accepting the cleansing of civil society of everything disagreeable results in severe methodological problems: one would have to exclude guerrilla movements when under arms, yet when they summon assemblies and conventions of civil society, as FARC and ELN had done or rather planned in Colombia, one would have to include them in civil society. The Mexican EZLN, who moved from the 'war of weapons' to the 'war of words', broadcasting its guerrilla discourse over the Internet, would have had to be first 'removed' from civil society and later be 'readmitted'. Would we not have to praise Greenpeace as civil societal when peacefully campaigning against environmental degradation, but to condemn it as anti-civil societal when doing so by violent means? As for the *piqueteros*, organisations of the unemployed, who called attention to their plight during the recent crisis in Argentina by blocking major streets, were they still civil society or not? How can it be possible from a logical point of view to define voluntary associations as being characteristic of civil society, but exclude them when they voluntarily join violent resistance against tyranny or anomy?

1.3. Term and concept – a preliminary definition

By stripping down the term civil society, we are left with the real structures and associations formed by actors,[11] who fill

the societal sphere between family, economy and the state. Civil societies are political and part of the political regime. They can contain democratic as well as non-democratic, civilised as well as non-civilised segments, where either segment may outweigh the other, and depending on the balance, may configure civil society as a whole as being democratic, non-democratic, civilised or non-civilised. Democratic civil societies are civilised, but civilised civil societies are not necessarily democratic.

Only with this determination of a civil society's quality as being (non-)democratic or (non-)civilised, but not in advance of any such definition, can measurement of the gap between normativity and actuality come into the picture. The normativity applied here has nothing to do with norms of civil society, but with norms that exist for other realms – such as democracy or civility.

2. APPLYING THE CONCEPT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

There is still no existing stringent model of civil society specifically for developing countries, and I do not intend to attempt any special version of one. I merely outline an approach as to how the Western concept which has already been developed and expanded deductively can now be inductively extended to take into account the specifics of developing countries, and to show where there is a need for research and for action in development policies. Firstly there is a need for a specific understanding of the logic of realm-environment for civil societies in developing countries, and secondly, an analysis of the specific inner space of civil society in developing countries.

2.1. The specifics of the logic of realm-environment

Economy, state and family demonstrate different configurations in developing and developed countries: in developing countries the economy is determined by rents rather than by market-economic sociation.[12] Typically a bourgeois nation state has not yet evolved. Higher value tends to be placed on the family

---

9 Rüb observes that civil society can include uncivil elements, just as a party system may well include antisystem-parties (Rüb, 2000, p. 185). Kaldor and Dubiel avoid this issue by stating that next to a civil(ised) society there may be an uncivil(ised) society, but this is not civil society (Kaldor, 2003, p. 510; Dubiel, 2001, p. 137). Reichardt, Keane and Whitehead consider violence as a civil societal paradox and consider it as an expression of ambivalence between normative civil societal claims and real historical actions (Reichardt, 2001, p. 45; Reichardt, 2003, p. 64; Keane, 2003, p. 155; Whitehead 1997, p. 104). Although Gosewinkel and Rucht want to transcend the oversimplification of civil society as a good, peaceful and harmonious society, and are convinced that the modern idea of civil society cannot simply disown violence, they still draw a line when faced with the "uncivil(ised)" (Gosewinkel and Rucht, 2004, pp. 30, 51) – to them, civil societal actions, are always peaceful actions. (Gosewinkel, 2004, p. 11). This differentiation lacks clarity.

10 Cf. Zinecker (1999, p. 183). This opinion is shared by White (1994, p. 377), Chandhoke (2001, p. 8), Kopecký and Mudde (2003, p. 2) and Elsenhans (2001, p. 29).

11 A convincing list of civil society actors can be found in Lingnau (2003, p. 235).

12 Here, sociation (in German *marktwirtschaftliche Vergesellschaftung*) is defined in the sense of Max Weber as a rational relation and (free) agreement, in which the approach of rational action is based on rationally motivated coordination of interests. Economic sociation however is constituted by a free agreement which is given by the dynamic equilibrium of the market.

than in western societies, where the value of the individual ranks higher. These specifics radiate into civil society and functionalise it according to the particular imperatives. The boundaries between civil society and the three surrounding spheres of economy, state and family are much more diffuse in developing than in developed countries (Baker, 1998, p. 81), so that in the former, civil society is not autonomous from family, state and economy (Elsenhans, 2001, p. 29, critical of Elsenhans: Heins, 2003).[13]

2.1.1. Civil society and the family

In Africa, Central Asia and, in a modified form in the indigenous communities of Latin America, we find that family clans[14] and tribal groups carry out politics, even replacing the state on a municipal level. Clientelism, particularly in its ritual kinsman form, emanates from the extended family and extends into civil society and the state. Particularly in relation to Africa, the claim arises time and again to incorporate clan-like and tribal structures into civil society (Hutchful, 1996, p. 68). The particular interaction of tribal structures with civil society should in any case be stated.

2.1.2. Civil society and the state

Usually we find no completed nation building in developing countries. Often it is a case of state failure, or of state building that has never been completed. Following the Washington Consensus, from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, the World Bank and the IMF turned need into a questionable virtue, minimising national interventions and assuming that imperfect markets are still better than imperfect states.[15] Within this neoliberal discourse the state has become a cause of disappointment and cynicism, whilst its counterpart, civil society, has become the new hope of development politics. This devaluation of the state automatically inspired a higher appreciation of civil society – with NGOs as its incarnation (Schedler, 1996, p. 9).

How far the non-state but political sphere of civil society really extends depends on whether a state exists – think of Palestine – in other words, on whether there is a functioning state or state failure. In the case of state failure the question arises as to whether this appears as authoritarian over-extended state through the overexpansion of state institutions, or as under-consolidated state through the notorious weakness of a failed state (Wallenstein, 1999, p. 2). In an over-extended state civil society would be minimised. In an under-consolidated state, in contrast, many (non-)democratic and (non-)civilised actors would be found within civil society, competing to replace the state's functions. In developing countries the state extends into civil society notably by restricting it and/or forcing it to assume duties and responsibilities that are actually those of the state. This does not rule out the possibility of civil society of its own accord permeating the state, as with the under-consolidated state".

Thus, there is no autonomy of civil society from the state in developing countries, not even on the part of those actors who are seen as its incarnation by the state's development cooperation. At the same time, development cooperation acts on the erroneous assumption that civil society stands in a zero-sum relation with the state so that civil society could possibly compensate for the deficits of a non-functioning state. Together with the contradiction between reality and – false – ideal, this produces disastrous consequences, because the necessary balance between two crucial pillars of society is disturbed and civil society is assigned (state) functions which it cannot solve.

2.1.3. Civil society and the economy

It is not so much the existence of civil society but rather its quality which is bound to the prerequisite of market-economy sociation. A civil society that is of autonomous status depends upon a functioning capitalist market economy. In rent economies, which are typical of developing countries, this cannot exist because labour is not in a position to negotiate (Elsenhans, 2001, p. 32, Elsenhans, 1994, p. 106). Unlike developed countries where capital is acquired by the bourgeoisie, in developing countries rents tend to be acquired by oligarchies through the symbiosis of economic and political rule, or by state classes through political office. Thus, economy and state are pressed much closer together in developing countries than in developed countries, and civil society is cornered by the pressure exerted by both sides.

In rent economies, rents are repeatedly used for exploiting and establishing institutions – including civil societal institutions, particularly NGOs – in order to acquire more rents (Elsenhans, 2002, p. 21; Elsenhans, 2000, p. 44, cf. Seibel, 1993). It is mostly the wealthy, well-networked (business-) NGOs, which in turn only evolve in order to profit from the state development cooperation, that are included in this development cooperation (Lingnau, 2003, p. 234). NGOs, for their part, are interested in acquiring a civil societal categorisation, because

---

13 The autonomy of civil society is based upon the independence of its actors from political power when acquiring resources, which they need for the realisation of their objectives (Elsenhans, 2001, p. 29).

14 It is a controversial issue whether the heavily cited contrast between the decaying nuclear family in developed countries and the intact extended family in developing countries does really exist.

15 At least since the financial crisis in Asia, the World Bank (earlier and more self-critically) and the IMF (later and less self-critically) in the context of the Post-Washington-Consensus changed their positions so that now states and good governance can play a vital role in poverty reduction. The World Bank and IMF are thus repairing the harm they had inflicted, even though this is still based on a narrow technocratic approach (Öniş and Şenses, 2005, pp. 263-290; cf. also: Stiglitz, 2002, pp. 24, 267)

this helps to guarantee their projects and appropriate financing. The donors operate under a purpose-made civil society umbrella that is ideal for NGOs engaged in development policies as their potential partners. In some countries, NGOs have succeeded in acquiring a virtually monopolistic claim to civil societal representation (Kuhn, 2003, p. 394, 406). They are perceived as key actors in civil society, or even as civil society per se, and are used, willingly, to protect the "good" civil society from the "bad" – as represented by peasant or workers' associations – which does not really serve their purpose of putting down roots within the population.

Unlike the state with its taxes, civil society does not have any unique resource of wealth at its disposal. This results in its dependence on the state and the economy. Neoliberal donor policy used to make a virtue of this necessity, dissolving the "bad" state in the "good" civil society, and in the end dissolving civil society itself in the "good" market or "good" family. Here one is reminded of Margaret Thatcher's words: "there is no such thing as society" (Thatcher, 1987), which bear an ironic proximity to Marxist economics, in a way which, naturally, Thatcher never intended.

## 2.2. Specifics of inner configuration

There is no reason for civil society in developing countries to be socially romanticised and mythologised. Civil society in these countries is often "undemocratic, oriented towards individuals and frequently merely a vehicle for acquiring rents from development politics" (Engel, 2001, p. 18). Generally, in developing countries the configuration of civil society derives from its non-autonomy and can be labelled as fragmentation. Fragmentation results from the fact that civil society is pressed in between state, economy and family, through various channels that accompany and support rent-seeking. The rent-seeking that is characteristic

of developing countries clamps the three adjacent spheres so tightly together that civil society, which finds itself in the middle, is damaged and either shrinks beyond recognition or tries on its own account to infiltrate into the adjacent spheres through subversive channels.

The figure below shows – despite its inevitably schematic nature – how the structure of civil society, pervaded by 'subversive', fragmenting channels may be visualised for developing countries. For the sake of clarity, I have confined myself to those channels that permeate civil society between state and economy, and left out those running between family and state as well as those between family and economy. For the same reasons the channels have been drawn in parallel, even though this does not illustrate how in reality they overlap and cross. The capacity of a civil society to counterpose "non-emancipating" channels with "emancipating" channels guarantees that the quality of that civil society does not only depend on the quality of the adjacent realms that permeate it, but also on its capacity for self-structuring as well as self-generating emancipation.

Parties and institutions of religious hierarchies, tribal and clan structures as well as labour unions and entrepreneur associations, highlighted in light grey, are located at the junction realm between civil society on the one side and state, family or economy on the other. Parts of it are attributed to the adjacent spheres, others to civil society. With regard to Iran, where one part of the religious hierarchy belongs to the state, there is another part which does not. There, the anti-clerical religious institutions led by lay intellectuals are placed in civil society just like the non-state clerics (Schirazi, 1995, p. 140). In the Muslim south of the Philippines, policies of violence often emanate from the interests of political clans operating in civil society, yet even here not every family or clan is an actor of civil society (Kreuzer, 2005, p. 4). El Salvador is an obvious example of how labour unions and entrepreneur associations became

Figure 3: Structure of civil society in developing countries

politicised during the civil war and won an autonomous place in civil society, while operating exclusively for the economic representation of interests in peaceful times (Zinecker, 2004b, pp. 23, 184).

The fragmenting channels represent structured, but non-market or non-democratic social processes. They bind together state, economy and family, and thereby pervade civil society. Such channels exist in developed countries too. However, in developing countries they are more deeply ingrained, overlap more markedly and intersect and reproduce each other, thus displaying a complex, fragmenting cross-effect which usually prevents civil society from acting as a collective democratic actor, and which may in cases of absolute disorder produce anomy. Of course there are also counter-channels, marked as arrows in the figures below (Figures 4 and 5), such as civilisation (versus violence) or democratisation (versus authoritarianism). Yet in reality these never exist in all versions in developing countries as an antidote against all fragmenting channels, and even if they do develop, they are, in contrast to the fragmenting channels, rarely dominant over a longer period.

Certainly not all fragmenting channels are present in every developing country's civil society. One will not find ethnicising where there is no multi-ethnic society. Where different ethnic or religious identities are not in dispute, a process of fundamentalism will not take place. As a general rule, only rent-seeking pervades civil society in every developing country. It is the main channel of fragmentation, and all other fragmenting channels are interdependent with it, even though there is no essential interdependence between them.[16] Groups which are particularly strongly interdependent are: ethnicising and fundamentalism, clientelism, corporatism and populism, violence and the mafia, as well as authority by discourse management and authoritarianism.

The respective degrees of occurrence of the channels and counter-channels have to be determined and assessed in relation to each other in concrete cases, upon which basis one could establish a typology of civil societies according to their configurations. One could place the types of civil societies so deduced in relation to the respective degrees of achievement of the tasks of development politics, such as the reduction of poverty, and see whether correlations and finally causalities appear, or if especially that particular type of civil society promotes development better than others, despite its non-autonomy and fragmentation.

The two following tables provide a simple illustration of this idea. They are based on tentative qualitative assessments. In order for the model to be practically applied, it would need to be made operational on the basis of adequate encoding.[17]

Figure 4: Fragmenting channels and opposing channels in Guatemala

---

16 That a rent economy promotes violence, authoritarianism, Mafia, clientelism and corporatism has been shown by Elsenhans (1977, 1981, 2009) and Zinecker (2004a, 2004c, 2007, 2010) and is hardly questioned in the literature. Concerning the connection between rent economy and ethnicising, especially ethnic or religious fundamentalism, I follow Elsenhans (2001). It is his premise that rent-acc umulating state classes are countered by middle classes which turn towards economic accumulation on the basis of small and medium-sized ventures, thereby aspiring to gain political majority. As a basis for ideological hegemony, however, neither the dispute about the advantages of a market economy nor Western values is applicable. Furthermore, any potential followers are too economically heterogeneous to be organised through their status in the production process. Therefore it is the fall-back to religious fundamentalism, which, according to Elsenhans (2001, p. 168 ff.), seems to be most adequate to fill this vacuum and ideologically back the hegemonic aspirations of the middle classes in the respective countries.

17 These figures are based on the experience the author has gained in several qualitative studies over a long period. Operationalisation could be conducted according to the five- to ten-level ratings, as was used for instance for the Bertelsmann-Transformation Index. The criteria and sub-criteria for the parameter value of the (counter-) channels would still have to be developed.

Figure 5: Fragmenting and opposing channels in Costa Rica

A comparison of the two images reveals the profoundly different length of the channels and counter channels in Guatemala and Costa Rica. With a typology based on this model it can be demonstrated in which channels civil society has weak points where development politics would have to focus. Before any decision on the support of a civil society agent, the channel in which the actor is situated can be determined. Furthermore, the location of exit or end-points, important for development politics, can be established. In the ideal democratic and socio-economic egalitarian scenario the table would be completely white, indicating the absence of fragmenting channels in civil society. It therefore shows whether the exit- or end-point of a channel lies in the deficits of family, or of state and economy. Accordingly, measures of development policy can be focussed upon the respective realm-environments. Such a civil society free of fragmenting channels could be considered to be self-structured and would thus fulfil the condition for its autonomy from the various context realms.

3. CONCLUSION

Civil society is merely one part of society. Therefore, confining oneself to its mere typology is not sufficient to arrive at viable and integral concepts and strategies for society. A further step is therefore necessary in which types of civil society must be confronted with the types of family, economy and state that overlie them in order to integrate these elements into an aggregate type of society. Then it remains to be seen whether certain types of family, economy and state correlate with particular types of civil society or its fragmenting channels. By this means we can expect more complicated, yet more realistic and thus praxeologically more significant models than those which

simplify civil society, reduce its dimensions and at the same time overburden it with normative pretensions.

In the ideal case, the state, family, economy and civil society are all strong. Between them there exists not a zero-sum game, but balance, and yes, mutual support. However, developing countries are not usually an ideal case. In the real situation of developing countries this balance does not occur, since civil society is not autonomous and is, moreover, fragmented. On the one hand, development policies should concentrate on the conditioning of civil society to overcome its fragmentation through increasing structural self-organisation and, on this basis, become autonomous from the adjacent spheres. On the other hand, it should provide the adjacent spheres of civil society development with the efficiency to allow them not to be sucked into civil society, but become autonomous from it so as to form together a stable societal – as it is market-sociated – structure. The efficiency of society as a whole, and consequently the outcomes achieved by development politics as well, are to be measured according to how far all four parts of the structure contribute – and not just civil society alone – to remedying the existing development and democracy deficiencies. At the same time civil society, particularly in developing countries, should neither be elevated to a "deus ex machina" nor be degraded to a "technical tool" (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p. 2), and far less be upgraded from "technical tool" to a "deus ex machina".

Dubiel's lament about the unfulfilled theory promise adhering to the term civil society remains. Sharpening the contours of this category by removing useless layers of meaning – as demanded in the introductory quote by Honneth – was the objective of this article. The application of the Western term civil society to the reality of developing countries undoubtedly serves as a litmus test, because merely by this means it is possible to reveal the weak points of the civil society concept that might be ruinous to developmental policy.

Abbreviations

ELN   Ejército de Liberación Nacional

EZLN Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional

FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

FSLN Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional

Bibliography

ALEXANDER, Jeffrey (ed.) (1999). *Real Civil Societies*. London: Sage Pub. Inc.

ANHELM, Fritz Erich (1996). "Civil Society – mehr als eine Mode?" *Entwicklungspolitik*. Iss. 10, pp. 15-20.

ARATO, Andrew (1990). "Revolution, Civil Society und Demokratie". *Transit*. Iss. 1, pp. 110-131.

BAKER, Gideon (1998). "Civil Society and Democracy: The Gap Between Theory and Possibility". *Politics*. Iss. 18, pp. 81-87.

BAUERKÄMPER, Arnd (2003). "Einleitung: Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure und ihr Handeln in historisch-sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive". In: Arnd BAUERKÄMPER (ed.). *Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure, Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich*. Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus. Pp. 7-31.

BAYART, Jean-Francois (1986). "Civil Society in Africa". In: Patrick CHABAL (ed.). *Political Domination in Africa. Reflections on the Limits of Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 109-125.

BENDEL, Petra; KRENNERICH, Michael (2000). "Zivilgesellschaft und demokratische Transformation in Zentralamerika". In: Wolfgang MERKEL (ed.). *Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 273-294.

BEYME, Klaus von (2000). "Zivilgesellschaft – von der vorbürgerlichen zur nachbürgerlichen Gesellschaft?" In: Wolfgang MERKEL (ed.). *Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 51-70.

BIRLE, Peter (2000). "Zivilgesellschaft in Südamerika – Mythos und Realität". In: Wolfgang MERKEL (ed.). *Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 23-71.

BRUMLIK, Micha (1991). "Was heißt 'Zivile Gesellschaft'? Versuch, den Pudding an die Wand zu nageln". *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*. Iss. 36, pp. 987-993.

BRYSK, Alison (2000). "Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America". *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 11, iss. 3, pp. 151-165.

BUDDE, Gunilla-Friederike (2003). "Das Öffentliche des Privaten. Die Familie als zivilgesellschaftliche Kerninstitution". In: Arnd BAUERKÄMPER (ed.). *Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure, Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich*. Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus. Pp. 57-77.

BUTTIGIEG, Joseph A. (1994). "Gramscis Zivilgesellschaft und die 'civil society' – Debatte". *Das Argument*. Iss. 206, pp. 529-554.

CAROTHERS, Thomas (1999). "Think Again: Civil Society". *Foreign Policy*. Winter 1999. [Rev. 22/04/05]. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/civsoc.htm>

CHANDHOKE, Neera (2001). "The 'Civil' and the 'Political' in Civil Society". *Democratization*. Vol. 8, iss. 2, pp. 1-24.

COHEN, Jean; ARATO, Andrew (1992). *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA/London: The MIT Press.

CROISSANT, Aurel; LAUTH, Hans-Joachim; MERKEL, Wolfgang (2000). "Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation: ein internationaler Vergleich". In: Wolfgang MERKEL (ed.). *Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 9-49.

DIAMOND, Larry (1994). "Toward Democratic Consolidation". *Journal of Democracy*. Iss. 5, pp. 4-17.

DRYZEK, John (1996). "Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization". *American Political Science Review*. Iss. 90, pp. 475-487.

DUBIEL, Helmut (2001). "Unzivile Gesellschaften". *Soziale Welt*. Iss. 52, pp. 133-150.

ECKSTEIN, Harry (1992). *Regarding Politics. Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press.

ELIAS, Norbert (1997). *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation.* 2. Band. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (1977). "Die Staatsklasse/ Staatsbourgeoisie in den unterentwickelten Ländern zwischen Privilegierung und Legitimationszwang". *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee.* Iss. 1, pp. 29-42.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (1981). *Abhängiger Kapitalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft. Versuch über den Staat in der Dritten Welt.* Frankfurt am Main/ New York: Campus.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (1994). "Wirtschaftsliberalismus ohne bürgerliche Revolution: Wer stützt die liberale Wirtschaft im Süden?" In: Wolfgang HEIN (ed.). *Umbruch in der Weltgesellschaft. Auf dem Weg zu einer "Neuen Weltordnung"?.* Hamburg: Schriften des Deutschen Übersee-Instituts. Pp. 101-124.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (2000). "Globalisation in a Labourist Keynesian Approach". *The Journal of Social Studies.* Iss. 89, pp. 1-66.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (2001). *Das internationale System zwischen Zivilgesellschaft und Rente.* Münster: Lit.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (2002). "A Convoy Model vs. an Underconsumptionist Model of Globalisation". In: 2002 New Orleans ISA Convention, March 24-27.

ELSENHANS, Hartmut (2009). "Rente und subnationale Gewalt". *Behemoth. A Journal of Civilisation.* Iss. 1, pp. 4-19.

ENGEL, Ulf (2001). "Politik des Augenscheins? Neue afrikapolitische Anstöße von Parteien und Fachministerien". *University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, Politics and Economics.* Iss. 55.

FINE, Robert (1997). "Civil Society Theory, Enlightenment and Critique". *Democratization.* Iss. 4, pp. 7-28.

FLORINI, Ann M. (2000). "Lessons Learned". In: Ann M. FLORINI (ed.). *The Third Force. The Rise of Transnational Civil Society.* Tokyo/Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. 211-240.

FORSCHUNGSGRUPPE WELTGESELLSCHAFT (1996). "Weltgesellschaft: Identifizierung eines 'Phantoms'". *Politische Vierteljahresschrift.* Iss. 37, pp. 5-26.

GELLNER, Ernest (1994). *Bedingungen der Freiheit. Die Zivilgesellschaft und ihre Rivalen.* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

GOSEWINKEL, Dieter; RUCHT, Dieter (2004). "History meets sociology: Zivilgesellschaft als Prozeß". In: D. GOSEWINKEL; D. RUCHT; W. VAN DER DAELE; J. KOCKA (eds.). *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational.* WZB-Jahrbuch 2003. Berlin: WZB. Pp. 29-60.

GOSEWINKEL, Dieter; RUCHT, Dieter; VAN DER DAELE, Wolfgang; KOCKA, Jürgen (2004). "Einleitung". In: D. GOSEWINKEL; D. RUCHT; W. W. VAN DER DAELE; J. KOCKA (eds.). *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational.* WZB-Jahrbuch 2003. Berlin: WZB. Pp. 11-26.

GRAMSCI, Antonio (1980). *Politik, Geschichte und Kultur.* Leipzig: Reclam.

HABERMAS, Jürgen (1998). *Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

HEINS, Volker (1999). "Globalisierung und Demokratie – Zur Diskussion um die Zivilgesellschaft". *Entwicklungspolitik.* Iss. 5, pp. 50-54.

HEINS, Volker (2002). Das *Andere der Zivilgesellschaft. Zur Archäologie eines Begriffs.* Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

HEINS, Volker (2003). "Rezensionsessay. Linker Marktoptimismus. Überlegungen zu Hartmut Elsenhans' politökonomischer Zeitdiagnose". *Leviathan.* Iss. 31, pp. 417-428.

HENRICH, Rolf (1990). *Der vormundschaftliche Staat.* Leipzig/Weimar: Kiepenheuer.

HONNETH, Axel (1992). "Soziologie. Eine Kolumne. Konzeptionen der 'Civil Society'". *Merkur.* Iss. 46, pp. 61-66.

HOWELL, Jude; PEARCE, Jenny (2001). *Civil Society & Development. A Critical Exploration.* Boulder/London: Rienner Publishers.

HUTCHFUL, Eboe (1996). "The Civil Society Debate in Africa". *International Journal.* Iss. 21, pp. 54-77.

IOANNIDOU, Anastasia (1997). "The Politics of the Division of Labour: Smith and Hegel on Civil Society". *Democratization.* Iss. 4, pp. 49-62.

JEHLE, Peter (1994). "Hegemonietheoretische Defizite der Zivilgesellschaftsdebatte. Zur Kritik an Kebir und der Habermasschule". *Das Argument.* Iss. 206, pp. 513-527.

KALDOR, Mary (2003). "The Idea of Global Civil Society". *International Affairs*. Iss. 79, pp. 583-593.

KARL, Terry Lynn (1995). "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America". *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 6, iss. 1, pp. 72-86.

KEANE, John (1998). *Civil Society. Old Images, New Visions*. Stanford/Oxford: Stanford University Press (and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.).

KEANE, John (2003). *Global Civil Society?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

KEBIR, Sabine (1991). *Gramsci's Zivilgesellschaft*. Hamburg: VSA.

KOCKA, Jürgen (2001). "Zivilgesellschaft. Zum Konzept und seiner sozialgeschichtlichen Verwendung". In: J. KOCKA; P. NOLTE; S. RANDERIA; S. REICHARDT (eds.). *Neues über Zivilgesellschaft aus historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichem Blickwinkel*. Berlin: WZB. Pp. 4-21.

KOPECKÝ, Petr; MUDDE, Cas (2003). "Rethinking Civil Society". *Democratization*. Iss. 10, pp. 1-14.

KOSELLECK, Reinhart (1991). "Drei bürgerliche Welten?" In: Krzysztof MICHALSKI (ed.). *Europa und die civil society*. Castelgandolfo-Gespräche 1989. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Pp. 118-129.

KÖßLER, Reinhart ; MELBER, Henning (1993). *Chancen internationaler Zivilgesellschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

KREUZER, Peter (2005). *Politische Clans und Gewalt im Süden der Philippinen*. HSFK-Report 1/2005. Frankfurt am Main.

KUHN, Berthold (2003). "Zivilgesellschaft aus der Perspektive der Entwicklungsländer". In: Arnd BAUERKÄMPER (ed.). *Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft. Akteure, Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich*. Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus. Pp. 391-415.

LAUTH, Hans-Joachim (1999). "Strategische, reflexive und ambivalente Zivilgesellschaften: ein Vorschlag zur Typologie von Zivilgesellschaften im Systemwechsel". In: Heidrun ZINECKER (ed.). *Unvollendete Demokratisierung in Nichtmarktökonomien. Die Blackbox zwischen Staat und Wirtschaft in den Transitionsländern des Südens und Ostens*. Amsterdam: Fakultas. Pp. 95-121.

LEWIS, David (2002). "Civil Society in African Context: Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept". *Development and Change*. Iss. 33, pp. 569-585.

LINGNAU, Hildegard (2003). "Zivilgesellschaft – zur Problematik einer Wunschvorstellung der staatlichen Zusammenarbeit". *Nord-Süd aktuell*. Iss. XVII, pp. 233-238.

LINZ, Juan (1990). "Diskussionsbeitrag. (Wieder-) Aufbau der civil society". *Transit*. Iss. 1, pp. 127-130.

MAKUMBE, John (1998). "Is there a Civil Society in Africa?" *International Affairs*. Vol. 74, iss. 2, pp. 305-317.

MENZEL, Ulrich (1998). "Plädoyer für eine universalistische Weltgesellschaft. Perspektiven und Grenzen eines idealistischen Projekts". In: *Is small beautiful? Die Leopold Kohr-Vorlesungen*. Schlaininger Schriften zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 1. Wien: Promedia. Pp. 20-38.

O'DONNELL, Guillermo; SCHMITTER, Philippe (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

ÖNIŞ, Ziya; ŞENSES, Fikret (2005). "Rethinking the Emerging Washington Consensus". *Development and Change*. Iss. 36, pp. 263-290.

PEARCE, Jenny (1997). "Civil Society, the Market and Democracy in Latin America". *Democratization*. Iss. 4, pp. 57-83.

POLLACK, Detlef (2003). "Zivilgesellschaft und Staat in der Demokratie". *Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen*. Iss. 16, pp. 46-58.

PRZEWORSKI, Adam (1990). "Spiel mit Einsatz. Demokratisierungsprozesse in Lateinamerika, Osteuropa und anderswo". Transit. Iss. 1, pp. 190-211.

PUTNAM, Robert D.; GOSS, Kristin A. (2001). "Einleitung". In: Robert D. PUTNAM (ed.). *Gesellschaft und Gemeinsinn*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung. Pp. 15-43.

PUHLE, Hans-Jürgen (1999). "Demokratisierungsprobleme in Europa und Amerika". In: Hauke BRUNKHORST; Peter NIESEN (eds.). *Das Recht der Republik*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Pp. 317-345.

REICHARDT, Sven (2001). "Zivilgesellschaft und Gewalt. Einige konzeptionelle Überlegungen aus historischer

Sicht". In: J. KOCKA; P. NOLTE, S. RANDERIA, S. REICHARDT (eds.). *Neues über Zivilgesellschaft aus historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichem Blickwinkel*. Berlin: WZB. Pp. 45-80.

REICHARDT, Sven (2004). "Gewalt und Zivilität im Wandel. Konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Zivilgesellschaft aus historischer Sicht". In: D. GOSEWINKEL; D. RUCHT; W. VAN DER DAELE; J. KOCKA (eds.). *Zivilgesellschaft – national und transnational. WZB-Jahrbuch 2003*. Berlin: Edition Sigma. Pp. 61-82.

RIEDEL, Manfred (1979). "Gesellschaft, bürgerliche". In: O. BRUNNER; W. CONZE; R. KOSELLECK (eds.). *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Band 2*. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. Pp. 719-800.

RÖDEL, Ulrich; FRANKENBERG, Günter; DUBIEL, Helmut (1989). *Die demokratische Frage*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

RÜB, Friedbert (2000). "Von der zivilen zur unzivilen Gesellschaft: das Beispiel des ehemaligen Jugoslawien". In: Wolfgang MERKEL (ed.). *Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 173-202.

SCHEDLER, Andreas (1996). "Einleitung: Zur entwicklungspolitischen Entdeckung der Zivilgesellschaft". In F. KOLLAND; E. PILZ; A. SCHEDLER; W. SCHICHO (eds.). *Staat und Zivile Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Entwicklungspolitik in Afrika, Asien und Lateinamerika*. Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel/Wien: Südwind. Pp. 9-16.

SCHIRAZI, Asghar (1995). "Gegenkultur als Ausdruck der Zivilgesellschaft in der Islamischen Republik Iran". In: F. IBRAHIM; H. WEDEL (eds.). *Probleme der Zivilgesellschaft im Vorderen Orient*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 135-164.

SCHMALZ-BRUNS, Rainer (1992). "Civil Society – ein postmodernes Kunstprodukt?" *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. Iss. 33, pp. 243-255.

SCHMIDT, Siegmar (2000). "Die Rolle von Zivilgesellschaften in afrikanischen Systemwechseln". In: Wolfgang MERKEL (ed.). *Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Pp. 295-334.

SEIBEL, Manfred (1993). *Funktionaler Dilettantismus. Erfolgreich scheiternde Organisationen im "dritten Sektor" zwischen Markt und Staat*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

SELIGMAN, Adam B. (1992). *The Idea of Civil Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

SHILS, Edward (1991). "The Virtue of Civil Society". *Government and Opposition*. Iss. 26, pp. 3-20.

SHILS, Edward. Cited in John KEANE (1998). *Civil Society. Old Images, New Visions*. Stanford/Oxford: Stanford University Press (and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.).

SÖLTER, Arpad (1993). "Zivilgesellschaft als demokratietheoretisches Konzept". In: W. LINK; S-W. EBERHARD; G. SCHWAN (eds.). *Jahrbuch für Politik, Halbband 1*. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Pp. 145-172.

STEPAN, Alfred (1988). *Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

STIGLITZ, Joseph (2002). *Die Schatten der Globalisierung*. Berlin: Siedler.

STRASSER, Carlos (1991). *Para una teoría de la democracia posible. La democracia y lo democrático*. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.

TAYLOR, Charles (1991). "Die Beschwörung der Civil Society". In: Krzysztof MICHALSKI (ed.). *Europa und die civil society. Castelgandolfo-Gespräche 1989*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Pp. 52-81.

TEMPEST, Clive (1997). "Myths from Eastern Europe and the Legend of the West". *Democratization*. Iss. 2, pp. 132-143.

THATCHER, Margaret (1987). "Aids, education and the year 2000". Interview for *Woman's Own*, 31 October 1987.

VARTY, John (1997). "Civic or Commercial? Adam Ferguson's Concept of Civil Society". *Democratization*. Iss. 4, pp. 29-48.

WALLENSTEEN, Peter (1999). "State Failure, Ethnocracy and Armed Conflict: Towards New Conceptions of Governance". [Rev. 22/04/05]. Available at: <http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/failed_states/1999/papers/Wallensteen.html>

WALZER, Michael (1992). *Zivile Gesellschaft und amerikanische Demokratie*. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag.

WHITE, Gordon (1994). "Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground". *Democratization*. Iss. 1, pp. 375-390.

WHITEHEAD, Laurence (1997). "Bowling in the Bronx: The Uncivil Interstices between Civil and Political Society". *Democratization*. Iss, 4, pp. 94-114.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (1999). "Transición incompleta y sociedad civil violenta" In: P. HENGSTENBERG; K, KOHUT; G. MAIHOLD (eds.). *Sociedad civil en América Latina: representación de intereses y gobernabilidad*. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad. Pp. 183-195.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (2003). "Wie im Westen so im Süden? Demokratisierung im Spannungsfeld zwischen Universalismus und Partikularismus". HSFK-Standpunkte 1/2003. Frankfurt am Main.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (2004a). "Regime-Hybridität in Entwicklungsländern. Leistungen und Grenzen der neueren Transitionsforschung". *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*. Vol. 11, iss. 2, pp. 239-272.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (2004b). *El Salvador nach dem Bürgerkrieg. Ambivalenzen eines schwierigen Friedens*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (2004c). *Drogenökonomie und Gewalt. Das Beispiel Kolumbien*. HSFK-Report, No. 5. Frankfurt am Main.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (2007). *Kolumbien und El Salvador im longitudinalen Vergleich. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Transitionsforschung*. Baden Baden: Nomos.

ZINECKER, Heidrun (2010). "Gewaltkriminalität in Zentralamerika – Entwurf eines erklärenden Theorie-Modells". In: K. SEFFER; H. ZINECKER (eds.). *Gewaltkriminalität in Zentralamerika. Formen, Ursachen, Einhegungsmöglichkeiten*. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Pp. 17–51.

Recommended citation

About the author

Heidrun Zinecker
zinecker@rz.uni-leipzig.de

Heidrun Zinecker is full professor for International Relations at the Institute for Political Sciences, University of Leipzig. Her main research is on theories of development, transformation, violence and peace. Her empirical focus is directed to Latin America.

CONFLICTOLOGY IN PRACTICE

Afghanistan and the Peace Through Development Paradigm: A Critical Assessment

Katharina Merkel

Abstract

A plethora of academic literature indicates that, in the post Cold War political landscape, poverty and development deficits are key in sparking civil conflict. Out of this recognition a new paradigm has emerged which underpins the idea that, by working to overcome these deficits, the risk of conflict can be essentially reduced and/or mitigated. The 'peace through development' paradigm supports the assumptio n that development and security are essentially intertwined. In this paper I discuss the challenges and opportunities associated with the paradigm within the Afghan context, addressing the two core questions: (1) how are poverty and development deficits connected to violence and conflict? and (2) what are the prerequisites for development to play a conducive role in the peacebuilding alchemy? This paper argues that at large, sustainable peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved through sustainable development. However, it also recognises the tremendous challenges faced to fully capitalise on the peace dividend that development might be able to provide, and at the same time develops a roadmap for more conflict-sensitive development programming.

INTRODUCTION

The 'peace through development' paradigm raises hopes and fears: the hope that development can provide a viable peace dividend to conflict-torn nations but also the fear that insensitive development programming might exacerbate tensions where they already exist. When exploring the role that development might play in preventing and mitigating conflict, several interlinked questions need to be addressed: What are the incentives for violent behaviour? How are poverty and wider development deficits connected to violence and conflict? How do development organisations interact with conflict dynamics? Which development policies and practices are conducive or not to the peacebuilding process?

When looking at mobilisation variables for violence, the rhetoric often employed in the Afghan context is that of religious fundamentalism. However, this paper questions the assumption that fundamentalist Islamic beliefs or, in other words, ideological grievances, are per se the source of the conflict. In Afghanistan, an impoverished country, with a major youth population, widespread hunger, and pervasive economic deprivation, in which an estimated 40 percent of the population remains unemployed despite billions of dollars in development aid that have been poured into the country, we may also need to look at the economic agenda to grapple with the phenomenon of conflict. While some of the poorest nations in the world with a long and proud history of peaceful coexistence provide evidence that poverty per se is not a source of conflict, the poverty-

violence link has become one of the major findings in the ever-growing literature investigating the causes of civil war (Miguel, 2007).

Recent academic research suggests that poverty is key in sparking civil conflict and a plethora of literature analyses patterns in different civil war settings. Yet, to date, much of this research has focused on Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is a major concentration of civil wars, and surprisingly little has focused on Afghanistan and its renewed insurgency, which has been gradually scaling up since 2005. This knowledge gap might in part be due to the fact that Afghanistan does not constitute a typical civil war setting, given its unique combination of internal and external conflict lines. Moreover, knowledge gaps might be further sustained by the inherent difficulties of conducting research in areas ravaged by insurgency. However, understanding the relationship between poverty and violence and the interaction between aid/development and conflict is essential for both development and security, to ensure that polices and interventions are based on sound analytical foundations. By assessing some of the basic assumptions underlying the peace through development paradigm within the Afghan context, this paper highlights and fills current gaps in the literature, thereby bringing the debate on the overlapping agendas for peace and development into the realm of state-building in Afghanistan.

1. INCENTIVE SYSTEMS FOR VIOLENCE

Undoubtedly the motivation of participants in violent situations is at the root of any armed conflict, and a better understanding of the processes and circumstances that make young men in Afghanistan ready cannon fodder for the insurgency is urgently required. While the war in Afghanistan has captured the attention of political leaders around the globe, surprisingly few attempts have been made to academically study the mobilisation variables of the Taliban and other militant groups such as the Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network. While searching for the roots of religious extremism, scholars mostly investigate the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism as its apparent consequential branch, on the global level. Yet religious extremism also needs to be understood in its own context.

A study commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID), one of the few scholarly attempts to study radicalisation variables of Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami combatants, came up with some interesting results. According to the study, young men in Afghanistan become Taliban combatants for many reasons, religion being only one of them, "but their peers then radicalise them into presenting their cause only in terms of jihad and only

with reference to Islam. In other words, the real process of radicalisation appears to happen after they have become Taliban combatants" (Ladbury, 2009, p. 4-5). The DFID study thereby draws a line between mobilisation and radicalisation factors and religious beliefs only seem to account for a small percentage of combatants being mobilised. So what is it that drives young men to join the insurgency in the first place? According to Ladbury's study, mobilisation is based on a number of personal reasons, ranging from financial needs to status and self-protection, in combination with larger structural grievances. This suggests that, while economic factors are low on the list of possible radicalisation variables, they might indeed be high on the list of motivational factors.

> "We thank God that the fighting we saw during the Taliban does not exist now, even though they still do suicide attacks. The main harm of the current conflict is poverty and unemployment. If there are employment opportunities for the people, there won't be killings" – a woman from Kabul.

> "If people are employed, the fighting will end" – a man from Kandahar.

> "If people are unemployed they are capable of everything" – a man from Parwan.

The above quotes support the broader research findings of a study released by the UK-based aid agency, Oxfam, in 2009, which found that an overwhelming 70 percent of Afghans consider poverty and unemployment to be the major factors that fuel the fighting in Afghanistan today. Two out of three respondents felt that addressing poverty and unemployment is essential to establish security and to bring lasting peace to the country.

Where blame for the conflict lies
Responses of 704 Afghan men and women

Source: Oxfam

If economic characteristics indeed provide such powerful explanatory variables for the conflict, the failed reconstruction attempts of the past decade might have a considerable role in the recurring violence. Statistics suggest that around 50 percent of all post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within only a decade, and with conflict recurring they may easily fall into what Collier et al. (2003) consider "the conflict trap", a cycle of war and economic decline. Collier (2004, p.2) therefore argues that "the most common legacy of war in fact is more war" and with a history of nearly 30 years of recurring violence, Afghanistan provides a grievous example. Have failures to kick-start economic development in the immediate aftermath of the conflict a role in the recurring violence? Have failures in the transition from relief to long-term development perpetuated the causes of the conflict? It is possible to conclude that at least in part they have. When, in 2001, the Taliban were ousted from power, most Afghans were eager to work for the future of their country and desperately waited for job-creation and development to kick in. Until 2005, there were very few attacks on the ISAF troops, but half a decade into the painfully slow reconstructing process, the insurgency again gained traction (Lopez, n.a.). It was a time when the world community was channelling much of its attention towards Iraq and when way too little was being done to alleviate Afghanistan from its misery. The immediate years following the ouster of the Taliban had presented a narrow window of opportunity during which the tangible benefits of reconstruction could have rallied the Afghan population to support the government (Lopez, n.a.). Yet reconstruction did not happen and this created a sense of hopelessness and despair among many Afghans. With few licit livelihood opportunities, the Taliban and other militant groups became last resort employers, and many young men were left with the impression that there were no options other than gun toting.

Lack of opportunities for gainful employment and a meaningful role in society also make adolescents in Afghanistan vulnerable to the lure of participating in criminal activities. In large swathes of Afghanistan, the political economy now centres on militancy, crime and the narcotics trade, all being elements that prosper under conditions of conflict and that may feed back to their sources. The war economy has a destabilising effect on the country which further undermines reconstruction efforts. The insurgency is strengthened through income from poppy production and smuggling, and the opium trade therefore has a critical destabilising effect on the country. The UN map plots the direct correlation between poppy production and political insecurity in Afghanistan:

SECURITY MAP AND OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN BY PROVINCE, 2007-2008

Narcotics have, over time, changed the nature of the conflict itself and today the insurgency and the opium trade need to be understood as a single phenomenon (Peters, 2009). NATO military intelligence suggests that as few as 5 percent of insurgent commanders now fight for ideological reasons, and Peters (2009) therefore argues that insurgents tend to behave like "mafiosi" rather than "mujahideen". Yet it is vital to understand that regular crime, just like the insurgency itself, allows different groups to wage war and to profit or just to cope and to survive. Peacebuilding strategies need to remove their ability to fund themselves, yet aggressive eradication strategies have mostly been counterproductive (Peters, 2009). Without offering realistic economic alternatives to farmers, they are likely to be driven to seek protection from anti-government groups. Small farmers cannot easily shift to alternative crops, so poppy eradication could severely exacerbate rural poverty, with greater backing for militant groups as a possible result. A successful transition from war to peace economies is vital to create stability, and providing licit livelihood opportunities is therefore a crucial step towards the institutionalisation of peace.

It is vital to understand that different kinds of economies have different kinds of actors with different motivations. This provides a powerful window of opportunity, since well-targeted development efforts have the potential to capitalise on the difference between criminal and insurgent groups by addressing the development needs of more moderate factions. Peace in Afghanistan is unlikely to be obtained unless the underlying crisis of poverty and chronic hunger are addressed and it is therefore reasonable to argue that the way to sustainable peace is through sustainable development. Yet this is only true if development is perceived as a realistic pathway out of poverty and only sustainable, dignified, non-violent employment opportunities can provide a viable peace dividend. If cash-for-work programmes are, for instance, not followed by realistic long-term livelihood opportunities, they might easily frustrate the ambitions of young men. For development to play a catalytic role in the peacebuilding alchemy, a more critical assessment of different development efforts is therefore urgently required.

2. AID, DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT

Development programmes have all too often perpetuated the causes of a conflict, and while development might be able provide a powerful incentive for non-violent behaviour, the reverse might also be true. Development aid and programmes may exacerbate conflict where it already existed and failed projects can cause tensions between villagers and others, especially in Afghanistan's fragile post-conflict environment. Development organisations in Afghanistan, whether they like it or not, participate in the conflict due to the vast sums of money they pour into a reality characterised by political turmoil. Afghanistan's over-dependence on development aid means that the way development aid is spent has enormous effects on the lives of almost all Afghans and this has very clear policy implications. As elsewhere in the world, in Afghanistan there needs to be a more critical assessment of development efforts and **more** attention should be given to how development aid is distributed and delivered. If development programmes incite more rage than appreciation, they will not only fail to create a peace dividend, but might even increase support for militants.

In particular, there needs to be a more critical assessment of the costs and benefits of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) which are closely associated with military occupation and are therefore frequently attacked (Zakhilwal et al., 2005). Development projects that are often attacked place villagers in danger and loss of civilian life can further increase backing for militant groups. There are alternatives to the PRT model for operating in insecure areas, in particular through greater community participation and contracting. It is widely recognised, for instance, that projects constructed by the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a national development programme implemented by the government of Afghanistan which works with elected village councils to determine what projects the community needs most, have been far less frequently attacked than development projects that involve foreign troops (Lopez, n.a). Decentralisation coupled with community contracting has allowed for high project implementation of NSP projects, even in areas ravaged by anti-government insurgency. Unlike most large donor projects, the projects implemented by the NSP do not have security regulations that require heavily armed guards, an important feature for a nation that perceives the presence of foreign troops as occupation. The World Bank further estimates that projects set up by the NSP are on average 30 percent cheaper than those by foreign organisations (Lopez, n.a.). Foreign government development initiatives often involve excessive profits to contractors and international consultants are often paid between $200,000 and $500,000 per year. An estimated 40 percent of the development budget is spent on foreign consultants and therefore ultimately does not reach those in need (Waldman, 2008).

The direction that money flows may undoubtedly increase or reduce support for the peacebuilding process. Social peace is threatened when distributional problems are severe and unequal aid distribution might be exploited by leaders of different factions. While leaders of armed groups may have ambiguous political motivations, their followers may primarily be motivated by grievance about their economic or social position. People's well-being stems in part from the well-being of their identity group – groups with shared relevant bonding and categorising identities. Group affiliations can occur along a number of identity lines and inequalities in political power may translate into similar inequalities at the economic and social fronts. Horizontal inequalities, may they be real or perceived, can be an important factor behind group mobilisation for violence (Stewart, 2006). Identities in Afghanistan are shared primarily through ethnic ties, and also through salient ways, such as rural/urban divides. Developmental disparities between rural and urban Afghanistan remain formidable and while up to 80 percent of the Afghan population live in rural areas, and despite poverty being significantly more severe in rural Afghanistan, development efforts have long been concentrated in the big cities. Income inequality, commonly measured by the Gini coefficient, is a powerful explanatory variable for the occurrence of civil conflict, and even scholars who tend to dismiss a direct link between poverty and conflict mostly agree that economic injustices might create inter-group hostilities which, in turn, can be linked to certain political outcomes.

According to World Bank figures, lagging regions – regions with a GDP lower than the national average – have experienced more than three times the number of terrorist incidents per capita, compared with leading regions in a country. This is, for instance, true for the federally administered tribal areas, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan (Ghani, 2010). "In Nepal, a higher poverty rate at the district level is associated with significantly more civil war deaths, in the ongoing Maoist insurgency there" (Miguel, 2007; p.56). Yet when we look at wealth distribution in Afghanistan by province, there is no suggestion that poverty is confined to or even more severe in areas now characterised by intense militant activity. The Bamyan and Badakhshan provinces are among the poorest but at the same time among the most secure regions in Afghanistan. However, looking at wealth distribution in rural and urban areas, the link between poverty and conflict becomes more apparent. Progress in rural Afghanistan has been slow to kick in and peace in rural Afghanistan is uneasy if not virtually non-existent. The higher level of insecurity in rural Afghanistan can clearly not only be attributed to poverty, however, rural neglect and wider developmental deficits might well play a considerable role in the continuing instability in rural areas.

The relationship between Kabul and rural Afghanistan has long been marred by deep mistrust and the continued lack of cohesion with rural areas provides a very powerful bottom-up incentive to engage in violence. Overcoming the historic volatile mistrust of the rural people as well as the self-serving image of Kabul is therefore a crucial challenge in peacebuilding and state-building in Afghanistan (Zakhilwal et al., 2005). Until most of the population sees significant improvements in their own villages, peace in Afghanistan will remain an illusion. Through participatory rural development approaches and non-partisan investments in rural areas, Kabul might be able to win the confidence of the rural community, while at the same time harnessing the potential of rural development to fight extreme poverty. Boosting living standards in rural areas can send an important message that Kabul has good intentions to address "issues of bread and butter", thereby increasing its recognition as a legitimate authority. As Fick et al. (2010, p.2) note; "in order to be successful, the Afghan government and its global partners must provide a vision for the future that is powerful enough to change people's behaviour". It is essential to include those who have historically been excluded and give them a stake in developing the future of their nation, to gain wide support for the peacebuilding process. In Afghanistan, the 'peace through development' paradigm can only prove successful if the crucial role of rural development is recognised.

3. CONCLUSION

Discussions on Afghanistan all too often centre on terrorism, but this seems to be by far not the most pressing issue for ordinary Afghans. While security is a major concern, an Afghan definition of security would need to entail a concept much wider than protection from terrorists, let alone the mere prevention of a global jihad. Security from an Afghan standpoint needs to entail a definition that figures broadly within the concept of human security, a life "free from want" and "free from fear". Human security encompasses not only protection from physical violence but also protection from other threats, including, but not limited to, economic insecurity, food shortage, health risks and environmental

degradation. Undoubtedly, security conceived in the sense of human security, cannot exist as long as the people of Afghanistan are incapable of making a decent living and feeding their families in a dignified way. Similarly, it is easy to argue that peace, in the sense of positive peace and not conceived as the mere absence of overt physical violence, cannot exist as long as Afghanistan continues to rank among the lowest on the human development index. Yet, there is strong evidence that poverty is not only a threat to human security and positive peace but is also directly linked to participation in violent situations.

The lack of licit livelihood opportunities and economic inequities between rural and urban areas provide very powerful incentives to engage in violence and the poverty-conflict links need to be better understood and accounted for. Development can be an explicit strategy to influence the course of political violence, and external assistance has the potential to either alleviate or worsen the conflict. More effective investments in sustainable development are required, in particular in programmes that address the underlying causes of militancy. Militant groups have pockets of popular support among the poor and vulnerable sections of the Afghan populace, in particular in rural areas where development deficits remain formidable. The poor in Afghanistan have very few opportunities to develop their full potential and to play a meaningful role in society, and they therefore feel excluded from the system. Addressing their development needs is essential to persuade them to support the system and to become productive members of society. The Afghan government must demonstrate that it is able to provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for its own population and that it is willing to give its citizens a stake in the future of their country. More attention should be given to economic concerns in order to reduce the economic incentives for young men to join the ranks of militant and criminal groups. "Development and security can be mutually supportive, and training people to create economic opportunities is a useful tool in countering insurgencies" (Fick et al, 2010; p.1). Yet this is only true when development actors are aware of the long-term impacts of their interventions, and development policies and practices need to drastically change their nature to become sensitive, sustainable and participatory, if they are to play a catalytic role in the peacebuilding alchemy.

Cited Works

COLLIER, P. (2004). "Development and Conflict" [online]. Oxford University Press. <http://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf>

COLLIER, P.; ELLIOTT, V.L.; HEGRE H. [et al.] (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. The World Bank and Oxford University Press.

FICK, N.; LOCKHART, C. (2010). "The Economic Imperative: Stabilizing Afghanistan through Economic Growth" [online]. Center for a New American Security.

<http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Economic%20Imperative_FickLockhart_April2010_code507_policybrief.pdf>

GHANI, E. (2010). "Conflict and Development: Where is Conflict Concentrated in South Asia?" [online]. The World Bank Blog.
<https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/conflict-and-development-where-conflict-concentrated-south-asia>

LADBURY, S. (2009) "Testing Hypotheses on Radicalization in Afghanistan: Why do men join the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami? How much do local communities support them?" Independent Report for the Department of International Development (DFID). [Online].
<http://d.yimg.com/kq/groups/23852819/1968355965/name/Drivers%20of%20Radicalisation%20in%20Afghanistan%20Sep%2009.pdf>

LOPEZ, R. (n.a.). "Afghan Exit Strategy: Understanding the National Solidarity Program (NSP). By Afghans, for Afghans" [online]. Jobs for Afghans.
<http://jobsforafghans.org/nsp.pdf>

MIGUEL, E. (2007). "Poverty and Violence: An Overview of Recent Reseach and Implications for Foreign Aid [online]. Berkeley University.
<http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_rcps.pdf>

OXFAM (2009). "The Cost of War. Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978-2009" [online].
<http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/afghanistan-the-cost-of-war.pdf>

PETERS, G. (2009). "How Opium Profits the Taliban" [online]. United States Institute of Peace.
<http://www.usip.org/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf>

STEWART, F. (2006). "Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities in Post Conflict Reconstruction" [online]. United Nations University.
<http://www.hicn.org/papers/Stewart_philadelphia.pdf>

WALDMAN, M. (2008). "Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan" [online]. ACBAR.
<http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20%2825%20Mar%2008%29.pdf>

ZAKHILWAL, O.; THOMAS, J.M. (2005). "Afghanistan. What Kind of Peace? The Role of Rural Development in Peacebuilding" [online].
<http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdf/Afghanistan_WKOP.pdf>

▬ *Recommended citation*

About the author

Katharina Merkel
kathamerkel@gmx.de

Since 2010, Katharina Merkel has been a consultant to various organisations in Kabul, Afghanistan, amongst them the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. She holds a Degree in Business Management from Staffordshire University and graduated from the Campus of Peace and Sustainability at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya.

Journal of Conflictology

ARTICLE

Gandhian Inversion of Modern Political Perception

Ramin Jahanbegloo

Abstract

The core of Gandhi's theory of politics is to show that the citizen is the true political subject and not the state. In other words, in Gandhi's mind the citizen was always above the state. As such, the political subject's decision on sovereignty becomes, for Gandhi, the true subject of political sovereignty. As a result, the Gandhian moment of politics is an effort to de-theologise and de-secularise the concept of modern politics as presented by the omnipotent sovereign of Thomas Hobbes. His ideas on ethics in politics lead Gandhi to criticise Hobbesian political authority and to disobey the state and its laws beyond the principle of fear. Gandhi's political practice is based on the taming of this fear.

"His physical body has left us and we shall never see him again or hear his gentle voice or run to him for counsel. But his imperishable memory and immortal message remain with us."

Jawaharlal Nehru

Everyone knows the central ontological question: Why is there being, being rather than nothing? But there is another central philosophical question which the human race has been unable to answer: Why is there violence, violence rather than nonviolence?

Why is there so much violence in the world today? Terrorism, religious and ethnic communalism, environmental deterioration, increased economic bankruptcies and the expansion of international hostilities – all of these point to a world of global challenges and multiple threats. It is clear that in such a world, plagued by violence, we urgently need strong ethical thinking which insists on applying fundamental ethical principles in interactions between individuals and between nations and to change the war-fostering political reality. At a time when humankind is confronted with clashes of national interest, religious fundamentalism and ethnic and racial prejudices, nonviolence can be the well-trusted means of laying the groundwork for a new cosmopolitics.

Many continue to believe that nonviolence is an ineffective instrument against dictatorships and genocide. However in the last few decades, many democratic initiatives, based on nonviolent militancy and an affirmation of human rights to help build global civil society on solid ethical foundations, could be associated with a kind of neo-Gandhian quest for peace and justice. Never in the history of the human race has nonviolence been so crucial. Nonviolence has recently evolved from a simple tactic of resistance to a cosmopolitical aim based on international application of the principles of democracy. Over the past three decades, the repercussions of global terrorism, human rights violations and environmental degradation have highlighted the need for politics of nonviolence at the global level to best deal with these problems. Global politics of nonviolence, therefore, is the task not only of governments but also of civil society, and intergovernmental, non-governmental and transnational organisations. Most importantly, the international community has the moral

obligation and duty to intervene in countries if they slide into lawlessness and cannot protect citizens from violations of human rights. Only a nonviolent society can work its way up to create institutions for development and foster inter-cultural and inter-religious harmony. In a century where terror conditions the life and mentality of at least two-thirds of humanity and violence influences our everyday culture, we cannot continue with the ostrich policy – no longer asking "whose responsibility is it?"

It would be folly to expect nonviolence to become effective and durable while the majority still thinks of politics in terms of the use of violence. It is true that, as Karl Jaspers affirmed: "In morality, moral conviction is decisive, in politics it is success." But it is also true that there is no long-term success in politics in the absence of morality. Thus, the political is dependent on the "over-political," which remains independent from politics. If politics does not remain dependent on the "over-political", it may end in ruin.

That is to say, political events bring moral responsibilities, and in turn, ethical views leave their imprint on political decisions. Politics without ethics is pure exercise of power. It is only in relation with ethics that politics can be elevated to a public virtue. Terrible crimes have been committed by political practices that tried to teach and impose moral behaviour. Spiritualising politics, as Gandhi understood, is not about moralising it, but is an effort to redefine it in terms of civic responsibility in an explicit public sphere. Politics is the morally conscientious and socially responsible exercise of civic roles: nonviolence is the key to this. When we examine where we are today, given the politics and technology of violence, we can only conclude that we live in a world with no wisdom. The time has come for humanity to renew its commitment, politically, economically, and culturally to the Gandhian moment of politics.

During his lifetime, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi became a world citizen. Out of his native Gujarat and later through experiments in England and South Africa, he emerged as an original hero into the public realm of national and international visibility – a hero destined to lead his people and nation out of the bitter experience of colonial oppression into a new era of independence and freedom. Somehow Gandhi remains easier to manage and explain to future generations as an Indian hero, if we forget his criticism of modern civilisation and his search for the democratisation of modernity that had already begun in 1909 with the publication of *Hind Swaraj*. As such, evoking the powerful originality of a Gandhian moment of politics means paying acute attention to the vital and global manifestation of the democratic hope that Gandhi

represented. He had the powerful determination to identify his life and his leadership with the cause of nonviolence, called for the spiritualisation of politics and revolutionary transformation of religious and political institutions in India, and attempted to unite the elites and the masses in India and organise them into a visionary nonviolent force. These are all significant manifestations of Gandhian pluralist thinking and creation of democracy. Perhaps, then, the Gandhian moment needs to be dissociated from all attempts to manage, market or domesticate the memory of Mahatma Gandhi. With the end of the first decade of the 21st century, we need to stop holding Gandhi captive to his most amenable history so that he might help us break free and move toward a future as intercultural communities of creativity and dialogue.

Gandhi once said, "There is no hope for the aching world except through the narrow and straight path of nonviolence."[1] If we want to reap the harvest of dialogical coexistence in the future, we have to sow seeds of nonviolence. Sixty years after Gandhi's death, we face a choice: either forge a peaceful human community in a plural world by speaking and acting to increase human solidarity, or preserve and extend the divide between communities and cultures by promoting religious and cultural prejudices and creating conflict and violence. Gandhi came to believe that the future of our global civilisation on this vulnerable globe was dependent on our ability to live together in harmony, tolerance and peace. Though he fired the spirit of nationalism and gave a clarion call to his countrymen to join him in the liberation of the motherland, Gandhi saw no difference in being a patriot and serving humanity. "Through the realisation of freedom of India," he said, "I hope to realise and carry on the mission of brotherhood of men."[2] As such, Gandhi's search for human solidarity and intercultural dialogue was an effort to narrow the gap between the logic of "we" and "they" while seeking, revealing and displaying many voices in Indian society and around the world who expressed this common aspiration for solidarity and mutuality in all its facets: ethical, spiritual, social, economic and political. Evidently, making sense of a plural world by cutting across various boundaries posed theoretical and practical challenges for Gandhi.

Gandhi's real challenge was to make politics and religion truthful by creating a dialogical bridge between the two. According to him, the process of fostering individual freedom and social harmony was only possible through the spiritualisation of politics and reintegration of politics within ethics. As such, Gandhi described his conception of true citizenship as "the reign of self-imposed law of moral restraint."[3] In fact, it was not the morals of a sectarian

---

1 Quoted in Thomas Merton (ed.) (1965), *Gandhi on Non-Violence*. New York: New Directions, p. 74.
2 *Young India*, 14 April 1929
3 M.K. Gandhi (1956). *Towards Everlasting Peace* (ed. A.T. Hingorani). Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, p. 217.

religion that, according to Gandhi, were to be fused with politics, but what Gandhi called "the highest moral law." He referred to the two sides of his ethics as truth and non-violence. Moreover, he described a moral action as "a matter of duty" and rejected any action which was "promoted by hope of happiness in the next world."[4] Not surprisingly, Gandhi frequently expressed his deep conviction that politics and religion were inextricably interlinked and that their separation resembled the separation of body and blood. Unlike those in India and around the world who believed that religion and social amelioration could not unite, Gandhi refused to consider the spiritual and secular ideals as opposite poles.

Mahatma Gandhi was different from most of the spiritual giants of India such as Sri Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo. Mahatma Gandhi put nonviolence as an absolute factor, an absolute imperative; but this was not always the case with other spiritual leaders. Sri Aurobindo, for example, used passive resistance as a means in the struggle for independence, but he was not an ardent champion of the doctrine of nonviolence. Gandhi, however, was greatly inspired by the spiritual-istic nationalism of some of these gurus. He stated that Vivekananda's influence increased his "love for his country a thousand-fold." But Gandhi's religion was not confined to temples, churches, books, rituals and other outer forms. It was closely related to the social and political realms. Gandhi was in this respect one of the few spiritual thinkers of his generation to also be a political leader. He once said that meditation and worship were not exclusive things to be kept locked up in a strongbox, but they must be seen in our every act.[5] Surprisingly, what made Gandhi's thinking unusual in a secular age was his conviction that secular politics and spiritual ethics could be harmonious. He was bold enough to consider both paradigms of politics and religion outside their traditional conceptual framework.

It was the unique achievement to invert the Hobbesian approach to politics as a universal desire for self-preservation. Gandhi essentially replaced the Hobbesian security paradigm of politics, which raises the question of the state as a political agent responsible for implementing the requirements of human security, with his own paradigm of human solidarity. Accordingly, Gandhi's project of spiritualising politics through nonviolent action has the twin objectives of bringing about a truly democratic transformation of society and thereby securing an ethical social order. Politics, for Gandhi, was the search for the ethical, and the bare fact of surviving with the help of a sovereign was of no value to him.

Gandhi's grammar of politics, therefore, was neither juridical nor technological and he adopted a new concept of society as a sphere of relationships of solidarity. He was quite aware of the fact that the search for human solidarity was not the same as seeking a social contract out of pragmatic self-interest. Gandhi, unlike Hobbes, did not view free society as a choice made by selfish people seeking to escape the confrontation of each against all others. For Gandhi, humans are not governed by their passions, but by their sense of self-restraint and self-suffering. "I have found," he wrote, "that mere appeal to reason does not answer where prejudices are age-long and based on supposed religious authority. Reason has to be strengthened by suffering."[6] He went on to distinguish between "self-suffering" and "violence" and developed the idea that self-suffering is a proof of courage and truthfulness in nonviolent action. According to Gandhi, "Suffering is the law of human beings; war is the law of the jungle. But suffering is infinitely more powerful than the law of the jungle for converting the opponent and opening his ears, which are otherwise shut, to the voice of reason… Suffering is the badge of the human race, not the sword."[7] This Gandhian idea of "self-suffering" may be looked upon as open recognition of the idea of interdependence and mutuality among social beings if one understands how Gandhi tried to explain what he meant by *sarvodaya* or "welfare of all."

As for his politics, Gandhi's idea of service to fellow human beings is a negation of the utilitarian principle of the "greatest good for the greatest possible number," which leaves no place for moral empathy and social self-sacrifice. Gandhi's emphasis on self-sacrifice and the capacity for service among human beings led him to criticise modern civilisation, which, according to him, had the pursuit of power, wealth, and pleasure as its predominant goals. A civilisation as such, which referred to itself as modern, did not take heed of morality as a stepping stone and guiding force for the construction of society. Consequently, Gandhi described what he considered "true civilisation" not as a linear progression of human kind, but rather as "good conduct" or a good way of life. In Gandhi's native Gujarati language, the word *sudharo* (civilisation) as opposed to *kudharo* (barbarism), implied that there is a higher mode of a conduct which leads to a better path of duty. This is important to note because duty has the connotation of a responsibility that is to endure under all circumstances, and it is duty that assists us in striving towards better conduct towards each other.

Gandhi saw a true civilisation as one that could attain the universal principles of morality. If a society was

---

4   M.K. Gandhi (1922). *Ethical Religion*. Madras: S.Ganesan, pp. 8-11.
5   *Harijan*, 20 April 1935.
6   *Young India*, March 1925.
7   Quoted in Thomas Pantham (1983). "Thinking with Mahatma: Beyond Liberal Democracy", *Political Theory*, vol.11, No. 2, May, p. 180.

not built on the foundations of ethics or morality, it would not be sustainable. Gandhi was deeply concerned with the moral and spiritual alienation of mankind, and his criticism of modernity and his approach of greater human solidarity to the problem of politics have to be seen in the context of this fundamental question. However, two questions remained for Gandhi: first, how does one go about emancipating civilisation from the maladies it produces? And second, how is a civilisation based on ethics and morality built? The answers to these questions can be found in Gandhi's major work entitled *Hind Swaraj*, in which he attempted to reconcile the question of Indian nationalism with his theoretical vision of civilisation. It was through the usage of his conceptual trinity of *swaraj*, *satyagraha* and *swadeshi* that Gandhi sought to reconcile, both practically and theoretically, the ailment of modern civilisation with a more sustainable and truer form of civilisation.

The first of the trinity was *swaraj*, or self-rule. Gandhi believed in a political community that included self-institution and self-rule as its foundations, leading to the growth of a truer moral civilisation and a common understanding of mutuality. In Gandhi's mind, *swaraj* would bring about social transformation through small-scale, decentralised, self-organised and self-directed participatory structures of governance. The second, *satyagraha*, or truth-force, involved voluntary suffering in the process of resisting evil. As has been explained by Joan V. Bondurant, "*Satyagraha* became something more than a method of resistance to particular legal norms; it became an instrument of struggle for positive objectives and for fundamental change." The third part of the trinity, *swadeshi*, or self-sufficiency, was considered by Gandhi as a way to improve economic conditions in India through the revival of domestic-made products and production techniques. As *swaraj* laid stress on self-governance through individuals and community building, *swadeshi* underlined the spirit of neighbourliness. As for *satyagraha*, it emphasised the principle that the whole purpose of an encounter with the unjust was not to win the confrontation, but to win over the heart and mind of the "enemy." Gandhi, therefore, believed that no true self-government could be achieved if there was no reform of the individual.

On this premise, Gandhi argued that the modern state as an institution was enmeshed in violence. Gandhi's criticism was not limited to the particular colonial state he was opposing, but was aimed at the fundamental rationale of the modern sovereign state itself. The key to this was, of course, the connection between political and moral sovereignty. As such, Gandhi believed that the centre of gravity of modern politics needed to be shifted back from the idea of material power and wealth to righteousness and truthfulness. In his

criticism of modernity, Gandhi saw modern civilisation as promoting ideals of power and wealth that were based on individual self-centeredness and causing the loss of community bonds that were contrary to the moral and spiritual common good (*dharma*). Therefore, as in the Hindu concept of *purusharthas*, meaning objectives of a human being, Gandhi advocated a life of balance, achievement and fulfilment. Ultimately in Gandhi's political philosophy the two concepts of self-government and self-sufficiency are tied into his political ideal of *Rama Rajya*, the sovereignty of people based on pure moral authority.

For Gandhi, therefore, politics is a constant self-realisation, self-reflection and self-reform within the individual. It is a process of self-rule through which citizens are able to contribute to the betterment of the community. Thus it goes without saying that Gandhi's nonviolence presupposes spiritual solidarity. Contrary to those who claim that Gandhi was a reactionary, it should be noted that his criticism of modern civilisation did not mean a return to the past. It was actually a move forward in human moral progress. Clearly Gandhi not only saw the need for fundamental change in the modern world but even recognised its inevitability. That is why his ideas have inspired people around the world, among them Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr. and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. King came to realise that Gandhi was the first person in history to re-invent the Christian ethic of love as "a potent instrument for social and collective transformation". It was then a short journey to unreserved acceptance of the Gandhian technique of nonviolence as the only viable means to overcome the problems faced by his people. Both King's and Gandhi's life-practices challenge our politics today: they represent a different image of human enlightenment, one that our world of violence direly needs as a method of reform.

These are truly interesting times to rethink a Gandhian moment of politics as a moral exercise of power. This is where the Gandhian spiritual approach to politics can be distinguished from the process of politicisation of politics and fundamentalist approaches to religion. Far from being utopian, the Gandhian approach can be seen as an ethical basis for the evaluation of existing political practices in today's world. As King once affirmed, "Timid supplication for justice will not solve the problem. We've got to confront the power structure massively."[8] In Gandhi's mind, democratising politics meant not only ending British colonialism but also taking nonviolent action on coercive power relations and unjust social structures. For him, the stability of human civilisation, the democratic potential of a community and the moral dignity of individuals depended on challenging the evils of the growing gap between the haves and

---

8   *The Washingtonian*, February 1968, p.53, quoted in James Echols (ed.), *I Have a Dream: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Future of Multicultural America*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, p. 19.

the have-nots. Therein lies the ultimate finality and power of the Gandhian moment. It was not just Gandhi's dream for India; it is a vision for humankind, with the powerful presence of the future for democratising modernity.

Basically speaking, if we are to recognise that we are in a new era where politics can be defined essentially as reducing violence and therefore creating the passage from hostility to hospitality, we must recognise that the Gandhian view of politics is not merely "the other possibility" for our world, but "the possibility realised in the first instance."[9] Furthermore, violence always remains, but as the Gandhian movement shows us, those who choose nonviolence must also make the effort to redefine and reconstruct politics as the transmutation of violence. For this reason, nonviolence is politics' point of departure, as well as its final goal. History bears witness, and everyday experience confirms that to make violence a political right and a moral duty is essentially a mistake. But it is also a mistake when politics becomes a vehicle for violence as soon as it is not founded on the ethical imperatives of solidarity and reciprocity. As such, nonviolence is the cornerstone of citizenship as a space of empowerment and self-government. That is why Gandhi believed in the exercise of active citizenship for a more enlightened and mature form of democracy. By this he meant that the success of democracy depends on its dialogical nature. The very essence of democracy, then, is the dialogue of citizens among themselves and the success of democracy is therefore the success of this dialogue. Therefore, the breakdown of dialogue always means a breakdown of democracy and the failure of the very foundations of the body politic.

Violence is liable to present itself as the ultimate means of expression of the anti-political. At the same time, we must understand this violence as an absence of a human environment that can foster the culture of tolerance and mutual respect. As we can see from the experience of nonviolence around the world in the past sixty years, the Gandhian idea only achieves its full existence when it is made flesh in exemplary human actions like those of King, Mandela and Tutu. Assuredly, prophetic nonviolent action is not easy in a time when the ultimate manifestation of power is military prowess. The Gandhian approach has political power because it is not just a dream, but an ethical vision. Ethical vision can be used to evaluate, to criticise, to guide, and to transform global citizenship to a civic movement of duty and responsibility. The Gandhian moment of politics is innovative and transformative, and not simply a calculation of static interest or balance of power. What it has shown us over the past sixty years, through different experiments with nonviolence around the world, is that we are not condemned to thinking about politics in purely strategic terms or as a mere mechanism to guarantee rights. The story of Gandhian nonviolence as a conscious political idea shows us how the act of negotiating relationships in a context of politicised divergences and differences pulls all parties, the strong and the weak, to an acknowledgment of a form of mutuality and solidarity with immediate ethical consequences. As such, the Gandhian moment of politics supports the civic capacity of citizens to redefine politics in relation to its explicit commonality, its feature of mutuality and a long-term guiding feature of a just society. Furthermore, it is not only about the value of engagement in public life, but also an ethos of a common world.

A final observation: today, the retreat of politics presents us with new and urgent problems. This retreat has led to outbreaks of great intolerance and violence. To reassert the primary value of politics as the civic capacity for mutuality and reciprocity, the Gandhian moment of politics can undoubtedly play a crucial role in pluralist sensitivity of civilisation. Gandhi's work and action make it clear that, while civilisation is rendered in the plural, its significant opposite remains the unethical feature of modernity. Gandhi equated the limits of ethics with the limits of civilisation. Moreover, he tried to reconstruct the grammar of civilisation by overcoming the social and political problems of violence. What is unique and innovative about the Gandhian approach is its capacity to make the idea of politics intelligible and appealing as a sphere of self-realisation and recognition of the other. That is to say, it demonstrates the alternative possibilities embedded within nonviolent tradition while revealing to future socio-political actors of nonviolence the basic conception of human solidarity and emancipative transformation.

Cited Works

ECHOLS, J. (ed.) (2004). *I Have a Dream: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Future of Multicultural America*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. P. 19.

GANDHI, M. K. (1922). *Ethical Religion*. Madras: S. Ganesan. Pp. 8-11

9   This expression is from the French philosopher Eric Weil in his book *Logique de la Philosophie*, Paris: Vrin, 1967, p. 69.

GANDHI, M. K. (1956). *Towards Everlasting Peace* (ed. A.T. Hingorani). Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. P. 217.

Harijan (20 April 1935).

MERTON, T. (ed.) (1965). *Gandhi on Non-Violence*: A Selection from the Writings of Mahatma Gandhi. New York: New Directions. P. 74.

PANTHAM, T. (1983). "Thinking with Mahatma: Beyond Liberal Democracy". *Political Theory*. Vol. 11, No. 2, May, p.180.

The Washingtonian (February 1968), p.53.

WEIL, E. (1967). *Logique de la Philosophie*. Paris: Vrin. P. 69.

Young India (March 1925).

Young India (14 April 1929).

Recommended citation

About the author

Ramin Jahanbegloo
ramin.jahanbegloo@utoronto.ca

Ramin Jahanbegloo is an Iranian-Canadian philosopher. He received his BA and MA in Philosophy, History and Political Science and later his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Sorbonne. He has worked as a lecturer and researcher at the Academy of Philosophy in Tehran, at the French Institute for Iranian Studies, at Harvard University, University of Toronto and at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi, India.

ARTICLE

The Meanings of Silence during Conflict

Renée Gendron

Abstract

This article focuses on the types and meanings of silence experienced during conflict. Silence is a form of communication that is cultural and context specific. Certain types of silence are constructive whilst other forms of silence can cause severe harm. This article explores the different types of silence experienced during a conflict. More specifically, this article examines the impacts of different types of silence on the mediation process.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines different types of silence experienced during a conflict. Silence is present in many conversations and, depending on the context, silence will have different effects and impacts on the nature of the conversation. Being able to better understand how silence impacts conflicts (both violent and non-violent), provides mediators with a better comprehension as to how to adjust the mediation process, where appropriate. Silence in the context of this article can mean two things. It can first mean a form of non-verbal communication in which neither of the parties speaks. Silence can also mean the ability of one party to stop a particular discussion. That is, one party is able to silence an issue, to avoid the matter being brought up and discussed.

This article presents problematic and constructive uses of silence and explores how silence is used in different contexts. From this, methods of incorporating constructive use of silence into mediation as well as techniques to remove destructive forms of silence from mediation are presented.

Here, conflict is described as behaviour that negatively impacts another individual or group. (Starks, 2006) Using this definition, conflict can be non-violent or violent, it can involve two or more parties, and it can entail a difference of opinion on, among other things, power, rights, interests, values or processes. The nature of a conflict may be immediate, as when two or more parties actually experience a conflict. It may also be intergenerational, when there is a conflict in one generation and the children become parties to the negative effects or outcomes of the conflict.

While the emphasis is on communication between two or more Western parties, a short discussion of the meaning of silence in non-Western cultures is also provided. The import and account of silence focuses on Western interpretations of silence. The author acknowledges that other cultures place different significance, meaning and interpretation on silence.

DEFINING SILENCE

Silence refers to the moments during a conversation in which verbal communication has ceased. The parties in the conversation may feel they have nothing left to say, cannot offer a response, require time to formulate a response or fully comprehend emotions. Silence can be a manifestation of power, the action of one party refusing to discuss one or

more topics another party wishes to consider. Silence can also be an opportunity for the parties to reflect on what has been said and to consider ways forward. The absence of verbal communication however, does not automatically mean that communication is not occurring. The temporary cessation of conversation has different impacts on the flow of communication. It may deepen one's comprehension of another's point of view or it may severely impede the ability of another party to fully express their opinion, thoughts and emotions.

Muldoon (1996) suggested that silence is more than the absence of noise. The context in which the silence occurs also has an impact on how it is experienced and interpreted. For Muldoon, there are different types of silence, including 'deep silence', 'true silence', and 'open silence'. Depending on the specific kind of silence being experienced by the individual, the meaning drawn from the silence varies greatly.

Madonik (2001) observed that silence is part of paralanguage as silence contains meaning. The specific context in which silence is experienced will influence the overall conversation as well as the interpretation of the communication. Poyatos (2002) argued that stillness and silence are communication systems within themselves. Both stillness and silence occur within the broader context of social interaction.

While Muldoon postulated the qualities of silence, Poyatos further argued that silence has multiple possible meanings, rather than a singular essential meaning. More specifically, the larger series of communication interactions between individuals of the same culture creates patterns of silence and stillness. When individuals from different cultures communicate, they may and do use silence in different ways to mean different things. Due to a difference in communication systems between the parties, what they believe they are communicating with their silence is not necessarily how that silence is being interpreted.

Three areas have been identified in which silence arises during mediation. It may be an indication of fear, a cultural communication pattern, or concern. Silence in the context of fear may indicate a significant power imbalance between the parties or it may mean that the subject matter is culturally sensitive: fear about a culturally sensitive matter or unease about discussing a particular subject. There are differences in perceptions (positive and negative) of silence in cultural communication patterns. Silence over a specific issue may denote that the parties are not yet comfortable discussing a specific topic, may not have the communication tools to adequately address a topic or they may experience a power imbalance that impedes a more thorough exploration of the subject. One or more of the parties may also be unduly exercising their power to remove or negate a specific subject from being addressed or put on the agenda.

PROBLEMATIC USES OF SILENCE

Problematic uses of silence are those that damage the relationship between the parties. Use of silence that involves harm to conflicting parties, may indicate an unexpressed mass trauma that needs to be addressed or may be evidence of uses (or abuses) of power. The specific dynamics of a particular power relationship may put additional strain on the parties, causing further disempowerment and subsequent harm to one or more of the parties.

Silence in the case of mass trauma

Wajnryb (2001, p.82) suggested that silence is often a means of communicating that which can not be communicated. In her book, Wajnryb recounted the story of a Holocaust survivor who returned to her village after the war. The survivor's family had been taken to the concentration camps and killed. In this situation, the survivor could not find adequate words to convey what it meant to have had all of her family killed. Wajnryb commented, "After sifting through a few other verbal options, she is reduced to silence, as the only appropriate response to such a catastrophe".

In some circumstances, the trauma resulting from an event is not easily expressed. In an effort to come to some resolution, discussion of the event may be restricted or denied. This type of silence can be crippling for the individuals and groups that experience the event in person. This negative silence can also have extremely detrimental effects on indirect parties, such as the children of survivors. An example of negative silence is that around the physical, emotional, psychological and sexual abuse of First Nations (aboriginal) children in residential schools in Canada. Silence was used by the more powerful party to deny the experience and the retelling of the experiences of an individual or a group. In denying the ability and the space to share, bring to light and explain experiences, the conflict is aggravated, the social isolation worsened and the emotional chasm between the parties deepened (Woolner, 2009).

In situations in which there is a significant power imbalance between the parties, more time can be created to allow the disadvantaged or less powerful party to fully express and articulate their point of view, interests and concerns.

Silence in the context of power

There are many other ways in which silence can be detrimental, not only as a means of ignoring a particular dispute or issue, but also as a means of disempowering and otherwise reducing the quality of the interaction and of the overall relationship. Silence can be used as a tool of aggression, during a specific interaction and also as a tool

in a larger strategy of aggression aimed at an individual or a group (Lusternberger and Williams, 2009).

The reasons for silence in the context of a conflict may relate to issues of power. A conflict becomes destructive when the quality of the relationship between the parties is diminished or otherwise harmed. Types of relational harm include violence, cessation of the relationship, bullying and detrimental changes to the organisation or context in which the relationship occurs. (Conflict Research Consortium, 1998).

The party with the most power may be preventing opportunities to discuss an item or an event. This may further disempower the other party, leading to a situation in which a mutually satisfactory resolution to the conflict may not be possible. In situations in which there is violence or other forms of abuse (such as domestic violence), silence negates the situation of those abused and oppressed and legitimates the actions of those committing repression (Cobb, 1997; Burns, 2008). Silence is, in this case, the ability to not bring up a point or an event. In not discussing an event, it is being silenced and subsequently, the aggrieved party can not recount the totality of events from their point of view. In this instance, the influence or power of one party over the process determines the topics discussed, the length of time spent on each topic and the offers of resolution. If one party is significantly more powerful, they may consistently offer potential resolutions that ignore or exclude a particular point or grievance of the counter-party. This further silences the issue, increasing the power imbalance and prolonging the silence. Other tactics that may be used by the more powerful party include ignoring requests for discussion, continued refusal to answer direct questions, and intentionally delaying actions agreed-upon. While some of these behaviours can and do occur out of genuine time and resource constraints, the consistent and often systematic under-resourcing of a particular relationship increases the silence over the power dynamics and subsequently reduces meaningful opportunities for all parties to the conflict to reach a durable win-win resolution.

Silence in the form of not providing sufficient information can have destructive effects on an individual, a series of relationships or an organisation. For example, a bullied co-worker is intentionally denied access to information and computer programmes that are necessary for their job. Silence, when used to control and deny information to others, will reduce trust levels between the parties. Silence can oblige individuals to try to fill in the missing pieces of information, giving rise to inaccurate perceptions, misunderstandings, and rumours. Rumours can in turn lead back to the source of the silence, the individual or the party that does not divulge more or all available information, causing more distrust by the counter-parties and other interested parties, leading to further restriction of access to accurate, timely and truthful information.

Not only does silence in the context of power have the ability to determine what is being discussed, the depth in which it is discussed and the possible resolution options, but also the time for the discussion. The resolution process may include opportunities to discuss items that the more powerful party may not be interested in discussing, and the amount and quality of the time spent on these matters, or resources in general, may not be made available. While the issue at hand is not necessarily silence itself, the manner in which the issue is addressed, can be a form of silence. Also, the speed at which an item is discussed will influence the power dynamics of mediation. The more powerful party may not be inclined to spend much time on the matter, so the totality of the issue is not fully explored and some key aspects may in effect be silenced.

CONSTRUCTIVE USES OF SILENCE

Constructive uses of silences are silences that enhance and strengthen communication between the parties. Constructive uses of silence create comfortable spaces within the discussion and the overall relationship to reflect, empathise and gain greater insight into one's own emotions, thoughts and actions, as well as the counter-parties' emotions, thoughts and actions.

Silence is part of non-verbal communication. In Western cultures, there is a strong cultural preference to avoid silence during conversations. Informal conventions around social etiquette put strong social pressure on people to keep a conversation going and to fill in the silences.

In other cultures, silence does not have the same social meaning. In communication styles of other cultures, such as First Nations in Canada, silence is not something to be filled. It is an accepted, normal part of any verbal communication and the participants in the conversation do not feel pressured or rushed to fill the silence. In Chinese and Japanese cultures, silence has a positive connotation. Often in non-aboriginal North American cultures, any silence in conversations is considered an embarrassment. (Madonik, 2001)

The meaning of silence depends on the context in which it occurs. The mediator and the parties to the discussion may have agreed to include stages of silent reflection. Silence can be a time for the participants to take a break from the conversation. This may facilitate a pause from the intensity of the mediation process, allowing time for the participants to engage in self-reflection or change their thoughts to a completely different subject matter (Front, 2008).

Silence can be a turning point within a conversation. Such turning points can have positive and negative aspects, depending on how the participants use the silence. One of

the key factors in how participants use the silence is their level of emotional intelligence (Salvoney & Mayer, 1990). If the participants evaluate the mood of the counter-party/ies as hurt or hostile, they may use the silence to formulate a response that will reduce tension or clarify previous statements so as to reduce the harm done. However, if one or more of the parties does not have a sufficient level of emotional intelligence, silence can be used to inflict more injury (consciously or unconsciously) onto the other party and may inject more hostility in the communication and the overall relationship.

Silence in the context of mediation

Silence can be an opportunity for mediators to allow the participants time to reflect. It can provide opportunities, during a specific session or in the overall process, for parties to consider options presented and discussed. Silence can also maintain a party's prominence in the resolution process. Instead of the mediator or facilitator feeling compelled to fill the void in verbal communication, silence can also put the onus on the disputing parties to seek out and discuss possible resolutions. In removing the mediator or the facilitator from this particular part of the discussion, the parties to the conflict may be more inclined to offer more or new information, or different options.

Silence can also indicate that there is an emotion, motivation or intent that is not being fully addressed or discussed during the process. The silence of one party, or the unwillingness to fully explore a specific issue, is a good opportunity to caucus, bring to light a specific topic and possibly provide opportunities to renegotiate the overall mediation process (Krivis, 2007).

There may be circumstances in which elevated levels of risk or threat overwhelm the individual. Although some may choose aggression as a response, many opt for silence. Eckersley (2002, p.32) incorporating Macy's work, on the human need for hope, states that "'numbing the psyche' takes a heavy toll, including an impoverishment of emotional and sensory life". Thus, in the case of mediation, silence may be an indication that one or more of the parties has lost confidence (hope) in the process or in a reasonable solution being reached.

Silence, emotional intelligence and mediation

Emotional intelligence in the context of both conflict and mediation has an introspective and a communicative dimension. The parties to a conflict can pause, maintain silence, and contemplate their own as well as their counter-party's perspective. Salovey et al. have argued that emotional intelligence can help an individual "generate or emulate vivid emotions to facilitate judgements and memories concerning feelings" and that emotional intelligence includes the "ability to interpret complex feeling such as emotional blends and contradictory feeling states" (Salovey, Detweiler-Bedell, Detweiler-Bedell and Mayer, 2008, p. 535). Where appropriate, silence can provide and facilitate opportunities for individual reflection. In a conversation, silence can provide a space in which the parties reflect and gain greater comprehension of the counter-party's comments. Upon further discussion, they may decide on a further process in which one or more of the parties works on one or more of the four branches of emotional intelligence defined Salovey and Grewal (2005).

The first branch pertains to the *perception of emotions* and refers to the degree of accuracy in perception and correctly identifying emotion in oral communication, cultural objects and facial expressions. The second branch of emotional intelligence concerns the *use of emotions*. Salovey and Grewal argued that this branch relates to channelling emotions to enhance cognition, thinking and problem solving. The third is the *comprehension of emotions*. It requires the individual to "comprehend emotion language and to appreciate complicated relationships among emotions". The fourth branch pertains to the *managing of emotions,* the ability and degree to which an individual is aware of and monitors their own emotions. This requires that the individual is cognizant of the fact that their emotions in relation to a person or event do change over time. It is also related to the ability of an individual to manage the emotions of another, meaning that an individual can harness their own emotions and facilitate an emotional response in others. Salovey and Grewal provide the example of a politician harnessing their anger towards a situation and using that anger during a speech to solicit engagement and action by the audience (Salovey & Grewal, 2005, p.p. 281-282).

Altering the mediation process to include a further process can involve coaching, receipt of training, time and/or space for reflection, as well as the inclusion of an advocate for any of the parties during the mediation. Each of these actions or a combination of these process modifications can help one or more of the parties increase their emotional intelligence.

If the mediator determines that the silence experienced between the parties is negative or destructive, they can work with one or all of the parties to increase their levels of emotional intelligence. One party may be incorrectly interpreting the intent and the essence of the communication and take offence. Conversely, a party may be inadvertently communicating an honest message with a possible mutually agreeable solution in an aggressive or otherwise hostile manner. Given the method of presentation, the message is not well received and the receiver is injured by the message. Using Salovey and Grewal's four branches of emotional intelligence (perception, use, com-

prehension and managing of emotion), relevant observations can be made and appropriate questions can be asked. The parties may take additional time to discuss how they interpret emotions in themselves as well as in the counter-parties. This exercise sheds more light on previous communications and events, enhancing the overall mediation experience. It can also improve the quality of dialogue between the participants who are making progress, as they gain increased awareness of their own emotions, of how those emotions are received by the counter-parties and how their behaviours influence the overall interaction within the mediation.

In terms of the process, there are several ways in which silence can be accommodated. The mediator must first appreciate the needs of the specific parties to the conflict. There may be an inherent power imbalance, a particularly sensitive topic is to be discussed, or the parties to the conflict may be from different cultural backgrounds in which the role of silence in communication is significantly different. There may also be several issues that need to be discussed and resolved, as well as a situation in which there is incomplete or inaccurate information.

Periods of silence can be built into the process, allowing for predetermined and agreed periods of reflection. The mediator can make it known at the beginning of each session that periods of silence will not be interrupted, and only the parties at the table will have the power to break the silence.

Another method of adapting the process to better meet the needs of the participants, specifically related to the use of silence, can be by slowing down the overall process itself. Instead of having one session with the expectation that it will address and resolve all issues, the process itself can be divided into different sittings. This will create time between sessions, allowing the participants time to reflect and evaluate where they are during the process. The time in between sessions can be a period of non-contact between the parties, in effect creating silence.

Process specific aspects of intergenerational conflicts

In the context of addressing intergenerational silence of Germany families on the Holocaust and World War II, Schwan (2001, p.132) argued that the following items need to be addressed:

1. Recognising the facts
2. Understanding the moral significance
3. Emotional participation
4. Emotional conflict
5. Integration of knowledge, meaning and conflicting emotional reactions into a moral system

In many ways, Schwan's suggestions are directly pertinent to mediation and the specific mediation process. In order for more information to be shared between the participants in mediation, they must recognize the facts. There may be some dispute about the nature of the facts, and the mediation process may first need to focus on having the parties discuss the facts and determine which are relevant, and assess why they are important to the matter at hand. In so doing, the participants are negotiating and assigning a moral significance to the facts considered as well as those not considered. As more information comes to light during the discussions between the participants, the parties to the conflict can, when inclined, become more emotionally and constructively engaged in finding a mutually acceptable resolution. As a consequence of these negotiations, the participants may find and implement a solution, and this resolution may be carried forward to other facets of the participants' lives, thereby cementing this resolution into their own personal moral system.

Active listening

A facilitator's or a mediator's active listening skills are exercised when determining what kind of silence is being experienced. Salem (2003) defined active listening as listening that builds trust between the parties as well as creating opportunities for the participants to fully disclose their emotions in a trusting environment. In other words, active listening allows the parties to feel comfortable when divulging their experiences and emotions in a constructive and non-abusive way. Salem (2003) suggested that active listening requires the parties to not interrupt one another, to demonstrate empathy to the counter-party and to reflect and appreciate the meaning of what the speakers are saying. Wold (2004) defined empathetic or active listening as focusing on understanding the other person. In other words, the listener is actively and intently paying attention to the context of the story as opposed to just the facts involved in the story.

In order to determine how silence can impact the mediation process, the mediator must first determine what kind of silence is being experienced. If the silence is simply a cultural method of communication in which time to reflect is needed or, if the silence is a wounded silence, during which one or more of the parties have withdrawn from the process. Then the facilitator or mediator can act appropriately. For example, if the mediator determines the silence to be a cultural method of communication, the mediator may respect the silence. If the mediator determines the silence to be harmful to one of the parties, explicitly stating this observation to all the parties, they may prompt a discussion on the topic or increase self-awareness of the parties, as sometimes the more powerful party imposing the silence may not be aware of the harm being done to the other party.

CONCLUSION

This article argues that silence can and does occur in different types of conflicts, including, but not limited to, two party personal conflicts and intergenerational conflicts. Silence occurs in many settings, sometimes having positive outcomes, when it allows the parties time to reflect, to reconsider and to phrase their responses more appropriately.

This article also explores the destructive uses of silences. Silence can be a tool used by a more powerful party to deny recognition of an experience or event. Silence can be used to gain and manipulate information, denying other interested parties opportunities to more meaningfully contribute to the interaction. For example, in workplace settings, management may intentionally or unintentionally use silence to keep information away from employees. In restricting access to information, the quality of the relationship is diminished as trust and opportunities for more substantive engagement by employees in the organisation are diminished.

However, when emotional intelligence is actively used by the parties to a conflict, as well as by the mediator, silence can provide significant opportunities to gain insights and empathy with the counter-parties. Through these moments of greater clarity and depth of understanding, the parties can explore and discuss more meaningful and appropriate options for a mutually acceptable resolution.

As there are many forms of silence, with many different meanings, silence does not always need to be addressed quietly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

References

BURNS, S. E. (2008). "Thinking about Fairness and Achieving Balance in Mediation". *Fordham Ubran Law Journal.* Vol. 35, iss. 1, pp. 39-81.

COBB, S. (1997). "The Domestication of Violence in Mediation" [online]. *Law &* Society. Vol. 31, iss. 3.
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3757/is_199701/ai_n8751408/?tag=content;col1>

CONFLICT RESEARCH CONSORTIUM (1998). Glossary [online]. International Online Training Program On Intractable Conflict, University of Colorado.
<http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/glossary.htm>

ECKERSLEY, R. (2002). "Future Visions, Social Realities, and Private Lives: Young People and Their Personal Well-Being". In: J. GIDLEY; S. INAYATULLAH (eds.). *Youth Futures: Comparative Research and Transformative* Visions. Westport CT: Praeger. Pp. 31-41.

FRONT, J. (2008). "A Quiet Revolution". *Psychotherapy Networker.* Vol. 32, iss. 1.

KRIVIS, J. (2007). "The Art of Attorney Mediation: 10 Ways to Improve Your Law Practice Using Negotiation Skills". *Dispute Resolution Journal.* Vol. 62, iss. 1, pp. 22-41.

LUSTENBERGER, D. E.; WILLIAMS, K. D. (2009). "Ostracism in Organizations". In: J. GREENBERG; M.S. EDWARDS (eds.). *Voice and Silence in* Organizations. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. Pp. 97-108.

MADONIK, B. G. (2001). *I Hear What You Say, but What Are You Telling Me? The Strategic Use of Nonverbal Communication in Mediation.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

MULDOON, M. S. (1996). "Silence Revisited: Taking the Sight Out of Auditory Qualities" [online]. *Review of Metaphysics.* Iss. 50.
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3545/is_n2_v50/ai_n28678380/>

POYATOS, F. (2002). *Nonverbal Communication across Disciplines. Volume II: Paralanguage, kinesics, silence, personal and environmental interaction.* Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Co.

SALEM, R. (2003). "Empathetic Listening. Beyond Intractability" [online]. Beyond Intractability: A Free Knowledge Base on More Constructive Approaches to Destructive Conflict .
<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/empathic_listening/>

SALOVEY, P; DETWEILER-BEDELL, B. T.; DETWEILER-BEDELL, J. B.; MAYER, J. D. (2008). "Emotional Intelligence". In: M. LEWIS; J. M. HAVILAND-JONES; L. FELDMAN BARRETT (eds). *Handbook of Emotions.* New York: The Guilford Press. 3rd Edition. Pp. 533-547.

SALOVEY, P.; MAYER, J. D. (1990). "Emotional Intelligence". Imagination, Cognition, and Personality. Iss. 9, pp. 185-211.

SCHWAN, G. (2001). Politics and Guilt: The Destructive Power of Silence. Thomas Dunlap (trans.)   Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska.

STARKS, G. L. (2006). "Managing Conflict in Public Organizations: Conflict Can Be Recognized, Tackled, and Resolved in Five Not-so-easy steps" [online]. The Public Manager.
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HTO/is_4_35/ai_n25000254/>

WAJNRYB, R. (2001). Silence: How Tragedy Shapes Talk. Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin.

WOLD, G. (2003). Basic Geriatric Nursing. St. Louis, Missouri: Mosby.

Recommended citation

About the author

Renée Gendron
rgendron@ciian.org

Renée Gendron, MA, is an associate for the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation.

Journal of **Conflictology**

CONFLICTOLOGY IN PRACTICE

The Neuro-Linguistic Programming Approach to Conflict Resolution, Negotiation and Change

Eduard F. Vinyamata Tubella

Abstract

Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) can bring new perspectives and new results to any endeavour involving personal (i.e. internal) and interpersonal communication. The organisation of information to achieve results is at the core of NLP and also a frequent goal for interpersonal conflict managers such as arbiters, mediators and negotiators. This article sheds light on one particular NLP tool, namely chunking.

Chunking is a direct application of the NLP Meta-model, a communications model used to find and challenge linguistic distortions in the client's language. Chunking deals with information size and direction. Information can be chunked up or down in size and can be moved laterally to find alternative examples of a concept at the same level of information.

In a conflict resolution or mediation setting, chunking up can be a guide to reach an initial agreement level, a compromise between the parties. Chunking down, on the other hand can be used to deal with specific problems and find a leverage point to make a breakthrough. Overall, NLP technologies such as chunking can bring performance, alternative methodologies and solutions at times where the highest academic approaches are not enough.

Keywords

neuro-linguistic programming, conflict resolution, chunking, information management

INTRODUCTION TO NLP AND HOW IT RELATES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP) can bring new perspectives and, most importantly, results, to any endeavour involving personal (i.e. internal) and interpersonal communication.

The author learned this precise fact first hand, on returning from an NLP Licensed Practitioner course and going back to Social Psychology in Harvard in the summer of 2009.

We were presenting our final papers to the class to get comments from both teacher and classmates on our chosen topic and focus. The first student of the afternoon stood up and explained she'd like to write about flying-related phobias. A personal experience had kindled her interest in the topic: on her last plane trip she was seated next to a man who was terrified of flying. Trying to help, she had asked him: "How is your relationship with your mother?"

A classroom full of bright people found that line of questioning perfectly reasonable. Including the teacher, who congratulated the student on her, ultimately fruitless, efforts.

Meanwhile, experienced NLP practitioners were permanently eliminating clients' phobias in less than 30 minutes, no intimate questions asked. Perhaps, then, NLP technology could bring performance, methodology, solutions

and attitude even in instances where the highest academic approaches simply did not.

NLP started as an exercise in modelling excellence. Richard Bandler and John Grinder studied the best therapists of the 1970s looking for the unconscious strategies that set the best above and beyond their peers. They were looking for what Robert Dilts, one of NLP's main developers, defines as "the difference that makes the difference" (Dilts, 2009). The result of this initial modelling work is found in the two volume book "The Structure of Magic", by Richard Bandler and John Grinder.

Today, a few decades later, John Grinder still defines NLP as "the modelling of excellence and the application of this modelling" (Grinder, 2009). Robert Dilts goes into a bit more detail by listing the result of 40 years of such modelling: a broad set of "tools for dreamers, methods, skills, models that help people live their dreams" (Dilts, 2009).

The organisation of information to achieve results is at the core of Neuro-Linguistic Programming, and one of the areas of knowledge at which NLP excels. The organisation of information in such a way is also a frequent goal for interpersonal conflict managers such as arbiters, mediators and negotiators. People in all of these professions, then, will surely find excellent tools to add to their professional toolset. One of these NLP tools, chunking, is outlined on the following pages.

A word of caution before we begin: This is an introductory text meant to awaken the interest of the reader in the possibilities of the NLP approach applied to Conflict Resolution. It is not a deep study of the NLP tools put forward and none of the technologies, methodology or ideas presented are originally from this author. To find more about each of them, go to the references, which contain the original sources and the authors I mention throughout the text, who deserve all the credit.

## INTRODUCTION TO THE META MODEL & CHUNKING

What is chunking?

To answer that, we must first take a small step back and look into one of NLP's axioms: "The map is not the territory" (Bandler and LaValle, 2006).

Citing the Licensed Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming® training manual, "The basic principle here is that people end up in pain, not because the world is not rich enough to allow them to satisfy their needs, but because their representation of the world is impoverished" (Bandler and LaValle, 2006). NLP practitioners work on ways to enrich their clients' maps, their representations of the world. This is done by using the Meta Model, and one of the many applications of the Meta Model is, precisely, chunking.

Chunking deals with information size and direction. Information can be chunked up or down in size and can be moved right or left. A visual aid of two arrows crossing each other at the centre is usually used.

We can place a specific representation of the world, an idea, an argument etc., at the central point where the two arrows cross each other. Let's look at an example, with the idea of a house.

We can "chunk up" an idea by moving it towards its perceived purpose or its bigger picture. In the case of a house we could increasingly chunk up the idea to a shelter, a living space, a home, an outward expression of ourselves, and so forth, up to the highest, most abstract level of information we can think of.

Alternatively, we can "chunk down" an idea by breaking it into smaller pieces: exploring specifics and details. Out of an idea of a house we could look into its structural configuration and materials, surrounding soil composition and so on, down to the most concrete and specific level of information we can think of.

Finally we can move the idea laterally, through all the possible examples of it at the same level of information. In our starting house example, we could differentiate between its uses (business, storage, residence). If we "chunk down" the idea of house to its construction year, for example, we can move laterally by decade of construction. We can do the same in terms of architectural styles and periods, or concepts such as size or number of floors.

Yet another example: the idea of a cat. It can be chunked up as a feline, or further up to explain it is an animal. It may also be chunked down to its details, such as breed, fur colour or type. Much like in our house example, lateral chunking would open up a catalogue of variations on a given level

of information. For example, if we chunk down the idea of a cat to its breed type, we can distinguish between Persian, Siamese, Somali, etc.

In a conflict resolution setting, chunking up allows us to ultimately reach an agreement level. Communicating on a meta level of information, agreements might be easier to achieve, which is not only a starting point, but might be used to lead the resolution process towards further agreements. Meanwhile, chunking down sometimes helps when dealing with a big problem, or when looking for leverage with which to make a breakthrough. Further detail shows how this could work in a mediation setting.

THE NLP PROCESS FOR CHANGE & CHUNKING

The NLP Process for Change decorates, together with a dozen more illustrations and ideas, the NLP training rooms. It is simple:

1. Build the desired state first;
2. Elicit the present state;
3. Choose and apply the intervention

(Bandler and LaValle, 2006).

To both build and elicit states (step one and two) we will use the concept of chunking, so an imaginary negotiation situation would follow this structure:

1. Start by chunking up (finding a desired state);
2. Follow by chunking down (finding a leverage point from the present state);
3. And end by choosing and agreeing on a new goal.

We complement the aforementioned NLP Process for Change by checking the ecology of our new found goal, testing it and future pacing it. These last three steps are all an integral part of NLP interventions in general and are explained at the end.

Overall, the process involves many new concepts for the uninitiated, but it is in fact quite simple when taken step by step. This will become clear as we work on an example, defining each concept on the way.

CHUNKING UP TO CHANGE OUR MINDS

The very first exercise NLP practitioners learn is to feel good for no reason at all. The idea behind the exercise is that when people feel bad they do not make good decisions. We do not want ourselves or our clients making bad decisions, so we learn to feel good for no reason at all. When it comes

to solving problems, Albert Einstein said something along the very same line of reasoning: "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them".

That is precisely the approach to conflict resolution in NLP: it first clearly identifies what the conflicting issue is and then "we 'chunk it up' one level above the conflict to find consensus with respect to 'higher level' positive intentions" (Dilts, 1997). Such positive intentions are always there, according to another NLP axiom: "There is a positive intention motivating every behaviour; and a context in which every behaviour has value" (Bandler and LaValle, 2006).

We can look at a hypothetic example of a young couple. She wants to have children. He does not. At this level of thinking, their positions are opposed. What happens when we chunk up each of their points of view? For her, having children could be a way to access the full range of experiences their relationship has to offer. For him, not having children could be the way to get the most of their present relationship stage. When chunked up, their positions are no longer in full opposition.

As higher levels of interest are elicited, intention and behaviour start to separate and ultimately, common ground can be reached. In this hypothetic example, chunking up from opposite points of view led to the realisation that both members of the couple could agree on the fact that their relationship had become the foundation of their happiness. Such an agreement "(...) does not mean that either party has to accept the method with which the other is attempting to satisfy the positive intention, nor does it mean that either party has to compromise their position" (Dilts, 1997). However, when positive intentions are recognised as such and an agreement is found, we can move on to the next step in the process.

CHUNKING DOWN TO FIND LEVERAGE

Ian Ross gives an interpretation of the chunking model that is especially clarifying at the chunking down step: "The purpose of this step is to establish the main barriers that currently affect the resolution of the problem or the achievement of the outcome" (Ross, 2004). Once the barriers have been established, a leverage point will be identified. A leverage point is "the one thing which, if it were resolved, would have the effect of negating the impact of all the other barriers" (Ross, 2004).

In practical terms, the first thing to do to chunk down is to ask what stops this from being resolved. This question will inevitably chunk down the conflict to its details, probably as several roadblocks or barriers. Yet this process will spring directly from a previous agreement frame, rather

than from the kind of thinking that originated the problem. Moreover, the idea is not to work on the problems individually, but to find (as when chunking up) common ground. Ross puts it in the following way: "What is common to all these problems?", "What drives all these barriers?" (Ross, 2004).

Following up on the hypothetic example, the woman could chunk down her demand and identify the following problems: "I don't want to be an old mother" or "I want us to build a family", among others. The man could chunk down his demand and identify the following problems: "Children are expensive" or "Children are time consuming", among others.

Identifying all the problematic details each party can come up with helps to understand the other side of the argument and perhaps raises points that had not been thought of. Doing this from an initial agreement frame, not stopping to go deeper into each problem but focusing instead on finding the commonalities in all of them, puts our clients in the best position to give shape to an agreement. At this point, lateral chunking, or the exploring of alternatives, might give us even more resources to reach an agreement. To come to a solution Dilts suggests "a mixture of the two existing choices, but should include at least one alternative that is completely distinct from the two in conflict" (Dilts, 1997).

Regarding our hypothetic example, we could reach a mixed solution, for example to have children but not yet. We could work on redistributing economic resources to be able to pay for a nanny. We could also come up with a completely different alternative, such as getting married and enjoying a trip around the world, as a first step to building a family. Whatever the new goal is, it should "satisfy the common intention and the individual positive intentions with the greatest positive impact systemically" (Dilts, 1997).

CHECKING FOR ECOLOGY AND FUTURE PACING

Whatever solution this process leads us to, it must not only resolve the conflict, but must also be aligned with each person's environment or community. In NLP, this verification is called "checking for ecology". In this context it boils down to working out whether the agreement will positively affect the client's family, friends, job, economy, health, etc, so any agreement will have to be adjusted or reworked altogether if it is detrimental to the client's ecosystem.

Checking for ecology is only one of the conditions that NLP practitioners take into account to determine the validity of the desired states or the desired outcomes of their clients. The rest of the conditions are beyond the scope of this article, but are greatly in detail on the Licensed Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming® course.

Once a solution has been validated for ecology, the last thing to do is to test it. In NLP, everything is tested before being approved. One way to test the acceptance of the new goal or agreement is to 'future pace' it. Future pacing is "the process of mentally rehearsing oneself through some future situation to help ensure that the desired behaviour will occur naturally and automatically" (Bandler and LaValle, 2006). Helping the client do that in the most effective way is, again, beyond the scope of this text. It is covered in the Licensed Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming® course, which also gives the tools to calibrate our client's conscious and unconscious responses to the tests.

References

BANDLER, Richard,. LAVALLE, John; LAVALLE, Kathleen (2006). *Licensed Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming®*. Training Manual. NLP Seminars Group International.

DILTS, Robert (1997). "Resolving Conflicts with NLP" [online article]. UNLP. [Date of consultation: January 17, 2011].
<http://www.nlpu.com/Articles/artic11.htm>

DILTS, Robert (2009). How would you describe NLP? [Youtube video]. UNLP. [Date of consultation: January 17, 2011]
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCEFD4a6524>

GRINDER, John (2009). What is NLP? [Youtube video]. UNLP. [Date of consultation: January 17, 2011].
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJzO5x6ko6w>

HARRIS, Kevin (1995). "Collected Quotes from Albert Einstein" [online]. Standford University. [Date of consultation: January 17, 2011].
<http://rescomp.stanford.edu/~cheshire/EinsteinQuotes.html>

ROSS, Ian (2004). "NLP in Business: Modeling Conflict Resolution" [online article]. Vievolve. [Date of consultation: January 17, 2011].
<http://www.vievolve.com/ModellingConflictResolution.aspx>

Recommended citation

About the author

Eduard F. Vinyamata Tubella
vinyamata@gmail.com

Eduard F. Vinyamata Tubella holds a Media Major from the Universitat Ramón Llull and studied Interpersonal Communication at New York University and Social Psychology at Harvard University. He is licensed and certified as Practitioner of Neuro-Linguistic Programming® by Richard Bandler and the LaValle team. Eduard F. Vinyamata has over 13 years of international experience in media and marketing, most as an entrepreneur. He is currently working as a research consultant and co-founding partner at Bamboo.

CAMPUS FOR PEACE | **UOC** Universitat Oberta de Catalunya www.uoc.edu

PIONEERS

Breaking through Walls: A Look at the Life of Leif Hovelsen

Christoph Beat Spreng

Abstract

As a student, Hovelsen was active in the resistance against the Nazi occupation of Norway. He was betrayed to the SS, got arrested and was taken to Grini Concentration Camp. There he was put into solitary confinement and was interrogated, tortured and threatened with a death sentence.

A profound transformation came about which led Hovelsen to devote his life to reconciliation between individuals and nations. This experience brought him to the industrial Ruhr area of Germany where he worked with others to build up a new, different kind of country. Informally, and in hindsight, effectively, he later contributed to a new relationship between the governments of Bonn and Oslo.

Still later he was engaged in creating coalitions of conscience on both sides of what was still the Iron Curtain; a personal contribution to what became visible by the fall of the Berlin Wall and also the Glasnost and Perestroika process.

Keywords

concentration camps, forgiveness, European reconstruction, citizen diplomacy, initiatives for change

1. BACKGROUND AND FAMILY

Leif Hovelsen had a modest, wholesome family upbringing. His father was a sportsman, and a professional skier. He was known to have made a ski-jump whilst playing a Souza tune on his accordion without interruption, and eventually became famous in the USA, touring with the renowned Barnum & Bailey Circus and promoting skiing in the State of Colorado. For papa Hovelsen hardly anything seemed impossible to do. Leif's mother was the devoted caregiver and believer. Leif seemed to thrive during his school years in Oslo. And with the war of ideas at large in the Europe of the 1930s his eager mind and heart grappled with concepts in philosophy and psychology. His childhood beliefs seemed too small to him now. Although attracted by the writings of Karl Marx, he was not convinced by them and continued searching for an all-embracing perspective. He was keen to be somewhere at the forefront. And sure enough, with the occupation of Norway by Nazi Germany, it did not take long before a clandestine shortwave radio receiver was mounted underneath the desk in his room. He had just begun his university studies and would excuse himself from the family room to 'do homework upstairs'. But he was listening to messages of the exiled King Haakon VII and government from London, distributing them via underground press and eventually being responsible for equipping others with shortwave receivers. In his

autobiographical book[1] he writes about these days: "Mother was suspicious at my eagerness to do homework. One day she surprised me when she entered my room. I had forgotten to lock it. I feared that my enterprise was foiled, at least in our home. But smilingly she asked: 'Would you also get me a headset?' Later, the three of us would often sit there and listen."

2. WAR, PRISON CAMP

"It was night time. Somebody was hammering on the house door and woke me up. I was afraid. Suddenly boots thumped up the stairs and the door was pushed open. The Gestapo!", writes Hovelsen. He had been betrayed. He was picked up on 9 June 1943, and taken to the well-known Grini Concentration Camp and tortured for most of the nearly two years he was held there, at times moved to the occupiers' headquarters in down-town Oslo for interrogation.

Camp life had many aspects. There was the pressure to conform to the ideas of people of a certain mindset, the temptation to compromise, as well as a little space for heroism. All of this formed a tough learning environment. For the first time, he also met people from other strata of Norwegian society. In some way, the inmates represented a cross section of the country's elite, such as an econometrist who was to later win the Nobel Prize. But between themselves they also mirrored pre-war domestic divisions. Some more senior prisoners eventually became his esteemed conversation partners. Eiliv Skard, a history professor, can be identified as one of them, having had a sustained influence on the young Hovelsen. With some of his own generation he was connected by solid comradeship. All the more testing when some of them were singled out, to be driven away to execution. Scenes of the final farewell under these conditions have deeply etched themselves into the memory of the survivors. Decades later, when publishing his book, Hovelsen would describe it like this: "…(I decided on the spot) when I saw Olav's face on that last evening never to deny or to betray". It is worth noting that such testing moments have not forged a tough hero, but an insightful, warm-hearted person. Maybe the following words of his help to shed some light on this: "(The ability) to stick to this promise (over the years has shown that it) was not a question of success or failure, but one of grace and commitment… Olav and his friends have become like part of my heart beat."

The following piece is very central to Hovelsen's life; therefore it is best conveyed in his own words, drawn from a speech[2] he gave in Switzerland at a commemoration of 50 years of the end of World War II:

"One of my friends from the Resistance had betrayed me. He had been misled to collaborate with the Gestapo. I was kept in solitary confinement for several months.

After some weeks of gruelling interrogations, the Gestapo officer in charge told me that I was on the list of those to be executed. 'But your case needs to go through the Police Court,' he added. Everything inside me screamed for life at this bitter point in time. I cried in desperation. Then I experienced that no evil, no man-made hell in the world can obstruct the love of God from reaching a human being. As I stretched out my hands to heaven in utter distress I felt God's power beyond my physical existence and my intellect. I was given an inner freedom and joy that could not be destroyed by any diabolic force. I knew the Gestapo had no power over me anymore, neither death nor the fear of execution. I was at peace with God and myself. It was as if a bridge had been built across the chasm between life and death towards eternity.

Some weeks later a senior officer of the Gestapo visited me. He was so exceedingly friendly that I could not imagine why he had come. Finally he let the cat out of the bag. He wanted to strike a deal. He suggested that it was much better to work together with them than to be executed: 'We can free you soon and you can tell us what is happening in the resistance movement.' This came so unexpectedly; I was dumbfounded. There was the person who held my fate in his hands. I felt small and powerless. Then, something broke through in me, and I heard myself saying: 'No, I cannot do this. It is against my conscience.' He looked at me, astonished: 'I don't understand you. You have been betrayed; betrayal is normal.' After a while he continued: 'If we release you today, you can go home to your parents, pick up your studies at the university and do what you like. Wouldn't that be what you want? We can guarantee that no human being will ever know that you are informing us.' Again, it came from inside my heart: 'No, I cannot do this. It is against my conscience.' He got up without a reply. At the door of the room he said: 'Think about it. I'll be back in a week. Then we can reach an agreement.'

During that week a lot of things went through my mind. I argued that my parents would understand if I accepted the offer. Would it not be more intelligent to stay alive? In my mind I was tempted to say yes. But faced with the possibility of becoming an informant I felt in my heart

1   Leif Hovelsen (2009). *Durch die Mauern – Wege zur Versöhnung*. Munich: Taschenbuch. 187 pages. ISBN 978-3-00-027271-4
2   *Caux-Information*, Nr. 5-6, 1995

that there was no other option than a clear 'No'. As I was about to take this deep resolve, something extraordinary took place. I experienced the contradiction of being truly free at the unique point of having lost everything.

But the Gestapo officer never returned."

The uncertainty and threats against prisoners continued, as did the process of their elimination. Eventually it transpired that those similarly sentenced and still held at Grini were due to be shipped to Germany, destined for the Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. At one such selection for transportation, Leif knew this was the road to a certain end. He wrote a letter of encouragement to his parents and had it smuggled out. In the hustle of being moved from place to place, four inmates, among them Leif, were not made to board the vessel with the 36 others headed for Germany. Some time later, news arrived that the vessel had hit a mine in the sea and sunk; only four survived, being saved by Swedish fishermen. This loss of colleagues hit Hovelsen very badly. He was tormented and could not understand why they had to perish while he was still alive.

3. LIBERATION AND FINDING FREEDOM

The spring of 1945 was characterised by the nervousness of the occupying forces, which influenced camp life – and eventually Nazi Germany capitulated, the event the Grini inmates had all hoped for and believed would happen one day. The days, weeks and months that followed were a mix of utter joy, jubilation and pride as well as mourning, dealing with loss and revenge.

At one point, Hovelsen and a colleague were put in charge of guarding Wehrmacht prisoners in Akershus Fortress. One day, a truck full of new prisoners wearing Luftwaffe uniforms arrived. To his great shock, Hovelsen immediately saw through the deception; they were the Gestapo commander and his guards unit of the Grini Camp, where Hovelsen had been held all that time. The superior, a British colonel, was shocked and gave Hovelsen and his colleague a free hand. So, tables turned, they gave the German officers the tough punishment drills which they, as inmates, had suffered at Grini. One of them became so worn out, he asked for water to drink. Hovelsen filled a bucket and threw the water in the man's face and shoulders. Loud, malicious cheers went up from all

his fellow countrymen who had watched the scene. This event was going to make the rounds in many subsequent conversations. One time, someone said, as if jealously: "You should have been tougher on them!" Hovelsen had become popular, kept telling that story, but he was not the happier for it.

This and all the other experiences before and after liberation were of such intensity, they were difficult to get over. Once, during a train ride, the punishment drill dealt to his former captors leapt back into his mind. It occurred to him that the battle which had given him inner freedom and victory in captivity, had now been lost and needed winning again. After much torment, he eventually accepted the tough truth that in his heart were the same seeds which he had so strongly condemned in the occupiers and their treatment of him and his fellows. He overcame his natural reserve and sought an encounter with one of the former Gestapo men whom he had never wanted to meet again; he had tortured Hovelsen. During his next guard duty he fetched him from the cell: "The evil you did to me is forgiven. I will not litigate against you… By the way, my mother asked me to tell you that she is praying for you." The man did not reply but after a while he was shaking all over. Hovelsen accompanied him back to his cell.

Many months later, he heard from the prison chaplain of Akershus Fortress. The man had been tried and condemned to death and prior to execution had asked for the Holy Communion. This news contained a dimension which Hovelsen could not cope with. It took time for him to understand what had happened, not least to himself. He had not wanted to meet his tormentor but when he did he felt liberated from bitterness and hate; he had found the grace of charity. But he was still unaware that this was going to be a very useful asset in the years to come.

His studies of history and philosophy at the university progressed well. The professor who had been such a good advisor at the Grini Camp was meanwhile promoted to Chair of the History of Ideas and hosted groups of students at his home for debates and for fellowship. Hovelsen and three other students became close friends as they searched for clarity on the meaning of life. How could alternatives to the power of weapons and repression become relevant? The arms race of the late 1930s had played out so horribly, the alternative of Moral Re-Armament[3] was worth looking into as a road from the ruins. Professor Skard suggested they look into this matter at an international conference in Caux, Switzerland.[4] In 1947, Hovelsen and his three friends were part of a bigger student delegation taking part in the

3 Initiatives of Change, its precursor movement was known as Moral Re-Armament. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_Re-Armament
4 Caux International Conference Centre, Switzerland. See www.caux.ch/.

proceedings there. It turned out to be an inspirational experience for students who had been so limited in their freedom of movement due to the war.

It should be added that the Swiss Conference was able to draw on more than ten years of intensive thought and work preceding World War II. One of the short-term concepts offered was: "Sound homes, team work in industry, a united nation". At the time, "team work in industry" served to pioneer the collective bargaining policies between workers and employers organisations, an aspect that was to be relevant in Hovelsen's future activities.

Upon returning to Norway after the conference, they started developing student activities and they received visitors from other parts of Europe. Then, on a family outing into the mountains, it occurred to Hovelsen that he should free himself from his studies to go to Germany and assist in trust-building initiatives as part of the reconstruction effort. This idea was an enormous challenge, both to himself and to his family, as he was the first generation to have made it to university. The idea of joining a movement in Germany had come up through a study trip to London, but Hovelsen had reacted with caution. Now, the idea came back to him with force and eventually he understood the deep meaning, seeing it in the perspective of having been spared whilst some of his friends had lost their lives. In spite of critical remarks, like "wasting his time on the Germans" or "betraying Norwegian interests" he took up this special assignment.

4. WITH COAL MINERS, STEELWORKERS

A similar understanding had prompted some of the regional post-war leaders of North Rhine-Westphalia to invite the teams, which Hovelsen then joined.

At that time, 60% of Germany's industrial capacity was in this relatively small area. Half a million miners produced the annual hundred million tons of coal from pits going as deep as 1000 metres. From the furnaces came 20-30 million tons of steel, and the largest river port of Europe lay adjacent to these enterprises, which ran all day and night in three shifts. The struggle in the hearts and minds of de-

cision-makers was also of some magnitude. All of that was to become home to Hovelsen for several years. His studies and the events in his life gave him many opportunities for open, honest encounters.

At the many meetings and international exchange visits there were theatre productions as well as printed materials with which to interact. One of these plays was "The Forgotten Factor" by Alan Thornhill,[5] a drama that aptly featured the human dimension of the industrial Ruhr area. Groups of people from the industries would be sent to the same international conferences that Hovelsen and his friends knew in Caux, Switzerland.

One of the Marxist-minded workers' council leaders returned home from there, saying: "I have sung the 'The Internationale'[6] most of my life, but there I saw it lived out for the first time." Over the years, a change in the industrial negotiation climate occurred. The end no longer justified all means. Instead "what is right, not who is right" became a working hypothesis.

It should be added that under the Western Allied Command, checks and balances had been brought into economic policy, which foresaw places for workers' representatives on boards of larger companies, what later became well known as the *Mitbestimmung* (co-determination). Initially it had been introduced as a safeguard against possible reactionary tendencies, but it proved to be a key to the post-war economic recovery of Western Germany. Hence the relevance of the time invested by Hovelsen, his friends Jens-Jonathan, Aage, Geoffrey and many, many others.

It is worth remembering here that the macro-level of European cooperation began with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which, in the words of French Prime Minister Robert Schuman, would henceforth "make war not only unthinkable, but materially impossible".[7] Thus, the approach of "sound homes, team work in industry…" which developed in the Ruhr Area was considered by analysts to ultimately constitute one of the basic elements of the Schuman Plan. Edward Luttwak[8] later stated: "They (the Caux conferences and Moral Re-armament [MRA] programmes) did not invent the Schuman Plan, but facilitated its realisation from the start. That is no small achievement in view of the vast importance …"

5   Rev Alan Thornhill. http://www.uk.iofc.org/node/38728.
6   The Internationale: Anthem of international socialism, originally written at the time of the Paris Commune in 1871.
7   European Coal and Steel Community: Robert Schuman's proposal of 9 May 1950, founding of the means of gathering the European nations into a peace-enhancing union. Source: http://schuman. info/
8   Edward Luttwak in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds.) (1994), *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, page 55. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-510280-0.

5. THE POWER OF EVIL

Hovelsen's talent for action seemed paired with that of reflection and analysis. In the full swing of post-war reconstruction work, he realised that promoting an alternative to the ideologies of Nazism and of Communism had its own inherent risk; that of a sense of superiority and with it of stagnation. Marx, Darwin, Freud and belief in progress had been influential in his studies. But these had not grasped the true nature of Evil. In the 1950s he met a Danish editor who told him about the efforts of the founder of the MRA movement, Dr Frank Buchman, to try to influence and change some Nazi leaders before the war. A meeting had taken place with SS leader Himmler at which the Danish editor was present. He told Hovelsen how depressed Buchman had been afterwards, remarking to the editor: "It is too late. The Demonical has already taken power." This had been his own clear perception when he was in solitary cell B24. How could this take-over have happened? Briefly put, it would begin with small and then bigger compromises until, under certain circumstances, one passed the point of no return. He shuddered to think what might have become of him if he had agreed to collaborate. Reflections like these led him to treasure the tenets of Christian belief; redemption had become an experience.

Other events, like the breakout of the Cold War left him puzzled and wondering.

Hovelsen had come to realise that for insights, which help to go forward in life, there was a price to pay, often born out of pain, and then somewhere along the way unexpected openings would bring visible progress. With time he learned to trust, or rather wait for, that mysterious Unexpected.

6. CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

With the rapid economic recovery of Western Germany came the negotiations of post-war reparation payments to victims of formerly occupied countries. The relations between the different capitals of Western Europe in mid-1958 had become weighed down with this issue. This was also the case between Oslo and Bonn. The media were venting discontent. Hovelsen took time to analyse the reparation issue, returning from Germany having been notified of the wish of the Federal Government to make progress on it.[9] Busy with other work he arranged to meet his Prime Minister Gerhardsen, asking him how he saw the issue and presenting him with nine points he had elaborated. Gerhardsen wanted to make headway on the reparations issue, expressing the idea that starting to negotiate and settling with smaller states like Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands might help to overcome the deadlock. They agreed that Hovelsen would sound out Bonn about this idea.

Hovelsen again met the minister in charge in Bonn who, after consultations, was glad to inform him that the Federal Chancellor warmly welcomed Gerhardsen's idea. It meant that the intended method for obtaining reparation from the Federal Republic – a single channel for all claims planned by the Allied Countries – needed to be modified. This modification was eventually initiated by Norway. To cut the story short, Norway was able to sign a Reparations Treaty on 7 August 1959. Denmark did the same with Bonn on 24 August. The Netherlands followed a bit later, on 8 April 1960, because it also included resolving a territorial issue. In Oslo some criticised the deal as being insufficient. Gerhardsen replied that it was a "favourable settlement". Much later, Hovelsen had the opportunity to plough through the Foreign Ministry reparation files and discovered that the 'one channel for all claims' method would have left Norway with half the reparation amount; so, Gerhardsen had been right and the settlement was indeed favourable.

The funds had come from a Bonn budget section, whose minister had visited Oslo in May of the same year – just before the crisis, and then too Hovelsen had worked hard to help arrange a dignified welcome to Oslo. That may well have been another thread in the tapestry of the Reparations Treaty. Essentially, Prime Minister Gerhardsen and Hovelsen were of the same view: the payments were obviously important to avoid continued hardship to victims and/or their dependants, but one should not lose sight of the core issue of the Reparations Treaties, that of restoring relations. This could not be achieved in a one-for-all-channel approach. Also, they had a clear perception of the need of the young Federal Republic to take steps to regain the confidence of each of its neighbouring countries. Such understanding was the totally unexpected fruit of the recent painful and trying years; they had both been inmates of the Grini Concentration Camp.

In the following years Hovelsen would repeatedly find himself in situations of support and guidance to leaders of his country and of Germany to overcome the pain of the past and to rebuild relationships. In 1970, this culminated

9   Leif Hovelsen (2009). *Durch die Mauern – Wege zur Versöhnung*. Munich: Taschenbuch. 187 pages. ISBN 978-3-00-027271-4

in Hovelsen preparing the German Federal President Heinemann's state visit to Norway, where King Olav V himself made personal moves to organise a dignified and constructive event.

While preparing the Heinemann state visit, Hovelsen was granted time for an exclusive press interview with the President, as a means to enlighten public opinion at home. Just before the interview, he felt impelled to forget the usual list of questions and instead tell the President of the life journey that had led him to be what he was and do what he did. He also offered his own view of the situation and the personalities that the President would meet in Oslo: a very unusual thing to do. The President in turn told him of the troubles he had had resisting the Nazi powers and of his wish to help open a new chapter in bilateral relations. Afterwards, Hovelsen got feedback from the presidential Press Secretary, who conveyed personal thanks and appreciation from his chief. The Press Secretary added: "The personal angle is precisely what the President appreciated, this happens so rarely: diplomats who come to see him tend to say things that are already known to us in most cases." It should be added that Hovelsen did get an article written prior to the state visit and discovered with pleasure that the main Norwegian news agency had distributed it to the media without any substantial changes.

7. BREAKING THE WALLS

The experience of tyranny in his youth had given Hovelsen a sharpened outlook. However, dictatorships were not eradicated with the end of World War II. Other such regimes continued to exist. Those who lived under these regimes and believed in and worked for freedom and human rights would find a natural friend in him. So they shared their lives with Hovelsen and discussed lessons to be drawn from events in the hope of making things better. Over the years he became friends with Yugoslav leader Milovan Djilas, a comrade of Tito, author of "The New Class" who was deposed and jailed. Other friendships with those who had suffered included Vladimir Maximov, Sergej Kovaliov and many others. Hovelsen was also actively involved in the nomination of Russian Scientist Andrej Sacharov[10] for the Nobel Peace Prize. He, Sacharov and his wife Jelena Bonner remained close to each other for years to come.

Although mutual friends had repeatedly suggested that he meet Alexander Solzhenitsyn, it actually never hap-

pened. But Hovelsen launched a campaign when he discovered that the Geneva and New York UN Headquarters had banned the sale of Solzhenitsyn's books on their premises. He was outraged at the infringement on freedom of speech in the very places that had launched the universal declaration of Human Rights. Together with friends working in the media and diplomats he succeeded in lifting the ban although it was never disclosed who had initiated it.

The sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, is known to have dared to challenge Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev publicly to his face. He had this to say: "When I met Leif Hovelsen, we became friends immediately. We realised that the most important thing in this life is human dignity and that our belief in this is independent of our achievements or of merit; it is a commandment from above and forms the foundation of our walk on this earth." It should be added that when Soviet leader Khrushchev died, his family asked Neizvestny to create the family tomb stone. Another of his sculptures is depicted on the cover of the Norwegian and German editions of Hovelsen's book, in fact inspiring its title: "Through the Walls – Ways to Reconciliation".

8. FINAL REMARKS

Section 6 lends itself to a much more detailed description. Also, further exploration could follow, such as to what extent supporting international developments of the kind would be replicable and under which set of conditions. Nevertheless, the most important characteristic of Hovelsen's work is his focus on building honest, trustworthy relations with people. His effort on public issues that needed solutions was blessed with success because of the prevailing personal trust. And inherent to the story is that the relationships had not been developed as a means to an end. It is worth noting here that this genuine people-centred approach took some courage on Hovelsen's part, and at times represented a challenge to depart from the moulds of convention. Undoubtedly, this part of the activities described is what was later termed Track Two or Multitrack Diplomacy, the subject which Joseph V. Montville first wrote about in 1981.

In this pioneer narrative we have traced the journey of an individual as it interacted with some decisive events of 20th century Europe. This interaction did not unfold as a previously prepared plan but as a wholehearted response to challenges as they occurred. This shows us some aspects of conscience-based decision-making in the context of personal and societal responsibility.

---

10 *Andrei Sakharov and Human Rights* (2010). Council of Europe Publishing. 170 pages. ISBN 978-92-871-6947-1

Recommended citation

About the author

Christoph Beat Spreng
c.spreng@caux.ch

Christoph Beat Spreng is a Council Member of Caux-Initiatives of Change, Switzerland. He was Programme Coordinator for the Caux International Conference Centre for ten years. For five years he has represented Initiatives of Change-International at the INGO Conference of the Council of Europe and serves as Special Advisor for Intercultural Dialogue. Originally a mechanical engineer, NGO activities have led him to work on industrial relations, minority issues, post-conflict situations and in the media.

PROFILE

Olympafrica International Foundation

Alassane Thierno Diack

The day after he was elected Head of the IOC, President Juan Antonio Samaranch wondered whether the Olympic Movement should get involved in assisting developing countries through their youth policies. He conceived the Olympafrica Programme, devised and implemented by the Senegalese architect Ibrahima Mbaye.

PRESENTATION – GOALS OF THE PROGRAMME

Olympafrica is a programme of social development through sport, implemented through the construction of centres intended for spreading the Olympic spirit and mass education, mainly focused on sport in economical, local sports facilities.

Centres are self-managed by local populations and have facilities for sporting, cultural, economic and educational activities.

The intended targets of Olympafrica Programme can be summed up in the four following components:

- First, set up economic, though operational and attractive, makeshift sport and socio-educational mini-complexes to encourage young people to return to and stay where they belong;
- second, use the popular impact of sport to motivate sports fans while offering them sustainable development-oriented activities;
- third, get youth and underprivileged people involved in non-conventional self-managed educational programmes;
- and fourth, foster the advent of young talent through local activity programmes provided by Olympafrica Centres.

The first Olympafrica Centre was built in Somone, Senegal and was inaugurated in November 1988. This Centre was named after Juan Antonio Samaranch in February 1990, in presence of the IOC President and Federico Mayor, Director General of UNESCO at that time.

In September 1992, ANOCA, the Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa, adopted a resolution to form the Olympafrica Foundation, which was established on June 23, 1993 in Lausanne, under the effective chairmanship of President Samaranch. The Foundation is thus an expression of ANOCA and is an integral part of this major international institution whose President also carries out the duties and functions of the Chairman of the Foundation.

Since then, the Olympafrica International Foundation has significantly developed and stands out as the major tool of the Olympic Movement in Africa for social development through sport.

To date, centres have been opened and are operational in almost 37 African countries, a figure that will have rocketed by the end of the current four-year programme in 2012.

Alassane Thierno Diack

PARTNERSHIP – INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The Olympafrica Foundation, through various partnerships with international sports institutions, foundations and universities, is in a position to support recipient populations in the fields of sport, education, cultural and economic activities.

With the wealth of financial and technical support of the IOC, ANOCA, Daimler, International Sports Federations such as the IAAF and many other partners, the Olympafrica Foundation has been actively involved in improving the standards of living of millions of people in the continent.

Appreciable results have been obtained in various areas thanks to the commitment of the voluntary managers and instructors from the neighbouring communities, but in particular, thanks to the fertile partnerships phased in with educational institutions and local associations.

All the managers (and to a lesser extent, the instructors) of the centres are trained by the Foundation through modules, which include management of a centre, and of sports, cultural and economic programmes, knowledge of the Olympic Movement, strengthening of peace and youth supervision.

MAIN SPORTING ACTIVITIES

In addition to daily activities and self-developed projects at the centres, the foundation has financed programmes such as the Daimler Football Cup, the IBA Mbaye Fellowship, and the IAAF school-oriented programme.

These sports programmes enable a lot of talented youngsters to be discovered, who may later join sports clubs affiliated to relevant national federations.

This is how several young athletes, supervised by the Centres, have distinguished themselves in national, continental and international competitions.

SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES

With the financial position of the Foundation, it has recently had the opportunity to finance small production units that allow Olympafrica Centres to become more independent while remaining NOC property even if they are managed by local populations.

In this way, the Foundation has been able to finance music equipment, tables, chairs, and tents, agricultural programmes, a moto-cab programme and endemic disease awareness programmes, a carpentry workshop dressmaking shops, screen printing shops, and a beauty parlour.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Regarding the cooperation component, major programmes are underway, including the establishment, with the collaboration of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, of the internet site called "Palaver Tree", which will provide all youth attending the Centres the opportunity to get assistance in various areas.

Several Centres have also been provided with libraries by the Foundation of the World Tourist Organization (UNWTO) through its "Thank You Small Libraries" Programme.

The Olympafrica Foundation is also in charge throughout Africa of the Olympic Values Education Programme (OVEP) of the IOC.

Olympafrica has signed an agreement with the You First Foundation, an organisation created by Spanish basketball players which is active in various areas offering training of youths and coaches, and in providing computers.

Various contacts have been initiated to implement new sports and environmental programmes which will expand the opportunities provided to local populations. This is how new partnerships will be finalised shortly with international federations including the International Federation of Associated Wrestling Styles (FILA), the African Weightlifting Federation and the US Olympic Committee.

The Foundation has also entered into an agreement with the Keba Mbaye Foundation that grants fellowships to the best sporting students.

Further to so many agreements, there is no doubt that attendance at the centres, which is already quite noticeable as they work with several million children every year, will continue to rise in the future. The centres will play an increasing role in the improvement of the living standards of local populations.

## Recommended citation

About the author

Alassane Thierno Diack
Executive Director

The International Olympafrica Foundation
Rte de Ngor, Immeuble CBAO 2-Etage
BP 22519 - Dakar Ponty
Senegal
Tel. +221 33 8201296
Email: olympaf@orange. sn
website: www.olympafrica. net

BOOK REVIEW

Who Benefits from Global Violence and War: Uncovering a Destructive System

Andreu Solà i Martín

Marc Pilisuk with Jennifer
Archord Rountree

Abstract

This book uncovers the root causes of violence in the modern world. It was completed in the fifth year of the United States military intervention in Iraq. Pilisuk describes the connections between the corporate world and the political elite in the United States, who shape foreign policy and plan military interventions.

Keywords

violence, war, United States, power, multinationals, neoliberalism

---

This book uncovers the root causes of violence in the modern world. Reading is recommended not only to scholars but any individual interested in knowing the extent to which modern warfare is still promoted by powerful interest groups in pursuance of lucrative goals. Its main contribution to the literature is to expose connections between the global economy and the triggers for violence against civilians who are often often exploited in production systems in developing countries or directly harmed by resource conflicts. This book was completed in the fifth year of the United States military intervention in Iraq. Pilisuk describes the connections between the corporate world and the political elite in the United States, who shape foreign policy and plan military interventions. Pilisuk's work is structured around two main themes. Firstly, the author goes through some of the major conflicts in which the US has recently been involved (Chapters 1 to 4). Secondly, he explores the modalities through which networks of power profit from the maintenance of a violent system (Chapters 4 to 8).

Chapter 1, "The Costs of Modern War", focuses on the human consequences of military actions. Soldiers, including thousands of children, suffer post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Despite the high percentage of allegedly precision weapons used in conflicts such as Iraq, modern warfare inflicts mainly civilian casualties. Pilisuk argues that the United States uses its military pre-eminence to protect corporate prerogatives; the United States is responsible for almost half the weapons sold worldwide, mainly to developing countries.

Chapter 2, "Killing: War and the Minds of Men", delves into the creation of enemy images and dehumanisation as a psychological mechanism, precursors of warfare. Wartime perceptions are more likely to blur shades of gray: war tends to invoke the mythical perception of reality characterised by absolute good and evil, us and them. However, a substantial number of combat veterans bear painful scars of their combat experience. Those who make the decision to go to war tend to be an elite group of men with the self-fulfilling vocation to exercise divine power to subjugate the weak and women in order to satisfy their deeply entrenched macho ideals.

Chapter 3, "The Hidden Structure of Violence", unveils cases of structural violence in the global economy. These include oppressive labour conditions suffered by workers, including children, in Nike factories in Indonesia during the 1990s, the manufacturing of small promotional toys based on characters from Disney Films for McDonald's Happy Meals in Vietnam as well as the spread of preventable diseases such us AIDS amongst vulnerable groups such as sex slaves in the Philippines. The United Nations estimates that there are 57 million female and child prostitutes worldwide. Global corporate growth relies on a division of labour based on each country's contribution to production. As a result, multinational corporations outsource their production facilities to countries with weak environmental and labour laws: structural violence blocks the need for human fulfilment.

Chapter 4, "People, Farmland, Water and Narcotics", explores the effects of the change in agriculture from small to corporate, plantation agriculture. Pilisuk argues that economic development does not address food security and malnutrition because of the uneven distribution of food and the inability of poor people to afford it. Six companies control cereal grain in the US and about the same number in the rest of the world. Canada, France, Australia, Argentina and the United States account for 80% of global grain export, and most nations depend upon imported food. Moreover, the green revolution has created hybrids of basic crops and the resulting monoculture places the world's harvest at risk to unknown diseases. Global multinationals such as Monsanto and Bechtel are also seeking control of world water supplies across the globe whilst grassroots resistance to privatisation of water provision has emerged in countries like Bolivia. Corporate domination of seeds and water has made small farms unprofitable and growing illegal crops has extended in conflict zones such as Colombia, Afghanistan and Burma.

Chapter 5, "Networks of Power", reveals the collaboration between government officials and the military-industrial complex as a major concentration of power. United States military and political officers move between positions in government and decision-making bodies to companies seeking contracts in the defence sector such as the Bechtel Group, the Carlyle Group and Halliburton. Corporate interests are put forward by groups with ideas and resources to influence policy and elite clubs to ensure alliances and loyalty. One example of how secret societies operate is the Bush family dynasty and their network of allies belonging to the Order of Skull and Bones. Think tanks, advisory boards and councils are involved in redefining major directions of policy: The Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission work towards benefiting corporations in the market place. The Project for the New American Century was formed in 1997 to plan American domination of global affairs. Business advocacy is articulated through influential groups such as the National Manufacturers Association and the Business Roundtable. At the international level, this network is represented by organisations such us the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In addition, Pilisuk argues that the corporate elite exercise considerable control over several stages of the United States electoral process, such as the funding of candidates through corporate sponsorship and political action committees.

Chapter 6, "RealPolitik: Strategies and Tactics for Winning", lays out the creation of enemy images for both anti-communism and the war on terror as policy strategies contrived by powerful corporate groups to boost the military-industrial complex. Pilisuk underlines that the policies undertaken reflect a planning process to secure the United States' corporate and military control of other nations by creating governments with a corporate agenda, to become client states of the US. Pressure to create governments willing to play by the rules of neoliberalism has also involved bypassing legal constraints and even overthrowing governments (US involvement in Iran and Guatemala). Other cases cited include undermining democracy in Venezuela, supporting mafia regimes in Eastern Europe, conspiring and aiding violent suppression in East Timor and pre-emptive military action in Iraq and the Middle East.

Chapter 7, "Disinformation", traces the origins of US war propaganda back to the campaign to promote United States participation in World War I through lobby groups such as the League to Enforce Peace and the Committee on Public Information. Corporations use the media to shape public opinion and advance their own interests. As a result of the mergers that have taken place since the 1980s, five media corporations now dominate the United States information industry and even have a share in over 100 joint business ventures. The power held by these media corporations results in strong bias on what passes for news. In addition, their lobby group, the powerful National Asso-

ciation of Broadcasters (NAB) presses for laws and regulations aimed at increasing corporate power. The United States government has also intensified its efforts to disseminate war propaganda through Pentagon contracts awarded to media agencies such us the Rendon and the Lincoln groups. Pilisuk also provides historical examples of media manipulation and justifications for war including a section on media complicity in spinning the war on terror.

Chapter 8, "Values and Habits that Maintain a Violent System", discusses the belief in the moral rightness of competitive individualism. The decline in job security and social benefits is viewed as a necessary consequence of the need to be competitive in a global economy. Pilisuk argues that gaining understanding of the long history of opposition to the corporate takeover of resources and communities can help to control its expansion. The evolution of the world's largest retailer Wal-Mart illustrates the shift towards a society of poor workers serving immensely wealthy corporations. The values that propelled Wal-Mart reflect the larger phenomenon of Christian fundamentalism. Surveys show a correlation between how often consumers shop at Wal-Mart and how conservative they are. Against all odds, the book concludes on a positive note: a surge of communities and grassroots activities are working towards creating a more caring society and the power of those who benefit from violence is slowly waning.

Recommended citation

About the author of the review

Andreu Solà i Martín
asolam@uoc.edu

Dr Andreu Solà-Martín has been a consultant and lecturer at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya since 2003 and is an honorary research fellow at the University of Bradford. Solà-Martin has a PhD in Conflict Resolution from the University of Bradford. He has taught courses in peace and security studies at the universities of Bradford, Birmingham and Manchester. Andreu has published monographs and articles in journals on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, mainly on Western Sahara and West Africa and has participated as a long-term observer in several EU election observation missions.

Agenda

PEACE AND COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK

Building Bridges, Networks and Expertise across Sectors

The Peace and Collaborative Development Network is a Free Professional and Academic Networking site in International Affairs, Peacebuilding and Related Fields.

This is an invitation to join the Peace and Collaborative Development Network (http://internationalpeaceandconflict.org), an online initiative to bring together organizations, professionals, academics and students working in peacebuilding, development, international affairs, social entrepreneurship and related fields.

The network fosters interaction between individuals and organizations around the world and currently has over 17,000 members and is attracting over 300,000 hits each month. The site is a terrific networking tool where members can find local and international partners and practitioners, share resources, read guides to careers, scholarships, internships, funding, and IT resources in the field, and exchange best practices. Discussion topics and personal blogs can be posted. The site also has a video section where members can access and view videos related to the field.

Becoming a member is fast, easy and free. Please, take a minute to visit and explore the network.

UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSITY

UNU Office at the United Nations, New York

Junior Professional Fellows Programme

The United Nations University Office at the United Nations, New York (UNU-ONY) recruits Junior Professional Fellows (JPFs) for two sessions each year, from August to January and February to July. The title "Junior Professional Fellow" reflects the high level of responsibility and opportunity given to those accepted into this program.

Applications deadlines:
February 1 to July 31 session: November 15
August 1 to January 31 session: May 15

For more information, please visit **www.ony.unu.edu/internships**

News Goo

New Matilda recently launched a new vodcast program, News Goo, presented by former BBC World TV newsreader, Jake Lynch.

News Goo takes a critical look at television news and current affairs: what they cover, what they don't, and why. The program's name comes from a rap by Polarity/1, which contains the line, "the more we watch, the less we know". Something we've all felt from time to time, sitting in front of a TV screen – but is it true? If so, how come? And how could it be different?

News Goo is produced by a team of experienced professionals, giving freely of their time and expertise. Like the rest of New Matilda's coverage, it depends on YOUR SUPPORT! If you would like to see further episodes of News Goo in the future, please make your donation here **http://newmatilda.com**

Jake Lynch left his former TV career to become Associate Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Sydney. He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Sydney Peace Foundation, which staged the Wikileaks event in Sydney Town Hall on Wednesday March 16th.