ARTICLE

In Search of the Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria: A Note on Administrations and their Agendas

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Abstract

Security and insecurity are two sides of the same coin which has been misrepresented in Nigeria. Thus, a representation to reflect the reality of Nigeria is needed. Security is human and structural. For the most part in Nigeria, it is about the structure, and here the influence of the military in governance and in shaping the theory and practice of security cannot be ignored. This influence was in part the function of the international enabling environments and the interpretation and domestication in countries such as Nigeria. In defining security prior to the UNDP paradigm shift in 1994, structure rather than human beings was the focus. To that extent, insecurity has prevailed in Nigeria. Insecurity affects human beings and is powered by corruption and poverty of the leadership and the followers. One such area of insecurity is setting the agenda for development. Looking at the historical trend and focusing on policies since 1999, the paper examines this type of insecurity. The inability of administrations to fulfil their set agendas for improving the quality of lives of Nigerians meant there was nothing to distinguish them from a military regime. This situation not only extends distrust, it enhances insecurity.

Keywords

INTRODUCTION

This paper takes a governance (Leftwich, 1993, pp. 605-624) perspective in examining agenda setting in administrations in Nigeria since the return of civilian rule in 1999. Governance as a concept is uniquely applied to developing countries, apparently buoyed by the concern of donors to the marked disparity between economic development and social policy. Leftwich argues that governance, as a concept, is not new. Western governments, and donor agencies in particular, influenced four factors in the present obsession with governance and good governance. They are the structural adjustment programme, resurgence of neo liberalism in the west, collapse of official commu-

nist regimes and the rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing countries and elsewhere (Leftwich, 1993). This fitted into the preoccupation of the west with dreaming up schemes meant to salvage the increasingly hopeless and desperate condition of the developing world. This is in sync with the definition of good governance given by one of its leading intervention agencies, the World Bank.

Underscoring this concern for Africa, where the bulk of the crisis prevailed, the Bank argued that "underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a crisis of governance" (World Bank, 1989). It defines governance as the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs. Good governance which the Bank argues is synonymous with sound development management (World Bank, 1992, p. 1)

includes some or all of the following features: an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press (World Bank, 1992, pp. 15, 60-61, 192). The approach, according to Leftwich, has been on management.

Nigeria has been lacking in most of the indexes of governance, let alone good governance, since independence. Indeed the connection that can be drawn between pursuing constitutional government and observing this governance yardstick, when measured in the last ten years of civil rule, falls short of ideal. Not only is the public service inefficient, it has been tampered with and politicised in the last ten years making it inefficient and bureaucratic; the judiciary is all but independent and in the first eight years of civil rule, it reached its lowest ebb in terms of enforcement of decisions, while the framework for enforcing contracts has been politicised; the country ranks high in corruption in the administration of public funds as demonstrated by the power, pension and oil subsidy probes and the consistent poor rating in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2012); where the absence of an independent auditor and a more corrupt legislature since 1999 facilitated the perpetration of acts of corruption that has impoverished the citizens, while the press has remained relatively free even as it pursues its own agenda.

Nigeria has consistently been in the Failed States Index (FSI) since 2005 (FSI, 2013); in the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) where the sub-national calculation of prevalence of poverty coincides with the endemically unstable North East, North West and North Central (MPI, 2013); the MPI validates the Nigerian Poverty Profiles on the prevalence of poverty in these areas (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, 2012); in the "Save the Children" survey which included Nigeria in the over 500 million children whose growth will be physically and mentally stunted in the next fifty years due to lack of sufficient food (BBC, 2012).

The indexes show that governance is worsening rather than improving in Nigeria. The tendencies of regimes to set agendas and goals for meeting the expectations of citizens for development is itself part of the corruption of the system. This enhances insecurity as it destroys the tenuous faith in the people in governance. This paper examines this type of insecurity. It conceptualises prevailing understanding of security and insecurity in the context of the military governance type. It argues from this premise that the inability of civil administrations, since 1999, to fulfil their set agendas of improving the quality of lives of Nigerians meant there was nothing to distinguish them from the defunct military regimes. The non-fulfilment of agendas such as President Obasanjo's National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), President Yar'adua's

Seven Point Agenda and the unfolding President Jonathan's Transformation Agenda is enhancing insecurity and distrust in the government.

PERSPECTIVE ON SECURITY AND INSECURITY

Security in Nigeria gained popular currency in Nigeria for three reasons. The first is the consequence of military intervention in politics. The second, and closely related to the first, is the international enabling environment including the origin of security studies, the cold war and the post-cold war worlds. The third is the prevailing insecurity that has worsened from the 1980s to the present day. Insecurity is the opposite of security and it describes the lack or absence of security. When situated in the military dominated environment of Nigeria, insecurity is seen from the context of how the soldiers, who governed Nigeria almost throughout its independence, thought of it. In this case, it raises the fundamental question of what constitutes the referent. Should it be state/regime survival? Or should it be people and their welfare?

Apart from the issue of broadening and deepening which has preoccupied scholars in security discourse (Ullman, 1983, pp. 129-53; Walt, 1991, pp. 211-39; Rothschild, 1995, pp. 53-98; Baldwin, 1997, pp. 5-29; Krause and Williams, 1997), the question of referent is also contentious. There are two main approaches in the discourse. There are the traditional and critical security approaches. The former regards the state as referent (Buzan, 1991) and the latter, human beings (UNDP, 1994; Booth, 2007; Kerr, 2010, p. 122; ANACDP, 2005). The former's focus on state and the external military dimension of security was born of the realities of European politics and the engagement of the cold war. This position continued even after the cold war ended.

The events of September 11, 2001, suggested the need for a review of the traditionalist position. This is because one of the key actors, Al-Qaida, was not a state and, more importantly, was not organised in the traditional way that states are organised. According to Booth (2005, pp. 31-32), it was not hierarchical but was organised in a cell-like fashion, and its chains of command were very different to those of the modern state. A number of points should be noted. One, there was a noticeable rise of non-state actors as a major security threat against state actors (Krahmann, 2003, pp. 5-26; Krahmann, 2005, pp. 19-34). Two, the non-state actors are mostly concentrated in the developing countries. Three, the grievances of the non-state actors are largely economic and directly related to the growing incapacitation of the state, which is the result of poor governance and increasing scrutiny of the new economic order. Four, their method of articulation essentially challenged the legitimacy and capacity of the state as most of them took up arms.

The entry of non-state actors into the fray demonstrates the restraints that the cold war imposed on the avenue of expression among aggrieved individuals, groups and communities. This is explained by the post-cold war, post 9-11 increase in the level of conflicts all over the world, but in particular developing countries. It is the growing dissatisfaction with falling standards of living and the inability of the state to provide for the growing population. Other residual areas of conflict have been issues of political, social, cultural and psychological marginalisation. Hence the focus of security should be people and internal. This is the case with Nigeria, where economic dissatisfaction is rife.

Consequently, the difference of culture, values and levels of development between the developed and developing world would naturally affect the referent of security. While the cold war was fought essentially on the economic plain, with repercussions in the military, technological, social and other realms, nationals of the leading states were catered for materially. Thus, even after the cold war ended and the concern of the developed world shifted to other platforms of security, the same cannot be said of the developing world. Here, material poverty was common while the cold war persisted and became glaring after the cold war. It is this poverty that constitutes a major source of internal disharmony for these countries. Therefore, human beings should constitute the referent in the definition of security in the Nigerian context. It is Nigerians that are imperilled and not the state, because there is no country threatening the existence of Nigeria. In other words, the definition of security is local, contextual, and historically specific.

Security is peoples' relative feeling of being secure from economic, political, social, cultural and psychological fear. Insecurity is peoples' relative feeling of the presence of economic, political, social, cultural and psychological fear. Of these forms of insecurity, the one that is most common and triggers consciousness of other forms of insecurity, is economic insecurity. Economic insecurity spawned other forms of insecurity into existence. In simple terms, economic insecurity is the absence of jobs, basic health care, accessible drinking water, education, life enhancing opportunities and creative policies that cater for short, medium and long term needs of the different cadre of the population. It is the absence of basic economic and social infrastructure that would avail citizens the opportunity to cater for their own welfare. The non-provision of these has created conditions of political, cultural and psychological exclusion detrimental to security (Booth, 2007).

This is what constitutes the governance crisis bedeviling Nigeria. The situation has come to constitute another dimension of insecurity as governments set agendas, raising people's expectations, only for them to fail to deliver. This has been common since the return to civil rule in 1999. While part of the problem was created by military rule, the hasty return to civilian rule was in part informed by the fact that the military discredited themselves, as well as the removal of the enabling international environment supportive of their intervention. Their exit was heralded by an immense campaign that equated return to civil rule with abundance for the citizens in terms of work, housing, education, infrastructure and the creation of a climate for continuous growth. Coming from an environment of deprivation, Nigerians were in a hurry for the attainment of these promises. As it turned out, successive regimes set agendas that were not attained. This increased the people's distrust and insecurity.

PUTTING AGENDA/TARGET SETTING IN PERSPECTIVE

Governments and institutions set targets and agendas as programmes they intend to carry out within the duration of their tenure. As a policy, it is aimed at guiding their conduct as well as improving the lots of the government or institution in question. It is also an attempt to leave lasting legacies. Thus it is not uncommon to read or hear mission statements at the beginning of a term of office. Indeed, annual budget statements are an example of this course of action. However, while budgets state what organisations and governments will accomplish in any financial year, setting agendas or targets adheres to a long-term plan of action that could span four or five years. Thus the long-term objectives guide the phased execution of the agenda or targets set. In recent times, setting agenda or targets has become a common phenomenon. There are two types of agenda or targets and they include those set by international organisations and intergovernmental organisations, especially the UN system, which individual countries key into, and those set by national governments usually at the commencement of new administrations.

In settings where politics is a vocation rather than expediency, it is important to set an agenda that could be accomplished in short, medium and long-term periods. Indeed, while it is not always the case that the targets will be met, it keeps the administration focused on the overall mission statement. As we noted above, the issue of governance is an important preoccupation in the relations between the developed and the developing world. This has been the case since the end of the cold war. It is commonly used in the relations between developed and developing countries as it determines the kind of assistance to be rendered to the latter. The assumption is that the developed world has a governance system that is responsive to the needs of the people while the latter is lacking. The nature of this relation also informed the decision by international organizations, beginning with the United Nations system, to set agendas and targets to be met at certain periods in the evolution of humanity.

It is from this consideration that the year 2000 was set aside to meeting different ambitious targets. Thus, we have had "health for all by the year 2000", "housing for all by the year 2000", "education for all by the year 2000", "literacy for all by the year 2000" and "water for all by the year 2000." The idea is not to say that these goals must be met by the year 2000 but it would ginger respective governments into making proactive attempts at reaching these goals. Among these are the Millennium Development Goals, which seeks to halve poverty by the year 2015, and Universal Basic Education to take basic literacy skills to all. The magic year 2000 passed without the fanfare that heralded its coming. In other words, it did not achieve results worth celebrating. Will the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) differ?

Different regimes in Nigeria have had cause to appropriate international targets and agendas to suit their needs, but also to perpetuate themselves in power and corruptly appropriate resources. Thus, we have had different regimes setting goals for the country by certain years while building their tenure and performance into those years. One prominent goal is the Nigeria Vision 20: 2020 which seeks to make Nigeria one of the top twenty economies in the world by the year 2020 (National Planning Commission, 2009). This apparent localization of universal ideas and ideals chimed with the globalization process. For the delinquent leadership in Nigeria, it has provided an escape route for poor performance and corruption. The magic year 2000, Universal Basic Education, the Millennium Development Goals and the anti corruption campaigns are instances of international agendas with local components.

THE MAGIC YEAR 2000

The year 2000 came and went and the only magic about it is that it did not accomplish anything. Influenced as it now appears by the world's rich states and the United Nations, many of the ills that are peculiarly third world were slated for elimination "by the year 2000". Even before the year 2000 came, the different powers connected with the project had started beating a hasty retreat, as little emphasis was placed on attaining these objectives. Sloganeering about the year started receding in the late 1980s, and by the beginning of the 1990s, it was replaced by new emergencies such as making the world safe for democracy, redrawing the map of the world following the fall of the Berlin Wall, pursuing human rights, environment and trade, and above all checking the threats from Islamic fundamentalism. It would appear the goals of year 2000 were a sop sold to the world's poor to check tendencies towards embracing communism.

As a sop, the implication became glaring following the collapse of the Asian Tiger economies which, thinking along this line, were sustained by a heavy dose of subsidies and privileged trading concessions. It was meant to keep them from going 'red' and to demonstrate to the rest of the world the viability of free enterprise. When eventually the threat from communism was removed, the various concessions were lifted and the full impact of the system was unleashed, resulting in the Asian flu.

There were an awful lot of goals to be attained by the magic year. They included health, water, sanitation, food, housing and education for all areas. These are areas in which the developing world is deficient and which the developed world can take for granted. Take the case of health for all as an example. With the gory statistics about the scourge of HIV/AIDS and the poor performance at curtailing malaria, how realisable would the call have been if it had not been hurriedly de-emphasized, considering the conspiracy of multinational drug corporations with huge investment in malaria. The developing world was taken for a ride and the promoters got away with it. The reasoning indicated by developments was that, if we cannot attain all these objectives by the "year 2000", we can at least speak for ourselves "in the next millennium." That is what transpired in the trade talks in Seattle in 1999.

When the Uruguay Round trade talk concluded in 1994 and over one hundred and twenty six countries initialled their signatures to the document in Marrakesh to create the World Trade Organisation (WTO), it was described by a watcher as a victory for the developed world. Most governments from developing countries, especially Africa, appended their signatures and later ratified it without understanding the implication. Apart from India, where there were isolated protests from farmers, nothing of the kind happened in sub-Saharan Africa. The most potent weapon used in checking the radicalism of the developing world and whipping them into shape was the threat of withholding development aid.

The 'Seattle intransigence' showed the way to what the developing world, with their numerical strength, can accomplish when united in a cause. The test of strength came over who should be the director of the new organisation. The developed world preferred Mike Moore while the developing world opted for Supachai Panitch Pakdi. The deadlock was broken when a compromise was reached with the two sharing the terms. Apparently buoyed by this development, the third world was firm in the Seattle trade talk. The group deplored, in strong terms, the politicisation of the talks, particularly the linking of social and environmental issues to the trade talks. A proposal from the United States that issues such as child labour be linked to trade irked the world's poor and resulted in the criticism of the proposal as an attempt to give the world's rich an edge over the poorer members. The year 2000 passed without the attainment of any of the objectives, at least not in Nigeria. Perhaps it was this realisation that informed the new Millennium Development Goals, which like the magic year 2000 is intent on halving poverty by the year 2015.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 2015

The failure of the year 2000 (Sachs, 2005, p. 213) launched the MDG, apparently to take over from the failed magic year. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals, to be achieved by 2015, that respond to the world's main development challenges. The MDGs are drawn from the actions and targets contained in the Millennium Declaration that was adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of state and governments during the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 (Sachs, 2005, p. 210). A cursory look at the goals demonstrates that they did not differ from the ones set out to be achieved by the magic year. Nor do they differ from the concerns of the developing world. The attainment of these goals relies overwhelmingly on the contribution of the world's rich nations, who have to contend with their own challenges.

In 2001, in response to the world leaders' request, the UN Secretary General presented the Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, an integrated and comprehensive overview of the situation, outlining potential strategies for action designed to meet the goals and commitments of the MDGs. The road map has been followed up since then with annual reports. In 2002, the annual report focused on progress made in the prevention of armed conflict and the treatment and prevention of diseases, including HIV/AIDS and malaria. In 2003, emphasis was placed on strategies for sustainable development. In 2004, it was on bridging the digital divide and curbing transnational crime. In 2005, the Secretary General prepared the first comprehensive five-year report on progress toward achieving the MDGs. The report reviews the implementation of decisions taken at international conferences and special sessions on the least developed countries, progress on HIV/AIDS and financing for development and sustainable development.

The outline reflected the intention of the UN while on the ground in different African states. While countries such as Rwanda are upbeat about meeting the targets of the MDGs, the case does not apply to Nigeria. Indeed, what we find happening here is the ability of the government to appropriate objectives such as the MDGs to fulfil its desire to perpetuate itself in power. The notion of visions that is commonplace among regime types in Nigeria derives from the global agenda-setting in the relation between the north and the south. In the annals of Nigerian politics we have had agendas whose intention was to accord occupants of the 'Villa' the chance to stay in power indefinitely, while insulating their non-performance in the lengthy gestation period of their programme. Among the prominent ones are the Visions 2010 and 2020. The latter reflected the long-term intention of the progenitor of the programme while domestically it was the Seven-Point Agenda. Some states in the federation keyed into the agenda-setting of the federal government, including those of Kaduna and Nasarawa.

HIGHLIGHTS OF AGENDAS OF PRESIDENTS OBASANJO, YAR'ADUA AND JONATHAN

Most Nigerian leaders since 1999 did not consciously prepare for the challenges of leadership and hence did not conceptualise, let alone articulate, any programme they intend or intended to implement. The programme they became identified with was hurriedly put together and therefore lacked vision and commitment. Olusegun Obasanjo was released from prison to become president while he, in his dying moments, supported Umar Musa Yar'adua and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan as president and vice president respectively. These three characters maybe did not envisage leading the country when circumstances thrust responsibility on them.

Nigerians had high hopes of the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo, largely because they thought he had seen it all at both ends of life's spectrum, considering the circumstances of his emergence and the enormous goodwill he garnered in the course of his travails. In retrospect, Nigerians were disappointed that Obasanjo was not the man to redeem the country. Drafted into the presidency without an agenda at the initial stage, Chief Obasanjo subsequently set targets for himself, which became documents for his administration's policies. They included the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) and, prominently, his plan to increase power generation to 10,000 megawatts by the year 2007. As a national emergency, legislation was drawn up and resources were appropriated to accomplish this objective.

When he relinquished power in 2007, Nigerians were told that over $16 billion had been expended without any electricity generated. This revelation came about with the inauguration of the Sixth Legislature by President Yar'adua and their institution of probes into and hearings on affairs of the previous government. Of importance here was the power sector probe chaired by Honourable Godwin Ndudi Elumelu. Considering the centrality of electricity to development, Nigerians were keen to learn why the Independent Power Project had failed to deliver the 10,000 megawatts of electricity by 2007, after gulping over $16 billion. The amount was allegedly sunk into the power sector between 1999 and 2007. The public hearing captured the attention of Nigerians as sordid revelations emanated of payments to contractors for jobs not done and supplies not delivered, over-invoicing, sites purportedly hosting projects without projects and subversion of due process in the name of fast

tracking completion without any results. The committee identified the perpetrators and recommended their investigation by appropriate agencies for economic sabotage to the country. According to its report, "former President Olusegun Obasanjo should be called to account for the recklessness in the power sector during his tenure. The committee recommends that EFCC and the ICPC should investigate him" (Ajiboye 2012).

The call to investigate and prosecute the dramatis personae including President Obasanjo was clear. According to an analyst, former President Obasanjo felt like a wounded lion, he bided his time but first, the Elumelu report had to be killed (Elombah, 2009). The initiative first came from the House of Representatives. What transpired there began with spirited attacks on the report by members and escalated to the creation of the Tambuwal seven-man committee indicative of the arsenal deployed to destroy the report. Secondly, Nigerians watched as the committee chairman and some of its members became the subject of investigation allegedly for corruptly enriching themselves by the sum of over five billio Nigerian Naira from the Rural Electrification Agency contracts. In the end, Chairman Elumelu was literally begging for his life while Nigerian attention was diverted from the report.

Former President Obasanjo used his vast resources to ensure nothing came out of the report under President Yar'adua or his successor, President Jonathan. Since it was the former president who handpicked his successors, the late President Yar'adua also inaugurated his administration with the Seven-Point Agenda, namely Critical Infrastructure, Niger Delta, Food Security, Human Capital, Land Tenure Changes and Home Ownership, National Security & Intelligence and Wealth Creation (Yakubu, 2007, pp. iii-xiv). Accordingly, the Seven-Point Agenda was described as "the driving force of this administration's policies and programme" and was "perhaps the most important framework for policy implementation" (Yakubu, 2007).

Of this policy framework, the late President's administration was only able to record success in the Niger Delta, where his predecessor's disposition to using force to resolve the faceoff with militants was changed to dialogue in the amnesty programme. The question of the provision of critical infrastructure, considered by most Nigerians as the most fundamental challenge in growth of the economy was not realised. This was the case with other objectives such as food security, human capital, home ownership, national security, intelligence and wealth creation. In fact, the President's health challenge became a national security priority issue that other aspects of his administration suffered.

President Jonathan is implementing the Transformation Agenda policy framework of his administration, which runs from 2011 to 2015. That there was a planned agenda became evident in the course of his campaign and was articulated after his election to office. According to an analyst, the President refrained from making specific pledges and only spoke about his intention to change the ways things were done and give the country a new sense of direction. Thus the lack of specifics left the transformation agenda abstract in the minds of many Nigerians (Usigbe, 2012). It was indicative of the argument that Nigerian leaders were never prepared for the task of giving the country a sense of direction.

In blaming the development and growth of Nigerian economy and the non-commensurate improvement in the welfare of citizens on the absence of "long term perspective, and lack of continuity, consistency and commitment to agreed policies", the administration was not only contradictory but it shot itself in the foot because it jettisoned the previous administration's policy document, which by all reckoning did not differ from its own. This stance questions its "avowed intention to correct these flaws". This is because an examination of the contents and inspiration for the Transformation Agenda showed that most was contained in the Seven-Point Agenda and drew its inspiration from the Vision 20: 2020. The Agenda has the following areas of priority: macroeconomic framework and economic direction, job creation, public expenditure management, governance, justice and judiciary, foreign policy and economic diplomacy, legislature, education, health sector, labour and productivity, infrastructure policies, programmes and projects, power, information and communication technology, Niger Delta and transportation (Usigbe, 2012, pp. 2-8).

While it is too early to comment on the success of the policy framework, its implementation by the different institutions of government leaves much to be desired. For instance, the area of governance, and in particular addressing corruption by existing institutions, leaves a sour taste in the mouth of many Nigerians and consistently questions the commitment of the administration to break with the past. The oil subsidy and pension fund probe, and before it the power sector probe, are all examples of unresolved areas. The inability to tackle corruption as a development challenge has continuously enmeshed Nigerians in poverty, insecurity and attendant social vices. Neither are Nigerians noticing any marked improvement in infrastructure such as transportation and power generation. Projects like the Abuja-Lokoja road, a vital road artery connecting north and south which began in the Obasanjo administration, has remained uncompleted with its attendant insecurity. The inability to complete this road demonstrates the lack of political will in tackling corruption. Significantly, it is a pointer to what lies in store for Nigerians in terms of implementing the full complement of the Transformation Agenda. The travails of power generation are no different.

The development challenge confronting Nigeria is not a national responsibility alone. It cuts across states and local governments. Resolving this challenge calls for a coordinated approach from all levels of governments.

This is lacking. While setting agendas and goals defined administrations at the national level, states and local governments key into these goals as policy statements without necessarily believing in them. For instance, it is not uncommon to hear governments at the lower levels committing themselves to the Transformation Agenda of the present national government. Beyond this commitment, there is nothing happening to demonstrate this. When the late President was at the helm, there were many versions of his Seven-Point Agenda, such as Governor Sambo's 11-Point Agenda in Kaduna State and Governor Doma's 13-Point Agenda for Nasarawa State. In the case of Nasarawa State, there was nothing to show for the ill-fated four years of Governor Aliyu Akwe Doma, except stealing public funds. Embedded in these agendas are insecurity and the dwindling faith of Nigerians.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY

One of the major problems confronting Nigeria since independence is the lack of leadership and strong institutions. Over fifty years after attaining independence, the country, in spite of its human and material endowment, is lacking in all critical infrastructures and has been governed on an ad-hoc basis without the benefit of planning. The lack of infrastructure has resulted in the collapse of initiatives in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy. The lion's share of responsibility for this state of affairs lies with past military dictatorships. In the last ten years of civil rule, nearly one thousand companies have closed their doors (Agboola, 2009, p. 42) and education, which should be the bedrock of whatever vision the leadership has for its people, has collapsed with teachers incessantly taking strike action over poor funding and welfare. The reason behind the closure of the companies was "unstable power supply". This is in spite of the over $16 billion sunk into the sector by the Obasanjo administration alone, and the equally huge resources committed to it by the late President Yar'adua and the present administration. Nigerians are not only insecure, they are distrustful of promises, as the dividends of democracy such as jobs, avenues for self-empowerment and improved living standards are not manifest.

Secondly, Nigerians are losing faith in the leadership, which in most cases they did not elect. The ruling Peoples' Democratic Party lacks internal democracy, resulting in the imposition of unpopular candidates on the people. While the scale of malpractice in the 2011 election was unlike the 2007 election, it was a process fraught with many irregularities. After ten years of democracy, the purported promise imbued in this governance type has visited hardship on the people. Policies such as reforming the electoral system and declaring an emergency on the power sector petered out, and can conveniently be blamed on the former

President's health problem. So did his determination to implement the Seven-Point Agenda and building the foundation for making Nigeria one of the twenty top economies in the year 2020. All these left Nigerian people disenchanted.

Thirdly, the continuing insecurity in the country is indicative of the dissatisfaction with development following the return to civil rule. The difference between military rule and democracy is the freedom of expression in the latter. In the former, there was little room for expression. Setting agendas is now a convenient way to postpone the salvation of Nigerians to distant dates. These agendas become, for those who have the means and can access them, an opportunity to build fences against growing poverty. These are just a few people while the majority have learned to survive outside the state and have no loyalty whatsoever to it (FSI, 2013). The spate of violence in the country reflects not only the catharsis the leadership inertia and ineptitude provided the people, but also an expression of a failing state The country is not only manifest in the twelve indices on the Failed State Index, it has maintained consistency in the total scores since 2005 (FSI 2013). The increasing reliance on coercive resources of the state in order to legitimise its rule chimed with the narrow definition of security as regime safety. This is because, in failing to enhance economic security which would guarantee legitimacy for the regime in the eyes of the people, the government is compelled to rely on state security to protect itself from its people.

Fourthly, a large swathe of the country's institutions has been turned into private fiefs for individuals and groups affiliated to them. The situation leaves many who cannot access them excluded and alienated. Institutions such as the Federal Character Commission (FCC) cannot ensure compliance with federal character in other institutions, while the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) have demonstrated their inability to tackle corruption. All administrations since 1999 have committed themselves, in their agendas, to tackling corruption and the poverty it spawned. It is reasonable to admit that they have demonstrated a great lack of political will to tackle corruption and poverty. This scenario permeates other sectors of government and society. In the process, they have destroyed the faith of Nigerians in their administration.

CONCLUSION

When governments repeatedly fail to deliver on their promises to the people, it leaves a wide communication gap between the government and the people. This creates insecurity. Persistence in the non-fulfilment and implementation of policies contravene the social contract between the government and the people. The last ten years of civil rule are replete with failed promises and agendas that have not been delivered. This affects governance.

In view of the often unprepared leadership Nigeria has been experiencing, it is advisable to reduce the expectation of the people by not devising grand schemes that will not see the light of the day. Considering that the leaders have been produced by one political party since 1999 at the national level, insisting on the continuity of policies may dissuade the need for 'fresh' policy thrust at the commencement of a new administration. However, until there is the political will to tackle corruption and other development challenges confronting Nigeria, administrations will keep churning out unrealizable agendas as a way of keeping citizens at bay, while insecurity and dwindling faith in government will be on the increase. ■

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